OSA/319/2021 of R.KALPANA Vs L.GANESAN on 7 October 2026

Judgment

(Judgment of the Court was made by N.Sathish Kumar J.) Aggrieved over the dismissal of the suit filed for delivery of vacant possession of the entire suit property, the present original side appeal has been filed by the appellants / plaintiffs.

2. The parties herein are referred to as per their rankings before the trial court.

3. The following brief facts of this case is necessary for disposal of this appeal:

3.1. The suit properties are originally purchased by the senior grand paternal uncle of the plaintiffs, namely C.K.Duraisamy, in the court auction on 19.12.1933. The said C.K.Duraisamy had executed a Will dated 27.03.1938 appointing the Official Trustee as the Executor of his estate and to hold the income of the estate of his nephew Ramachandran, who is the son of

C.K.Thiruvenkatasamy, the brother of C.K.Duraisamy, for life and thereafter, for the children of Ramachandran equally. The said Will was the subject matter of probate proceedings in T.O.S.No.4 of 1939 and the Will was probated. Later, one Krishnasamy, brother of said C.K.Duraisamy filed a suit in C.S.No.3 of 1940 against Ramachandran and Karumbatha and the said suit was originally dismissed. Later on appeal in O.S.A.No.69 of 1942, the matter has been remanded before the trial court. On remand, all the parties entered into a compromise and the compromise terms were set out in the memo of compromise dated 04.02.1943. The Compromise decree was passed on 05.02.1943, wherein C.K.Krishnaswamy and his wife Logambal were given life estate in respect of the suit property and vested remainder to the sons born to them with the condition that the properties shall be reverted back to the estate of C.K.Duraisamy Mudaliar if C.K.Krishnasamy and his wife did not beget any male issues. After the death of Krishnasamy, his wife Logambal filed an application to set aside the compromise decree. The said application was dismissed by the court on 10.09.1954 and the appeal against the said order in O.S.A.No.98 of 1955 was also dismissed.

3.2. Later, the daughter of Logambal, namely Nallatchi also filed a suit in C.S.No.196 of 1972 for declaration that she is also entitled to maintenance and entitled to joint possession of various items of movable and immovable properties along with Official Trustee. The said suit was dismissed by this court by a judgment and decree dated 28.07.1975 and the appeal filed against the said decree and judgment, namely O.S.A.No.22 of 1976 was also dismissed by judgment dated 15.12.1976. Hence, it is the contention of the plaintiffs that as Logambal was given only the life interest and she died only on 24.12.1994, the other defendants have no right to continue in the suit properties. After the death of Logambal, the properties shall be reverted back to the plaintiffs as per the compromise decree, but the defendants were in possession of the properties even after the death of Logambal. Any sale executed by the second defendant or the first defendant is not binding on the plaintiffs. Hence, the suit has been filed for recovery of possession within 12 years from the demise of Logambal.

3.3. It is the case of the defendants together that the properties originally belonged to one C.K.Duraisamy Mudaliar. The said C.K.Duraisamy Mudaliar executed the Will in respect of the joint family property and the property handed over to the Official Trustee, who was managing the estate. C.K.Duraisamy Mudaliar is one of the two sons of Karumbata Mudaliar. Karumbata Mudaliar had three sons and they are : C.K.Duraisamy Mudaliar, C.K.Krishnasamy Mudaliar and C.K.Thiruvengadasamy Mudaliar. C.K.Krishnasamy Mudaliar filed a suit in C.S.No.3 of 1940 against the official trustee claiming half share in the properties including the suit property of the deceased C.K.Duraisamy Mudaliar. In the compromise decree passed in C.S.No.3 of 1940, the suit property was allotted to C.K.Krishnasamy Mudaliar and his wife Logambal providing life estate and after the death of C.K.Krishnasamy Mudaliar and Logambal, the suit property was directed to be taken absolutely by the son or sons born to them with the sole intention of providing the suit property by way of allotment to the family of C.K.Krishnasamy Mudaliar and his wife. Similar allotment of the property bearing door nos.6 and 7 in Kandappa Achari Street, Purasawakkam, Chennai was made in favour of Karumbata Mudaliar to enjoy the life interest and after his lifetime to be taken by his male issues absolutely. The first son of the deceased Thiruvengadasamy Mudaliar, namely Ramachandran, father of the plaintiffs was provided life estate in the said property and after the life time of said Ramachandran, the property was directed to be taken by his male children. While making such allotment of the suit property to C.K.Krishnasamy Mudaliar and his wife and the property bearing door nos.6 and 7 in Kandappa Achari Street, Purasawakkam, Chennai to Karumbata Mudaliar and Ramachandran, it was mentioned in clauses 2 and 4 of the compromise decree that the properties shall be reverted back to the estate of C.K.Duraisamy Mudaliar in the absence of the life estate holder having male children.

3.4. It is further contended that as per the compromise decree dated 05.02.1943, the suit property was provided to C.K.Krishnasamy Mudaliar to enjoy the life interest and subsequently after his death, by his wife C.K.Logambal to enjoy the life interest. C.K.Krishnasamy Mudaliar died in the year 1943 and on his death, C.K.Logambal became entitled to the suit property and was in possession and enjoyment of the property from 23.07.1943 in view of her pre existing right to claim maintenance and on the date of coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, C.K.Logambal was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property as such life interest holder and became entitled to the absolute rights on account of enlargement of her life interest under section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Hence, it is the contention that from the date of the Hindu Succession Act coming into force, the said Logambal became the absolute owner and her life interest was enlarged absolutely as per section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. The said Logambal, as absolute owner, had executed a mortgage deed on 19.01.1979 in favour of one P.Vembuli Chetty and sold a portion to the second defendant on 21.10.1983 and another portion was sold to third defendant on 05.12.1984. The plaintiffs have sent notice on 15.07.1985 after the death of Ramachandran being the plaintiffs’ father and the reply notice was sent by the defendants indicating that Logambal’s limited right was enlarged to an absolute right as per the Act. Hence, it is their main contention that the suit is barred by limitation and the defendants became absolute owners of the suit properties.

3.5. Based on the abovesaid pleadings, the following issues were framed by the learned single Judge: ‘i.Whether the suit schedule property belonged absolutely to C.K.Dhuraisamy by virtue of his purchase under a Court auction or it belonged to the joint family? ii.Whether after the advent of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the life estate conferred under the compromise decree in C.S.No.3 of 1940 upon C.K.Logambal Ammal enlarged under

Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, in recognition of her pre-existing right to maintenance? iii.Whether the sales effected by C.K.Logambal Ammal are valid and binding? iv.Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to recovery of possession without seeking relief of declaration? v.Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim damages for use and occupation? vi.Whether defendants 2 and 3 are bona-fide purchasers for valuable consideration of the portion purchased by them?

(vii) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? And viii.Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any relief?’

3.6. On the side of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.P.1 to P.15 were marked. On the side of the defendants, D.W.1 was examined and Exs.D.1 and D.2 were marked. On the basis of the evidence and materials, the learned Single Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that Logambal’s limited estate was enlarged into her absolute right and that the suit is also barred by limitation. Challenging the same, the present appeal is filed.

4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the suit property originally purchased by C.K.Duraisamy in the court auction under Ex.P.1, dated 19.12.1933. Later the said Duraisamy executed Ex.P.2 Will dated 27.03.1938 appointing the official trustee as executor of his estate and to hold the income of the estate in trust for Ramachandran, who is the son of Thiruvengadasamy. The executant Duraisamy died on 29.12.1938. The said

Will was probated. Later, the a brother of the testator, namely Krishnasamy filed a suit in C.S.No.3 of 1940 inter-alia contending that the subject matter of the Will are the joint family properties. Though the suit was originally dismissed, later on appeal the said Krishnasamy had given up his claim of fraud and undue influence. Therefore, the matter has been once again remanded to the trial court. In the trial court, a compromise decree was entered into between the parties, wherein Krishnasamy and his wife Logambal were given only life estate and thereafter the vested remainder to the male legal heirs and in the absence of male issues, the properties shall revert back to the estate of Duraisamy. Later, the husband of Logambal, namely Krishasamy died on 19.07.1943 leaving behind his wife Logambal and daughter Nallatchi. Logambal during her life time has filed an application challenging the compromise decree in A.No.756 of 1953. The said application was dismissed and the appeal filed against the same was also dismissed. Thereafter, the daughter of said Logambal had filed a suit in C.S.No.196 of 1972 claiming maintenance and other reliefs. The said suit, after contest, was dismissed. In the said suit, it has been clearly held that the properties shall revert back to the estate of C.K.Duraisamy Mudaliar and the legatees under the Will are entitled to as per the Will.

5. The learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the compromise terms entered between the parties makes it clear that Logambal and her husband were given only life estate and further, it is made clear that the vested remainder shall be to the male children and in the absence of any male children, the properties shall be reverted back to the estate of Duraisamy. Further, the recital of the compromise makes it clear that the said Logambal and her husband shall have no right to raise any loan on their life estate or otherwise encumber their interest in the said property. Further, the clauses in the compromise terms makes it clear that the terms of the said memorandum of consent were beneficial to defendants 2 and 3 in the said suit who were then minors. Hence, the learned counsel would submit that when Logambal herself has filed an application and later challenged the compromise decree, it is not her case that the life interest was given to her in lieu of the pre-existing right to maintenance. Therefore, it is his contention that when Logambal has even challenged the very compromise decree and has not asserted that she had any pre-existing right in the properties purchased by C.K.Duraisamy, now her daughter and transferee from Logambal cannot take a different view as if Logambal had pre-existing right claiming maintenance over the property. Further, the learned counsel would submit that the learned single judge has relied on the provisions of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act to hold that the suit should have been filed within 12 years. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the limitation for recovery of the suit property will be reckoned only from the date of the death of the life estate holder and the suit has been filed within 12 years and hence, the learned counsel submitted that the suit is very much maintainable.

6. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel has relied on the following decisions:

(i) V.Tulasamma and others Vs. Sesha Reddy reported in (1977) 3 SCC 99;

(ii) Ranvir Dewan Vs. Rashmi Khanna reported in (2018) 12 SCC 1;

(iii) Bijoy Gopal Mukerji Vs. Krishna Mahishi Debi reported in 1907 SCC OnLine PC 1;

(iv) Minor C.R.Ramaswami Ayyangar Vs. C.S.Rangachariar reported in Vol.51 L.W. 11;

(v) Gopalakrishna Vs. Narayanagowda reported in (2019) 4 SCC 592;

(vi) Sadhu Singh Vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike and others reported in (2006) 8 SCC 75.

7. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents / defendants submitted that though the property was originally purchased in the court auction by C.K.Duraisamy, according to him, it is a joint family property. Therefore, one of the brothers of Duraisamy filed a suit in C.S.No.3 of 1940 and in the said suit, a compromise decree was passed on 05.02.1943. Though Logambal, wife of Krishnasamy was not a party to the suit, she was given life interest considering the fact that she has pre-existing right of maintenance. Only in that context, the life interest was given not only to her husband, but also to

Logambal. Hence, according to the learned counsel, as per the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, she can hold the property and hence, after the death of her husband Krishnasamy on 19.07.1943, she became entitled to her husband’s share and she was in possession of the property from the date of compromise decree. Hence, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, since her limited estate was enlarged to her absolutely by virtue of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the learned Single Judge was right in dismissing the suit. Further, even in the year 1985, there were exchange of notices, wherein the sale by Logambal in favour of second and third defendants were already known to plaintiffs. Further, the suit has been filed beyond the period of 12 years and hence, the suit itself is barred by limitation. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel relied on the following decisions:

(i) V.Tulasamma and others Vs. Sesha Reddy reported in (1977) 3 SCC 99;

(ii) Jupudy Pardha Sarathy Vs. Pentapati Rama Krishna and others reported in (2016) 2 SCC 56; and

(iii) C.Masilamani Mudaliar Vs. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil reported in (1996) 8 SCC 525.

8. In the light of the above submissions, now the point that arises for consideration in this appeal are as follows:

(a) Whether the life estate given to one Logambal in C.S.No.3 of 1940 enlarged as the absolute estate by virtue of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956?

(b) Whether the suit itself is barred by limitation? Points (a) and (b):

9. The suit property was originally purchased by one C.K.Duraisamy by virtue of Ex.P.1, dated 19.12.1933 in the court auction. Duraisamy had also executed a Will appointing the Official Trustee as executor for administering the estate and to hold the income of estate to Ramachandran for life and thereafter, to divide the corpus of estate among children of said Ramachandran as per Ex.P.2 Will, which was also probated in T.O.S.No.4 of 1939 by judgment dated 29.11.1939. Later one Krishnasamy, brother of the testator Duraisamy, filed a suit in C.S.No.3 of 1940 seeking declaration of the properties which was disposed of by said Doraisamy, are actually joint family properties and that he had half share in the same. The Official Trustee as well as the life estate holder Ramachandran were made parties to the said suit. Though the suit was originally dismissed and in appeal, he had given up the plea of fraud and undue influence, etc., Therefore, the suit was remanded back to the trial court and at that stage, a compromise was entered into between the parties and a compromise decree came to be passed on 05.02.1943 under Ex.P.3. Though the suit has been filed for declaration to declare the various documents executed by the plaintiff in favour of Duraisamy Mudaliar are sham and nominal on the ground that the same was obtained by fraud and undue influence, this ground was given up in the appeal, be that as it may. The compromise itself is for the benefit of minor defendants 2 and 3 and to the estate represented by the Official Trustee, granting leave to the guardian-ad-litem of minor defendants 2 and 3 to enter into the said compromise on their behalf. The terms of the said compromise between the parties and the decree are as follows: ‘1.That the Official Trustee, Madras do from and out of the estate of C.K.Dhuraisamy Mudhaliar in his hands pay to (a)C.K.Krishnaswamy Mudaliar, the Plaintiff herein a sum of Rupees four thousand five hundred only (Rs.4,500/-) for the purpose of discharging his debts; (b)Mr.T.A.Vijiaraghavachari, Advocate for the plaintiff a sum of Rupees Three thousand five hundred only (Rs.3,500/-) in complete and full settlement of his claim for fees under the agreement with the plaintiff and

(c) Provide for Logambal the plaintiff’s wife and Nallachi her minor daughter jewels at a cost of Rupees two thousand only (Rs.2,000/-)

2. That the said plaintiff and his wife Logambal Ammal shall have only a life estate in premises No.16, Venkatachallam Street, Purasawalkam, Madras and the said property shall vest absolutely in any son or sons born to them and in the absence of any son the said property shall revert to the estate of C.K.Dhuraisamy Mudhaliar.

3. That plaintiff or his wife shall have no right to raise any loan on their life estate or otherwise encumber their interest in the said property;

4. That Karumbatha, defendant 2 herein and the first son of the deceased Thiruvengadaswamy Mudhaliar shall have a life estate without power of alienation in premises Nos.6 and 7, Kandappachari Street, Purasawalkam, Madras and after his life time the said property shall vest in his male children absolutely and that in the absence of any male child the property shall revert to the estate of C.K.Dhuraisamy Mudhaliar, and

5. That the Official Trustee, Madras do from and out of the estate of the said C.K.Dhuraisamy Mudhaliarr pay to (a)Mr.N.Srinivasa Iyengar, Advocate for the guardian-ad-liten for defendants 2 & 3 a further sum of Rupees seven hundred and fifty only (Rs.750/-) as and for this fees and (b)retain and pay himself his costs of this suit when taxed and noted in the margin hereof.’

10. The above terms of the compromise makes it very clear that parties ultimately intended that the property shall revert to the estate of Dhuraisamy Mudaliar and it shall be dealt with as per the Will. The plaintiff and his wife were given only life estate and further there was specific prohibition in the compromise decree for dealing with the property by way of alienation or create any encumbrance over the property by life estate holder. Therefore, it is not the case that the life estate has been given to the husband and the wife only in view of any pre-existing right of Logambal to claim maintenance. The very plaint filed by her husband clearly shows that he had challenged certain registered documents already executed by him in favour of his brother C.K.Dhuraisamy on the ground that the same were obtained by undue influence and fraud. Later,

that ground was also given up by him in the appeal and thereafter, the matter has been remanded and the compromise has been entered into. If really her husband had any right over the property, he would not have accepted the mere life estate alone. Therefore, Logambal being the wife of the plaintiff in the suit, at the most though she was not a party, was given only life estate.

11. Further, the very intention of the parties in the compromise decree makes it very clear that the intention of the parties is to preserve the property by giving life estate only, thereafter the properties shall be reverted back to the estate of Duraisamy Mudaliar in the absence of the life estate holder having male children. It is relevant to note that Logambal was not a party to the suit. She was given only the life estate along with her husband with specific restriction that she will not have any right either to raise any loan on the life estate or to encumber their interest in the said property. It is also relevant to note that the husband of Logambal died on 19.07.1943. After his death, Logambal has filed an application in A.No.756 of 1953 which was marked as Ex.P.4, wherein she has sought to file a suit in forma pauperis to cancel the compromise decree Ex.P.3. In the application, she has alleged that the compromise decree is mala fide and not binding on her or her daughter even though the suit was instituted by her husband and the compromise was brought about by her husband. According to her, the benefits obtained by her husband under the compromise decree are low. Therefore, she wanted to challenge the same. However, the said application was dismissed by the Master holding that the said

C.K.Duraisamy became absolute owner of the properties obtained under the partition and release deeds and when he died in the year 1938 leaving behind his Will, in respect of which Probate was obtained in the year 1939 in T.O.S.No.4 of 1939 by the Official Trustee, who was in possession and management of the suit properties since then.

12. Challenging the dismissal of the application, she has filed an appeal in OSA No.98 of 1955 and the appeal was also dismissed. Later, while Logambal was alive, her daughter Nallatchi filed a suit in O.S.No.196 of 1972 for declaration that she has along been in joint possession of the estate along with her father. She has further alleged in the said suit that certain documents were signed by her father without being aware of the actual contents and later she has also assailed the compromise. Though she has not challenged the compromise but she sought maintenance at the rate of Rs.250/- per month and various other reliefs. The suit was contested and several issues were framed. In the said suit, her mother was also made as 6th defendant. The mother of the plaintiff has also filed an application in A.No.2759 of 1970 claiming maintenance which was dismissed on 25.02.1971. These are all clearly recorded in the judgment Ex.P.5 in C.S.No.196 of 1972. It was held that Duraisamy had full testamentary capacity to dispose of by will the properties and businesses which he had obtained on division of the family as and towards his share and particularly in issue no.6, a finding has been recorded as follows:

'Under the terms of the Will, defendants 4 and 5, on the death of Ramachandran, will take the properties absolutely on 02-09-1967, they having become absolute owners there cannot be maintenance as against their estate. Hence, this issue is answered against the plaintiff.’ The appeal in O.S.A.No.22 of 1976 filed against the said judgment was also dismissed. In the light of the above background, now when the present suit has been filed for recovery of possession on the basis of the original Will of C.K.Duraisamy, it is the contention of the defendants that the life interest given to Logambal has become absolute interest in view of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

13. In this context, it is relevant to quote section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which reads as follows: '14.Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.--(1)Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.-- In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after the marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.

(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.'

14. Admittedly, though the life estate was given to Logambal and her husband, her husband died long back and Logambal died only on 24.12.1994. Further, there is no dispute with regard to the position of law in Tulasamma case and much emphasis has been made to the judgment in Tulasamma case in paragraph 20 which reads as follows: '20. Thus on a careful consideration and detailed analysis of the authorities mentioned above and the Shastric Hindu law on the subject, the following propositions emerge with respect to the incidents and characteristics of a Hindu woman's right to maintenance: “(1) that a Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow;

(2) though the widow's right to maintenance is not a right, to property but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in property i.e. it is a jus ad rem not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court;

(3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment and is of such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser has notice of the widow's right to maintenance, the purchaser is legally bound to provide for her maintenance;

(4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing right which existed in the Hindu law long before the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946, and is, therefore, a pre-existing right;

(5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a sort of co-owner in the property of her husband, though her co-ownership is of a subordinate nature; and

(6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person who succeeds to the property or purchases the same is in a position to make due arrangements for her maintenance.”' On a careful perusal of the above proposition makes it clear that a Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property and if the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property. The fact remains in this case is that Logambal's husband also was given only life interest. Such being the position, it cannot be said that she has acquired absolute interest by virtue of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act.

15. It is relevant to note that it is not the case of said Logambal during her life time that the life interest under Ex.P.3 compromise decree was given only in lieu of maintenance. Whereas she has challenged various documents executed by her husband and she has challenged the compromise decree on various other grounds. It is not the case of Logambal that she acquired such life interest only in lieu of maintenance. Therefore, when a women in whose favour life interest was given under the compromise decree for herself and when it is not asserted that her right was given only in lieu of maintenance, now her successor cannot take a different stand in different proceedings. It is further to be noted that the daughter of Logambal, namely Nallatchi filed a suit as stated above, wherein also in issue no.6, it has been clearly held that the property shall be reverted back to the estate of the testator Duraisamy Mudaliar and those findings have already reached finality. Therefore, after the death of Logambal, the so-called transferee from the said Logambal cannot take the stand as if the life interest was given to Logambal only in lieu of the maintenance. Reliance was placed on another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jupudy Pardha Sarathy case, wherein Hon'ble Supreme court has held in paragraphs 14 and 15 as follows: ‘14. It is well settled that under the Hindu Law, the husband has got a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he is possessed of properties then his wife is entitled to a right to be maintained out of such properties. It is equally well settled that the claim of the Hindu widow to be maintained is not a mere formality which is to be exercised as a matter of concession, grace or gratis but is a valuable, spiritual and moral right. From the judicial pronouncements, the right of a widow to be maintained, although does not create a charge on the property of her husband but certainly the widow can enforce her right by moving the

court and for passing a decree for maintenance by creating a charge.

15. The Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946 was enacted giving statutory recognition of such right and, therefore, there can be no doubt that the right to maintenance is a pre-existing right. ‘

16. Absolutely, there is no dispute with regard to the above settled position of law, but the fact remains that her husband did not have any right over the property and he was given only life interest and Logambal was never made a party in the suit and the very intention of the parties in the compromise decree clearly shows that the property should be reverted back to the estate of Duraisamy Mudaliar. Further challenge made by Logambal against the compromise decree failed. Later her daughter also filed the suit, but failed and in the suit, the specific issue was also framed with regard to the testator's right as to how the property will be reverted back to the estate. As already stated, in issue no.6, it has been clearly held that the property shall revert back to the estate of the Duraisamy Mudaliar. Such being the position, Logambal did not have any right whatsoever claiming any maintenance from the estate of Duraisamy Mudaliar, since it was held to be a separate property. Further, during the proceedings, Logambal also claimed maintenance and filed a separate application and the said application was also dismissed. Therefore, the right of claiming maintenance from the property has also been decided and negatived and particularly, Logambal in whose favour life interest was given has not even asserted that such right has flown to her since she has pre-existing right to claim maintenance over the property. Whereas she has challenged the transfers effected by her husband on the ground that the same was obtained by fraud by the elder brother. That apart, it is not her case that the life estate was given only for recognising her pre-existing right of maintenance. Since the matter had already decided, her successor cannot take a different stand. Further the earlier decisions, namely Exs.P.4 and P.5 have reached finality and also binding on the legal representatives. Therefore, the defendants cannot take a contrary view as the life interest was reserved for the first time by way of the decree in compromise. Therefore, we are of the view that sub-clause (2) of section 14 alone will apply in this case. Hence, the learned single Judge's interpretation that section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 will come to the aid of the defendants cannot be sustained in the eye of law.

17. The learned Single Judge has also non suited the plaintiffs on the ground of limitation. According to the defendants, during the life time of Logambal, two portions have been sold individually to defendants 2 and 3. Even in the year 1985, when the legal notice was issued, they asserted the absolute right of Logambal. As per Ex.P.2 Will, the estate shall revert back to the beneficiary. The plaintiffs are the children of legatee under the Will of Duraisamy Mudaliar, namely Ramachandran, who died in the year 1967 leaving behind his wife and two minor daughters. The life interest holder, namely Logambal, died only in the year 1994. Therefore, only after her death, the reversioners are entitled to recover the property within a period of limitation and for seeking possession of the property from the alienees, the suit should be brought within 12 years from the date of the life estate holder. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gopalakrishna Vs. Narayanagowda reported in (2019) 4 SCC 592 and in paragraphs 41, 42, 44 to 46, it was held as follows: ‘41. Taking up the second question, we notice the following commentary of Mulla on Hindu Law: “207. Reversioner's suit for possession and limitation.—A suit by reversioners, entitled to succeed to the estate on the death of a widow or other limited heir, for possession of immovable property from an alienee from her must be brought within 12 years from her death (the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Schedule I, Article 141), and of movable property, within six years from that date. Now see Articles 65, 109 and 113 of the new Limitation Act, 1963. The reversioner may sue for possession without suing to have alienation set aside. The reason is that he is entitled to treat the unauthorised alienation as a nullity without the intervention of any court.”

42. The learned counsel for the respondents has placed considerable reliance on the judgment of this Court in Kalipada Chakraborti v. Palani Bala Devi [Kalipada Chakraborti v. Palani Bala Devi, (1953) 1 SCC 13 : AIR 1953 SC 125] . Therein, this Court dealt with transfer of Shebeiti right by Hindu widow and the suit by reversioners challenging the same. This Court held as follows : (AIR pp. 129-30, paras 14-15)

“14. … But all doubts on this point were set at rest by the decision of the Privy Council itself in Jaggo Bai v. Utsava Lal [Jaggo Bai v. Utsava Lal, 1929 SCC OnLine PC 35 : (1928-29) 56 IA 267] and the law can now be taken to be perfectly well settled that except where a decree has been obtained fairly and properly and without fraud and collusion against the Hindu female heir in respect to a property held by her as a limited owner, the cause of action for a suit to be instituted by a reversioner to recover such property either against an alienee from the female heir or a trespasser who held adversely to her accrues only on the death of the female heir. This principle, which has been recognised in the Law of Limitation in this country ever since 1871, seems to us to be quite in accordance with the acknowledged principles of Hindu law. The right of reversionary heirs is in the nature of spes successionis, and as the reversioners do not trace their title through or from the widow, it would be manifestly unjust if they are to lose their rights simply because the widow has suffered the property to be destroyed by the adverse possession of a stranger. The contention raised by Mr Ghose as regards the general principle to be applied in such cases cannot, therefore, be regarded as sound.

15. … Ordinarily there are two limitations upon a widow's estate. In the first place, her rights of alienation are restricted and in the second place, after her death the property goes not to her heirs but to the heirs of the last male owner.” (emphasis supplied)

44. It is next relevant to notice Section 28 of the Limitation Act: “28. Extinguishment of right to property.—At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.” In other words, while it was open to the reversioners to ignore an alienation made by a Hindu widow and the period of limitation would not start to run upon a transfer effected by the Hindu widow, undoubtedly, the period of limitation for filing a suit for recovery of possession would commence upon the death of the widow.

45. The property was alienated by Seethamma, the widow of Ramanna in favour of her brother Shrinivas Rao in the year 1913. Undoubtedly, it was open to the reversioner to proceed on the basis that such alienation does not bind her.

46. Thereafter, in 1938, Seethamma passed away. Even proceeding on the basis that Jankamma, the granddaughter of Ramanna was a reversioner, her estate in expectancy became vested in her, upon the death of Ramanna's widow, Seethamma in 1938. While it is true that it was open to the reversioner to ignore the sale deed executed by the widow, as not binding on her, as far as suit for recovery of possession, the law clearly provided for a period of 12 years and the period of limitation started with the death of the limited owner, namely, the widow in 1938. The time started ticking with the passing away of the widow in 1938. The period of limitation being 12 years, it ran out in 1950. With the running out of the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1908 (by Articles 140 and 141), the very right of the alleged reversioner Jankamma also came to an end. Thus, when she executed the sale in the year 1955 in favour of the appellants, she could not have conveyed any right. That apart, even for a moment, proceeding on the basis that period of limitation would start from 12 years from 1955 when the sale deed was executed in favour of the appellants by Jankamma even that period ran out in 1967. Admittedly, the suits were filed several years even after 1967. ‘

18. Further, in Sadhu Singh Vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike reported in (2006) 8 SCC 75, in paragraphs 21 and 23, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: ‘21. Thus understood, it has necessarily to be held, as was held by the first appellate court, that Isher Kaur was not competent to gift away the properties in favour of the Gurdwara as she had done. Even if the gift were to be treated as valid, the donee thereunder cannot resist the claim for eviction by the legatees under the will, the nephews of Ralla Singh, on the cessation of the life estate of Isher Kaur. Admittedly, that life estate has ceased and once it is found that the plaintiff has acquired a title to the property as a legatee under the will, he would be entitled for and on behalf of himself and his brother to recover possession of the property from the Gurdwara in view of the death of Isher Kaur. 23…... The defendant Gurdwara is a donee from Isher Kaur and its title would depend on the title Isher Kaur had. Obviously, Isher Kaur could not confer a larger title than she herself had. On a true construction of the will we have found that Isher Kaur had only a life estate in the properties. Hence, the gift executed by her cannot survive the cessation of the life estate or stand in the way of the ultimate beneficiary recovering possession on the strength of the bequest in his favour on the coming to an end of the intervening life estate. ‘

19. Admittedly, legatee had only life interest and she had no better right of title to transfer the property. In such view of the matter, merely on the basis of some transfers effected by her, the respondents now cannot resist delivery of possession and the right to sue accrues on the death of the life estate holder and she died only in the year 1994 and that the suit has been filed within a period of twelve years for recovery of possession and such being the position, merely because the life estate holder, who have no absolute title over the property has sold the property, such alienation need not be binding on the plaintiffs. Accordingly, both the points are answered.

20. The decree and judgment of the learned single judge, dated 24.11.2020 in C.S.No.400 of 2007 are set aside. The suit filed by the appellants herein is decreed as prayed for. Accordingly, this Original Side Appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. (N.S.K.,J.) (G.K.M.,J.) 07-10-2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes VVK

N.SATHISH KUMAR J. AND GK.MUTHUKUMAAR J. VVK OSA No. 319 of 2021 AND CMP NO. 18789 OF 2021 07-10-2026