WP/35513/2023 of R.VENKATACHALAM Vs THE ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE on 29 September 2026

ORDER

This Writ Petition has been filed seeking issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records pertaining to the impugned order of dismissal from service passed by the third respondent in his proceedings dated 06.09.2022, and confirmed by the second respondent vide order dated 26.09.2023 and by the fourth respondent vide order dated 29.08.2025, and quash the same and consequently direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential service and monetary benefits.

2. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner joined the service as a Sub-Inspector of Police in the year 2008. It is the further submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that, while he was in service, an FIR was registered against him in Crime No.291 of 2018 under Sections 366 and 506(i) of the IPC and another FIR in Crime No.565 of 2018 under Sections 420, 509 and 506(i) of the IPC and Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, It is also his contention that he was placed under suspension on 22.06.2018 and, thereafter, a charge memorandum was issued against him on 18.09.2019 in PR No.35 of 2019. It is also his submission that, on identical charges and relying upon the same set of evidence, criminal proceedings were also initiated, which ultimately ended in acquittal on 12.05.2023 and 03.03.2023 in S.C.No.28 of 2023 and C.C.No.14 of 2019, respectively.

2.1. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that, despite his request to defer the disciplinary proceedings on account of the pendency of the criminal prosecution, the respondent authority did not defer the same and proceeded with the enquiry in the absence of the petitioner and ultimately ex parte found him guilty. Therefore, it is the specific submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that, having been acquitted of the criminal charges, and in view of the fact that no fair opportunity was given to the petitioner to effectively defend his case, the petitioner seeks interference with the punishment of dismissal, which was subsequently confirmed by the Appellate Authority as well as the Head of the Department. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan and Others, reported in (2024) 1 SCC 175.

3. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate would contend that the petitioner was involved in serious offences of kidnapping of an unmarried woman and cheating her brother for securing Government job. He would further submit that the charge memorandum was issued on 18.09.2019 and, thereafter, summons were issued to the petitioner on various dates. Despite receipt of the summons, the petitioner did not think it fit to defend the case and left the matter unattended. If the impugned order is interfered with on the ground of his non- appearance, it would amount to putting a premium on the default committed by the petitioner. The learned Government Advocate would submit that the petitioner cannot take advantage of the order of acquittal passed by the Criminal Court, since the standard of proof before the Criminal Court is proof beyond reasonable doubt, whereas, in disciplinary proceedings, the standard of proof is only that of preponderance of probabilities. The learned Government Advocate would further submit that, considering the gravity of the offences, the punishment of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner is proportionate. Therefore, he would contend that there are no grounds to interfere with the impugned order.

4. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made on either side and perused the materials available on record.

5. It is not in dispute that, subsequent to the registration of two criminal cases at Anthiyur Police Station, viz., Crime No.291 of 2018 under Sections 366 and 506(i) of the IPC, and Crime No.565 of 2018 under Sections 420, 506(i) and 509 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, the same were subsequently taken on file as S.C.No.28 of 2023 and C.C.No.14 of 2019, respectively, and, in both the cases, the petitioner was acquitted of all the charges.

6. On a perusal of the charges in the disciplinary proceedings, it is seen that they are more or less similar to the charges levelled against the petitioner in the criminal prosecution. According to the charge memorandum issued to the petitioner, the first charge is that he had cheated one Veluchamy by representing that he could secure a Government job for his son and received a sum of Rs.5 lakhs. The second charge is that he kidnapped an unmarried girl, with an intention to prevent her marriage, circulated the intimate photographs taken with her through WhatsApp and Facebook. The third charge is a consequential charge of causing disrepute to the disciplined force.

7. Admittedly, all the witnesses relied upon by the Management, namely, Veluchamy, the victim and other official witnesses, had supported the charges before the Enquiry Officer. The defence put forth by the petitioner is that, on account of the pendency of the criminal prosecution, the disciplinary proceedings ought to have been deferred. However, it is well-settled principle of law that merely because a criminal prosecution is pending, it is not always necessary to defer the departmental proceedings, unless the delinquent establishes before the authority as to how the continuation of the departmental proceedings would prejudice his defence in the criminal prosecution. It is also well settled principle of law that deferment of disciplinary proceedings on account of the pendency of a criminal prosecution is not a universal rule. The same has to be considered having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.

8. In the present case, though the charges appear to be similar, it is relevant to mention that, immediately after registration of the criminal cases, all the witnesses were examined in the disciplinary proceedings, namely, on 06.04.2019 and 13.04.2019. All the witnesses, in unison voice, supported the charges. Admittedly, the petitioner was given opportunities to defend his case on 06.11.2019, 08.11.2019, 25.10.2020 and, thereafter, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there was no progress in the enquiry. Thereafter, opportunities were again afforded on 21.10.2020, 23.10.2020 and 07.12.2020. If the petitioner had any grievance with regard to the progress of the disciplinary proceedings, he ought to have taken appropriate steps to seek deferment of the disciplinary proceedings, either by filing a Writ Petition before this Court or by bringing the issue to the notice of the higher authorities. However, in the present case, he did not take any such initiative and remained a mute spectator.

9. It is relevant to mention that, according to the statement of the victim, when one of the witnesses in the disciplinary proceedings, namely, Mr.Vijayan, questioned the petitioner as to why he had circulated the photographs taken along with the victim, he had stated that, until the complaint is withdrawn, he would do the same. According to the charge, the alleged kidnapping took place on 09.06.2018, and the complaint with regard to the circulation of the photographs of the victim was lodged on 08.11.2018. When the witnesses were examined before the Enquiry Officer immediately after the occurrence, they had, in categorical terms, explained the sequence of events. On a perusal of the statements recorded before the Enquiry Officer, it is amply clear that the petitioner had allegedly continued to intimidate them to withdraw the complaint, whereas, now, the petitioner relies upon the acquittal. However, the statements given before the Criminal Court was after a considerable lapse of time, namely, during the years 2022 and 2023, long after the occurrence.

10. It is also relevant to note that the victim had deposed before the Criminal Court only after she got married. Therefore, in the circumstances of the case, the possibility of the witnesses not supporting the criminal prosecution after a considerable lapse of time, particularly after the victim got married and to protect her matrimonial life, cannot be completely ruled out. But as a matter

of fact, there is clear evidence available before the disciplinary authority in support of the charges. Therefore, in the aforesaid backdrop, this Court is of the firm view that the acquittal recorded by the Criminal Court, by itself, would not advance the case of the petitioner.

11. Though the petitioner relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Lal’s case (cited supra), the said case arose in a different factual context, wherein the charges were contested both in the disciplinary proceedings as well as before the Criminal Court. Contrarily, in the case in hand, the witnesses had turned hostile before the Criminal Court. Therefore, the aforesaid judgment is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Further, in the case in hand, the findings rendered by the disciplinary authority are based upon the evidence available on record.

12. At this juncture, it is relevant to mention that, while exercising the power of judicial review, it is the duty of this Court to examine whether the decision-making process has been undertaken in a fair and legitimate manner and whether the findings of the disciplinary authority have been rendered by ignoring any material evidence. It is also well settled that mere acquittal by a Criminal Court will not, by itself, confer upon the employee any automatic right to claim reinstatement or other service benefits. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Deputy Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthram, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598. Therefore, this Court is of the firm view that the findings rendered by the disciplinary authority are well merited and do not warrant interference.

13. Now, the point that arises for consideration is whether the continuation of the disciplinary proceedings, notwithstanding the pendency of the criminal proceedings, is justified or not.

14. As already stated, there is no universal rule with regard to conducting parallel proceedings, and the same depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Even in the present case, the petitioner has not demonstrated before this Court as to how the continuation of the disciplinary proceedings, or the manner in which the same was conducted, had prejudiced his defence in the criminal prosecution. Therefore, this Court is of the firm view that, when the witnesses had categorically deposed before the Enquiry Officer and sufficient opportunity had been afforded to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses on various dates, the non-appearance and calculated reticence of the petitioner cannot be encouraged by finding fault with the disciplinary authority.

15. Therefore, in view of the above detailed discussion, this Court is of the firm view that the findings rendered by the disciplinary authority are in accordance with law on the basis of available materials, and that the authorities have followed the principles of natural justice to the fullest extent possible. Therefore, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the impugned orders.

16. In the result, this Writ Petition is dismissed. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. No costs. 29-09-2026 Index: Yes Speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes KV To

1. The Additional Director General of Police Law and Order, Chennai.

2. The Inspector General of Police West Zone, Coimbatore.

3. The Deputy Inspector General of Police Coimbatore Range, Coimbatore District.

4. The Director General of Police, Chennai - 600 004.

C.KUMARAPPAN J. KV WP No. 35513 of 2023 29-09-2026