CMPMO/276/2015 on 30 July 2026

2026:HHC:32271 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA

CMPMO No. 276/2015

Decided on: 30.07.2026

Anil Kumar & another

…..Petitioners

Versus

Union of India & others

…Respondents ________________________________________________________________

Coram:

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Petitioner: Mr. Ashok Sood, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Rajat Rana, Advocate.

For the Respondent: Mr. Shashi Shirshoo, Central Government

Standing Counsel, for respondents No.1 to

4. Respondents No. 5, 6, 7 and 9 ex-parte.

Mr. Atul G. Sood, Advocate, for

respondent No.10(i).

None for respondents No. 11 to 15.

Romesh Verma, Judge (oral)

The instant petition arises out of order, dated 4.6.2015, as passed by the learned District Judge, Solan, whereby an application filed by the plaintiffs/petitioners for amendment of the plaint came to be dismissed.

1Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

Facts, as emerge in the present case, are that the plaintiffs/petitioners filed a suit before the learned trial court for declaration that the plaintiffs and the proforma defendant No. 5 are the owners in possession of the property/Estate known as Parsonage Estate bearing Survey No-47 including the land and building existing thereon measuring 1.03 acres situated in Kasauli, Tehsil Kasauli, District Solan since 1845, earlier in District Ambala, Punjab and resumption notice dated 26.3.1992 addressed to Hira Lal Sood, Satyawati Sud, Beli Ram Sud, Sadar Bazaar Kasauli Cantt, as conveyed to the plaintiffs vide communication dated 26.3.1992 issued by the Under Secretary Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, relating to the resumption of Parsonage Estate including a cottage known as Kasauli Independent Club Kasauli Cantt, measuring 1.03 acres is illegal, null and void and therefore, not binding upon the plaintiffs/petitioners with further decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in any manner with the peaceful and lawful possession of the plaintiffs/petitioners enforcing the notices dated 29.5.2009 and 13.8.2009 and from recovering any amount from the plaintiffs in any manner whatsoever.

The aforesaid suit has been contested by the defendants/respondents by filing written statement refuting therein all the averments as made in the plaint.

Learned trial Court framed the issues and thereafter directed the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective claims. The plaintiffs/petitioners completed their evidence and thereafter, the case was fixed for evidence of the defendants/respondents and at that stage, an application came to be filed by the plaintiffs/petitioners on 4.1.2014 for amendment of the plaint. As per averments as made in the application, it has been stated that the Union of India had been occupying the suit property as a tenant and was got vacated by the plaintiffs/petitioners by filing rent petitions under H.P. Urban Rent Control Act and further in execution thereof, possession of the suit property had been taken by the plaintiffs/petitioners and, thus the plaintiffs/petitioners claim themselves to be owners in possession of the same. It was averred that respondents/Union of India are claiming that they have a right to requisition the property because the same is being held on old grant basis. The factual and legal basis are highly disputed and emphatically denied by the plaintiffs/petitioners and the suit has been filed challenging the right to resumption and order passed for the said purpose.

It has been further averred in the application that the defendants/respondents have taken stand that there was some litigation in the year 1948-49, with regard to trees and there is finding with regard to title also. The plaintiffs/petitioners were not having exact knowledge about the earlier litigation and recently after going through record, they have come to know about said litigation i.e. civil suit no. 77 of 1948 titled as Union of India Vs. Heera Lal & another decided by Sub Judge 1st Class, Ambala. Against the judgment and decree passed in said suit on 27.06.1949 an appeal came to be preferred in the Court of Senior Sub Judge Ambala which could not find favour. The judgment and decree in said suit and then appeal, both are nullity and as such they do not affect rights, title and interests etc. of the plaintiffs/petitioners qua the suit property.

It is the case of the plaintiffs/petitioners that after transfer of the case from High Court to the Court of District Judge, Solan, they engaged a local Counsel and during discussion and consultation, the Counsel opined that in order to avoid technical complications, pleadings with regard to aforesaid judgments and decrees are necessary and amendment is required. After receiving such legal opinion the plaintiffs/petitioners have intended to amend the plaint by adding para-6 (xxviii), which reads as under:-

(xxviii) That defendant no. 1 (Dominion of India as detailed in the then plaint) filed a civil suit no. 77/1 of 1948 titled as "Dominion of India Vs. Heera Lal & another" in the Court of Ld. Sub Judge 1st Class, Ambala for declaration that Dominion of India is owner of site of survey no. 43 & 47 Kasauli Cantt. on the basis of G.G.O. 179 of 1836 and so trees growing thereupon. The predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs and proforma defendants asserted that the said property has been purchased by Sh. Diwan Chand and Sh. Kirpa Ram in a public auction and they became owners in possession and thereafter their successors. In the said suit defendant no. 1 with malafide intention so as to have undue advantage and gain suppressed true facts from the Hon'ble Court specially pertaining to the history of establishment of Kasauli Cantonment, area, nature of the properties situated therein and various administrative and official orders etc. etc. whatsoever issued about the Kasauli Cantonment which came into existence in the year 1850. Specially, fact that on the suit land houses and structures existed much prior to coming into existence of Kasauli cantonment. When the area was notified as Kasauli Cantonment even at that time the private properties were not disturbed, the ownership and possession of individual owners continued as it is. The Kasauli Cantonment was established or constituted on land measuring 587 acre and out of said area the private land owned by private individuals measured 43 acres. In Kasauli cantonment the entire land is not owned by defendant no. 1 but portion thereof is owned by individuals including the plaintiffs. Further that the G.G.O in question was applicable only applicable to the areas where Bangal Army was located or stationed and at no point of time the same was located and posted at Kasauli and as such the G.G.O. relied in said suit was not applicable to Kasauli Cantt. area. The entire record pertaining establishment of Kasuali Cantonment in the year 1850 and subsequent developments was and is with defendant no. 1 but in the above mentioned civil suit no. 77 of 1948, the defendant no. 1 intentionally suppressed these true and material facts with an ulterior motive so as to have undue advantage and illegal gain, such act on the part of defendant no. 1 amounts to fraud. Had the defendant no. 1 disclosed true history and all material facts which were within it's special knowledge and not known to others being pertaining to old records and developments i.e. approximately 100 years old record and developments, in that eventuality the judgment and decree passed in civil suit Dominion of India Vs. Heera Lal and another dated 27- 06-49 would have been otherwise and suit of defendant no. 1 would have been dismissed or the the judgment and decree dated 27-06-49 passed by Ld. Sub Judge, 1st Class, Ambala, would have been certainly quashed and set aside by Ld. Senior Sub Judge Ambala in the judgment and decree passed on 3-01-1950 by said Hon'ble Court and the decision would have been in favour of the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs. The suppression of above true and material facts by the defendant no. 1 is an act of deliberate deception with a motive to grab the property owned by the plaintiffs, the defendant no. 1 had no right to withhold true facts, vital and material documents and information from the Hon'ble Courts of law so as to gain unfair advantage and deprive ordinary citizens from their property i.e. suit property as such the above mentioned both judgments are nullity and do not effect the rights, title and interest to the plaintiffs qua the suit property. Moreover the Union of India being welfare State is morally and legally bound to protect life and property of it's citizens, any act of defendant no. 1

which deprives any citizens from his lawful rights including qua the property amounts to fraud being against the statutory provisions and also against principle of natural justice and fair play as such also the above mentioned judgments and decrees are null and void ab-initio and further deserve to be declared so. Further, moreover in the said litigation the main dispute was with regard to trees. The above mentioned judgments and decree were never got executed by the defendant no.1 and as such also the above mentioned judgment and decree have become infructuous and this facts is within the knowledge of the defendants. The defendants have been admitting the plaintiffs to be owner in possession of the suit property and such admission has been further made in the above mentioned rent petition, as such also the above mentioned judgments and decrees are null and void.

The plaintiffs/petitioners have further intended to add in 8th line of prayer clause after words in Kasauli Cantt. as under: “the judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit No. 77 of 1948, titled as Dominion of India Vs. Heera Lal" dated 27- 06-49 passed by Ld. Sub Judge 1st Class Ambala and judgment and decree in appeal titled as Heera Lal Vs. Dominion of India" dated 3-01-1950 being nullity do not cast any clout, loss or injury to the title and possession of the plaintiffs.”

The said application came to be resisted by the Union of India by filing a reply, wherein it was averred that the application is highly belated and the averments as made in the

application are afterthought. It is the case of the defendants/respondents that the facts, which are intended to be incorporated in the plaint, were very much within knowledge of the plaintiffs/petitioners, therefore, the application does not disclose any cause of action and the same deserves to be dismissed.

Learned District Judge vide order dated 4.6.2015 dismissed the application, as filed by the plaintiffs/petitioners.

Feeling dissatisfied by the order, dated 4.6.2015, the plaintiffs/petitioners have approached this Court by filing instant petition under article 227 of the Constitution of India.

It is contended by Mr. Ashok Sood, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Rajat Rana, Advocate, for the plaintiffs/petitioners that the impugned order is erroneous, contrary to provisions of law and in conflict to the provisions, as envisaged under order VI Rule 17 of CPC. He has submitted that this is a fit case, where the application for amendment of plaint ought to have been allowed as the averments as made in the application are very relevant and the same go to the root of the case for the final determination of the suit in question.

On the other hand, Mr. Shashi Shirshoo, learned Central Government Standing Counsel, has defended the impugned order. He has submitted that a well reasoned order has been passed by the learned trial court, which does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. He has further submitted that while invoking provisions of article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court will not interfere a well reasoned order.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material available on record.

In the present case, admittedly, the suit was instituted by the plaintiffs/petitioner in the year 2002 against the defendants/respondents No. 1 to 4. The original suit was preferred before this Court and thereafter on account of enhancement of the pecuniary jurisdiction, the same was remitted to the Court of learned District Judge, Solan. The plaintiffs/petitioners have sought declaration against the defendants-Union of India on the ground that they are owners in possession of the suit property and the resumption notice, dated 26.3.1992, as issued by the defendants/respondents, is illegal, null and void and is not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs/petitioners.

The suit has been contested by the defendants on various grounds and all the averments as made therein have been totally refuted.

As far as application for amendment is concerned, it is the case of the plaintiffs/petitioners that they intend to incorporate in the pleadings that the judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit No. 77 of 1948, titled as Dominion of India Vs. Heera Lal" dated 27-06-49 passed by Ld. Sub Judge 1st Class Ambala and judgment and decree in appeal titled as Heera Lal Vs. Dominion of India" dated 3-01-1950 being nullity do not cast any cloud, loss or injury to the title and possession of the plaintiffs.

Learned counsel for the defendants/respondents has referred to the pleadings as contained in the plaint, wherein in para 6 (xxvii) thereof, the plaintiffs/petitioners themselves have pleaded that they have perfected their title by way of adverse possession after passing of judgment and decree of Senior Sub Judge, of 1949 and in appeal of 1950 for continuous, uninterrupted, open and hostile to the knowledge of the defendants/respondents on expiry of period of 30 years. Para 6(xxvii) reads as follows:- That the defendants have not disputed the ownership of the plaintiffs in the property. The property has been owned and possessed by the plaintiffs and their predecessors prior to the year 12.9.1826. The predecessors of the plaintiffs purchased the property on 21.6.1927 and since then they are continuing open, hostile possession of the property and have been dealing with the same as owner. The property never vested in the Cantonment Board Kasauli under GGO No. 170 dated 12.9.1836. The claim of the defendants in that with the issuance of GGO NO. 179 dated or establishment of 12.9.1836 with the Kasauli Cantonment Board in 1850 or any time thereafter, the property comprised in Kasauli Cantonment Board more particularly property as Parsonage bearing Survey No. 47 known Estate measuring 1.03 acres have vested in defendant no. 1 to 3 is without any basis and wholly untenable. The plaintiff in alternative without prejudice to the claim of plaintiff qua suit land as submitted above, the predecessors-in-interest plaintiff and proforma defendant-5 and the plaintiffs themselves have perfected their of Senior title by way of adverse possession after passing of judgement and decree Sub Judge, 1949 and in appeal of 1950 for continuous, uninterrupted, open and hostile to the knowledge of the defendants on expiry of period of 30 years. This plea of adverse possession is taken by the plaintiffs without prejudice to their case pleaded above."

Learned counsel for the defendants/respondents has submitted that since decree came to be passed in 1949-50, after elapse of more than 70 years, the plaintiffs/petitioners cannot be permitted to take said ground in the suit that too at the belated stage.

This Court is in agreement with the contention of the learned counsel for the defendants/respondents that factum of passing of the judgment and decree in the year 1949-50 was very much within knowledge of the plaintiffs/petitioners and the same was incorporated in the pleadings itself.

It would be apposite to reproduce provisions of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC, which read as under:- “17. Amendment of pleadings: - The Court may at any stage at the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and no such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties.

"Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial."

As per the aforesaid provisions, the court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend their pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. However, it has been provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial.

In the present case, the plaintiffs have failed to establish due diligence for the incorporation of the amendment which they have sought in their application. As has rightly been held by the learned trial Court that earlier also when the matter was pending before this Court, an application came to be filed by the plaintiffs/petitioners for amendment of the plaint under order VI Rule 17 of the CPC and the said application was allowed. The plaintiffs/petitioners ought to have incorporated averments as have been made in the application at hand, however they have failed to do so and after a considerable period, when the matter was fixed for evidence of the defendants/respondents, the instant application came to be filed. The learned trial court has rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs/petitioners have failed to demonstrate due diligence and the application has been filed belatedly. The judgments and decrees came to be passed during 1949-50 and after lapse of more than 70 years, said averments cannot be permitted to be taken in the plaint itself, by moving the application, which was filed in the year 2014.

From the perusal of provisions of Order VI Rule 17 of CPC, it is evident that ordinarily, an amendment in pleadings is not to be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court is satisfied that the party concerned could not apply even after the exercise of due diligence. In other words, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to have specifically pleaded that in spite of due diligence, they could not raise the matter now sought to be raised.

The Hon’ble Apex Court has interpreted the proviso to be a mandatory requirement to prevent frivolous applications for amendment intended only to delay the trial.

In Salem Advocate Bar Association vs. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3353, it was held as under:- “27. Order VI Rule 17 of the Code deals with amendment of pleadings. By Amendment Act 46 of 1999, this provision was deleted. It has again been restored by Amendment Act 22 of 2002 but with an added proviso to prevent application for amendment being allowed after the trial has commenced, unless court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. The proviso, to some extent, curtails absolute discretion to allow amendment at any stage. Now, if application is filed after commencement of trial, it has to be shown that in spite of due diligence, such amendment could not have been sought earlier. The object is to prevent frivolous applications which are filed to delay the trial. There is no illegality in the provision.”

What is 'due diligence' has not been defined in the Code, but it has been explained by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Chander Kanta Bansal vs. Rajinder Singh Anand, (2008) 5 SCC 117, in the following terms: “16. The words "due diligence" have not been defined in the Code. According to Oxford Dictionary (Edn.2006), the word

"diligence" means careful and persistent application or effort. "Diligent" means careful and steady in application to one's work and duties, showing care and effort. As per Black's Law Dictionary (18th Edn.), "diligence" means a continual effort to accomplish something, care; caution; the attention and care required from a person in a given situation. "Due diligence" means the diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an obligation. According to Words and Phrases by Drain- Dyspnea (Permanent Edn.13-A) "due diligence", in law, means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. "Due diligence" means reasonable diligence; it means such diligence as a prudent man would exercise in the conduct of his own affairs.”

Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in M. Revanna vs. Anjanamma, (2019) 4 SCC 332, held that the burden lies upon the person, who seeks an amendment after the commencement of the trial to show that he could not have sought the amendment before the commencement of trial, and it was observed as follows: “7. .. The proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC virtually prevents an application for amendment of pleadings from being allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial. The proviso, to an extent, curtails absolute discretion to allow amendment at any stage. Therefore, the burden is on the person who seeks an amendment after the commencement of the trial to show that in spite of due diligence, such an amendment could not have been sought earlier. There cannot be any dispute that an amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right, and under all circumstances. Though normally amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid multiplicity of litigation, the court needs to take into consideration whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide and whether the amendment causes such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money.”

The said position was reiterated in Vijay Hathising Shah vs. Gita Devi, (2019) 5 SCC 360, wherein it was observed as follows: “9. In our view, the trial court was right in rejecting the application. This we say for more than one reason. First, it was wholly belated; second, Respondent 1-plaintiff filed the application for amendment of the plaint when the trial in the suit was almost over and the case was fixed for final arguments; and third, the suit could still be decided even without there being any necessity to seek any amendment in the plaint. In our view, an amendment in the plaint was not really required for the determination of the issues in the suit.”

In view of the aforesaid exposition of law and the provisions of

Order

VI Rule of the CPC, the plaintiffs/petitioners have failed to make out a case for the amendment of the plaint. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the defendants/respondents that in case the amendment application is allowed at this stage, it would amount to de novo trial and the parties shall be relegated to the same stage at which the suit was initially filed by the plaintiffs/respondents i.e. 20 years ago. The application, as filed, is highly belated and no reason has been assigned why the said plea was not taken at the first instance. The averments, as made in the application, do not show due diligence on the part of the plaintiffs. Admittedly, trial in the case at hand has commenced. No plausible explanation has come forward that what prevented the plaintiffs to take such plea at the time of institution of suit.

This Court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial court has passed a well-reasoned order, and it does not suffer from any illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error.

The power under Article 227 is limited to see that the Courts below function within the limits of their authority or jurisdiction. The High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate Court or Tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that, over the last 50 years, it has consistently been observed that the limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 cannot be exercised by interfering with findings of fact or by setting aside the judgments of the courts below on merits.

Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 2226 of 2010, titled State of Haryana & others vs. Manoj Kumar, decided on 09.03.2010 has held as follow:- “23. More than half a century ago, the Constitution Bench of this court in Nagendra Nath Bora and Another v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam & Others AIR 1958 SC 398 settled that power under Article 227 is limited to seeing that the courts below function within the limit of its authority or jurisdiction.

24. This court placed reliance on Nagendra Nath's case in a subsequent judgment in Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu AIR 1963 SC 1895. The court observed that jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 is not by any means appellate in its nature for correcting errors in the decisions of subordinate courts or tribunals but is merely a power of superintendence to be used to keep them within the bounds of their authority.

25. This court had an occasion to examine this aspect of the matter in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim & Others (1983) 4 SCC 566. The court observed as under:- "The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority," and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. for this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision."

26. This court again clearly reiterated the legal position in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani & Another v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi (1995) 6 SCC 576. The court again cautioned that the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes.

27. A three-Judge Bench of this court in Rena Drego (Mrs.) v. Lalchand Soni & Others (1998) 3 SCC 341 again abundantly made it clear that the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or the tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227. Its function is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and reappreciating it.

28. In Virendra Kashinath Ravat & Another v. Vinayak N. Joshi & Others (1999) 1 SCC 47 this court held that the limited power under Article 227 cannot be invoked except for ensuring that the subordinate courts function within its limits.

29. This court over 50 years has been consistently observing that limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 cannot be exercised by interfering with the findings of fact and set aside the judgments of the courts below on merit.”

To the similar extent, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 3072 of 2022, titled as Ibrat Faizan vs. Omaxe Buildhome Private Limited, decided on 13.05.2022 has held as follows: - “14. In view of the above, in the present case, the High Court has not committed any error in entertaining the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order passed by the National Commission which has been passed in an appeal under Section 58 (1)

(a) (iii) of the 2019 Act. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. However, at the same time, it goes without saying that while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court subjects itself to the rigour of Article 227 of the Constitution and the High Court has to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 within the parameters within which such jurisdiction is required to be exercised. 14.1 The scope and ambit of jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution has been explained by this Court in the case of Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97, which has been consistently followed by this Court (see the recent decision of this Court in the case of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 SCC Online SC 29).

Therefore, while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court has to act within the parameters to exercise the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It goes without saying that even while considering the grant of interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has to bear in mind the limited jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, while granting any interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against an order passed by the National Commission, the same shall always be subject to the rigor of the powers to be exercised under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.”

Consequently, in view of aforesaid exposition of law and discussion, the present petition, being devoid of any merit, deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

Before parting, it is made clear that any observation made here-in-above shall not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the main case and the same shall be adjudicated upon uninfluenced by any observation made here- in-above, which are only for the purpose of the instant petition.

(Romesh Verma) 30th July, 2026

Judge (pankaj)