CRP/5311/2025 of MURUGAN Vs CHINNAPAIYAN (Died), 1. Santha on 25 September 2026

ORDER

The revision petitioners are decree holders in a suit for specific performance, aggrieved by the dismissal of an application for condonation of delay in representing an Unnumbered R.E.P.____ of 2022, for the purposes of executing the decree in O.S.No.58 of 2005.

2. I have heard Mrs.R.Poornima, learned counsel for the revision petitioners and Mrs.C.Jayachithra, for Mr.T.S.Baskaran, learned counsel for the respondents, who are the legal representatives of the judgment debtor.

3. In order to ascertain and gather correct particulars, I had directed the Registry to call for the original records from the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Krishnagiri. Pursuant to the said order, records have also been received and the same have also been perused by me.

4. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the decree for specific performance was granted on 06.12.2005 and in order to execute the decree, seeking execution of sale deed, the execution petition was filed on 12.12.2008. Within a few days, the execution petition was returned for certain compliances and after lapse of close to two years, the execution petition was represented on 30.11.2010. The Executing Court however returned the same in January 2011, which was again represented by the petitioners on 09.03.2015. Thereafter, the execution petition was returned only on 08.12.2021. It is therefore the contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners that the delay cannot be solely attributed to the petitioners.

5. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners would also point out that in the interregnum period, there was also bifurcation of Courts and that was the reason why the returned papers could not be taken back earlier and represented in time. She would further state that the decree has not given any direction to the decree holders to deposit the balance sale consideration, but only casted an obligation on the judgment debtors to execute the sale deed within a period of two months. She would therefore state that the Executing Court clearly erred in dismissing the application for condoning delay in representing the papers, for which sufficient cause had been shown by the petitioners. In fact, the learned counsel for the petitioners has also pointed out that the attempt made by the respondents to set aside the ex-parte decree was also unsuccessful and the decree has become final and therefore, when the execution petition was filed, admittedly within time, the petitioners cannot be left without any remedy and an inflexible approach cannot be adopted by rejecting the condone delay application in representing the EP, especially when more than sufficient cause has been made out by the petitioners. The learned counsel for the petitioners also states that the balance sale consideration has already been deposited, as directed by the Trial Court and therefore, there is absolutely no impediment for the execution of the decree in favour of the revision petitioners. She would therefore pray for the revision petition being allowed.

6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents would state that in a suit for specific performance, the successful plaintiff will have to show readiness and willingness, right from the date of contract, till the conclusion of the execution proceedings. The petitioners have clearly slept over their rights and the lethargy shown by the petitioners in taking return and representing the papers is itself writ large on the face of record and she would therefore state the Court has rightly refused to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioners, even though the delay that was sought to be condoned was only a delay in representation of the execution petition. She would however state that the delay is also inordinate, namely 2456 days and absolutely no acceptable or sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioners, warranting exercise of discretion in their favour. She would also state that the balance sale consideration was deposited by the petitioners on their own accord, without any permission granted by the Trial Court, by seeking extension of time, especially when the decree was to be complied with, within a period of two months. In support of her contention, the learned counsel for the respondents has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

V.S.Palanichamy Chettiar Firm Vs. C.Alagappan and another, reported in (1999) 4 SCC

702.

7. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel on either side. Moreover, on perusal of records, I find that the revision petitioners, pursuant to the decree dated 06.12.2005, deposited a sum of Rs.15,000/- on 07.08.2006. For better appreciation, the decree passed in O.S.No.58 of 2005 is extracted hereunder for easy reference: 1/gpujpthjpfs ; thjpfsplk ; kPjpf;fpiuaj;bjhifia bgw;Wf;bfhz;L thjpfspd; “

brytpy; ,uz;L khj fhyj;jpw;F jhth brhj;Jf;fis bghWj;J thjpfs; bgahpy; xU gjpt[ fpuag;gj;jpuk; bra;JbfhLf;f ntz;Lk; vd;W Mizaplg;gLfpwJ/ 2/gpujpthjpfs; nkw;go tPjk; bra;J bfhLf;fj; jtWk;gl;rj;jpy; ePjpkd;wj;jpd; K:yk; eltof;if vLj;Jf;bfhs;s mDkjpaspj;J jPh;g;ghdJ gpwg;gpf;fg;gLfpwJ khw;W ghpfhukhf 3/2 Kjy; 7 gpujpthjpfSf;F Kd; gzkhf U:/2.25.000-?k; mjw;F Mz;blhd;Wf;F gpd;tl;oahf 12# tl;otPjk; tHf;Fj; jhf;fy; bra;j njjpKjy; bjhif brYj;Jk; njjptiu nrh;j;J brYj;jntz;Lk; vd;W Mizpalg;gLfpwJ/ 4/Kjy ; gpujpthjp jhth brhj;jpy ; mj;JkPwp thjpfspd ; epk;kjpahd RthjPdj;jpw;F ,il";ry ; tpistpf;fhky ; ,Uf;f epue;jpu cWj;Jf;gl;lis gpwg;gpj;J Mizaplg;gLfpwJ/ 5/gpujpthjpfs; thjpfSf;F ,t;tHf;fpd; bryt[j; bjhifahf U:/20.949- ? brYj;jntz;Lk; vd;W Mizaplg;gLfpwJ/”

8. No doubt, the decree does not specifically mention any time limit for payment of the balance sale consideration. However, the interpretation that is sought to be given by the petitioners that there is no time limit for deposit of balance sale consideration, is certainly not acceptable, in a suit for specific performance. The plaintiff is entitled to equitable and discretionary relief of specific performance only upon establishing readiness and willingness in terms of Section 16(c) r/w Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act.

9. The first clause in the decree mentioning two months time for the defendants to execute and register a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, has to be read in conjunction with the time for deposit of balance sale consideration. Therefore, the petitioners ought to have deposited the balance sale consideration within a period of two months and could not have taken their own sweet time to deposit the balance sale consideration. If at all there was any ambiguity, it was for the plaintiff to seek appropriate directions from the Trial Court with regard to the time within which the balance sale consideration is required to be deposited. No doubt, the decree was sought to be set aside, but such attempt was unsuccessful and the decree has become final. However, R.E.A.No.75 of 2011 was filed by the 1st defendant, claiming that pursuant to the decree, which also granted an alternate relief to the defendants to refund the advance of Rs.2,25,000/-, together with interest at 12% per annum and in view of the plaintiffs not exercising their right to get the sale deed executed in their favour, the plaintiffs were entitled only to refund of the advance, together with interest, as decreed by the Trial Court.

10. In the said REA, the 1st defendant also contended that there was a Panchayat resulting in a Muchlika executed between the 1st defendant and the plaintiffs, in and whereby, the plaintiffs had agreed to receive the balance sale consideration of Rs.91,024/- after factoring a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- paid to the plaintiffs.

11. A counter affidavit was filed by the decree holders to the said REA, contending that there was no such settlement agreed to between the parties and also contending that the respondents have already filed an execution petition and for execution of the sale deed and that the same is yet to be numbered. Receipt of a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- has also been denied in the said counter affidavit. After enquiry, REA.No.75 of 2011 was disposed of on 20.06.2019, recording an endorsement made by the counsel for the respondents that the advance amount and interest have been deposited and therefore, REA may be closed. The Court closed REA.No.75 of 2011 on the very same date. However, on 02.08.2019, the Court suo motu reopened the matter and found that since a sum of Rs.6,16,299/- has been paid towards decree amount, the entire decree is fully satisfied and full satisfaction of the decree was recorded by the Executing Court on 02.08.2019.

12. Admittedly, the petitioners have not challenged the said order dated 02.08.2019 recording full satisfaction of the decree. However, on the other hand, taking advantage of the decree for specific performance and there being no specific time for payment of balance sale consideration of Rs.15,000/-, the petitioners deposited the balance sale consideration of Rs.15,000/- on 07.08.2006, after a lapse of eight months from the date of decree. When the Executing Court has already recorded full satisfaction and without challenging the said order, firstly it is not open to the decree holders to now seek for specific performance of the agreement of sale. When the decree granting alternate relief has been acted upon.

13. No doubt, as contended by the revision petitioners the respondents only relied on an alleged Muchlika, in and by which the decree holders alleged to have agreed to receive the advance, together with interest at 12% per annum and that in furtherance of the same, a sum of Rs.3 lakhs was also paid and the balance due was Rs.91,000/- odd. However, the Court did not pass any orders on the said application and the respondents have voluntarily calculated the entire amount payable towards the alternate relief and deposited the same which is evidenced by the ledger extracts dated 06.02.2019. The petitioners participated in the said REA proceedings and despite the same, they have not

taken any diligent steps to prosecute the execution petition filed by them for executing the decree for specific performance in their favour.

14. As already stated despite suffering an adverse order in REA.No.75 of 2011, where full satisfaction of the decree has been recorded, the said order has also not been challenged by the petitioners. Therefore, once full satisfaction was recorded by the Executing Court, it was no longer open to the petitioners to seek the relief of specific performance by prosecuting the EP. Merely because the decree has become final and the petitioners have also deposited the balance sale consideration and the attempts to set aside the decree were also unsuccessful, in the above narrated circumstances, it will not clothe the petitioners with a right to fall back on the decree for specific performance when the alternate relief for refund of advance together with interest has been satisfied and full satisfaction has also been recorded by the Executing Court.

15. No doubt, there was no permission granted as rightly contended out by the learned counsel for the petitioners, for enabling the respondents to deposit Rs.6,16,299/- before the Executing Court. However, nothing prevented the petitioners from challenging the order dated 02.08.2019, recording full satisfaction on 02.08.2019. Without doing so, the petitioners cannot maintain a fresh execution petition or even be permitted to pursue the execution petition originally filed in time, by subsequently seeking condonation of delay in representing the said execution petition.

16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in V.S.Palanichamy Chettiar Firm’s case, held that when there is a decree to enforce a contract for sale and the amount is not deposited in line with the decree, then a Section 28 application under the Specific Relief Act would become necessary and the Court that passed a decree has to apply equitable considerations for extending the time for payment under the decree. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that though Section 28 is to be ordinarily filed by the decree holder who is armed with a decree for specific performance, even the vendor/judgment debtor is entitled to apply for rescission of the contract or oppose the execution of the decree on the ground of default of the vendors/decree holders deposit the balance sale consideration within the period stipulated in the decree.

17. Even applying this decision to the facts of the present case, the deposit of Rs.15,000/- after a lapse of eight months is certainly not in line with the decree passed by the Trial Court which granted an outer limit of two months for the execution of the sale itself to be completed by the defendants/judgment debtors, which can only imply that the balance sale consideration should have been paid within the said period of two months.

18. The first clause of the decree cannot be interpreted to suit the convenience of the plaintiffs, stating that no time has been fixed for payment of the balance sale consideration. Courts have consistently held that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiffs have to establish readiness and willingness right from the date of the contract, till the satisfaction of the decree for specific performance. Without even filing an application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, seeking extension of time, the petitioners have deposited the balance sale consideration of Rs.15,000/-, after a lapse of eight months. The said act of the petitioners itself only shows lack of readiness and willingness on their part.

19. Secondly, when the decree not only granted the relief of specific performance, but also the alternate reliefs for refund of advance, which has been availed of by the respondents by depositing the entire advance amount, together with applicable interest way back in 2019 itself and the said order not being challenged by the petitioners till date, the petitioners are now estopped from falling back on the first clause of the decree entitling them for execution of the sale deed in their favour. For the above reasons, the condone delay application, though one for representation of the EP and despite the reasons assigned that it was not on account of failure or omission on the part of the petitioners, but only because of bifurcation of Courts, the very application for execution itself is not maintainable, in view of the Executing Court recording full satisfaction of the decree as early as on 02.08.2019, considering the compliance of the alternate relief for refund of advance by deposit. In such view of the matter, I do not see any merit in the revision warranting interference in the order of the Executing Court refusing to condone the delay of 2456 days.

20. In fine, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. 25.09.2026 Neutral Citation Case : Yes / No Speaking / Non-speaking order Index : Yes/No ata To The Principal Subordinate Court, Krishnagiri.

P.B.BALAJI.

J, ata Pre-delivery order made in CRP.No.5311 of 2025 25.09.2026