WP/16870/2024 of G.LOGESH KUMAR Vs THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE on 25 September 2026

ORDER

The present Writ Petition has been filed challenging the impugned order dated 28.05.2024 passed by the respondent.

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2. The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of the present Writ Petition are that the petitioner entered service as a Grade II Police Constable in the Tamil Nadu Police Service. From 2011 to 2017, he was on deputation with the Railway Police, Villupuram. While so, he was placed under suspension from 08.05.2014 to 30.12.2017, on account of a certain occurrence that had taken place on 07.05.2014, in respect of the same, after a period of ten years, the impugned charge memorandum was issued. Challenging the same, the present Writ Petition has been filed.

3. Heard the learned counsel for both sides and perused the materials available on record.

4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that there was an allegation against certain Police Officials serving at the Villupuram Railway Police Station in respect of the alleged custodial death of one Jayavel on 07.05.2014. In this regard, an FIR was registered before the Villupuram CBCID in Crime No.4 of 2014. After a detailed investigation, a charge sheet was filed on 19.02.2016, in which the petitioner was arrayed as a witness in the list of S.No.6, to speak about the illegal detention of the deceased and also regarding the entry made by the Police Constables. However, the petitioner was also placed under suspension in the year 2014, vide suspension order dated 07.05.2014. Subsequently, the suspension was revoked by order

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dated 04.07.2017, and his pay was thereafter regulated vide order dated 23.02.2021 by treating the suspension period as spent on duty.

4.1. It is the specific submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that, since the petitioner had been arrayed as a witness and his suspension had been revoked, it is evident that he had no direct or indirect role or involvement in the alleged custodial death, as stated in the report of the Deputy Inspector General of Police. The learned counsel would contend that the sudden issuance of the impugned charge memorandum after a period of ten years would not only prejudice the petitioner’s defence but is also without any basis. In support of his contention, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the following judgments:-

(i) UCO Bank and Others v. Rajendra Shankar Shukla, reported in (2018) 14 SCC 92;

(ii) M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India and Others, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88;

(iii) P.V. Mahadevan v. MD, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 636; and

(iv) The Secretary to Government v. N. Ponniah, reported in 2007 Writ L.R. 903. Hence, he prayed for interference with the impugned order.

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5. Per contra, the said contention was stoutly opposed by the learned Government Advocate and would submit that, in connection with the custodial death, the petitioner had also joined hands in the brutal assault and was thereby responsible for the death of the said Jayavel. By his conduct, the petitioner had brought shame and ignominy to the Police Department and had thereby committed grave misconduct. He would further contend that, as per G.O.No.273, dated 30.03.2017, the Government had recommended the initiation of disciplinary proceedings. The learned Government Advocate would further submit that the delay of seven years was incidental to the administrative process and that there was nothing wilful or wanton in the said delay. Considering the magnitude of the crime, the delay was immaterial. Hence, he prayed to dismiss the present Writ Petition.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to either side submissions.

7. Before delving into the factual aspects of the matter, this Court deems it appropriate to refer to the precedents relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. In P.V. Mahadevan’s case (cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, in the absence of any explanation for the delay, after referring to the oft-quoted judgment in State of M.P. v. Bani Singh, reported in 1990 Supp SCC 738, quashed the charge memorandum on the ground of inordinate delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings.

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8. In the present case also, on a perusal of the counter affidavit, except for the explanation that a delay of seven years is not substantial, no reason has been assigned as to why there was a delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings, despite the respondent having been aware of the occurrence since 2014.

9. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further relied upon M.V. Bijlani’s case (cited supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the charge memorandum on the ground that the delay had caused prejudice to the delinquent officer. Further, in Rajendra Shankar Shukla’s case (cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, even if there had been some internal discussion, a delay of seven years in arriving at a decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings was unreasonable and unacceptable. Similarly, a Division Bench of this Court, in N. Ponniah’s case (cited supra), held that permitting disciplinary proceedings to continue after an inordinate delay would be nothing but putting a premium on the total inaction and indifferent attitude displayed by the Disciplinary Authority. Though the petitioner has relied upon various judgments, all the said judgments make it clear that there cannot be any universal criterion for application and that each case has to be considered on the basis of its own distinctive facts. Therefore, mere delay by itself may not be sufficient to quash the disciplinary proceedings.

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10. Coming back to the factual aspects of the case, in the order revoking the suspension dated 04.07.2017, there is a clear reference to the letter of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CBCID, Chennai, in C.No.C5/9490/2014, dated 15.06.2016, wherein it has been stated as follows:- “The Deputy Inspector General of Police, CBCID, Chennai, in his letter in C.No.C5/9490/2014, dated 15.06.2016, has informed that P.C.1250 G. Logeshkumar has no direct or indirect role in the said case and that he was cited as a witness in the case. It was also informed that a decision regarding his duty may be taken at your end.”

11. Thereafter, after following due procedure, the petitioner’s suspension period from 08.05.2014 to 30.12.2017 was treated as spent on duty. Therefore, even in the year 2017, the respondent, after an elaborate consideration of the materials, had arrived at a conclusion that the petitioner had neither a direct nor an indirect role in the incident in question. Subsequently, the petitioner’s pay for suspension period was also regulated and paid.

12. At this juncture, this Court would like to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Government of A.P. and Others v. V. Appala Swamy, reported in (2007) 14 SCC 49, wherein it has been held that there are no hard-and-fast rules with regard to the quashing of disciplinary proceedings

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on the ground of delay. It has further been held that each case must be determined on its own facts, taking into consideration, inter alia, the following criteria:-

(i) Whether, by reason of the delay, the employer had condoned the lapses on the part of the employee; and

(ii) Whether the delay had caused prejudice to the employee.

13. In the present case, as per the order revoking the suspension dated 04.07.2017, the respondents has not condoned the petitioner’s alleged lapses, but one step further arrived at a categorical finding that the petitioner had neither a direct nor an indirect role in the incident. In the case in hand, apart from the prolonged delay, there is a clear conclusion by the respondent that the petitioner had no involvement whatsoever. This conclusion is further fortified by the fact that the petitioner’s suspension was reverse and they treated the petitioner’s suspension period as spent on duty and regulated his pay, and that the petitioner still continues his service.

14. The aforesaid factual position is further vindicated by a perusal of the charge sheet filed in Crime No.4 of 2014, wherein, as already stated, the petitioner has been arrayed as Witness No.6. Considering the fact that the petitioner was not shown as an accused in the criminal case, and upon the conclusion of the respondent that the petitioner has neither direct nor indirect

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involvement, permitting the present proceedings to continue merely because the Officers presently in charge have taken a different view would amount to putting a premium on the Department’s inaction and keeping the employee under the constant threat of disciplinary proceedings, which is antithetical to the service jurisprudence. Further, the same remind the conduct of some person having “faith in their doubt, and doubt in their faith.”

15. Therefore, having already taken a decision that the petitioner had no direct or indirect involvement, the issuance of a charge memorandum merely on the ground that the Government had subsequently issued a Government Order would result an inherent inconsistency. Such proceedings cannot be permitted to continue after a decade. Therefore, this Court is of the firm view that there are sufficient reasons to interfere with the impugned charge memorandum.

16. In view of the above detailed discussion, the impugned order dated 28.05.2024 is hereby quashed. Accordingly, the present Writ Petition is allowed. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. No costs. 25-09-2026 Index: Yes Speaking Order Neutral Citation: Yes KV

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To The Deputy Inspector General of Police Railways Chennai- 8.

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C.KUMARAPPAN J. KV Pre-Deliver Order in WP No. 16870 of 2024 25-09-2026