CRP(MD)/2457/2026 of Kannan Vs K. Geetha on 22 September 2026

COMMON ORDER

C.R.P.(MD)No.2457 of 2026 has been filed challenging the order, dated 16/07/2026 passed in I.A.No.8 of 2026 in R.L.T.O.P No. 22 of 2022, whereby the application filed by the respondent/landlord seeking to reopen the proceedings was allowed. C.R.P.(MD)No.2458

of 2026 has been filed challenging the order, dated 16/07/2026 passed in I.A.No.9 of 2026 in the said R.L.T.O.P., whereby the application filed by the respondent/landlord under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking to amend the eviction petition by incorporating an additional ground of eviction under Section 21(2)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Regulation of Rights and Responsibilities of Landlords and Tenants Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), was allowed.

2. The petitioner is the Tenant and the respondent is the Landlord. The respondent/Landlord instituted R.L.T.O.P No.22 of 2022 seeking eviction of the petitioner on the ground that the premises was required for the use and occupation of his close relative. The petitioner contested the proceedings. The evidence on both sides was completed and the matter was also heard. When the matter was posted for reply arguments, the Landlord filed I.A.Nos.8 and 9 of 2026 seeking to reopen the proceedings and to amend the eviction petition by incorporating an additional ground relating to the alleged failure of the tenant to enter into a written tenancy agreement in terms of the provisions of the Act.

3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the applications have been filed for reopening the proceedings and amendment seeking to introduce an entirely new cause of action at the fag end of the proceedings. According to him, the original R.L.T.O.P. was filed on the ground that the premises was required for the use and occupation of the Landlord's close relative. At no point of time had the Landlord pleaded that he had called upon the Tenant to enter into a written agreement in accordance with the Act and that the Tenant had refused or failed to do so.

4. It is further submitted that the parties had admittedly entered into a rental agreement dated 26/02/2019 and according to the Landlord himself, the period of tenancy under the said agreement had subsequently expired. However, there is no averment in the original eviction petition that after the commencement of the Act, the

Landlord called upon the Tenant to execute a fresh written and registered tenancy agreement and that the Tenant refused or failed to comply with such request.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that Section 4(2) of the Act contemplates the execution of a written agreement in respect of a tenancy created prior to the commencement of the Act and that the proviso thereto provides for consequences where either the Landlord or the Tenant fails to enter into such agreement. Therefore, before relying upon such failure as a ground for eviction, there must be a factual foundation in the pleadings to show that the Landlord called upon the Tenant to enter into the requisite agreement and that the Tenant failed or refused to do so. It is further contended that no such foundational pleading was available in the original eviction petition. On the contrary, according to the learned counsel, the consistent case of the Landlord was that the premises was required for the use and occupation of his close relative. The proposed amendment, therefore, seeks to introduce a distinct and independent ground of eviction after the completion of evidence and when the matter had reached the stage of final arguments. The reopening of the evidence is also consequential upon the proposed amendment and therefore, cannot be permitted at such a belated stage.

6. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/Tenant relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Basavaraj Vs. Indira and others, reported in (2024) 3 SCC 705. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC, reiterated that an amendment after commencement of trial cannot be permitted unless the party seeking the amendment establishes that despite due diligence, the matter could not have been raised before commencement of trial. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that mere “oversight” cannot constitute due diligence and that the burden lies upon the party seeking amendment to establish the same.

7. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Hemalatha v. Jeevanantham and others reported in 2026 (4) CTC 39, wherein the Division Bench, while considering the scheme of the Act, held inter alia, that Section 21(2)(a), insofar as it relates to failure to comply with Section 4(2), applies to tenancies created prior to the commencement of the Act and that after expiry of the transitional period, the requirement of a written and registered tenancy agreement is mandatory. Therefore, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners prays for setting aside the impugned orders passed by the trial court, by allowing these civil revision petitions.

8. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/Landlord would submit that there is already an averment in paragraph 4 of the original eviction petition to the effect that the rental agreement between the parties had come to an end and that the Tenant had failed to vacate the premises. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the proposed amendment does not introduce a new cause of action, but merely seeks to incorporate the appropriate statutory provision and the consequential ground arising out of the existing facts. It is further submitted that the learned Rent Court, upon considering the pleadings, has rightly exercised its discretion in allowing the amendment and reopening the evidence on the side of the Landlord and that no interference is warranted in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

9. In support of his contention, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/Landlord relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vasantha (Dead) through L.Rs. Vs. Rajalakshmi @ Rajam (Dead) through L.Rs., reported in 2024 (3) CTC 209, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that an amendment of pleadings can, in an appropriate case, be permitted even at a later stage of the proceedings where it is necessary for determining the real controversy between the parties.

10. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of this Court in Piyush Sethia Vs. Asha Kumari, rendered in C.R.P No. 4533 of 2024, dated 15/11/2024, wherein the amendment sought by the Landlord to incorporate an additional ground under Section 21(2)

(a) of the Act was upheld. The learned Judge observed that the amendment in that case did not change the cause of action or the frame of the eviction proceedings and that the Rent Court was not bound by Order VI Rule 17 CPC in the same manner as a Civil Court. In view of the above circumstances, he prays for the dismissal of the civil revision petitions.

11. This Court has considered the rival submissions and perused the materials available on record.

12. From a perusal of R.L.T.O.P No.22 of 2022, it is evident that the Landlord originally sought eviction mainly on the ground that the premises was required for the use and occupation of his close relative. There is no specific averment in the original eviction petition that the Landlord had called upon the Tenant to enter into a written and registered tenancy agreement in terms of Section 4 of the Act and that such request was refused or not complied with by the Tenant.

13. It is also not in dispute that the parties had entered into a rental agreement dated 26/02/2019. According to the Landlord, the period for which the said agreement was entered into had expired. However, the mere expiry of the period of the rental agreement cannot, by itself, be construed as a pleading that the Landlord had called upon the Tenant to execute a fresh written and registered tenancy agreement in terms of Section 4 of the Act and that the Tenant had failed or refused to do so.

14. The distinction assumes significance. The proposed amendment is not merely a correction or incorporation of a provision of law. The amendment seeks to introduce a new factual foundation, namely, that the Tenant failed or refused to enter into an agreement

contemplated under Section 4 of the Act and that such alleged failure constitutes an additional ground for eviction under Section 21(2)(a) of the Act. Consequently, the Landlord also seeks reopening of his evidence to establish the factual foundation for the newly proposed ground.

15. In Basavaraj Vs. Indira and others (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made it clear that once the trial has commenced, the burden is upon the party seeking amendment to establish that despite due diligence, the matter could not have been raised earlier.

16. In the present case, the Landlord was admittedly aware of the terms of the tenancy and of the alleged expiry of the rental agreement from the inception of the proceedings. No explanation whatsoever has been placed before this Court as to why the alleged failure to execute a fresh agreement under Section 4 of the Act was not pleaded at the earliest stage.

17. At this juncture, it is also necessary to consider the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent in Piyush Sethia Vs. Asha Kumari (supra). In the said case, the original eviction petition itself had been presented invoking, inter alia, Section 21(2)(a) of the Act and the subsequent amendment was sought in the context of the legislative amendment relating to the said provision. The learned Judge found that the amendment did not alter the basic nature of the eviction proceedings.

18. The facts of the present case are materially different. Here, the original eviction petition was founded on the alleged requirement of the premises for the use and occupation of the Landlord's close relative. The proposed amendment seeks, for the first time, to introduce the alleged failure of the Tenant to enter into a tenancy agreement under Section 4 of the Act as an additional ground for eviction. Thus, the proposed amendment is founded upon a factual allegation which was absent from the original pleadings.

19. Likewise, the decision in Vasantha (Dead) through L.Rs. Vs. Rajalakshmi @ Rajam (Dead) through L.Rs. (supra) cannot be applied mechanically to the facts of the present case. The said decision reiterates that amendment of pleadings may be permitted at a later stage where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It does not dispense with the statutory requirement of due diligence where the amendment is sought after commencement and conclusion of trial, nor does it authorise introduction of an entirely new factual foundation at the stage of final arguments.

20. Further, the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Hemalatha Vs. Jeevanantham (supra) has clarified the statutory position concerning Section 21(2)(a) and Section 4(2) of the Act. While the statutory ground may be available in an appropriate case, the availability of such a statutory ground does not dispense with the requirement that the necessary factual foundation for invoking that ground must be pleaded and established in accordance with law.

21. In the present case, the Landlord was aware, from the inception of the proceedings, of the terms of the tenancy and the circumstances relating to the alleged expiry of the rental agreement. Nevertheless, no specific pleading was made that the Tenant had been called upon to execute a fresh written and registered agreement under Section 4 of the Act and that the Tenant had failed or refused to comply with such request. The amendment and reopening applications were filed only after the evidence of both sides had been completed and the matter had reached the stage of final arguments.

22. It is well settled that an amendment which is necessary for determining the real controversy between the parties may ordinarily be permitted. However, the Court cannot permit an amendment which, at the fag end of the proceedings, introduces a new factual case requiring fresh evidence, particularly when the party seeking amendment has failed to demonstrate due diligence. The proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC places a specific restriction in such circumstances.

23. More importantly, the learned Rent Court appears to have allowed the amendment and reopening primarily on the ground that the original petition contained an averment that the rental agreement between the parties had come to an end. The learned Rent Court, however, has not considered whether there was any foundational pleading regarding the essential factual ingredient sought to be introduced by the amendment, namely, a demand by the Landlord to enter into a fresh agreement under Section 4 of the Act and the alleged failure or refusal on the part of the Tenant.

24. The absence of such foundational pleading cannot be cured merely by incorporating a new statutory provision at the conclusion of the trial. The proposed amendment would require the Tenant to meet a new factual case which was not the case originally pleaded by the Landlord and in respect of which, no evidence was let in by the parties.

25. In such circumstances, permitting the amendment would not merely facilitate determination of the existing controversy. It would enlarge the scope of the eviction proceedings by introducing a distinct factual foundation and an additional ground of eviction after the completion of the trial. The reopening of the evidence would necessarily follow from such amendment and would further prolong proceedings which had already reached the stage of final arguments.

26. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the proposed amendment seeks to introduce a new factual foundation and an additional ground of eviction at the stage of final arguments, without the Landlord establishing that despite due diligence, such ground could not have been pleaded at the earlier stage. The same is hit by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC. Consequently, the consequential application for reopening the evidence also cannot be sustained.

27. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Rent Court has committed an error in allowing I.A.Nos.8 and 9 of 2026. Accordingly, the order, dated 16/07/2026 passed in I.A.Nos.8 and 9 of 2026 in R.L.T.O.P No.22 of 2022 on the file of the learned Rent Court is set aside. I.A.Nos.8 and 9 of 2026 stand dismissed.

28. It is represented by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/Landlord that R.L.T.O.P No.22 of 2022 was instituted in the year 2022, the evidence on both sides has already been completed and the matter was at the stage of final arguments. In view of the same, the learned Rent Court is directed to proceed with R.L.T.O.P No.22 of 2022 from the stage at which it presently stands and dispose of the same on merits and in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

29. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival claims in R.L.T.O.P No.22 of 2022. The learned Rent Court shall decide the same independently and uninfluenced by any of the observations made in this order.

30. With the above observations and directions, C.R.P. (MD)Nos.2457 and 2458 of 2026 are allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 29.09.2026 Index:Yes/No Internet:Yes/No er

To,

1. The Rent Controller-cum- District Munsif Court, Karaikudi.

2. The Section Officer, VR/ER Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.

R.POORNIMA, J. er

CRP(MD)Nos.2457 and 2458 of 2026 29/09/2026