WP/18378/2022 of R.Selvaraj Vs The Chairperson on 22 September 2026

ORDER

The present Writ Petition has been filed seeking issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records pertaining to the order of removal from service dated 15.06.2006 passed by the second respondent, the consequential order of termination dated 28.03.2007 passed by the second respondent, the order dated 27.03.2014 confirming the order of removal from service, passed by the fourth respondent in Proceedings No.ERD/SZ/A/13-14/, and the order dated 26.03.2015 reconfirming the order of removal from service, passed by the first respondent in Proceedings No.ERD/SZ/M/14-15/8, quash the same and consequently direct the respondents to disburse the terminal benefits payable to the petitioner as on 01.12.2003, in accordance with the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as “the LIC Staff Rules”), and the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “the LIC Pension Rules”), together with the arrears and interest thereon with effect from 01.12.2003.

2. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner joined the Life Insurance Corporation of India as an Assistant in the Clerical Cadre on 04.07.1981 and his probation was declared to have been completed on 08.01.1982. Subsequently, he was promoted to the post of Administrative Officer on 06.10.1997. It is the further submission of the learned Senior Counsel that, as per Rule 31(1) of the LIC Pension Rules, an employee who has completed 22 years of qualifying service is entitled to seek voluntary retirement. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted an application for voluntary retirement on 06.10.2003 and also submitted an application seeking early relieving with effect from 23.10.2003. The learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the application for voluntary retirement was acknowledged by the third respondent on 07.10.2003. According to the LIC Pension Rules, if the application for voluntary retirement is not rejected within the prescribed period, the same is deemed to have been accepted upon completion of 90 days. Therefore, since the petitioner’s application for voluntary retirement was submitted on 06.10.2003 and was not rejected within the prescribed period, the petitioner would be deemed to have been relieved from service on 07.01.2004.

2.1. It is the further submission of the learned Senior Counsel that, after 07.01.2004, there was no employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the respondents and, therefore, the issuance of the charge memorandum was contrary to law. The learned Senior Counsel would contend that, though the respondents relied upon a letter allegedly sent to the petitioner informing him that his application for voluntary retirement had been kept in abeyance, even according to the respondents, the said letter was not received by the petitioner, but was received by one J. Parthasarathy. The respondents have not explained who is the said J. Parthasarathy or in what capacity he related to the petitioner.

2.2. The learned Senior Counsel would further submit that, in the application for voluntary retirement, the petitioner had furnished his correspondence address as D.159, KTVR Flats, First Floor, Thadagam Road, Shivaji Colony, Coimbatore – 641 025. However, the letter allegedly sent by the third respondent on 23.12.2003 was addressed to the Divisional Office. Even according to the charge memorandum, the petitioner had been absent from duty from 02.12.2003. Therefore, the very fact that the letter was addressed to the office address, despite the respondents being aware that the petitioner was absent from duty, would clearly indicate that the petitioner was not served with any letter informing him that his application for voluntary retirement had been kept in abeyance.

2.3. It is also the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that, nearly two years after the petitioner sought his retirement benefits, the charge memorandum was issued. The learned Senior Counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Dinanath Shantaram Karekar and others, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 569, and would contend that the theory of “communication” cannot be invoked and that actual service of the communication must be proved and established. Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that, in the absence of proof of service of the letter dated 27.12.2003, by which the petitioner’s application for voluntary retirement was allegedly kept in abeyance, the issuance of the charge memorandum is illegal and vitiated, as there was no subsisting employer-employee relationship. Hence, he prayed to interfere with the impugned orders.

3. Per contra, the said contention was stoutly opposed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents and would contend that, though the petitioner submitted his application for voluntary retirement on 06.10.2003, requesting to be relieved from service with effect from 23.10.2003, he was informed that his application for voluntary retirement had been kept in abeyance by the Competent Authority and that he was instructed to continue in service until further orders, vide letter dated 27.12.2003.It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the said letter was served upon the petitioner on 29.12.2003. He would further submit that acceptance by the Department is necessary for voluntary retirement to take effect, whereas the petitioner has not produced any document to establish that his application for voluntary retirement was accepted by the respondents.

3.1. The learned counsel would further submit that, since the genuineness of the petitioner’s community certificate was under dispute, the question of sanctioning the terminal benefits did not arise and, therefore, the petitioner’s application for voluntary retirement was kept in abeyance. He would further submit that, though the petitioner was instructed to continue in service, he failed to resume duty and remained absent from 02.12.2003. The learned counsel would contend that the show-cause notice was served upon the petitioner on 31.05.2005 and, after following the principles of natural justice and considering the petitioner’s reply, the final order dated 15.06.2006 was passed, imposing the penalty of removal from service. It is also submitted that the petitioner had categorically admitted the charges levelled against him in the charge memorandum.

3.2. The learned counsel would further submit that, since the application for voluntary retirement had been kept in abeyance, the petitioner continued to remain in service until the date of the final order dated 15.06.2006. Since the petitioner remained unauthorisedly absent and the said fact was not seriously disputed by him, the finding of the Disciplinary Authority that the charge had been proved cannot be faulted. It is also his submission that, having regard to the petitioner’s prolonged absence of nearly two years, the punishment of removal from service cannot be said to be disproportionate. Hence, he prayed to dismiss the present Writ Petition.

4. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made on either side.

5. The charge against the petitioner is that he had failed to attend the office from 02.12.2003 without furnishing any written intimation and had thereby abandoned his duty, in terms of Regulation 39(4)(iii) of the LIC Staff Rules, read with Explanation 1. At the outset, it is not in dispute that the petitioner had not attended duty from 02.12.2003. According to the petitioner,

since he had submitted an application for voluntary retirement on 06.10.2003 and had paid the amount in lieu of the waiver of the three-months notice period, his subsequent absence cannot be treated as unauthorised absence or abandonment of duty. However, the respondents would contend that, on 27.12.2003, they had sent a letter to the petitioner instructing him to continue in service, as his application for voluntary retirement had been kept in abeyance.

6. Before proceeding further, this Court deems it appropriate to consider the meaning and scope of “abandonment of service”. Abandonment of service is not established merely by the fact of absence. It is something beyond mere absence and has to be determined by taking into consideration of the surrounding circumstances and the intention of the parties. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in G.T. Lad and others v. Chemical and Fibres of India Ltd., reported in (1979) 1 SCC 590, wherein, while referring to the principles governing abandonment of service, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, to constitute abandonment, there must be a total or complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an intention not to resume the same. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that abandonment is always a question of intention and that such intention cannot ordinarily be attributed to an employee without adequate evidence in that regard.

7. In the case in hand, it is not in dispute that the petitioner had not attended duty after 02.12.2003. However, according to the petitioner, his absence was solely on account of the submission of his application for voluntary retirement. In this regard, the petitioner relies upon his letter dated 06.10.2003, by which he sought voluntary retirement and requested to be relieved from service with effect from 23.10.2003. Thereafter, he submitted another letter dated 01.12.2003, intimating the remittance of the amount equivalent to 34 days’ salary towards the remaining period of the 90-day notice period. From the following day onwards, the petitioner appears to have remained absent from duty.

8. According to the petitioner, since the application for voluntary retirement was submitted on 06.10.2003, if the same was not rejected within 90 days, it would be deemed to have been accepted. Even assuming such a position, the 90-days period would have expired on 06.01.2004. However, the conduct of the petitioner, who had admittedly worked in the organisation for nearly 22 years, for immediate unilateral relief upon depositing the amount equivalent to 34 days’ salary, and thereafter discontinuing from his work, cannot be readily accepted as a proper course of conduct.

9. From the petitioner’s own statement, it is apparent that there was a period of 34 days during which he remained absent without authorisation. The remittance of the balance amount towards the notice period, by itself, would not establish that the petitioner had been relieved from service or that his application for voluntary retirement had been accepted. It may the petitioner’s impression that, upon remitting the requisite amount, he would be relieved from service. However, merely on the basis of such remittance, the petitioner cannot assume that he had been relieved from service in the absence of an order of acceptance. Therefore, this Court is of the firm view that the petitioner’s absence during the relevant period constitutes a serious lapse on his part.

10. As already stated, in an organisation, an employee cannot expect to be relieved instantaneously upon submitting an application for voluntary retirement. At the same time, this Court is conscious of the fact that the Management did not issue any communication to the petitioner for more than one and a half years, until the charge memorandum dated 31.05.2005 was issued. The delay in issuing the charge memorandum necessitates an examination of the defence raised by the petitioner. It is the petitioner’s case that, in terms of Rule 31 of the LIC Pension Rules, notwithstanding his absence from duty, upon completion of 90 days from the date of submission of the application for voluntary retirement, he was deemed to have retired from service. For ready reference, this Court deems it appropriate to extract Rule 31 of the LIC Pension Rules, which reads as follows:- “31 Pension on Voluntary retirement4

(1) At any time after an employee has completed twenty years of qualifying service he may, by giving notice of not less than ninety days, in writing, to the appointing authority, retire from service: Provided that this sub-rule shall not apply to an employee who is on deputation unless after having been transferred or having returned to India he has resumed charge of the post in India and has served for a period of not less than one year: Provided further that this sub-rule shall not apply to an employee who seeks retirement from service for being absorbed permanently in an autonomous body or a public sector undertaking to which he is on deputation at the time of seeking voluntary retirement.

(2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub-rule

(1) shall require acceptance by the appointing authority: Provided that where the appointing authority does not refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the expiry of the period specified in the said notice, the retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry of the said period.

(3) (a) An employee referred to in sub-rule (1) may make a request in writing to the appointing authority to accept notice of voluntary retirement of less than ninety days giving reasons therefor; (b) on receipt of a request under clause(a), the appointing authority may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), consider such request for the curtailment of the period of notice of ninety days on merits and if it is satisfied that the curtailment of the period of notice will not cause any administrative inconvenience, the appointing authority may relax the requirement of notice of ninety days on the condition that the employee shall not apply for commutation of a part of his pension before the expiry of the notice of ninety days.

(4) An employee, who has elected to retire under this rule and has given necessary notice to that effect to the appointing authority, shall be precluded from withdrawing his notice except with the specific approval of such authority: Provided that the request for such withdrawal shall be made before the intended date of his retirement.

(5) The qualifying service of an employee retiring voluntarily under this rule shall be increased by a period not exceeding five years, subject to the condition that the total qualifying service rendered by such employee shall not in any case exceed thirty-three years and it does not take him beyond the date of retirement.

(6) The pension of an employee retiring under this rule shall be based on the average emoluments as defined under clause(d) of rule 2 of these rules and the increase, not exceeding five years in his qualifying service, shall not entitle him to any notional fixation of pay for the purpose of calculating his pension.

11. According to the respondents, reliance is placed upon the letter dated 27.12.2003, whereby the petitioner was instructed to resume duty. The respondents contend that, under the said letter, the application for voluntary retirement was not rejected but was kept in abeyance. On a perusal of Rule 31, it appears that the provision contemplates two options, namely, acceptance or rejection of the application, and does not expressly provide a middle path of keeping the application in abeyance. However, keeping an application in abeyance may, to some extent, be construed as withholding permission for voluntary retirement until a decision is taken.

12. Admittedly, the said letter was issued within the prescribed period of 90 days. However, according to the petitioner, the letter was not served upon him. Even according to the respondents, the said letter was not directly served upon the petitioner, but was received by one J. Parthasarathy. The “To” address mentioned in the said letter is nothing but the office address. Admittedly, the petitioner had been absent from duty from 02.12.2003. Therefore, the very fact that the letter was sent to the office address raises a prima facie doubt regarding its actual service upon the petitioner.

13. In the petitioner’s letter dated 01.12.2003, he had furnished his correspondence address as D.159, KTVR Flats, First Floor, Thadagam Road, Shivaji Colony, Coimbatore – 641 025. The fact that the petitioner had furnished the aforesaid address for correspondence is not disputed by the respondents. The said letter forms part of the typed set of papers and there is no specific denial by the respondents with regard to the address furnished by the petitioner. When the petitioner had furnished a specific address for communication and had admittedly been absent from duty from 02.12.2003, the fact that the alleged letter dated 27.12.2003 was addressed to the office address gives rise to a serious apprehension regarding whether the said letter was actually served upon the petitioner or any of his family members.

14. Though it is contended that one J. Parthasarathy had received the letter, there is no reference to the identity of the said person or his relationship with the petitioner. The doubt surrounding the service of the letter dated 27.12.2003, coupled with the delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings in June 2005, leads this Court to the firm view that the respondents, despite being aware that the petitioner’s application for voluntary retirement had been kept in abeyance, did not insist upon his resuming duty immediately. Only subsequently, as an afterthought, the respondents proceeded to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. Even today, it is not the case of the petitioner that his application for voluntary retirement was expressly rejected. According to the respondents, the application continued to remain in abeyance. In the meantime, the petitioner was removed from service on the allegation of unauthorised absence.

15. As already indicated, the respondents have treated the petitioner’s absence as unauthorised absence amounting to abandonment of service. However, taking into consideration the factual circumstances, namely, that the petitioner had submitted an application for voluntary retirement, had remitted the amount equivalent to 34 days’ salary towards the remaining notice period, the doubt surrounding the service of the letter dated 27.12.2003 and the prolonged silence of the respondents in initiating disciplinary proceedings for

nearly 17 months, this Court is of the view that both parties appear to have proceeded on the understanding that the petitioner’s absence was in accordance with the applicable Rules, though such understanding may have been erroneous.

16. Such an erroneous understanding cannot be attributed solely to the petitioner. The respondents are also responsible to an extent, as they did not take any effective action for more than 17 months. Therefore, this Court entertains a serious apprehension with regard to the charge of abandonment of service. At the same time, it is also relevant to note that the petitioner took nearly seven years to challenge the order passed by the Chairman.

17. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the firm view that the finding of the respondents that the letter dated 27.12.2003 had been served upon the petitioner appears to be perverse. The said finding tilts the balance in favour of the petitioner and provides sufficient justification for this Court to interfere with the impugned orders. However, considering the peculiar circumstances and the fact that the dispute has remained pending between the petitioner and t he respondents for a considerable period, this Court does not propose to issue any further consequential directions at this stage.

18. In view of the above detailed discussion, the impugned orders are set aside and the matter is remitted back to the respondents for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is made clear that, until the respondents take a decision upon such fresh consideration, the petitioner shall not be entitled to claim any monetary benefits on the basis of his contention that he had voluntarily retired from service.

19. In the result, this Writ Petition is allowed as indicated above. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. No costs. 22-09-2026 Index: Yes Speaking Order Neutral Citation: Yes KV

To

1. The Chairperson Life Insurance Corporation of India, Central Office, Yogakshema, Jeeva Bima Marg, P.B.No. 19953, Mumbai - 400 021.

2. The Executive Director (Personnel), Life Insurance Corporation of India, Central Office, Yogakshema, Jeeva Bima Marg, P.B.No. 19953, Mumbai - 400 021.

3. The Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, India Life Building, P.B.No. 3810, Trichy Road, Coimbatore - 641 018.

4. Managing Director (Appellate Authority), Life Insurance Corporation of India, Central Office, 'Yogakshema' Jeeva Bima Marg, P.B.No.19953, Mumbai 400 021.

C.KUMARAPPAN J. KV WP No. 18378 of 2022 22-09-2026