ANAND KUMAR BHARANI vs INDIAN BANK (ALLAHABAD BANK) on 9 October 2026

**JUDGMENT**

1. 1. The Applicant has filed the present Miscellaneous Application under Section 22(2)(g) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 seeking to set aside the ex parte judgment dated 10/01/2020 passed in O.A.No.1539/2018. Alongside, he has filed an application for condonation of delay.

2. 2. The Applicant contends that he was never served with notice of the Original Application and only became aware 2M.A.No.64/2024

of the proceedings when recovery action reached his employer in August 2024. He submits that the ex parte judgment, if allowed to stand, would cause grave prejudice.

1. 3. The Respondent Bank disputes this, pointing out that summons were issued at three addresses, including the Applicant's employer, and upon failure of service, substituted service was effected through newspaper publication in "Raj Express" dated 28/09/2019. The Bank argues that the Applicant's plea of ignorance is untenable and the application is hopelessly barred by limitation.

**Findings**

1. 4. It is a settled legal position that two conditions are required to be examined for setting aside an Ex-parte order : (i) whether the Defendant proves that he had no notice of the date of hearing of the suit; and (ii) whether he had no sufficient time to appear and answer the claim of the plaintiff. Once these two conditions are satisfied, an ex parte decree can be set aside.

2. 5. The record of O.A.No.1539/2018 demonstrates that summons were dispatched by registered post to the following three addresses of the Applicant, including his official address at Airport Authority of India, Jabalpur:

*"Shri Anand Kumar Bharani S/o. Shri M.K. Bharani

i. House No.208, AnmolAppartment,*

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*Near Marium Chowk, Opp. Ridge Road, Civil Lines, Jabalpur.*

ii. *Plot No.88-A, PH No.37, Dream City Colony, Phase-II, Vill. Murla, Teh. & Dist. Sehore.*

iii. *C/o. Airport Authority of India, Jabalpur (MP)."*

6. When service failed, the Bank effected substituted service by newspaper publication. Such service is recognized as valid under law. Hence, the Applicant is deemed to have been served. Thus, the Applicant in this case has failed to satisfy the above mentioned first condition that he had no notice of the date of hearing.

7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Sunil Poddar & Others v. Union Bank of India, Appeal (Civil) No.85 of 2008, decided on 08/01/2008***, held:

*"19. It is, therefore, clear that the legal position under the amended Code is not whether the defendant was actually served with the summons in accordance with the procedure laid down and in the manner prescribed in Order V of the Code, but whether (i) he had notice of the date of hearing of the suit; and (ii) whether he had sufficient time to appear and answer the claim of the plaintiff. Once these two conditions are satisfied, an ex parte decree cannot be set aside even if it is established that there was irregularity in service of summons. If the Court is convinced that the defendant had otherwise knowledge of the proceedings and he could have appeared and answered the plaintiffs claim, he cannot put forward a ground of non-service of summons for setting aside ex parte decree passed against him by invoking Rule 13 of Order IX of the Code. Since the said*

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*provision applies to Debt Recovery Tribunals and Appellate Tribunals under the Act in view of Section 22(2)(g) of the Act, both the Tribunals were right in observing that the ground raised by the appellants could not be upheld. It is not even contended by the appellants that though they had knowledge of the proceedings before the DRT, they had no sufficient time to appear and answer the claim of the plaintiff-bank and on that ground, ex parte order deserves to be set aside."*

Applying this principle, the Applicant's vague plea of lack of knowledge cannot constitute "sufficient cause" under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, as made applicable to DRT proceedings by Section 22(2)(g) of the Act.

1. 8. Similarly, in ***Parimal v. Veena (2011) 3 SCC 545***, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that vague assertions of ignorance are insufficient to justify setting aside an ex parte decree. The Applicant's explanation is neither supported by evidence nor convincing.

2. 9. The Applicant's reliance on alleged knowledge only in August 2024 is misplaced. Limitation runs from the date of deemed service by publication in September 2019, not from a subsequent discovery. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Nikhila Divyang Mehta v. Hitesh P. Sanghvi, W.P. No.13459/2024, decided on 15/04/2025***, reiterated that limitation commences from accrual of cause of action, not from a later date of alleged knowledge.

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10. The Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in W.P.No.40627/2025 (order dated 14/11/2025)

filed by the Applicant in this case himself had already observed:

*"Prima facie, it cannot be believed that the notices were not served upon him at any of the addresses. The petitioner has very vaguely pleaded that no notice was served upon him..."*

This reinforces that the Applicant's plea is an afterthought.

11. It is noteworthy that the Applicant has provided only three addresses on records of the Bank and notices were duly sent by registered post at all the three addresses. If the Applicant claims that he has been transferred from his service station where he was posted at the time of availing loan, then it was his duty to inform in writing about change of his address to the Bank, which has not been done. Hence, the Applicant cannot claim benefit of his own omission to intimate change of his address to the Bank. It may also be observed that the Applicant is a responsible government employee and it was also his duty to inquire about the status of his loan account with the Bank after his alleged change of address on account of transfer. In the present case, the Applicant has shown indifferent attitude towards his moral responsibility to ✓

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repay the loan availed from the Respondent Bank, which is public money.

**On Costs**

1. 12. The RDB Act is enacted to ensure speedy adjudication and recovery of public money. Entertaining belated applications after five years undermines finality, delays recovery, and wastes judicial time. The Applicant, despite being a government servant holding a responsible post, failed to discharge his duty to inform the Bank of his change of address. His conduct reflects negligence and lack of bona fides.

2. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that courts must discourage frivolous and dilatory tactics. In ***Sunil Poddar (supra)***, it was observed that once knowledge of proceedings is established, defendants cannot misuse procedural technicalities to reopen concluded matters. Similarly, in ***Parimal v. Veena (supra)***, the Court stressed that vague excuses cannot justify delay.

3. 14. In the present case, the Applicant has not only failed to establish sufficient cause but has also consumed valuable judicial time by filing a meritless application after five years, despite clear observations of the Hon'ble High Court in the first round of litigation. Such conduct 7M.A.No.64/2024

warrants imposition of costs, both to deter abuse of process and to uphold the sanctity of judicial proceedings.

**ORDER**

- • The Miscellaneous Application No.64/2024 is dismissed as barred by limitation and devoid of merits.

- • The Applicant is directed to deposit **cost of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand Only)** in the **National Defence Fund Account No.11084239799 (IFSC: SBIN0000691)** with **State Bank of India, Institutional Division, Parliament Street, New Delhi**, within three days.

- • The cost is imposed to mark the Tribunal's disapproval of the Applicant's dilatory conduct and to compensate for the judicial time wasted in entertaining a meritless plea. File be consigned to records.

Pronounced in the Open Tribunal on 9^th October, 2026.

**(PANKAJ KUMAR UPADHYAY)** **PRESIDING OFFICER** **DRT-II, AHMEDABAD** **In-charge: DRT, Jabalpur** **09/10/2026**

Saloni