Madras High Court
CRP/4971/2025 of R.MALA Vs E.ARPUTHAM on 11 September 2026
THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Order reserved on : 07.09.2026
Order pronounced on : 11.09.2026
CORAM
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.BALAJI
CRP.No.4971 of 2025
& CMP.No.25110 of 2026
R.Mala
.. Petitioner
Vs.
E.Arputham
.. Respondent
Prayer: Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 115 of CPC, to set aside the order in E.P.No.50 of 2024 in O.S.No.339 of 2008 dated 15.09.2025 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Kanchipuram.
For Petitioner
: Mr.Kanchi GV.Mathiazhagan
For Respondent
: Mr.Joseph Sundar
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ORDER
The judgment debtor, who suffered a decree in O.S.No.339 of 2008, is the revision petitioner.
2. I have heard Mr.Kanchi GV.Mathiazhagan, learned counsel for the revision petitioner and Mr.J.Joseph Sundar, learned counsel for the respondent.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner would mainly contend that the execution petition was hopelessly time barred and without noticing the valid objections with regard to the maintainability of the execution petition, the Executing Court has proceeded to allow the execution petition. He would refer to Article 135 of the Limitation Act to drive home his submissions that for execution of a decree for mandatory injunction, the limitation period provided is only three years, unlike execution petitions relating to possession, etc., of immovable properties, where a larger period of 12 years is available for execution of the decree. He would therefore pray for the revision petition being allowed.
4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent would place strong reliance on the decision of this Court in M.A.Raja Vs. S.Vedhantham Pillai and others, reported in 2000 (II) CTC 199 and contend that when a decree is for permanent injunction, as well as mandatory injunction, then it is only Article 136 of the Limitation Act which would apply, for which there is no limitation provided and therefore Article 135 of the Limitation Act cannot be pressed into service. He would therefore state that there is no error committed by the Executing Court in entertaining the execution petition and passing the impugned order. He would therefore pray for the revision petition being dismissed.
5. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel on either side.
6. In order to appreciate the rival contentions advanced, it would be relevant to notice the prayer sought for in the original suit before the Trial Court. The respondent prayed for a declaratory relief that he is the absolute owner of the suit property and for a consequential permanent injunction, restraining the defendant that is the revision petitioner herein, from putting up any further construction and interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The relief of mandatory injunction was also sought for, directing the defendants 1 and 2 to remove the unlawful construction put up in the suit property. The third and fourth reliefs of permanent injunction were sought for against the official defendants, namely the Junior Engineer and the Superintending Engineer attached to the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board to restrain them from giving any approval for the construction made unlawfully and also from giving electricity service connection to the suit property, on any application made by the revision petitioner.
7. The suit was contested by the revision petitioner and ultimately, the Trial Court, in and by a decree dated 23.12.2016, partly decreed the suit, granting the declaratory relief and consequential permanent injunction as sought for in the first relief in the plaint, besides also granting the mandatory injunction that was sought for as the second suit relief. The remaining reliefs pertaining to permanent injunction as against the statutory defendants was not granted and the suit was dismissed insofar as such reliefs were concerned. The Trial Court granted three months time from the date of decree i.e., 23.12.2016, for removal of the unlawful construction put up in the suit property.
8. Admittedly, the defendant did not comply with the said mandatory injunction passed against him. In fact, the revision petitioner filed a suit in O.S.No.247 of 2008, for declaration of his title and for consequential permanent injunction. Both the suits were tried together and in and by a common judgment, the suit filed by the respondent was partly decreed and the suit filed by the petitioner was dismissed. The revision petitioner preferred an appeal in A.S.No.2 of 2018 only as against the decree passed in O.S.No.247 of 2008, in and by which the Trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the revision petitioner.
9. Admittedly, no challenge was made to the decree in O.S.No.339 of 2008, which granted the mandatory injunction in favour of the respondent-decree holder. Therefore, the decree granted on 23.12.2016 in O.S.No.339 of 2008 became final, with the verdict of the Trial Court. The Trial Court had granted three months time for in removal of the unauthorized construction, which also ended on 23.03.2017. In terms of Article 135 of the Limitation Act, the execution petition for execution of a decree for mandatory injunction had to be filed within a period of three years. Given the above facts and dates, the execution petition should have been filed on or before 22.03.2020. Admittedly, the EP was filed only on 17.04.2023.
10. Firstly, the petitioner cannot take advantage of the dismissal of the appeal preferred by the petitioner as against a different suit in O.S.No.247 of 2008. The limitation for execution of the decree started running from the date of decree, namely 23.12.2016 and the only period that can be excluded is the three months time granted by the Trial Court for removal of the unlawful construction. As already discussed herein above, the execution petition ought to have been filed on or before 22.03.2020.
11. Strong reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in M.A.Raja's case, where this Court held that when a decree for mandatory injunction is granted, consequent to a finding that the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction and if the obstruction continues, then it would be a violation of the decree for permanent injunction, entitling the same to be executed under Order XXI Rule 32 of CPC. This Court, in the facts of that case, held that a decree for permanent injunction is not barred by limitation and since the decree for mandatory injunction called upon the defendant to remove the structures that were in existence at the time of institution of the suit and passing of the decree, this Court held that the plaintiffs were well within their rights to take the assistance of the Court, as long as the obstruction continues and the right of enjoyment is affected by wrongful assertion of the defendant and till such time, such obstructions are removed. I do not see how this decision can be applied to the facts of the present case. Though that was also a suit for mandatory injunction as well as permanent injunction, on facts, I find that the dispute was with regard to usage of a pathway and obstruction alleged by the plaintiff.
12. The Trial Court in that case had granted a decree for both permanent injunction and mandatory injunction, restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff and also for removing the buildings put up by them obstructing the entrance/usage of pathway by the plaintiff. In such circumstances, this Court held that while holding that the plaintiff was entitled to make use of the road, without any obstruction from the defendants and since the defendants had already put up construction in the said road and the Court granting both decrees for permanent injunction as well as the mandatory injunction, then it cannot be contended that the execution petition is barred by limitation and held that the plaintiff would still be entitled to execute the decree, as if it is a decree for perpetual injunction.
13. However, in the facts of the present case, especially in the light of the suit reliefs that have already been discussed herein above, the plaintiff had only prayed for a consequential permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from putting up any further construction. A separate relief for mandatory injunction was sought against the defendants 1 and 2 for removal of the unlawful construction already put up by the 1st defendant, namely the revision petitioner herein in the suit property.
14. Though the Trial Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the reliefs given for issues 1 and 2 alone, the concluding portions of the judgment clearly specify the nature of reliefs granted to the respondent. The plaintiff was only declared to be the owner of the suit property comprised in S.No.185/12 at Chinnaiyangulam Village, measuring East-West 26 ft and North-South 40 ft and mandatory injunction against the 1st defendant alone to remove the unlawful construction made in the suit property, within three months. Thus, the Trial Court appears to have not granted the suit reliefs, as prayed for even in respect of reliefs 1 and 2. Therefore, it is not open to the respondent to contend that when the Trial Court has specifically observed in the judgment that the respondent is entitled to the reliefs granted in respect of issues 1 and 2, the consequential relief of permanent injunction is also granted and therefore, the respondent can take benefit of the ratio laid down by this Court in M.A.Raja's case. I have already distinguished the facts in M.A.Raja's case and held that on the facts of the present case, the ratio in M.A.Raja's case cannot be applied. However, a copy of the decree is not enclosed, along with the revision and therefore, I am not in a position to see whether the decree has been granted in respect of the consequential permanent injunction prayed for by the respondent in the first suit relief.
15. The present execution petition admittedly is in respect of the second suit relief, which is the relief of mandatory injunction. For various reasons already discussed herein above, the execution petition is belated and beyond the statutory period of three years and therefore, the decree cannot be executed insofar as it relates to the relief of mandatory injunction. However, subject to decree there being any consequential decree for permanent injunction also being granted, then it is needless to state that it is always open to the respondent to enforce the decree for permanent injunction as granted by the Trial Court, in the event of there being any violation of the said decree for permanent injunction, by seeking appropriate relief in fresh execution proceedings. Insofar as the decree for permanent injunction, there is no question of limitation and whenever there is a violation of the decree, if available, in favour of the respondent, the same can be sought to be enforced, by taking out appropriate execution application.
16. In the light of the above, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the order dated 15.09.2025 in E.P.No.50 of 2024 in O.S.No.339 of 2008 on the file of the
Principal District Munsif, Kanchipuram, is set aside. No costs. Connected Civil Miscellaneous Petition is closed. 11.09.2026 Neutral Citation Case : Yes / No Speaking / Non-speaking order Index : Yes/No ata To The Principal District Munsif, Kanchipuram.
P.B.BALAJI.
J, ata Pre-delivery order made in CRP.No.4971 of 2025 11.09.2026