CRP(MD)/1765/2023 of N. KUMUDHA Vs SELVI(AMENDED AS)SELVI ALIAS on 11 September 2026

COMMON ORDER

This civil revision petition is filed against the order dated 11.04.2023 passed in I.A.Nos.8, 9 and 10 of 2023 in O.S.No.83 of 2019 on the file of the Principal District Court, Karur.

2. The revision petitioner is the plaintiff in the suit in O.S. No. 83 of 2019 filed for specific performance on the basis of the sale agreement dated 28.09.2018 entered into between the revision petitioner/plaintiff and one Balasubramaniam, who was the husband of the first defendant, father of defendants 2 and 3, and son of the fourth defendant. The total sale consideration agreed upon was Rs.25,00,000/-, out of which the revision petitioner/plaintiff had paid a sum of Rs.20,00,000/-. The balance sale consideration of Rs.5,00,000/- was agreed to be paid within a period of ten months. However, in the meantime, the said Balasubramaniam died on 04.12.2018. Thereafter, the legal heirs of the deceased vendor denied the plaintiff's claim for specific performance. Consequently, the revision petitioner/plaintiff was constrained to institute the suit for specific performance against the legal heirs of the said Balasubramaniam.

3. In the meantime, the petitioner, in her written statement, denied the title of the deceased Balasubramanian and contended that the suit properties are the absolute and self-acquired properties of one Natarajan and that the said Balasubramanian had no right, title, or interest whatsoever over the said properties. It was further contended that the said Natarajan, during his lifetime, had executed a registered Will dated 24.01.2005 in favour of his grandson, the second respondent herein, while reserving a life estate in favour of the fourth defendant. Thus, the petitioner completely denied the title of the deceased Balasubramanian over the suit properties. Subsequently, in order to establish that the petitioner had entered into the sale transaction bona fide and had agreed to purchase the property on the basis of the title represented by the deceased Balasubramanian, the petitioner filed I.A. Nos. 8, 9 and 10 of 2023 seeking to reopen the evidence, recall the witness, and receive/mark certain documents in evidence for the purpose of establishing her claim and title.

4. The respondents contested the said applications and strongly opposed the same, contending that the petitioner/plaintiff cannot be permitted to introduce evidence relating to the title over the suit properties, as the same is beyond the scope of the present suit for specific performance. The Trial Court, accepting the said contention, dismissed the petitions in I.A. Nos. 8, 9 and 10 of 2023, observing that it is the duty of the plaintiff to establish the existence and validity of the agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the husband of the first defendant, namely, the deceased Balasubramanian, and also to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. The Trial Court further observed that the documents sought to be produced by the petitioner would not establish or prove the factum of the contract between the plaintiff and the deceased Balasubramanian and would not in any manner assist the Court in determining the issues involved in the suit. The Trial Court also held that, by seeking to introduce the said documents, the plaintiff was attempting to convert the suit for specific performance into one for declaration of title or rights in respect of the suit properties. Holding that the documents sought to be produced were not necessary for deciding the issues in controversy, the Trial Court dismissed the said applications. Aggrieved by the said order, the present revision petition has been filed.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents/defendants contended that, though the respondents had categorically denied the petitioner’s claim in their written statement dated 04.09.2019 itself, the petitioner did not take any steps to produce the documents now sought to be introduced at the appropriate stage of the proceedings. It was further contended that, after the completion of the evidence on both sides and when the suit had been posted for arguments, the petitioner came forward with the present applications seeking to reopen the evidence and produce additional documents. According to the learned counsel, the applications were filed belatedly and only with a view to introduce matters which are beyond the scope of the suit for specific performance. Hence, the Trial Court had rightly dismissed the applications, and the impugned order does not call for any interference.

6. In support of his case, he relied upon a judgment in Marikannu Vs. Alagammal(died) and Ors., reported in (2019)5 LW 170. He relied upon the another judgment in Alok Gupta Vs. Anjani Gupta and Anr., reported in (2023) 0 Supreme(Del) 2539 and also in Mohd Ansaar Alias Teepu Vs. Dildar and Others reported in (2020)1 AWC 194, and the relevant portions are extracted hereunder: “5.In Gurmit Singh Bhatia (supra), cited by learned counsel for the petitioner, the suit was for specific performance of an agreement for sale. An order of temporary injunction was operating in the suit, restraining the first defendant from alienating the suit property. In violation of the said injunction order, he executed sale deed in favour of third party, who thereafter sought impleadment in the suit, alleging that he is in possession of the suit property. In the said backdrop, the Supreme Court did not permit impleadment of the third party, observing thus: -

"15. As discussed herein earlier, whether Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 were proper parties or not, the governing principle for deciding the question would be that the presence of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 before the court would be necessary to enable it effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. As noted herein earlier, in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale, the issue to be decided is the enforceability of the contract entered into between the appellant and Respondents 2 and 3 and whether contract was executed by the appellant and Respondents 2 and 3 for sale of the contracted property, whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and whether the appellant is entitled to a decree for specific performance of a contract for sale against Respondents 2 and 3. It is an admitted position that Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 did not seek their addition in the suit on the strength of the contract in respect of which the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale has been filed. Admittedly, they based their claim on independent title and possession of the contracted property. It is, therefore, obvious as noted herein earlier that in the event, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 are added or impleaded in the suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale shall be enlarged from the suit for specific performance to a suit for title and possession which is not permissible in law. In the case of Vijay Pratap v. Sambhu Saran Sinha [(1996) 10 SCC 53] this Court had taken the same view which is being taken by us in this judgment as discussed above. This Court in that decision clearly held that to decide the right, title and interest in the suit property of the stranger to the contract is beyond the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract and the same cannot be turned into a regular title suit. Therefore, in our view, a third party or a stranger to the contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character. As discussed above, in the event any decree is passed against Respondents 2 and 3 and in favour of the appellant for specific performance of the contract for sale in respect of the contracted property, the decree that would be passed in the said suit, obviously, cannot bind Respondents 1 and 4 to 11. It may also be observed that in the event, the appellant obtains a decree for specific performance of the contracted property against Respondents 2 and 3, then, the Court shall direct execution of deed of sale in favour of the appellant in the event Respondents 2 and 3 refusing to execute the deed of sale and to obtain possession of the contracted property he has to put the decree in execution. As noted hereinearlier, since Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 were not parties in the suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of the contracted property, a decree passed in such a suit shall not bind them and in that case, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 would be at liberty either to obstruct execution in order to protect their possession by taking recourse to the relevant provisions of CPC, if they are available to them, or to file an independent suit for declaration of title and possession against the appellant or Respondent 3. On the other hand, if the decree is passed in favour of the appellant and sale deed is executed, the stranger to the contract being Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 have to be sued for taking possession if they are in possession of the decretal property.

16. That apart, from a plain reading of the expression used in sub-rule

(2) Order 1 Rule 10 CPC "all the questions involved in the suit" it is abundantly clear that the legislature clearly meant that the controversies raised as between the parties to the litigation must be gone into only, that is to say, controversies with regard to the right which is set up and the relief claimed on one side and denied on the other and not the controversies which may arise between the plaintiff-appellant and the defendants inter se or questions between the parties to the suit and a third party. In our view, therefore, the court cannot allow adjudication of collateral matters so as to convert a suit for specific performance of contract for sale into a complicated

suit for title between the plaintiff-appellant on one hand and Respondents 2 and 3 and Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 on the other. This addition, if allowed, would lead to a complicated litigation by which the trial and decision of serious questions which are totally outside the scope of the suit would have to be gone into. As the decree of a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, if passed, cannot, at all, affect the right, title and interest of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 in respect of the contracted property and in view of the detailed discussion made hereinearlier, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 would not, at all, be necessary to be added in the instant suit for specific performance of the contract for sale."

6. It is clear from the law laid down by the Supreme Court that a third party, who seeks to raise question of title, cannot be permitted to be impleaded in a suit for specific performance. A suit for specific performance, it was held, cannot be permitted to be converted into a complicated title suit between the plaintiff, the defendants and the third parties. However, in the instant case, there is no dispute relating to title of the defendants to the suit property, as it was a suit for partition. The only dispute was regarding extent of share of the defendants and the manner in which property is to be divided. These questions can only be effectively decided, if the assignee of the interest of the defendants is permitted to be brought on record, as has been done by the court below. It is noteworthy that in Khemchand Shankar Chaudhary (supra), Amit Kumar Shaw (supra), Savita Devi (supra), Dhan Lakshmi (supra) and Thomson Press (India) Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court permitted impleadment of assignee at the stage of preparation of final decree in partition suit.” and prayed to dismiss the petition.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon a judgment in

Pemmada Prabhakar and Others Vs. Youngmen's Vysys Association, reported in (2015)5 Supreme Court Cases 35 para 29, and the relevant para is extracted hereunder: “29.The provisions of Section 17 of the Specific Relief Act in categorical term expressly state that a Contract to sell or let any immovable property cannot be specifically enforced in favour of a vendor or lessor who does not have absolute title and right upon the party. It is worthwhile to extract Section 17 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 here :- “17.-Contract to sell or let property by one who has no title, not specifically enforceable.- A contract to sell or let any immovable property cannot be specifically enforced in favour of a vendor or lessor; (a) who, knowing not to have any title to the property, has contracted to sell or let the property (b) who, though he entered into the contract believing that he had a good title to the property, cannot at the time fixed by the parties or by the court for the completion of the sale or letting, give the purchaser or lessee a title free from reasonable doubt.” In view of the aforesaid provisions of the Specific Relief Act, the Agreement of Sale entered between the plaintiffs and some of the co-sharers who do not have the absolute title to the suit schedule property is not enforceable in law. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated and considered by both the First Appellate Court and the Second Appellate Court. Therefore, the impugned judgment is vitiated in law.

and states that in the contract for the sale of immovable property cannot be specifically enforced in favour of a vendor or lessor who has no absolute title or right over the property and who, though he entered into the contract believing that he had a good title to the property, cannot at the time fixed by the parties or by the Court for the completion of the sale or letting, give the purchaser or lessee a title free from reasonable doubt. In view of the said statutory provision, where the agreement of sale has been entered into by some of the co-sharers who do not have absolute title over the entire suit schedule property, such an agreement cannot be specifically enforced in law.

8. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff contended that, unless the petitioner is afforded an opportunity to establish the title under which the deceased Balasubramanian entered into the agreement of sale, the petitioner would be seriously prejudiced in prosecuting the suit for specific performance. He submitted that the question of title has arisen only because the respondents/defendants have specifically denied the title of the deceased Balasubramanian over the suit properties. The learned counsel fairly conceded that there was some delay in producing the documents. However, he submitted that the documents sought to be produced are not documents created or obtained by the petitioner at a belated stage, but are documents relied upon by the defendants themselves in support of their claim. He further contended that the defendants have taken a specific stand that the suit properties have subsequently been transferred in favour of defendants 4 and 2. Therefore, in order to disprove the said contention and establish the circumstances relating to the title and transfer of the suit properties, the petitioner seeks permission to produce and mark the said documents. According to him, the documents are necessary for a proper and effective adjudication of the dispute between the parties.

9. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents 1, 2 and 5 and perused the materials on record.

10. It is true that the scope of a suit for specific performance is limited to determining whether there was a valid and enforceable contract between the parties and whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. However, in the present case, the defendants have specifically denied the title of the original vendor, namely, the deceased Balasubramanian, who executed the agreement of sale in favour of the petitioner/plaintiff. The defendants have also relied upon subsequent transactions and asserted rights over the suit properties. In such circumstances, when the petitioner has sought an opportunity to establish the title of the vendor under whom he claims to have entered into the agreement of sale, there is no justification for denying him an opportunity to produce the relevant documents, particularly when he asserts that he entered into the agreement bona fide, believing that the deceased Balasubramanian was the owner of the suit properties, and that he had already paid about 75% of the agreed sale consideration. Therefore, the documents sought to be produced cannot be said to be wholly irrelevant or beyond the scope of the dispute, especially when the title of the original vendor itself has been specifically put in issue by the defendants. The learned Trial Court, without properly considering the aforesaid circumstances and the effect of the defence raised by the respondents, dismissed the applications. The said order, therefore, is liable to be set aside.

11. In view of the foregoing discussion, the Civil Revision Petitions are allowed. The petitioner is permitted to produce and mark the documents in accordance with law. The Trial Court is directed to proceed with the matter and complete the trial within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 11.09.2026 NCC : Yes / No

Index : Yes / No Ns To

1. The Principal District Court, Karur

2. The Section Officer, Vernacular Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.

R.POORNIMA

, J. Ns C.R.P(MD)Nos.1765 to 1767 of 2023 and C.M.P(MD)No.8821 of 2023 11.09.2026