WA/2511/2026 of K.MUTHUKUMAR Vs THE MANAGEMENT OF HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LIMITED on 7 September 2026

JUDGMENT

(Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dr.G.Jayachandran J.) This Writ Appeal has been filed by the workman, who is aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge interfered with the order of the Industrial Tribunal, which had dismissed the approval petition filed by the Management seeking approval for the dismissal order passed pursuant to disciplinary proceedings.

2. The facts of the case are as below:- The appellant herein was appointed as a Technician under the respondent Management on 07.07.1999. He abstained from duty without authorization from 07.02.2014. For his unauthorized absence, a charge memo was issued by the Management and subsequently, a domestic enquiry was conducted. Though the appellant responded to the initial show-cause notice, he failed to participate in the subsequent enquiry proceedings. Despite further notices being sent to his last known address, he either refused to receive or the notices returned unserved with the endorsement “left”. Consequently, the Management proceeded with the domestic enquiry ex-parte and awarded the punishment of dismissal for his unauthorized absence. The said dismissal order dated 12.09.2014, was presented before the Industrial Tribunal for approval under Section 33 (2)(b) of the Industrial Dispute Act.

3. The Tribunal framed the following questions for consideration based on the pleadings and records:- “1.Whether the order of dismissal is in accordance with the Standing Orders?

2. Whether the applicant paid one month wages or not?

3. Whether the order of dismissal is by way of victimization or not?”

4. On considering the evidence on record, the Tribunal held that the misconduct of unauthorized absence was not grave in nature and it would not require an order of dismissal. Holding that the punishment imposed was very harsh and wholly disproportionate to the proved misconduct, the Tribunal found that termination order unjustified. Consequently, it directed the Management to reinstate the respondent-workman within four weeks from the date of the order, without back wages from the date of his dismissal till the date of reinstatement.

5. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal, the Management has filed writ petition in W.P.No.10438 of 2019.

6. The learned Single Judge, on perusing the materials on record and the undisputed facts, observed that the respondent-workman was absent unauthorizedly for more than 200 days, for which he was charge-sheeted twice, The first spell of unauthorized absence spanned 62 days (from 07.02.2014 to 09.04.2014) and the second spell spanned 43 days (from 10.04.2014 to 29.05.2014). Though the respondent-workman replied to the initial show-cause notice and thereafter, remained ex-parte during the domestic enquiry.

7. When a second show-cause notice was issued calling for an explanation against the proposed punishment, the respondent replied on 04.09.2014 stating that he was not able to attend duty due to poor health and his absence was not wilful insubordination. Having found no element of victimization or breach of principles of natural justice, the learned Single Judge held that the Tribunal’s interference with the punishment by invoking powers under Section 11A of the I.D.Act, while considering an approval petition under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, was erroneous and contrary to the well-settled principles of law laid by the Courts. Particularly, the learned Single Judge relied upon the celebrated judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in John D'Souza v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (2019) 18 SCC 47, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as below:- “22.The Legislature has, thus, provided a self- contained mechanism through Section 10 read with Sections 11(3) and 11A of the Act, for adjudication of an ‘industrial dispute’ stemming out of an order of discharge or dismissal of a workman. Having done so, it can be safely inferred that neither the Legislature intended nor was there any legal necessity to set-up a parallel remedy under the same Statute for adjudication of the same ‘industrial dispute’ by the same Forum of Labour Court or Tribunal via Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. To say it differently, Section 33(2)

(b) has been inserted for a purpose other than that for which Section 10(1)(c) and (d) have been enacted.

Section 33(2)(b), thus, is neither meant for nor does it engender an overlapping procedure to adjudicate the legality, propriety, justifiability or otherwise sustainability of a punitive action taken against a workman.

25. The Labour Court/Tribunal, nevertheless, while holding enquiry under Section 33(2)(b), would remember that such like summary proceedings are not akin and at par with its jurisdiction to adjudicate an ‘Industrial dispute’ under Section 10(i)(c) and (d) of the Act, nor the former provision clothe it with the power to peep into to the quantum of punishment for which it has to revert back to Section 11A of the Act. Where the Labour Court/Tribunal, thus, do not find the domestic enquiry defective and the principles of fair and just play have been adhered to, they will accord the necessary approval to the action taken by the employer, albeit without prejudice to the right of the workman to raise an ‘industrial dispute’ referrable for adjudication under Section 10(1)(c) of (d), as the case may be. It needs pertinent mention that an order of approval granted under Section 33(2)(b) has no binding effect in the proceedings under Section 10(1)(c) and (d) which shall be decided independently while weighing the material adduced by the parties before the Labour Court/Tribunal.”

8. The learned Single Judge has also taken note of the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalla Ram v. D.C.M. Chemical Works Ltd. (1978) 3 SCC 1 while considering the application for approval. Judicial pronouncements have constantly established that while considering an application for approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D.Act, the Tribunal is not required to consider the propriety or adequacy of the punishment, but only to look into the facts to ensure that the enquiry proceedings are not flawed on facts and do not involve a patent exercise of malafides and victimization.

9. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant, who is before this Court challenging the order of the learned Single judge, submitted that the notice issued to the appellant for the enquiry was not served and the enquiry was conducted behind his back without considering the very crucial facts and that the appellant was suffering from acute jaundice and was admitted to the hospital. The medical reports and other documents were considered by the Tribunal, which found that the dismissal order was not fair and justifiable. However, the learned Single Judge failed to take note of the materials placed by the workman in the proper perspective and has given a narrow interpretation to Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D.Act.

10. The said submissions, though they appear genuine and reasonable when submitted on behalf of the appellant, are countered by the conduct of the appellant in abstaining himself from participating in the enquiry. Despite having knowledge of the initiation of the domestic enquiry and responding to the show- cause notice, his actions clearly show a refusal to receive the enquiry notice and leaving his last known address without any intimation even to the postal department or the Management. Having already initiated disciplinary proceedings, the appellant cannot take umbrage under the plea of natural justice to support the order passed by the Tribunal, which was set aside by the learned Single Judge.

11. The law is well settled in respect of the power conferred upon authorities under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, but such power cannot be extended by drawing upon the powers conferred under Section 11A of the Act. The learned Single Judge rightly pointed out the erroneous exercise of power by the Tribunal while dealing with the approval application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. If at all, the punishment of dismissal for habitual unauthorized absence is excessive, this matter cannot be decided under Section 33(2)(b) and the remedy must be sought elsewhere. An application requesting approval for dismissal cannot be tested on the parameters of the quantum or proportionately of the punishment, but only on the parameters of a violation of the principles of natural justice.

12. Regarding the element of victimization, the Tribunal in this case has not found any such evidence on record. While so, the Tribunal should not have gone into the proportionality of the punishment while considering the approval application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act.

13. The learned Single Judge rightly pointed out the said defect and set aside the order. We also have our own reservation that when an approval application is declined, an order of the Tribunal to reinstate the appellant without back wages will tantamount to allowing a proved delinquent to be reinstated without even a memo of punishment; on that score also, we find no infirmity in the order of the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge rightly interfered with and set aside the order of the Tribunal, which had refused the approval. We find no reason to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge, this Writ Appeal stands dismissed. No costs.

14. However, the dismissal of this writ appeal shall not stand in the way of the employee seeking redressal before the appropriate forum in accordance with law. Further, the time taken in pursuing this matter all along shall be excluded for the purpose of reckoning limitation. (Dr.G.J.,J.) (E.M.,J.) 07-09-2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes/No rpl

To The Industrial Tribunal, Chennai.

DR.G.JAYACHANDRAN J. and E.MANOHARAN J. rpl Writ Appeal No. 2511 of 2026 07-09-2026