CRP(MD)/2292/2026 of G.Kalaiselvi (Died), Silamba Vs G.Veeramani on 3 September 2026

O R D E R

This Civil Revision Petition is filed challenging the order passed in I.A.No.215 of 2026 in O.S.No.87 of 2016, dated 14/07/2026 by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Thanjavur.

2. The petitioner is the sole defendant in the suit. He is represented by his wife Mrs.Madhavi, as his Power of Attorney Agent. The suit was filed by the respondent/plaintiff seeking specific performance of the agreement of sale and in the event of failure to execute the sale deed, a direction to have the sale deed executed through the process of the Court and for delivery of possession of the suit property. The plaintiff has also sought an alternative relief for recovery of a sum of Rs.8,60,000/- said to have been paid as advance.

3. The petitioner states that he was working in Singapore and therefore, his wife was appointed as his Power of Attorney Agent. During the pendency of the suit, the original defendant died, leaving behind the present petitioner as his legal heir, and the petitioner was impleaded as a party to the suit. Summons was duly served upon him and he entered appearance through counsel.

4. The petitioner further states that after entering appearance, he left India and was unable to contest the suit, as his family was dependent upon his income and he was unable to come to India. Thereafter, on 30/01/2025 his Power of Attorney Agent received notice in the Execution Petition for delivery of the suit property. Immediately thereafter, she contacted the petitioner and his counsel and came to know that an ex- parte decree had already been passed against the petitioner on 28/08/2018. Thereafter, the petitioner executed a Power of Attorney in favour of his wife and filed a petition to condone the delay of 2,626 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex-parte decree and prayed for allowing the same.

5. The respondent/plaintiff resisted the petition. According to the respondent, the delay had not been properly explained. It was further contended that the petitioner and his Power of Attorney Agent were fully aware of the proceedings and had on several occasions filed petitions to set aside the ex-parte order/decree, but failed to take steps to get the same numbered. It was specifically contended that the Power of Attorney Agent had earlier filed a petition under Order IX Rule 7 CPC on 19/06/2018 to set aside the ex-parte order, but failed to take steps to get the petition numbered. Thereafter, another petition was filed on 18/07/2022 under Order IX Rule 13 CPC along with a petition to condone the delay of 1,423 days. Even that petition was not numbered. A further petition was filed in E.P.No.297 of 2019 seeking to set aside the ex-parte order passed therein, but no steps were taken to get the same numbered. Again, a petition was filed in E.P.No.431 of 2024 along with a petition seeking recognition of the petitioner's wife as his Power of Attorney Agent. Even that petition was not numbered. The respondent, therefore, contended that the conduct of the petitioner and his Power of Attorney Agent clearly demonstrated that they were negligent, lethargic and not vigilant in prosecuting the proceedings. It was further contended that all these material facts had been suppressed in the present petition and that the petitioner had falsely stated that he came to know about the ex-parte decree only on 30/01/2025.

6. The respondent further submitted that E.P.No.297 of 2019 had been filed for execution of the sale deed and that despite having knowledge of the proceedings, the petitioner remained ex-parte. The sale deed was subsequently executed on 20/10/2023 and the Execution Petition was closed on 22/11/2023. Thereafter, when proceedings for delivery of the suit property were initiated, the present petition came to be filed with an enormous delay.

7. The learned Trial Court, after considering the rival submissions and the documents marked as Exs.R1 to R4 dismissed the petition. The Trial Court held that the petitioner and his Power of Attorney Agent were not vigilant and that the delay had not been satisfactorily explained. The Trial Court further held that the petition had been filed only with a view to prolong the execution proceedings.

8. Challenging the said order, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was residing and working in Singapore and that his wife was acting as his Power of Attorney Agent. It was contended that the delay was neither wilful nor deliberate and that the petitioner had taken steps to set aside the ex-parte decree. According to the learned counsel, the earlier counsel had failed to take the necessary steps to get the petitions numbered and, therefore, the petitioner should not be made to suffer for the lapse committed by his counsel.

9. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand and Others v. Sushila Bhatt, SLP(C) Nos.27014 of 2024, dated 03.02.2025, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paragraph 6 as follows:- “6.It is clear from the language of the above provision and the jurisprudence developed around the law of limitation that the Courts should exercise conscious discretion while considering an application for condonation of delay. Based on the principles enshrined in the precedents of this Court, it can be inferred that if it is wilful negligence, lethargy or incompetence of public instrumentalities, ignorance or inaction of a party which causes delay in approaching the appellate judicial forum, it does not fulfil the threshold of ‘sufficient cause’ to condone the delay. However, if the reason for delay is illiteracy of a party or an error by the advocate, which was beyond the control of the party, then the Court can favourably consider these factors to condone the delay. The length of delay is also a material consideration while exercising the discretion. In the present case, we find that a delay of 204 days is not extraordinary or inordinate to dismiss the appeal. Further, the delay has not resulted in crystallisation of any right to the opposite party. The Appellant State has justified the delay with cogent reasons and relevant timeline of events transpired among various departments of Government. Considering the length of delay and satisfactory explanation provided by the Appellant, we are inclined to allow the appeal.”

10. In Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, Civil Appeal Nos.8183-8184 of 2013, dated 13.09.2013, it has been held in paragraph 13 as follows:- “13. Recently in Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, the learned Judges referred to the pronouncement in Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil, wherein it has been opined that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in the latter case no such consideration arises. Thereafter, the two-Judge Bench ruled thus: ‘23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under

Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost.

24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on the bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.’ Eventually, the Bench, upon perusal of the application for condonation of delay and the affidavit on record, came to hold that certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent and, accordingly, reversed the decision of the High Court which had condoned the delay of more than seven years.”

11. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Robin Thapa v. Rohit Dora, reported in (2019) 7 SCC

359. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:- “Ordinarily, litigation is based on adjudication on the merits of the contentions of the parties. Litigation should not be terminated by default, either of the plaintiff or the defendant. The cause of justice does require that, as far as possible, adjudication be done on merits.”

12. Reliance was also placed upon the order of this Court in Brahmand Farm Lands Ltd., represented by its Director V.K. Somakumar v. K. Venkatesan, C.R.P.(NPD)No.3361 of 2017, dated 16.03.2021, wherein it has been held in paragraph 11 as follows:- “11.Insofar as the ex-parte decree is concerned, in a suit for specific performance, the litigation should not be terminated by default and the adjudication should be done, as far as possible.” In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the judgment reported in (2019) 7 SCC

359 in the case of Robin Thapa v. Rohit Dora, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held as follows: ‘8.Ordinarily, litigation is based on adjudication on the merits of the contentions of the parties. Litigation should not be terminated by default, either of the plaintiff or the defendant. The cause of justice does require that, as far as possible, adjudication be done on merits. ..........

13. The matter arises from a suit for specific performance. It may be true that there is a case for the respondent that the appellant has actually let out the building on rent. The appellant’s case is that this is the appellant’s residential house and the matter is a loan transaction. Specific relief is undoubtedly a discretionary relief. The appellant has submitted that the appellant is prepared to deposit the entire amount spent by the respondent towards getting the sale deed executed. We would think that the interest of justice demands that, subject to putting the appellant on terms, an opportunity should be given to the appellant to contest the case and the case must be directed to be disposed of within the time limit.’

In the case on hand, the respondent filed the suit for specific performance and the petitioner was set ex-parte. As stated supra, the judgment itself is not a judgment in the eye of law. Further, the suit for specific performance cannot be allowed by default of the defendant and it should be adjudicated on merits.”

13. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that there was a delay of nearly seven years and that the petitioner had failed to explain the delay. It was contended that the petitioner came to know about the ex-parte decree only on 30/01/2025 was demonstrably false in view of Exs.R1 to R4.

14. The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that Ex.R1 is the petition filed by the Power of Attorney Agent under Order IX Rule 7 CPC seeking to set aside the ex-parte order; Ex.R2 is the petition filed under Order IX Rule 13 CPC on 18/07/2022; Ex.R3 is the petition filed in E.P.No.297 of 2019 seeking to set aside the ex-parte order passed therein; and Ex.R4 is the petition filed by the Power of Attorney Agent seeking recognition of the petitioner's wife as his Power of Attorney Agent. According to the learned counsel, all these documents clearly establish that the petitioner had knowledge of the proceedings much earlier. It was, therefore, contended that the petitioner, having failed to take the necessary steps in the earlier proceedings and having allowed the petitions to remain unnumbered, cannot now contend that he came to know about the ex-parte decree only on 30/01/2025.

15. The learned counsel further submitted that the suit was instituted in the year 2016, the ex-parte decree was passed on 28/08/2018, the sale deed was subsequently executed on 20/10/2023 and the Execution Petition was closed on 22/11/2023. At the stage when the proceedings for delivery were taken up, the petitioner had come forward with the present petition only to delay the execution of the decree. Reliance was also placed upon the judgment in Vellaithai and others v. V. Duraisami, reported in (2009) 5 LW 880, wherein it has been held in paragraph 6 as follows:- “6.On a reading of the above said principle set out, it is well settled that the rule of liberal approach should be extended while considering the application for condonation of delay only when sufficient cause has been shown and there is no lack of bona fide or an attempt to hoodwink the Court by the party concerned, who has come forward with an application for condonation of delay. In such cases, no indulgence could be shown by condoning the delay.”

16. In M. Jeya v. N. Saber Nisha, C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.1592 of 2010, dated 31.01.2019, it has been held in para 8 as follows:- “8.The delay involved in the matter is huge and inordinate and in such view of the matter, it is for the respondent, who should substantiate the reasons projected with reference to the delay and the respondent having failed to place any material whatsoever and even not endeavoured to examine her in the matter, in the light of the above position, the impugned order of the Court below is liable to be struck down and accordingly, the same is set aside.”

17. In Puspaleela v. Kaleel, C.R.P.(MD)No.2286 of 2019, dated 10.07.2020, this Court considered a similar case involving an inordinate delay in seeking to set aside an ex-parte decree in a suit for specific performance. The Court found that the petitioner had suppressed the fact that an earlier petition filed for condonation of delay had already been numbered and dismissed and that the medical explanation offered was insufficient to account for the entire period of delay. The Court further held that the petitioner, having remained inactive for years despite knowledge of the proceedings, could not seek indulgence by filing a fresh petition after the execution proceedings had substantially progressed. Ultimately, the order of the Trial Court was modified by dismissing the petition without costs. The said principle is directly applicable to the facts of the present case, particularly when the petitioner and his Power of Attorney Agent had knowledge of the proceedings and had already filed several petitions, but failed to pursue them and prays for dismissal of the civil revision petition.

18. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent and perused the materials available on record.

19. The petitioner is admittedly the defendant in the suit and is represented by his wife as his Power of Attorney Agent. The suit was filed for specific performance of the agreement of sale. The ex-parte decree was passed on 28/08/2018. The petitioner now seeks to condone the delay of 2,626 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex-parte decree.

20. The specific case of the petitioner is that he came to know about the ex-parte decree only on 30/01/2025, when notice was received in the Execution Petition filed for delivery of the suit property. However, the documents relied upon by the respondent, particularly Exs.R1 to R4, completely contradict the said contention.

21. Ex.R1 clearly shows that a petition had already been filed by the Power of Attorney Agent under Order IX Rule 7 CPC to set aside the ex-parte order. Thereafter, Ex.R2 was filed under Order IX Rule 13 CPC on 18/07/2022 along with a petition to condone the delay. Ex.R3 was filed in E.P.No.297 of 2019 seeking to set aside the ex-parte order passed in the execution proceedings. Again, Ex.R4 was filed seeking recognition of the petitioner's wife as his Power of Attorney Agent. Therefore, it is evident that the petitioner and his Power of Attorney Agent had knowledge of the proceedings and the ex-parte order much prior to 30/01/2025. Though several petitions were filed, no effective steps were taken to get the same numbered and pursue them to their logical conclusion. The petitioner cannot, therefore, now contend that he came to know about the ex-parte decree only upon receipt of the notice for delivery.

22. The conduct of the petitioner is also relevant in the light of the principle laid down in Puspaleela v. Kaleel. In the said case, this Court declined to condone an inordinate delay where the petitioner had suppressed the earlier proceedings and had failed to satisfactorily explain the prolonged period of inaction. The Court emphasised that where the materials disclose prior knowledge of the proceedings and lack of diligence on the part of the litigant, the Court cannot extend the benefit of a liberal approach merely on the ground that the matter ought to be decided on merits.

23. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the earlier counsel failed to take steps to number the petitions cannot be accepted. No such specific plea was raised before the Trial Court. The petitioner has not stated in the affidavit filed in support of the present petition that the matter had been entrusted to a counsel and that, despite his repeated efforts, the counsel had failed to take the necessary steps.

24. It is well settled that a litigant cannot remain completely indifferent to the proceedings and thereafter seek to shift the entire responsibility upon his counsel. The litigant is expected to be vigilant and to follow the progress of the case. Though a mistake committed by counsel may, in an appropriate case, constitute sufficient cause, there is no general proposition that the mistake of counsel by itself is always a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. The bona fides of the explanation and the conduct of the litigant have to be examined.

25. In the present case, the Power of Attorney Agent herself had filed several petitions and, despite having knowledge of the proceedings, failed to take steps to have them numbered and proceeded with. Therefore, the plea that the petitioner was unaware of the proceedings cannot be accepted.

26. The conduct of the petitioner has to be considered in the light of the subsequent developments also. E.P.No.297 of 2019 was filed for execution of the sale deed. The sale deed was executed on 20/10/2023 and the Execution Petition was closed on 22/11/2023. Thereafter, when the proceedings for delivery of the suit property were initiated, the petitioner came forward with the present petition seeking to condone the enormous delay.

27. Though the Court is generally inclined to adopt a liberal approach while considering an application for condonation of delay, such discretion cannot be exercised in favour of a party who has failed to explain the delay satisfactorily and whose conduct demonstrates lack of diligence and negligence. The length of delay by itself may not be decisive; however, the explanation offered for the delay must be bona fide, satisfactory and acceptable to the Court.

28. In Esha Bhattacharjee, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has specifically held that the conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors and that the concept of liberal approach cannot be extended so as to ignore the conduct of the party. In the present case, the petitioner has not satisfactorily explained the delay of 2,626 days. On the contrary, the documents produced by the respondent establish that the petitioner had knowledge of the proceedings and had, on several occasions, attempted to set aside the ex-parte order, but failed to pursue the same. The plea

that the petitioner came to know about the decree only on 30/01/2025 is, therefore, unacceptable.

29. This Court is also unable to accept the submission that the present petition was filed bona fide to contest the suit. The sequence of events clearly indicates that the petitioner remained inactive for several years and approached the Court only when the decree had reached the stage of execution and delivery of the suit property.

30. The decision in Robin Thapa v. Rohit Dora, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, cannot advance the case of the petitioner. No doubt, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has emphasised that, ordinarily, litigation should be adjudicated on merits rather than being terminated by default. However, the said principle does not dispense with the requirement of showing sufficient cause for the delay. In Robin Thapa, the Supreme Court considered the peculiar facts of that case and ultimately granted relief subject to stringent conditions.

31. In the present case, the petitioner had knowledge of the proceedings much earlier, had filed several petitions, but failed to pursue them. Therefore, the principle laid down in Robin Thapa's case cannot be mechanically applied to the facts of the present case.

32. The decision in Puspaleela v. Kaleel also supports the above conclusion, as this Court, in the context of an inordinate delay, considered the suppression of earlier proceedings, the prior knowledge of the litigant and the failure to satisfactorily account for the period of inaction as circumstances disentitling the petitioner to the discretionary relief of condonation of delay.

33. The Trial Court has considered the relevant materials, particularly Exs.R1 to R4 and has arrived at a conclusion that the delay had not been sufficiently explained. This Court finds no perversity, illegality or material irregularity in the said finding warranting interference under the revisional jurisdiction.

34. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner has failed to establish sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 2,626 days. The order passed by the learned Trial Court does not call for any interference.

35. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.

03.09.2026 Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes / No er

R.POORNIMA, J. er To,

1. The Principal Subordinate Judge, Thanjavur

2. The Section Officer, VR/ER Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.

CRP(MD)No.2292 of 2026 03/09/2026