CRP(MD)/70/2026 of Jcob Jayakumar Vs Jacob Senthilkumar on 3 September 2026

O R D E R

This Civil Revision Petition is filed against the fair and decreetal order, dated 16/09/2025 passed in I.A.No.1 of 2024 in O.S.No.7 of 2022 by the learned Sub Judge, Valliyoor.

2. The petitioner herein is the plaintiff, who filed the suit seeking enforcement of his alleged right of pre-emption against the first respondent, who is the son of his paternal uncle. The petitioner contended that the first respondent is the owner of the property adjoining his property, which was purchased by the first respondent's father, namely, Rathinam Nadar, on 01/09/1984. The petitioner also claims to be the owner of a separate property situated adjacent to the property belonging to the first respondent. When the first respondent was about five years old, his father passed away. Thereafter, the petitioner claims to have taken care of the first respondent and his sister and brought them up. The petitioner states that the first respondent attempted to alienate the said property in favour of a third party. Therefore, the petitioner instituted the suit seeking enforcement of his alleged right of pre-emption against the first respondent. During the pendency of the suit, the first respondent executed a sale deed in favour of the second respondent on

CRP(MD)No.70 of 2026 14/03/2022. Since the second respondent acquired an interest in the subject matter of the suit pursuant to the said sale deed, the petitioner filed the present impugned application seeking to implead the second respondent as a necessary party to the proceedings.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the suit was instituted on 07/01/2022, prior to the execution of the sale deed in favour of the second respondent on 14/03/2022. During the pendency of the suit, the first respondent alienated the suit property in favour of the second respondent. Therefore, the petitioner sought to implead the second respondent as a necessary party to the proceedings. However, the trial Court dismissed the impugned application on the ground that it was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year prescribed under Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The trial Court further held that the petitioner had admittedly acquired knowledge of the sale through the written statement filed by the first respondent and that no satisfactory explanation had been offered for the delay in filing the application for impleadment. Aggrieved by the said order, the present Civil Revision Petition has been filed.

CRP(MD)No.70 of 2026

4. In support of his contention, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the following judgments:-

(i) Velamuri Venkata Sivaprasad (Died) and another Vs. Kothuri Venkateswarlu (Dead) By LR.s and others, reported in (2000)2 SCC 139, wherein it has been held in para 53 as follows:- “53.The other ground of objection raised by Mr. Nageshwara Rao i.e. the plea of limitation: Limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and on the issue of limitation B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. as the first appellate Court in the instant matter had the following to state: "The last question that remains to be considered, pertains to bar of limitation. This issue has been considered by the trial court under issue No. 12 and it found that the suit is not barred, in-so-far as defendants 1-7 are concerned, but that it is barred as against the 8th defendant (alleged adopted son of the 1st defendant) and 9th defendant. This is for the reason that the 8th defendant was not originally impleaded only on 29.12.1971 in pursuance to an order of the court in IA No. 2657/71. But it must be noticed that the alleged adoption was made on 30.11.1965, while the present suit was instituted on 1.10.1965. The sale deed in favour of defendants 3,4 and 9, is dated 10.1.1966 under a notice (Ex.B-36) and that, once they came to know of the

CRP(MD)No.70 of 2026 adoption, they ought to have filed a suit for declaration (that the said adoption is not true or valid) within three years of the adoptions or at any rate, within three years of their knowledge of the adoption; since the 8th defendant has been impleaded only on 29.12.1971, and because of Section 21 of the Limitation Act the suit must be deemed to have been instituted as against the 8th defendant only on the date of such imp leading, the suit must be held to be barred as against the 8th defendant. The said argument, however, fails to take notice of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 21, which provides that nothing in sub-section (1) of Section 21 shall apply to a case where a party is added or substituted owing to assignment or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit. Since the adoption has been made pending the suit, and also because the alienation in favour of the 9th defendant is pending the suit, the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 21 that the suit shall be deemed to be instituted as against the impleaded party only on the date of such impleadings, is inapplicable. If so, it cannot be said that the suit is barred by Article 113 of the Limitation Act. In . fact, the Trial Court has found that no such adoption ever took place, and which finding is not questioned in this appeal. It cannot therefore, be said that the suit is barred by limitation."

(ii) In Amit Kumar Shaw and another Vs. Farida Khatoon and another, reported in (2005)11 SCC 403,

CRP(MD)No.70 of 2026 wherein it has been held in paragraphs 14 and 15 as follows:- “14.An alienee pendente lite is bound by the final decree that may be passed in the suit. Such an alienee can be brought on record both under this rule as also under O 1 Rule 10. Since under the doctrine of lis pendens a decree passed in the suit during the pendency of which a transfer is made binds the transferee, his application to be brought on record should ordinarily be allowed.

15. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is an expression of the principle "pending a litigation nothing new should be introduced". It provides that pendente lite, neither party to the litigation, in which any right to immovable property is in question, can alienate or otherwise deal with such property so as to affect his appointment. This Section is based on equity and good conscience and is intended to protect the parties to litigation against alienations by their opponent during the pendency of the suit. In order to constitute a lis pendens, the following elements must be present:

1. There must be a suit or proceeding pending in a Court of competent jurisdiction.

2. The suit or proceeding must not be collusive.

3. The litigation must be one in which right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question.

CRP(MD)No.70 of 2026

4. There must be a transfer of or otherwise dealing with the property in dispute by any party to the litigation.

5. Such transfer must affect the rights of the other party that may ultimately accrue under the terms of the decree or order.”

5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and perused the materials available on record.

6. In the present case, the petitioner/plaintiff instituted the suit on 07/01/2022 claiming a right of pre-emption in respect of the suit property. The first respondent/defendant entered appearance and filed his written statement on 07/07/2022, specifically stating that the suit property had already been conveyed in favour of Linga Chithirai under a sale deed, dated 14/03/2022. Thereafter, the petitioner/plaintiff filed I.A.No.1 of 2024 seeking to implead the said purchaser, namely Linga Chithirai, as a necessary party to the suit. The said application was filed only on 19/11/2024, i.e., more than two years after the petitioner had acquired knowledge of the sale.

7. It is true that, in Amit Kumar Shaw and another Vs. Farida Khatoon and another, reported in (2005) 11 SCC 403, the Hon'ble

CRP(MD)No.70 of 2026 Supreme Court has held that an alienee pendente lite is bound by the final decree that may be passed in the suit and that such alienee can be brought on record under Order I Rule 10 or Order XXII Rule 10 CPC. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed in paragraphs 14 and 15 that ordinarily, an application to bring an alienee pendente lite on record should be allowed, having regard to the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. However, the facts of the present case stand on a different footing. In this case, the petitioner admittedly acquired knowledge of the sale as early as in July 2022 through the written statement filed by the first respondent. Despite having such knowledge, the petitioner did not take any steps to implead the subsequent purchaser until 19/11/2024. No satisfactory or acceptable explanation has been offered for the delay of more than two years.

8. It is also relevant to note that Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a period of one year for a suit to enforce a right of pre- emption. The period begins to run from the date on which the purchaser takes possession of the property sold or where the subject matter of the sale does not admit of physical possession from the date on which the instrument of sale is registered. The statutory period of limitation is therefore only one year.

CRP(MD)No.70 of 2026

9. In the present case, the petitioner had knowledge of the subsequent sale in July 2022 itself. Nevertheless, the application for impleadment was filed only on 19/11/2024 without any explanation for such prolonged delay. The petitioner cannot, after consciously allowing the period to lapse, seek to introduce the subsequent purchaser into the proceedings so as to effectively enforce the pre-emption claim against him. So, the decision in Amit Kumar Shaw does not help the petitioner in the facts of the present case. In the said decision, the transferees had satisfactorily explained the delay and had approached the Court upon coming to know of the pending litigation. The Supreme Court, in that factual context, held that the transferees pendente lite ought to be brought on record. In the present case, on the contrary, the petitioner had knowledge of the sale from July 2022 itself and has not offered any satisfactory explanation for filing the application only in November 2024.

10. Further, the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Velamuri Venkata Sivaprasad (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Kothuri Venkateswarlu (Dead) by LRs. and another, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 139. However, the said decision relates to the effect of

CRP(MD)No.70 of 2026 remarriage of a Hindu widow upon her rights in the property of her deceased husband and does not deal with the issue of impleadment of a subsequent purchaser in a suit for pre-emption. Therefore, the said decision has no application to the facts of the present case.

11. In view of the above, this Court finds that the petitioner had knowledge of the sale in July 2022 itself, but failed to take steps for impleading the subsequent purchaser within a reasonable time and has not furnished any satisfactory explanation for the delay of more than two years. The trial Court has considered the relevant facts and the period of limitation and has rightly dismissed the application. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Trial Court.

12. In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.

03.09.2026 Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes / No NCC : Yes / No ns/er

CRP(MD)No.70 of 2026 To,

1. The Subordinate Judge, Valliyoor.

2. The Section Officer, VR/ER Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.

CRP(MD)No.70 of 2026 R.POORNIMA, J. ns/er

CRP(MD)No.70 of 2026 03/09/2026

CRP(MD)No.70 of 2026