WA/643/2026 of Government of TamilNadu Vs S. Ganesan on 2 September 2026

JUDGMENT

(Krishnaswamy Govindarajan,J.) This Writ Appeal is filed against the order dated 22.10.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.3201 of 2017.2.

2. The unsuccessful respondents in the writ petition are the appellants herein. The first respondent in the writ appeal is the writ petitioner.

3. It is the case of the writ petitioner that he was appointed as Secondary Grade Teacher on 01.07.1966 in Panchayat Union School. He was given Selection Grade on 01.10.1976 and Special Grade on 19.10.1986. He was promoted as Primary School Headmaster and thereafter as Middle School Headmaster on 01.07.1987. On 01.10.1999, he was promoted as Assistant Elementary Educational Officer and retired on 30.09.2009.After retirement, he made a representation to claim benefit under G.O.Ms.No.210, School Education (G1) Department, dated 14.08.2009 and G.O.Ms.No.234, School Education (G2) Department, dated 10.09.2009, to count his service rendered as Primary School Headmaster before 01.06.1988 for the purpose of awarding Special

Grade in the post of Middle School Headmaster. Since the petitioner’s representation was not considered, he filed W.P.No.22099 of 2015 before this Court which was disposed on 23.07.2015 with a direction to consider his representation. The 3rd appellant herein, vide proceedings dated 23.05.2016, forwarded a proposal to the Accountant General to refix his pay. The Accountant General, 2nd respondent herein, by order dated 28.11.2016, returned the proposal. Challenging the same, W.P.No.3201 of 2017 was filed. The learned Single Judge, vide order dated 22.10.2024, set aside the impugned return and directed the respondents to consider the proposal dated 23.05.2016 in the light of the judgment in W.P.No.25985 of 2014 dated 29.07.2015. Aggrieved over the same, the Government has filed the present appeal.

4. The learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the appellant submitted that:

a. G.O.Ms.No.210 dated 14.08.2009 and G.O.Ms.No.234 dated 10.09.2009 were issued only to implement the orders of the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal in O.A.No.2250 of 1991 dated 25.04.1996 and O.A.No.3521 of 1997 dated 17.04.2002, confirmed in W.P.Nos.29626 and 29624 of 2005 dated 15.09.2005 and W.A.No.223 of 2008 dated 21.04.2008.The said G.Os were restricted in favour of 619 specific persons who were Middle School Headmasters as on 01.06.1988 and had joined as

Secondary Grade Teacher before 01.10.1970. The 1st respondent herein was appointed as Elementary School Headmaster on 01.07.1966 and became Middle School Headmaster only on 01.07.1987. He was not holding the post of Middle School Headmaster as on 01.06.1988 in terms of G.O.Ms.No.1652 Education Department dated 26.10.1987 read with G.O.Ms.No.1178 Education Department dated 26.10.1987. His name is not found in the list annexed to G.O.Ms.No.210 and G.O.Ms.No.213 dated 01.12.2022. Hence, he is not a beneficiary.

b. The 1st respondent has already been awarded Selection Grade / Special Grade in the lower posts of Secondary Grade Teacher. Now counting the same period again for Middle School Headmaster will lead to double benefit / unjust enrichment, which is contrary to the fundamental concept of Selection / Special Grade as held in W.P.(MD) Nos.3186 & 3187 of 2016 and W.A.Nos.375-383 of 2018 dated 14.03.2018 (Madras High Court) and W.P.(MD) No.10825 of 2014 (Madurai Bench dated 09.07.2019). Claims raised after long lapse cannot be extended to similarly placed persons. Such G.Os cannot be used as general entitlement.

c. The claim filed after decades of retirement is barred by laches and delay. Repeated retroactive claims based on G.Os cause enormous financial liability for the State exchequer as held in W.P.(MD) 10825/2014. Dead and stale claims filed long after retirement are unsustainable. Therefore, the order passed by the Writ Court is liable to be set aside.

5. The counsel for the first respondent submitted that the learned Single Judge vide order dated 22.10.2024 rightly set aside the impugned return order of the Accountant General and directed to consider the proposal of District Elementary Educational Officer dated 23.05.2016 in the light of W.P.No.25985 of 2014 dated 29.07.2015, which has become final and implemented for similarly placed persons. The appellants argument of double benefit is misconceived. The Accountant General has no jurisdiction to sit over the Government Order and return it. The learned Single Judge rightly held that Accountant General cannot go beyond G.O.Ms.No.210 and allowed the writ petition, which needs no inference. Hence, the counsel prays for dismissal.

6. We heard the counsel for the appellants and the respondent and perused the records.

7. The issue is no more res integra. This Court had occasion to consider the very same issue of cut off date 01.06.1988 in W.A.No.137 of 2024 dated 10.05.2024. The Division Bench in that judgment has categorically held in Paras 10 to 13, which is extracted hereunder:

‘’10. A perusal of the aforementioned Government Order makes it clear that the key point is the specified cut-off date of 01.06.1988, as per G.O. Ms. No. 210 dated 14.08.2009. This date is crucial to be noted to examine as to whether the benefits conferred therein can automatically be extended in favour of others, like the respondent. In this case, the respondent was promoted to the post BT Headmaster only on 28.07.1993, which falls after the cut-off date. Therefore, as per the guidelines specified in the G.O., the respondent is not eligible for the benefit. The Government Order was issued with specific conditions and criteria, which cannot be arbitrarily extended to employees who fail to meet the prescribed requirements. Such an approach would exceed the scope and intent of the Government, with which the order was passed. Even otherwise, G.O. Ms. No.210 itself was passed to comply with the order passed by this Court in favour of specific persons, thereby restricting its application in favour of others.

11. It is pertinent to mention that if an employee has been in the same job for more than 10 years without promotion, he will receive a selection grade. If no promotion is granted after 20 years in the same role, he becomes eligible for a special grade. These grades are meant to compensate the lack of promotional avenue for a long period of service rendered by an employee. However, in this case, the respondent after getting selection grade on 28.10.1981, subsequently promoted as Tamil Pandit on 07.01.1988 and further promoted as B.T. Middle School Headmaster on 28.07.1993, still seeks to get the benefits under G.O. Ms. No.210 dated 14.08.2009. Therefore, the claim of the respondent for counting his past service in the lower categories of Secondary Grade Teacher and Tamil Pandit Grade I for the purpose of granting selection/special grade in the promoted post of BT Headmaster is fundamentally flawed and unsustainable.

12. It is also to be noted that for counting the past service in lower category posts for selection grade/special grade to certain persons who were working as Middle School Headmasters, not only this G.O. Ms. No. 210 dated 14.08.2009 was issued, but several Orders have been issued. To grant such benefits, several writ petitions and writ appeals have been filed. Subsequently, Review Application No.227 of 2015 and connected matters were referred to the Full Bench. The Full Bench of this Court held that the issue cannot be agitated again and determined that the benefit shall be notionally calculated, with monetary benefits payable on and from 01.03.2017. In the Full Bench Judgment, one of the learned Judges has given the consenting order vide a separate order, wherein, it was observed as follows: “4. The Government at last woke up to the fact that the entire issue needs to be addressed by this Court afresh, as thousands of Writ Petitions were allowed without proper examination and adjudication. Orders passed by this Court over the years, in favour of the employees by following the earlier order one after the other may be correct or incorrect and this Court may still hold in favour of the employees after proper judicial scrutiny and critical examination of the issues on hand. But the fact of the

matter is that there was no proper adjudication of the claim by the Teachers vis-a-vis the Government Order in question and that precisely is the issue. However, it has become too late in the day for fresh adjudication and start the litigation process from the scratch all over again which means that thousands of beneficiaries of the orders passed by this Court would be forced to confront an uncertain future, which situation would be unwholesome. particularly the beneficiaries, most of them retired, many of them no more, they and the families have been living in a small comfort of recurring monthly pensionary hope. After all in the old age, hope is the only will for their remaining survival.

5. In these circumstances, the Full Bench in quest for equitable, just and fair solution, has to find the terms with pragmatism acceptable to both parties and at the same time, not upsetting the stated position of the parties. Such an arduous task was meant to be tight rope walking, not falling on either side and tilting the scales of justice, one way or the other. The Full Bench was bestowed with the task of remedying the extraordinary situation brought upon the institution, on its own, equally contributed by the employees and the Government and such extraordinary situation called for extraordinary remedy. The Full Bench with the best of its intention attempted only that and by an order the age old controversy which has been engaging the attention of this Court at the instance of both the employees and the Government is effectively put an end to.

6. Courts being overburdened at all times, develop tendencies to dispose of cases as early as possible with good intention, having public interest in mind, but in its anxiety so, the Courts like in the present batches, fall in error in disposing of matters without complete adjudication. A small error of judgment followed routinely by others has snow balled into a behemoth today threatening the very efficacy of the justice delivery system.

7. The extraordinary situation as we have seen now in the batch of cases, should be an eye opener for the institution in future, as our perennial urge for quick disposal, howsoever, well meaning, has its flip side too.”

13. From the above, it is evident that although the Full Bench declined to interfere with the appeals filed by the Government, it observed that some of the claims have been wrongly made. The Full Bench further gave an ultimatum for filing of any further writ petitions relating to the subject matter of controversy until 09.12.2016 and thereafter, no writ petition shall be filed. In this case, the instant writ petition has been filed only in the year 2017. Thus, the writ petition has been filed after 09.12.2016, i.e., beyond the date fixed by the Full Bench of this Court for entertaining any further litigation in this regard.’’

8. It is pertinent to note that the 1st respondent retired from service on 30.09.2009. However, he initiated legal proceedings by filing Writ Petition only in 2015, six years after his retirement. Subsequently, he filed W.P. No. 3201 of 2017, eight years after demitting office. In (2013) 12 SCC 179, in the case of State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, the promotion on an ad- hoc basis was dealt with in consonance with delay and laches. In paragraph 28 and 29 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has heald as follows. “28. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled principles and even would not remotely attract the concept of discretion. We may hasten to add that the same may not be applicable in all circumstances where certain categories of fundamental rights are infringed. But, a stale claim of getting promotional benefits definitely should not have been entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court.

29. True it is, notional promotional benefits have been granted but the same is likely to affect the State exchequer regard being had to the fixation of pay and the pension. These aspects have not been taken into consideration. What is urged before us by the learned counsel for the respondents is that they should have been equally treated with Madhav Singh Tadagi. But equality has to be claimed at the right juncture and not after expiry of two decades. Not for nothing, has it been said that everything may stop but not the time, for all are in a way slaves of time. There may not be any provision providing for limitation but a grievance relating to promotion cannot be given a new lease of life at any point of time.”

Further, in (2015) 1 SCC, in the case of State of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, while dealing with the aspect of delay and laches and the relief to similar set of employees given by the Court, the Supreme Court summarized the legal principles in paragraph 22 which reads as follows; “22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under.

22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.

22.2. However, this principle is subject to well- recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.

22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the Judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence.”

9. Admittedly, in the present case, the 1st respondent was not working as Middle School Headmaster as on 01.06.1988 as required under G.O.Ms.No.1652 and G.O.Ms.No.1178. He became Middle School Headmaster only on 01.07.1987 and thereafter promoted as Assistant Elementary Education Officer. He does not find place in the 619 beneficiaries list annexed to G.O.Ms.No.210 dated 14.08.2009 and G.O.Ms.No.213 dated 01.12.2022. Therefore, he does not come under the ambit of G.O.Ms.No.234 dated 10.09.2009 and G.O.Ms.No.210 dated 14.08.2009. As rightly pointed out by the appellant, due to both the financial burden on the State exchequer and the delay and laches, the petitioner does not deserve any order from this Court.

10. The learned Single Judge failed to give due weight to the financial consequences, doctrine of laches, and the fact that Government Orders issued to comply with court orders in favor of specific persons are in personam and cannot be used as general entitlement. The learned Single Judge also erred in relying on the previous judgment in W.P.No.25985 of 2014 dated 29.07.2015 although it was not challenged and the proposals forwarded to the Accountant General were returned. The entire issue was diverted and hence it is necessary to adjudicate the issue afresh in the light of W.A.No.137 of 2024.

11. In view of the categorical finding in W.A.No.137 of 2024 dated 10.05.2024, the writ petitioner / 1st respondent herein is not entitled to claim the benefits and he does not come under the benefits of G.O.Ms.No.234 / G.O.Ms.No.210. However, the Writ Court has not considered W.A.No.137 of 2024.

12. In view of the above finding, we are inclined to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge.

13. In the result, the Writ Appeal is allowed; The order dated 22.10.2024 made in W.P.No.3201 of 2017 is set aside; Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed; No costs. (S.M.S.,J.) (K.G.R.,J.) -09-2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes/No rli

S.M.SUBRAMANIAM, J. AND KRISHNASWAMY GOVINDARAJAN, J. rli WA No. 643 of 2026 02-09-2026