CRP/2473/2026 of Usha Raveendran Vs N.C.Kandasamy on 31 August 2026

COMMON ORDER

The tenant is the revision petitioner in both the revision petition.

2. CRP. No.2473 of 2026, has been filed seeking to set aside the concurrent orders passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority and the Rent Controller, ordering eviction of the petitioner on the ground of willful default and denial of title. CRP. No.2475 of 2026, has been filed challenging the fixation of fair rent.

3. I have heard Mrs.Chithra Sampath, learned Senior Counsel for Mr.M.Ganesan, learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant and Mr.A.Palaniappan, learned counsel for the respondent/landlord.

4. Brief facts that may be necessary as a prelude for deciding the present revision petitions are as follows:

The respondent claiming to be landlord of the tenanted premises and the petitioner being a tenant in respect of the petition premises, approached the Rent Controller and sought for eviction on four grounds viz., wilful default in payment of rents, denial of title, acts of waste and nuisance. The said eviction petition was contested by the revision petitioner, contending that the original lease was only in respect of vacant land and that the superstructure was put up by the revision petitioner and her husband, at their costs and therefore, the Rent Control Petition itself was not maintainable.

5. In parallel, the respondent also filed a petition for fixation of fair rent, contending that the contractual rent paid by the petitioner/tenant is not commensurate with the market rents, on the very same ground, the petitioner resisted the fair rent petition as not being maintainable.

6. The Rent Controller, after elaborate trial allowed the eviction petition, holding that the denial of title is not bonafide and consequently, the petitioner is guilty of wilful default in payment of rents. However, the Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition, insofar as the two other grounds viz., acts of waste and nuisance. Insofar as the fair rent petition, the Rent Controller finding that jural relationship of landlord and tenant exists, fixed the fair rent at Rs.1,09,620/- per month, payable from the date of filing of the petition, with a further decree that it would increase at 10% for every two years on the then prevailing rent, unless and otherwise, the parties mutually agreed to the contrary. Challenging the fixation of fair rent as well as the order of eviction, the petitioner filed two Rent Control Appeals. However, the respondent/landlord did not file any appeal, challenging the dismissal of the eviction petition on the grounds of acts of waste and nuisance.

7. In the eviction petition, on the side of the respondent/landlord, K.Ravikumar was examined as P.W.1 and marked Ex.P1 to Ex.P12, were marked and on the side of the revision petitioner, the revision petitioner examined himself as R.W.1 and one Mr.Rathish Ravindran, was examined as R.W.2 and marked Ex.R1 to Ex.R14. However, before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, the petitioner has marked additional evidence and there has also been cross examination with regard to the additional documents that have been marked on the side of the revision petitioner as Ex.R15 to R184.

8. Arguments of Mrs.Chitra Sampath, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.M.Ganesan, learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant are summarized herein below:

(i) Without there being a jural relationship of landlord and tenant insofar as letting of a building or a part of a building, the Rent Controller is not even conferred with any jurisdiction to try any eviction petition or a petition for fixation of fair rent;

(ii) The original owner had categorically admitted that the lease was in respect of land alone;

(iii) The petitioner and her husband, had put up the superstructure at their costs and despite supporting documentary evidence, the Courts below have not factored the crucial evidence which clearly established that the superstructure did not belong to the respondent/landlord;

(iv) The Courts below have failed to interpret Ex.R7, Ex.R15, Ex.R166 and Ex.R168 in a proper perspective. The Courts below have failed to appreciate that Ex.R15, was admitted by the land owner himself and the Appellate Authority had merely held that the defence taken by the petitioner was improbable, but has not rejected the contentions of the petitioner;

(v) Insofar Ex.R166 and Ex.R168, it is contended that there has been no rebuttal or even an additional reply statement filed by the landlord and in such circumstances, the Appellate Court should have held Ex.R7, Ex.R15, Ex.R166 & Ex.R168 to be valid;

(vi) The Courts below have not addressed the issue of denial of title in a judicious manner or proper perspective;

(vii) The denial of jural relationship of landlord and tenant was only with regard to the superstructure and not with regard to the vacant land that was originally leased and therefore, such denial is not malafide, but bonafide which ousts the very jurisdiction of Rent Controller;

(viii) Insofar as fair rent, once there was no lease of any building or part of a building, then the question of invoking Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Building Lease and Rent Control Act, 1960 (in short 'Act') and seeking fixation of fair rent itself does not arise.

(ix) The Courts below have erroneously entertained the Application under Section 4 of the Act and proceeded to fix the fair rent, which is without jurisdiction. The learned Senior Counsel would therefore pray for both the revisions being allowed.

9. Per contra, Mr.A.Palaniappan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord would state that the petitioner had filed a counter affidavit to the eviction petition as well as fair rent petition, taking a definite stand that the superstructure was put up by her and her husband. However, the petitioner had demolished her own case, before the Appellate Authority by relying on additional documents, which go against the pleadings made before the Rent Controller, especially in the counter statement. It is therefore the submission of Mr.A.Palaniappan, learned counsel for the respondent that the plea taken in the counter statement and the reliance placed on the additional documents before the Appellate Authority are self destructive.

10. He would further state that a totally new case is now projected in the revision to get over the findings of the Rent Controller as affirmed by the Rent

Control Appellate Authority. In this regard, he points out that Paragraph No.2.2 of the affidavit filed in support of CMP. No.10523 of 2026 and taking me through Ex.R166, Mr.A.Palaniappan, learned counsel would invite my attention to the cross examination of the petitioner/tenant before the Appellate Authority as well and contend that no such case was pleaded by the petitioner herself and therefore, the additional documents that have been filed and relied upon are of no evidentiary value. He would further state that the Rent Controller and the Rent Control Appellate Authority are not full-fledged Civil Courts where eviction petitions and fair rent petitions are to be tried elaborately like Civil Suits and it is settled law that the scope of enquiry before the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority is summary in nature. He would therefore, meet the argument of the learned Senior Counsel, Mrs. Chitra Sampath, that it was not necessary for the respondent to have filed an additional reply statement, rebutting the additional documents, which according to the learned Senior Counsel were fatal to the respondent/landlord.

11. Similarly, the learned counsel for the respondent would contend that it was sufficient for the respondent/landlord to bring it to the notice of the Appellate Authority that the defence set up by the tenant was improbable and no intrinsic evidence need be adduced to establish that Ex.R15, was not executed by the original landlord. He would also refer to the relevant dates and some of the documents, which according to him would clinchingly establish that the

alleged consent of the original landlord is highly doubtful and cannot be relied upon. He would therefore state that even pending the eviction petition, the petitioner took a risk in not paying any rents and having failed to establish that the denial of title was bonafide, the petitioner had to consequently and necessarily suffer an order of eviction on the grounds of wilful default as well as denial of title.

12. Insofar as the fair rent petition, he states that apart from contending that the fair rent petition was not maintainable and legal submissions made in that regard, no attempt was even made by the petitioner to attack the solid evidence produced on the side of the respondent, for enabling the Rent Court to fix the fair rent, taking into consideration the relevant factors that are to be reckoned before fixing fair rent for a premises under Section 4 of the Act. Mr.A.Palaniappan, learned counsel for the respondent/landlord would therefore pray for dismissal of both the revision petitions.

13. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on either side. I have also gone through the order of the Rent Controller, the Judgment of the Appellate Authority, the documents exhibited before the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority which have been filed by way of typed set of papers and the oral evidence adduced by the parties before the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority as well.

14. The primordial submission of the learned Senior Counsel, Mrs.Chitra Sampath is that the original lease was only in respect of vacant land and not relating to any portion of superstructure or constructed area and therefore, the respondent/landlord was knocking at a wrong door in order to seek recovery of possession. It is trite law that for invoking the provisions of Tamil Nadu (Building Lease and Rent Control) Act, the fundamental requirement is a jural relationship of a landlord and tenant which relates to not merely land, but land and building. Unless, some superstructure, whatever little extent it may be, forms part of the subject matter of the lease, the Rent Control Act cannot be invoked. Therefore, keeping this principle in mind, I proceed to address the grounds raised in the revision petition and the arguments advanced on either side.

15. On considering the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel Mrs.Chitra Sampath, as well as Mr.A.Palaniappan, I find that ultimately, the scope of revision boils down to the interpretation and evidentiary value of Ex.R7, Ex.R15, Ex.R166 and Ex.R168.

16. Ex.R7, is a consent letter executed by Tirupurasundari on 16.08.1982. It is addressed to the petitioner’s husband E.V.Raveendran. It appears to be a consent letter issued by the then landlady, Tirupurasundari Ammal, giving consent to the husband of the petitioner to construct an additional top floor, apart from the already existing construction, at his own costs. Even assuming that the said consent letter had been issued by the original land owner, for a moment forgetting the fact that the genuineness of the said letter has been disputed by the respondent/landlord, this consent letter only talks about putting up of additional construction over and above the existing superstructure. This letter does not admit the fact that the existing superstructure on that date was put up by Mr.E.V.Raveendran.

17. Ex.R13, is a notice issued by the Corporation of Madras on 14.06.1964, under Section 236 of the Madras City Municipal Act IV of 1919. It is a show cause notice as to why fine should not be imposed for construction of two rooms on the second floor without permission. On the reverse of Ex.R13, it is also mentioned that the said construction should be stopped immediately. Therefore, both Ex.R7 and Ex.R13, are of no assistance to the petitioner to establish that the original construction was put up by the petitioner’s husband and the petitioner, as pleaded in the counter statement.

18. Coming to Ex.R15, it is an understanding agreement, entered into by Janaki Amma, W/o.Velayudam Naicker and Natesan Chettiar, S/o.Narayana Swamy Chettiar, on 4th July 1971. In the said understanding agreement, it is stated that Janaki Amma has constructed the building/superstructure and that she has demolished and reconstruct the building by appointing one Dhanapal as Mason after obtaining building plan approval from the Corporation of Madras for ground, first and second floor. The owner Natesa Chettiar, has given full consent to construct the building and Natesa Chettiar agreed to receive the land rent alone from Janaki Amma. In turn, Janaki Amma has agreed that she will not claim any right over the land, except the building that has been constructed by her, which has also been agreed to by Natesa Chettiar.

19. This Ex.R15, is of the year 1971. In terms of this understanding, it evidences that Janaki Amma has already put up construction of ground floor, first floor and second floor, after demolishing and reconstructing the then existing building and Natesa Chettiar has agreed to receive land rent alone from Janaki Amma. In this context, the case of the petitioner has to be seen. In the counter statement filed before the Rent Controller, the petitioner has stated that the land at Door at New No.13 and old No.26, Vengu Chetty Street, Park Town, Chennai -03, was owned by Natesa Chettiar, who had leased the property as vacant land to the revision petitioner and her husband, way back in the year 1965, to be used by them for commercial purposes and that in pursuance of the said oral agreement, the petitioner and her husband have constructed the superstructure viz., the ground and two floors and have been running a lodge under the name and style of 'Ravindra Lodge' for the past 50 years. It is not the case of the petitioner that the construction was put up by Janaki Amma, in terms of Ex.R15. As rightly pointed out by Mr.A.Palaniappan, learned counsel for the respondent, the additional evidence that has been adduced by way of Ex.R15, is self destructive to the case of the petitioner. In such circumstances, when Ex.R15, is not in sync with the definite stand taken by the respondent, no reliance can be placed on the said exhibit. In fact, during cross examination before the Appellate Authority, a suggestion has been put to the petitioner, denying genuineness of Ex.R15, as well. The petitioner cannot be permitted to rely on a document, which is firstly not pleaded in the counter statement and that too, for the first time before the Appellate Authority and secondly, when such documents runs contra to the case set up as defence by way of counter statement before the Rent Controller.

20. Coming to Ex.R166, it is again a consent letter said to have been given by Natesa Chettiar and witnessed by Tirupura Sundari and addressed to the father of Raveendran, i.e., the father in law of the petitioner herein. It is alleged to be dated 24.04.1962. In and by the said consent letter, Natesa Chettiar and Tirupura Sundari, have stated that since Velayudam Nair had agreed to bear the entire costs of demolition and reconstruction of the building leased out at D.No.5, Vengu Chetty Street, Park Town, Chenani -3, and based on the undertaking given by Velayudam Nair, father in law of the petitioner, the tenant Velayudam Nair would be paying property tax, water tax and Electricity Bill for the entire property and that neither Natesa Chettiar nor Tirupura

Sundari, would claim rent for the superstructure and that the possession of Velayudam Nair would not be disturbed for a period of 99 years. This letter also evidences the further fact that Natesa Chettiar and Tirupura Sundari, had given consent to change water tax, property tax and Electricity connection in the name of Velayudam Nair, besides also for obtaining necessary approvals in the name of Velayudam Nair from the Corporation of Madras.

21. Insofar as Ex.R168, it is an undertaking agreement, signed by Tirupura Sundari, daughter of the original owner, Natesa chettiar, in favour of the petitioner and her husband, who were running the lodge. The said undertaking agreement mentions the fact that Janaki Amma, mother in law of the petitioner had constructed the building/superstructure and after her demise, the petitioner and her husband are running the lodging house, after obtaining consent from Natesa Chettiar and Tirupura Sundari. The undertaking agreement further records the fact that the petitioner's husband has been requesting for sale of the land also to him and since there were internal family disputes, Tirupura Sunadari was not in a position to take a call with regard to the sale of the land in favour of the petitioner's husband. The said undertaking agreement further records that the petitioner and her husband can claim ownership only for the building that was constructed by their family, in the manner known to law, but not for the land. This undertaking agreement does not bear any date. It is however typed on a 20 Rupees non judicial stamp paper issued on 24.02.2004. In fact, this alleged undertaking agreement also runs contradictory to the stand taken by the petitioner herself. Pending the appeal, multiple and contradictory stand have been taken to attempt to establish that what was leased was only vacant land. However, as already found, when the documents on which strong reliance is placed on by the petitioner herself clearly evidence the fact that the building was let out to her father in law, I do not see how these unregistered documents can have any evidentiary value, especially in the absence of pleadings with regard to these documents.

22. In fact, a conjoint reading of Ex.R7, Ex.R15 and Ex.168 only shows that the petitioner has been blowing hot and cold and there is no conclusive or satisfactory proof with regard to the construction having been put up by her and as pleaded in the counter statement. The Courts below have also discussed the additional documents in the light of the Ex.R7, consent letter as well and rightly came to the conclusion that if the original construction was itself put up by the tenant and her husband or even assuming, father in law or mother in law of the petitioner, then there was no necessity for obtaining any fresh consent, from the daughter of Natesa Chettiar, for putting up an additional room on the top floor. As already discussed, Ex.R7, does not even confirm the fact that the then existing construction was put up by the petitioner, her husband or her in laws. In fact the Appellate Authority has rightly noticed that the petitioner herself is a signatory to Ex.R168 and that being the case, there being no pleading with

regard to the said Ex.R168 and a contrary stand is taken that the construction was put up by the petitioner and her husband, no reliance could be placed on Ex.R168.

23. Admittedly, in pursuance of the said consent letter, there has been no mutation effected in the name of Velayudam Nair or S.N.Raveendran, much less the revision petitioner. Further, no planning permission has been filed to evidence the fact that Velayudam Nair had put up the construction and that the planning permission was in his name. This document in fact, runs counter to even Ex.R15, which indicates that it was Janaki Amma, who had put up the construction, at her costs. Further, the alleged consent letter dated 24.04.1962, appears to be in the nature of lease for a period of 99 years, which ordinarily would require registration and necessary stamp duty to be paid. However, admittedly, the said consent letter has not written on any stamp paper, leave alone being registered in accordance with law. However, one interesting aspect that comes to light from Ex.R166, is that the consent letter clearly indicates that Velayudam Nair was a tenant in respect of the building leased out to him by Natesa Chettiar. For clarity, the relevant portion of the said letter is extracted hereunder:- " As you have agreed to spend the entire money for the demolition and re-construction of the building leased out by me bearing Door No.5, Vengu Chetty Street, Madras 03 and based on the undertaking given by you, that you will pay the property tax, water tax and EB for the entire property, namely land and building, I hereby assure you that I will not claim rent for the superstructure in the said premises and I consent that myself or on my legal heirs will not disturb your possession for a period of 99 years."

24. Therefore, despite the contradictory stand taken pending appeal, without even a pleading that the property was constructed by Janaki Amma or that it was constructed by Velayudam Naicker, despite specifically taking a stand in the counter statement before the Rent Controller that the construction was put up by the petitioner and her husband in the year 1965, the document that has been exhibited not only failed to establish the case of the petitioner, but also only goes to indicate that the original lease was not only in respect of land, but also in respect of building. In such circumstances, the plea taken by the petitioner in the counter statement and attempted to be established by way of letting in additional evidence before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, only exposes the falsity in the contradictory claims being made by the petitioner. This conduct of the petitioner clearly amounts to a malafide denial of jural relationship of landlord and tenant when such denial in not bonafide, it affords a ground to the respondent/landlord to seek eviction under Section 10(2)(vii) of the Act.

25. Further, admittedly, the petitioner has not paid any rents and absolutely, no proof is forthcoming to evidence the fact that the petitioner has been paying rents, without any default. Even pending the eviction petition and the appeal, despite suffering an order of eviction before the Rent Controller, the petitioner opted not to pay any rents and has run a risk of being branded as a willful defaulter.

26. Further excepting for filing receipts for payment of tax on profession, viz., the business being run under the name and style of Ravindra Lodge and Electricity Bills and Rent Bills, which also do not indicate that the rent is only for the land and not for the building, no other acceptable document has been exhibited on the side of the petitioner to substantiate that the original lease was in respect of the vacant land alone and not the superstructure. In any event, as already indicated, the document relied on by the petitioner herself exposes the falsity in the claims made by the petitioner that she and her husband had put up the superstructure, when even as early as in 1962, the original owner of the property Natesa Chettiar, has clearly stated that the lease has been only in respect of the building and not just vacant land. Even assuming the said consent letter has not been challenged or rebutted as contended by the learned Senior Counsel, Mrs.Chitra Sampath, there is nothing brought on record on the side of the revision petitioner to establish that in furtherance of the said consent letter, Velayudam Nair, the father of her husband, Raveendran, i.e., father in law of the petitioner had changed assessments in his name or obtained any building approval plan for putting up construction and that such plan was issued in his name.

27. In these circumstances, I am unable to see any serious error or infirmity in the findings of the Rent Controller as well as the Rent Control Appellate Authority. In fact, the Rent Control Appellate Authority has also in great detail, discussed all the additional documents and the evidence adduced before it, while confirming the order of eviction, passed by the Rent Controller. Under Section 25 of the Act, the scope of revision and power available to this Court is restricted and limited and unless there is gross perversity in appreciation of evidence and findings have been rendered without any evidence or against the pleadings, then alone this Court is entitled to interfere with concurrent findings rendered by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority. Even when a different view is possible to be taken on a given set of facts, even then this Court cannot interfere with concurrent findings arrived at by two Courts. Even from this angle, I do not seek any grounds made out warranting interference under Section 25 of the Act, with regard to the eviction order passed concurrently.

28. Also as rightly pointed out by Mr.A.Palaniappan, learned counsel for the respondent, even in the present grounds of revision, in the affidavit in support of CMP. No.10523 of 2026, the petitioner attempts to introduce a new case by contending that property of Old No.5, then 26, now No.13, Vengu

Chetty Street, Park Town, Chennai -3 was consisting of a land and mud house which was let out by Natesa Chettiar to Velayudam Naicker for 99 years. It has never been such case of the petitioner either before the Rent Controller or before the Appellate Authority and clearly the said stand taken goes to show that the petitioner is going all out to project a false case that the construction was put up by her and her husband.

29. Yet another aspect which also assume significance is that in the year 1961 in Ex.P3, settlement deed, registered document Natesa Chettiar, the original owner has settled the subject property in favour of his daughter, Tiripura Sunadari, giving her a limited life estate, without any power of alienation, with the vested reminder being given to the respondent/landlord. The settlement deed is in respect of not only land, but also land and building. Therefore, as contended by Mr.Palaniappan, learned counsel for the respondent, when Natesa Chettiar, has consciously included the building also in the settlement executed by him in 1961 by way of a registered instrument, there was absolutely no necessity for him to have given a consent letter on 24.04.1962 as projected in Ex.R166, by the revision petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner having failed to establish any bonafide denial of the existence of landlord and tenant relationship are liable to be evicted.

30. Insofar as fair rent, excepting for arguing on the maintainability of the petition before the Rent Controller, invoking the provisions of the Rent Control Act, on the ground that lease was in respect of vacant land alone and that superstructure was put up by the petitioner and her husband, no separate arguments were even advanced, attacking the findings and calculations that had been made by the Rent Controller in arriving at the fair rent. Findings of the Rent Controller have been affirmed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority as well.

31. In view of the above, even insofar as fixation of fair rent, I do not see any grounds available to the petitioner to seek interference with the concurrent findings, especially in the light of the findings that the denial of jural relationship of landlord and tenant itself was not bonafide. However, the Courts have grossly erred in fixing the fair rent in slabs. There is no such power conferred on the Rent Court or the Rent Control Appellate Authority and fair rent can be fixed only with respect to the date of filing of the fair rent application.

32. In view of the above, CRP. No.2473 of 2026 is dismissed and CRP. No.2475 of 2026 is partly allowed, confirming the fair rent fixed, but, however, setting aside the 10% enhancement once in two years. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are also closed.

31-08-2026 Index: Yes Speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes RKP To

1. The XII Judge of Court of Small Causes at Chennai.

2. The VII Judge of Court of Small Causes, Chennai. P.B.BALAJI, J. RKP Pre-delivery Order in CRP. No.2473 & 2475 of 2026 and CMP. Nos.10523 & 10525 of 2026

31-08-2026 CRP. Nos.2473 & 2475 of 2026 and CMP. Nos.10523 & 10525 of 2026 P.B.BALAJI, J. After pronouncement of orders, in CRP. No.2473 of 2026, Mr.M.Ganesan, learned counsel for the petitioner sought for six months time to enable the tenant to peacefully vacate and hand over vacant possession.

2. The learned counsel for the respondent would vehemently oppose the said request of the learned counsel for the petitioner, stating that the petitioner has already dragged the matter endlessly. However, he leaves it open to the discretion of the Court.

3. Taking into account that the petitioner has been in possession for several decades, I am inclined to grant time till 31.01.2027, subject to the petitioner filing an affidavit of undertaking that he would vacate and hand over the tenanted premises, without driving the respondent to initiate forcible execution proceedings. The affidavit of undertaking shall be filed within a period of one (1) week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

4. Read this order in conjunction with the order pronounced on 31.08.2026. 31.08.2026 ata P.B.BALAJI, J. ata CRP. No.2473 & 2475 of 2026 and CMP. Nos.10523 & 10525 of 2026

31-08-2026