WA/1619/2026 of THE BRANCH MANAGER (Disciplinary Authority) Vs V. Vijayakumar on 24 August 2026

Judgment

(Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.M.Subramaniam J.) Under assail is the writ order dated 16.02.2024 passed in W.P.No.15101 of 2015. The respondents in the writ petition has instituted the present intra court appeal under Clause XV of the Letters Patent. The first respondent herein filed the writ petition challenging the order of dismissal from service. Facts in brief :

2. The appellant Cotton Corporation of India Limited is a Government of India undertaking. The first respondent was appointed as Junior Cotton Purchaser on 13.10.1997. His nature of duties include, purchase of cotton from the farmers, gin it in ginning factory, get the cotton pressed into bales and hand over the bales to the officer in charge of the cotton godowns of Cotton Corporation of India. At the time of handing over the bales, the cotton bales are weighed and checked by the godown keeper and thereafter was being supplied to the textile units.

3. A show cause notice dated 20.03.2014 was issued to the first respondent herein / petitioner in the writ petition raising an allegation that he procured low quality cotton which was dusty and not packed properly and there was abnormal weight loss of the bales. The first respondent submitted an explanation on 10.04.2014. Not satisfied with the explanation, departmental disciplinary proceedings were initiated and a charge memorandum was issued vide proceedings dated 15.05.2014 framing three articles of charges. Annexures to the charge memorandum provides the statement of imputations of misconduct, list of documents and list of witnesses relied upon. An opportunity was offered to the first respondent to submit his explanation.

4. Accordingly, the first respondent submitted his explanation denying the charges. Not satisfied with the explanation, the disciplinary authority appointed an enquiry officer, who in turn conducted an enquiry into the charges and submitted a final report holding that the charges are proved. The findings of the enquiry officer in his report was accepted by the disciplinary authority and a second show cause notice was issued along with the copy of the enquiry report to the first respondent. He submitted his further explanations on the findings of the enquiry officer, which was also taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority and a final order in the departmental disciplinary proceedings was issued vide proceedings dated 11.05.2015 imposing the penalty of dismissal from service.

5. The first respondent initially did not prefer an appeal, but filed the writ petition. During the pendency of the writ petition, he preferred an appeal, which was closed by the appellate authority on the ground that the issue relating to dismissal from service is subjudice before the High Court. Arguments of the appellant :

6. Learned counsel for the appellant would mainly contend that there is no infirmity in following the procedures as contemplated under the Cotton Corporation of Indian Employees Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Discipline and Appeal Rules’). Opportunities as contemplated under the said Rules were provided to the first respondent at every stage. Thus, the Rules are scrupulously followed and complied with by the disciplinary authority while conducting the process of departmental disciplinary proceedings.

7. The contention of the respondent that the issues are predetermined is incorrect. While issuing the show cause notice, the disciplinary authority is empowered to accept the findings of the enquiry officer and communicate the same to the delinquent, enabling him to submit his explanation in an effective manner. On receipt of the explanation, the disciplinary authority may take a decision on its own merits. Therefore, the second show cause notice issued calling for further explanation from the delinquent officer per se would not be a ground to assail the order of dismissal issued validly by the competent authority.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant drew the attention of this Court with reference to the findings in Para 8 of the impugned writ order, whereby the learned Single Judge proceeded on the basis that certain findings are made in the show cause notice itself. However, those paragraphs are available in the order of dismissal and not in the show cause notice. Thus, the entire finding of the writ Court in Para 8 and in subsequent paragraphs were based on incorrect documents. The judgment relied on by the respondent herein before the Writ Court is factually distinguishable and the learned Judge ought not to have relied on the said judgment to set aside the order of dismissal.

Arguments of the respondents

9. Learned counsel for the respondents would strenuously oppose by stating that the disciplinary authority predetermined the issue before passing the impugned order of dismissal from service. Opportunities as contemplated under the Discipline and Appeal Rules were not offered and thus the principles of natural justice have been violated. The disciplinary authority, while issuing the second show cause notice, agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and while so, there is no further opportunity provided to the delinquent officer to respond to the show cause notice as the disciplinary authority has predetermined the issue and decided to impose the penalty. The said ground was considered by the Writ Court. The presenting officer was initially included as a witness, but subsequently deleted. All these circumstances would show that the authority competent had predetermined the issue.

10. The Writ Court has considered two judgments. In the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others -vs- B.Karunakar and Others1, in Para 26 the Apex Court made an observation regarding providing a reasonable opportunity and compliance of principles of natural justice. In the case of State Bank of India -vs- Raja and Another2, the Division Bench 1 (1993) 4 SCC 727 2 (2018) SCC Online Mad 3102

of this Court considered the issue and made a finding that the enquiry officer has concurred with the disciplinary authority, which would be insufficient and therefore the said judgments have been relied upon by the Writ Court for assailing the order of dismissal issued by the disciplinary authority. Though an appeal was filed during the pendency of the writ petition, it was closed on the ground of pendency of writ proceedings. For all these reasons, the writ court considered the issues and allowed the writ petition. Thus, the writ appeal is to be rejected. Legal Position

11. This Court thought fit to consider the legal principles emerged in disciplinary matters through various judgments. The scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters, the procedures to be followed in the context of the right of the charged officials are of paramount importance.

12. Basically certain discrepancies in the evidence in disciplinary matters will not make it a case of no evidence. Generally in exercise of judicial review, the Courts must restrict its review to determine;

(i) Whether the rules of natural justice have been complied with;

(ii) Whether the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence;

(iii) Whether the Statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been observed;

(iv) Whether the finding of the disciplinary authority suffer from perversity;

(v) Whether the penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct.

13. In the case of State of Rajasthan and Others vs. Heem Singh reported in (2021) 12 SCC 569, the Apex Court considered the principles of preponderance of probabilities and judicial review over disciplinary matters, as under; H. On “preponderance of probabilities” In M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple~5 J.) v. Suresh Das [M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple~5 J.) v. Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1] , a Constitution Bench of this Court has described the standard of “preponderance of probabilities” in the following terms : (SCC pp. 540~41, paras 720~21)

720. The court in a civil trial applies a standard of proof governed by a preponderance of probabilities. This standard is also described sometimes as a balance of probability or the preponderance of the evidence. Phipson on Evidence formulates the standard succinctly : If therefore, the evidence is such that the court can say we think it more probable than not/, the burden is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal, it is not. [ Phipson on Evidence] In Miller v. Minister of

Pensions [Miller v. Minister of Pensions, (1947) 2 All ER 372] , Lord Denning, J. (as the Master of Rolls then was) defined the doctrine of the balance or preponderance of probabilities in the following terms : (All ER p. 373 H).

(1) It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence, “of course it is possible, but not in the least probable” the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice.

721. The law recognises that within the standard of preponderance of probabilities, there could be different degrees of probability. This was succinctly summarised by Denning, L.J. In Bater v. Bater [Bater v. Bater, 1951 P 35 (CA)] , where he formulated the principle thus : (p. 37) So also in civil cases, the case must be proved by a preponderance of probability, but there may be degrees of probability within that standard. The degree depends on the subject~matter. I. Judicial review over disciplinary matters

34. We have to now assess as to whether in arriving at its findings the High Court has transgressed the limitations on its power of judicial review. In Moni Shankar v. Union of India [Moni Shankar v. Union of India, (2008) 3 SCC 484 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 819] , a two~Judge Bench of this Court had to assess whether the Central Administrative Tribunal had exceeded its power of judicial review by overturning the findings of a departmental enquiry by reappreciating the evidence. In regard to the scope of judicial review, the Court held thus : (SCC p. 492, para 17).

17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi~judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the Department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely, preponderance of probability. If on such evidence, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality. (See State of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava [State of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava, (2006) 3 SCC 276 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 521] and Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn. [Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn., (2007) 4 SCC

669 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68].”

14. In the case of Union of India and Others vs. Dalbir Singh reported in (2021) 11 SCC 321, the Apex Court carved out principles on disciplinary proceedings as under; “20. A three~Judge Bench of this Court in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh [State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 298] was dealing with the issue of non~examination of passengers when the allegation against the conductor was non~issuance of the tickets. This Court held that in a domestic enquiry, strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply and that all materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. This Court held as under :

4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act.”

21. This Court in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554] had laid down the broad parameters for the exercise of jurisdiction of judicial review. The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 616~17, paras 12~13).

13. Despite the well~settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

(i) re-appreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based;

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.

22. In another judgment reported as B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , it was held that the power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. The judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. The Court is to examine as to whether the enquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. This Court held as under : (SCC pp. 759~60, paras 12~13)

12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an enquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the enquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold enquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.

13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel,

(1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.

26. In the case of Union of India and Others vs. Subrata Nath reported in 2022 Live Law (SC) 998, the Apex Court held as follows; “15. It is well settled that courts ought to refrain from interfering with findings of facts recorded in a departmental inquiry except in circumstances where such findings are patently perverse or grossly incompatible with the evidence on record, based on no evidence. However, if principles of natural justice have been violated or the statutory regulations have not been adhered to or there are malafides attributable to the Disciplinary Authority, then the courts can certainly interfere.

16. In the above context, following are the observations made by a three~Judges Bench of this Court in B.C.Chatruvedi (supra):

12. ...........The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.

13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal.

27. To sum up the legal position, being fact finding authorities, both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are vested with exclusive power to examine the evidence forming part of the inquiry report. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has the discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee keeping in mind the gravity of the misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal cannot ordinarily reappreciate the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in respect of the penalty imposed unless and until the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the offence that it would shock the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons, as enumerated in P. Gunasekaran (supra).” Discussions

14. The basic facts are not controverted between the parties. Pursuant to the charge memorandum framing three charges, explanation was submitted by the delinquent officer. He also participated in the departmental enquiry conducted by the enquiry officer. Enquiry report was communicated to the delinquent officer and he submitted further explanation on the findings. Thereafter, the penalty of dismissal from service is imposed. The contention of the respondent is that the issues are predetermined by the disciplinary authority and the rules of natural justice has been violated. In this context, Rule 25 of the CCI CDA Rules 1975 contemplates the procedure for imposing major penalties. The requirements under the Rules and compliance by the disciplinary authority has been furnished by way of a chart on behalf of the appellant which stands extracted hereunder:

15. Pertinently, Rule 26 speaks about action on the enquiry report. Sub- clause (2) stipulates that, “ the disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiring Authority on any Article of Charge, record its own reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charges, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose.”

16. Therefore, it is amply clear that only in the event of disagreement with the findings of the enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority has to record reasons for such disagreement and while agreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer, it is sufficient that the explanation submitted by the delinquent officer on the findings of the enquiry report is considered. In other words, repetition of findings of the enquiry officer is not required, but the explanation submitted by the delinquent officer alone is to be considered for taking a final decision.

17. In the present case, perusal of the order impugned would show that the disciplinary authority considered the documents relied on before the enquiry officer between the parties. The deposition of the witnesses were considered. The authority has stated that they are not inclined to accept the objections and rejected the objections raised on behalf of the delinquent officer. That apart, the authority has considered that the lapses on the part of the delinquent officer has resulted in monetary loss to the tune of Rs.29,68,401/- under Article 1 and under Article 2 a sum of Rs.17,26,889/- was the loss caused to the Corporation as per the report of the enquiry officer. When they have agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer, and recorded the findings to that extent, it would be sufficient to consider for imposing penalty. Repetition of findings of the enquiry officer need not be considered as a mandatory requirement as it would not provide a ground that principles of natural justice has been violated.

18. In the present case, the procedures as contemplated under the Discipline and Appeal Rules were followed and the principles of natural justice has been complied with in all respects in compliance with the Rules. That being the factum, the ground raised by the respondent that the principles of natural justice are violated is unsustainable.

19. Regarding the ground raised by the respondent that the authority has predetermined the issue, this Court is of the considered view that on reading of the enquiry officer’s report, the disciplinary authority has formed an opinion whether to accept the finding or not to accept the finding. Once the disciplinary authority accept the findings it is to be stated in the show cause notice enabling the delinquent to submit his explanation on the finding of the enquiry report. In the event of disagreeing with the finding of the enquiry officer, then alone the reasons for disagreement must be recorded in the show cause notice. Therefore, agreeing with the enquiry officer’s findings per se cannot be construed as predetermining the issue and it is the expression and opinion of the disciplinary authority enabling the delinquent officer to submit his further explanation on the findings of the enquiry officer. Unless the disciplinary authority makes up his mind either to agree or disagree with the findings of the enquiry officer, the delinquent officer may not be in a position to submit his explanation.

20. That apart, the decision to agree with the findings of the enquiry report was taken by the disciplinary authority considering the findings, deposition of witnesses and documents considered by the enquiry officer and it is not an independent decision taken dehors the findings of the enquiry officer. Therefore, the opinion expressed by the disciplinary authority in the second show cause notice that he agreed with the findings of the disciplinary authority would not provide a ground for assailing the order of dismissal from service.

21. The judgment relied upon by the respondent in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others -vs- B.Karunakar and Others cited supra is a case where, no enquiry report was served on the delinquent officer. Therefore, the Court set aside the order of punishment. Thus, the facts are distinguishable and in the present case the enquiry report was furnished to the respondent and he submitted his objections on the findings of the enquiry officer. Thus, the said case is of no avail to the respondent.

22. Regarding the other case decided by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of State Bank of India -vs- Raja and Another, it was a case where the disciplinary authority has merely concurred with the findings of the enquiry officer. However, in the present case the disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and offered opportunity to the delinquent officer to submit his explanation. The said objections were considered by the disciplinary authority, final decision was taken and the penalty of dismissal from service was imposed. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the ground raised by the respondent would be insufficient to assail the order of dismissal from service. The order of dismissal from service was issued after compliance of the principles of natural justice and by following the procedures as contemplated under the Discipline and Appeal Rules.

23. Regarding the scope of judicial review, as discussed under the caption “Legal Position”, in the present case, the rules of natural justice have been complied with. The findings of misconduct is based on some evidence and the statutory rules governing the conduct of disciplinary enquiry has been observed in all respects. The findings of the disciplinary authority is based on the findings of the enquiry officer in his final report, since the disciplinary authority fully agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer. The last point is whether the punishment of dismissal from service is disproportionate to the proven misconduct. Charges proved would show that there is huge financial loss caused on account of the lapses committed by the respondent in the Corporation. Since it is a financial loss caused to the Government of India undertaking, the authorities have found that the proven charges are grave and imposed major penalty. Thus, this Court could not find any reason to take a view that the punishment is disproportionate to the gravity of the charges proved.

24. In view of the discussions made in the aforementioned paragraphs, the writ order impugned order dated 16.02.2024 in W.P.No.15101 of 2015 is set aside and the writ appeal stands allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. (S.M.S.,J.) (K.G.R.,J.) 24-08-2026 Index: Yes Speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes KST To The Managing Director, The Cotton Corporation of India Ltd, Kapas Bhavan, Plot No.3A,Sector 10, CBD, Belapur, Navi Mumbai.400614.

S.M.SUBRAMANIAM J. AND KRISHNASWAMY GOVINDARAJAN J. KST WA No. 1619 of 2026 AND CMP NO. 14871 OF 2026 24-08-2026