CRP/1347/2026 of S.Narayanan Vs S.Rakesh Kumar on 20 August 2026

ORDER

This revision petition has been filed to set aside the order made in I.A.No.2 of 2024 dated 02.01.2026 in O.S.No.77 of 2013 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Tambaram. An application was filed in I.A.No.2 of 2024 by the revision petitioner, seeking to recall the Joint Memorandum of Compromise dated 03.09.2013 in O.S.No.77 of 2013. The said application, on contest, has been dismissed by the District Munsif Court, as against which, the present revision petition has been filed.

2. I have heard Mr.V.Chandraprabu, learned counsel for the revision petitioner and Mr.Sai Prashanth, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, Mr.P.Sunil, learned Government Advocate for the 2nd respondent, who is only a formal party in this revision.

3. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would invite my attention to the provisions of Order XXIII of CPC and contend that the petitioner has no recourse, except to approach the Court that recorded the compromise memo, which has been rightly done in the present case. He would further state that the 1st respondent, having undertaken that he would not interfere with the possession of the property that is allotted to the petitioner, has violated the terms of the compromise memo, which therefore gives rise to a ground to recall the compromise itself. In this regard, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Navratan Lal Sharma Vs. Radha Mohan Sharma and others, reported in 2024 SCC On line SC 3720. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further state that the petitioner, having entered into a compromise, the 1st respondent cannot breach the terms of compromise on one hand and on the other hand, take advantage of the compromise decree as well. He would therefore state that there is no impediment for the petitioner to seek setting aside of the joint compromise memo. He would therefore pray for the revision being allowed.

4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, Mr.Sai Prashanth states that there is no fraud or misrepresentation alleged surrounding the execution of the joint compromise memo and what is now alleged is a breach of the terms of the compromise, by making an allegation against the 1st respondent that he has encroached into the property, which was allotted to the petitioner under the joint compromise memo. It is therefore the contention of the learned counsel for the 1st respondent that this is a fresh cause of action available to the petitioner and the apprehension of the petitioner that he is left without any remedy, excepting by approaching the same Court, which passed the compromise decree, cannot be countenanced. He has also relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat (D) through LR, Sadhna Raj Vs. Rajinder Singh and others, reported in AIR 2006 SC 2628. He would therefore pray for dismissal of the revision.

5. Admittedly, pending suit, the parties have reached a compromise. The terms of the settlement have also been reduced to writing, by way of joint memorandum of compromise dated 03.09.2013. The suit has been disposed of / decreed, in terms of the joint memo of compromise. Admittedly, the revision petitioner, the 1st respondent and their respective counsel are signatories to the said joint memo of compromise. Even today, it is not the case of the petitioner that the compromise was brought about by any fraud or misrepresentation. The grievance of the petitioner is only that despite coming forward to compromise the dispute, the 1st respondent has allegedly gone back on the compromise terms, by encroaching into the property that was clearly allotted to the petitioner, I do not see how this can afford a ground to seek forsetting aside the compromise memo itself.

6. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, the allegation of encroachment or trespass certainly gives rise to a fresh cause of action to the petitioner to file a fresh suit against the alleged trespasser or encroacher, but does not give rise to a cause of action to seek recalling the compromise memo itself. In fact, it permissible in terms of the compromise decree, the petitioner can even seek remedy by execution of the decree.

7. No doubt, the 1st respondent has agreed to certain terms, which are now alleged to be breached by the 1st respondent. It is a matter for evidence, subject to the contention that may be taken by the 1st respondent. However, when there is no allegation that the compromise itself was brought about by fraud, coercion or misrepresentation, then I do not see any necessity for setting aside the compromise memo. The apprehension of the petitioner that he has no other remedy excepting than approaching the Court, which recorded the compromise is baseless. It is always open to the petitioner to workout his remedy in accordance with law, subject to the law of limitation. The petitioner cannot today complain of breach of the terms of the compromise and cite it as a ground for recalling the joint memo compromise itself, that too, which has been passed way back on 03.09.2013. In the light of the above, the Trial Court, in my considered opinion, has rightly dismissed I.A.No.2 of 2024 and the said order does not warrant any interference in this revision.

8. As far as reliance placed on Navratan Lal Sharma’s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court only relied on the earlier decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat’s case, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree, in order to seek avoidance of such consent decree is to approach the very same Court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of such compromise and establish that there was no compromise. I do not see how this decision can be applied to the facts of the present case, because the petitioner admits to the factum of a compromise reached between the parties and the suit being disposed of, in term of the compromise. However, in the light of the above discussions, it is made clear that Order XXIII of CPC shall not come in the way of the petitioner approaching the competent Civil Court, seeking redressal of his grievances in accordance with law, subject to law of limitation.

9. In fine, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. It is brought to my notice that in pursuance of the interim order dated 11.06.2026, the suit filed in O.S.No.28 of 2014 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Tambaram, by the 1st respondent has also been stayed. Considering that the suit is of the year 2014 and the suit is at the stage of trial, the learned District Munsif, Tambaram, is directed to expedite trial and dispose of the suit on or before 31.01.2027. No costs. Connected Civil Miscellaneous Petition is closed. 20.08.2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes/No ATA To The District Munsif Court, Tambaram.

P.B.BALAJI, J. ATA CRP No.1347 of 2026 20.08.2026

CRP No.1347 of 2026 & CMP.No.6549 of 2026 P.B.BALAJI.J. A mention was made by the learned Government Advocate, Mr.P.Sunil, requesting for his name to be reflected in the order in the revision petition, since at the time of hearing and disposing of the revision, he was the Government Advocate appearing for the second respondent.

2. In the light of the above, the name of Mr.P.Sunil, learned Government Advocate appearing for the second respondent, shall be incorporated in the order passed in the revision.

3. Registry shall issue a fresh copy of the order after incorporating necessary corrections.

4. Except for the aforesaid modifications, order dated 20.08.2026, remains unaltered in all other respects. 09.10.2026 rkp

P.B.BALAJI, J. RKP CRP No.1347 of 2026 & CMP.No.6549 of 2026 09.10.2026