CR.R/489/2024 on 2 November 2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 489 of 2024 Reserved on: 16.10.2026 Date of Decision: 02.11.2026. Rekha ...Petitioner Versus Navdeep Sahni ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr Naresh Kumar Tomar, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Pranav Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present revision petition against the judgment dated 25.04.2024 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur, District at Nahan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 21.07.2022 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajgarh, District Sirmaur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant and accused knew each other. The accused required money and construction material for her shop. She approached the complainant in July 2019 and asked the complainant to lend her money and the construction material. The complainant paid ₹88,000/- to the accused by means of bank transfer. The accused also borrowed construction material worth ₹1,12,000/- from the complainant's shop. She promised to repay ₹2,00,000/- to the complainant within 6 months. The complainant demanded the money from the accused, and the accused issued a cheque of ₹2,00,000/- in the complainant's favour to discharge her debt/liability. The complainant presented the cheque before his bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement “funds insufficient”. The complainant issued a notice to the accused, which was delivered to her on

11.11.2020. The accused failed to repay the money. Hence, he filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court for taking action against the accused as per the law.

3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to her for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which she pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The complainant examined Himanshu Negi (CW1) and himself (CW2) to prove his complaint.

5. The accused, in her statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the complainant's case in its entirety. She claimed that she had a dispute with her husband, and the complainant filed a false complaint against her in connivance with her husband. She had not issued any cheque in the complainant’s favour. She did not produce any evidence, despite repeated opportunities, and the learned Trial Court closed her evidence on 21.07.2022.

6. The learned Trial Court held that the complainant's version that the accused had borrowed money and the

construction material from his shop was believable. This version was duly corroborated by the bills and the statement of account. The cheque carries with it a presumption that it was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The accused failed to rebut the presumption. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement “insufficient funds”, and the notice was duly served upon the accused. All the ingredients of commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced her to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months, pay a fine of ₹2,50,000/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 months for the commission of the aforesaid offence.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by learned Trial Court that the complainant's version was duly corroborated by the

documents on record. The defence taken by the accused that the complainant had filed a false complaint against her in connivance with her husband was not proved. The cheque was dishonoured with endorsement “insufficient funds”. The notice was duly served upon the accused, and the accused had not paid the money to the complainant. All the ingredients of commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied, and the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was adequate, which did not require any interference from the Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The complainant had failed to prove that the cheque was issued for a legally enforceable debt/liability. The plea taken by the accused was probable, and the learned Trial Court erred in rejecting it. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside.

9. I have heard Mr Naresh Kumar Tomar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Pranav Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.

10. Mr Naresh Kumar Tomar, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The complainant failed to prove that the accused had taken any money or the construction material from him. The plea taken by the accused that the complainant had filed a false complaint in connivance with her husband was highly probable, and the learned Courts below erred in rejecting this plea. The learned courts below had imposed a harsh sentence. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned courts below be set aside.

11. Mr Pranav Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that learned Courts had rightly appreciated the material on record. The complainant's version was corroborated by the documentary evidence. The accused had not stepped into the witness box to prove the defence taken by her in her statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC,

and the learned Courts below had rightly rejected her version. The accused had failed to rebut the presumption attached to the cheque, and she was rightly convicted. This Court should not re-appreciate the evidence while exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder:

“438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439.

(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub- section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.

(3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the

findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record.

7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts.

7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case, which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the

correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless:

i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law.

ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all.

iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.

7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of

conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.

28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.”

7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction.

14. The ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were explained in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 as under:

5.3. At this juncture, it is pertinent to highlight the key ingredients as highlighted by this Court in the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745: 2000 SCC (Cri) 546: (2000) 100 COMP CAS 755. “10. On a reading of the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act, it is clear that the ingredients which are to be satisfied for making out a case under the provision are:

(i) a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person out of that account for the discharge of any debt or other liability;

(ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

(iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank;

(iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;

(v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice.

11. If the aforementioned ingredients are satisfied, then the person who has drawn the cheque shall be deemed to have committed an offence. In the explanation to the section, clarification is made that the phrase “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.

5.4. The ingredients of the offence under Section 138 are as follows:

i. The drawing of a cheque by a person on an account maintained by him with the banker for the payment of any amount of money to another from that account.

ii. The cheque being drawn for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability.

iii. Presentation of the cheque to the bank within the period of six months or within the period of its validity.

iv. The return of the cheque by the drawee bank as unpaid either because the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account. v. A notice by the payee or the holder in due course making a demand for the payment of the amount to the drawer of the cheque within thirty days of the receipt of information from the bank in regard to the return of the cheque.

vi. Failure of the drawer of the cheque to make payment of the amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice.

vii. Filing of the complaint within a month from the date of expiry of the grace period of fifteen days before a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate not below first class.

15. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

16. The complainant reiterated the contents of the complaint in his proof affidavit (Ext.CW2/A). He stated in his cross-examination that the accused had taken the shop from Dinesh Thakur on rent. The husband of the accused used to visit the complainant's shop to take the construction material. He had transferred the money to the accused after 2-4 days of the demand. He started handing over the articles to the accused 2-4 days after she had demanded the construction material from him. He denied that he had taken the cheque from the husband of the accused and had misused it in connivance with him.

17. His statement is duly corroborated by the statement (Ext.CW1/C) of the account in which ₹43,000/- and ₹45,000/- are shown to have been transferred to the account of the accused on 30.05.2019 and 22.07.2019. Similarly, the complainant’s statement of the account (Ext.CW2/E) also shows the transfer of ₹45,000/- on 22.07.2019. Thus, the complainant's version that he had transferred ₹88,000/- to the

accused by way of bank transfer was rightly accepted by the learned Courts below.

18. The complainant's version regarding the handing over of the construction material is corroborated by the bills (Ext.CW2/G to Ext.CW2/I), in which the material worth ₹49,930/-, ₹31,850/- and ₹30,220/- (total ₹ 1,12,000/-) is shown to have been given to the accused on a credit basis on 02.07.2019, 09.07.2019 and 13.07.2019 respectively. The accused has not provided any explanation for the transfer of money to her account or the issuance of a bill in her name. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly accepted the complainant's version that the accused had borrowed money and the construction material from the complainant and issued a cheque to repay the debt/liability.

19. Once the complainant's version is accepted as correct that the accused had issued a cheque in his favour, a presumption would arise under Section 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Jain vs. Ajay Singh (2023) 10 SCC 148 that the

proof of the execution of the cheque by the complainant would trigger the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act and the burden would shift upon the accused to rebut the presumption. It was observed:

37. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by the accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device under Section 139 of the Act helps shift the burden on the accused. The effect of the presumption, in that sense, is to transfer the evidential burden on the accused of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability. Until this evidential burden is discharged by the accused, the presumed fact will have to be taken to be true, without expecting the complainant to do anything further.

20. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED, PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI ACT ARISE

15. In the present case, the cheque in question has admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1-Accused. This Court is of the view that once the execution of the cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability arise against the accused. It is pertinent to mention that observations to the contrary by a two-Judge Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde,

(2008) 4 SCC 54, have been set aside by a three-Judge Bench in Rangappa (supra).

16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of cheques as a mode of payment in commercial transactions.

17. Needless to mention that the presumption contemplated under Section 139 of the NI Act is rebuttable. However, the initial onus of proving that the cheque is not in discharge of any debt or other liability is on the accused/drawer of the cheque [See: Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197].

21. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda (supra) that a statutory presumption arises on the admission or proof of the execution of the negotiable instrument, and the burden is upon the accused to rebut this presumption. It was observed:

5.7. A conjoint and harmonious reading of the aforesaid provisions clearly indicates towards the statutory presumption that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration and that it was executed for discharge of debt or liability once the execution of the negotiable instrument is either proved or admitted. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument was executed by the drawer, the rules of presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act help him and shift the burden of rebutting the said presumptions upon the said drawer. Since these presumptions are rebuttable, the accused has the burden of disproving the same by leading evidence, either direct or indirect, to the effect that there did not exist any consideration or debt or that the non-existence of the said debt or consideration is so probable that a prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration or debt

existed. However, a bare denial of the passing of any consideration or existence of any debt does not support the defence of the accused and, therefore, to disprove the presumptions, something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted back to the complainant. The accused has to bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which the court may either believe that the consideration and the debt did not exist or their non- existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that it did not exist.

22. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the cheque carried a presumption that it was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability, and the burden was upon the accused to rebut the presumption.

23. The accused claimed in her statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC that she had a dispute with her husband and the complainant and her husband had filed a false complaint. She did not step into the witness box to prove this defence and only relied upon her statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC to prove her defence, which is not sufficient. It was held in Sumeti Vij v. Paramount Tech Fab Industries, (2022) 15 SCC 689: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 201 that the accused has to lead defence evidence to rebut the presumption

and mere denial in his statement under Section 313 is not sufficient. It was observed at page 700: “20. That apart, when the complainant exhibited all these documents in support of his complaints and recorded the statement of three witnesses in support thereof, the appellant recorded her statement under Section 313 of the Code but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut the presumption in support of her defence available under Section 139 of the Act. The statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code is not substantive evidence of defence, but only an opportunity for the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution's case against the accused. Therefore, there is no evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheques were issued for consideration." (Emphasis supplied)”

24. Therefore, the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of CrPC was not sufficient to rebut the presumption, and the accused cannot derive any advantage from it.

25. The accused had also not produced any complaint made by her to the police or any other authority regarding any dispute with her husband. She has not explained the circumstances under which her husband could have handed over her signed cheque to the complainant. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly rejected the defence taken by the accused, and there is no infirmity in the findings recorded by

the learned Trial Court that the accused had failed to rebut the presumption attached to the cheque.

26. The complainant asserted that the cheque was dishonoured with endorsement “insufficient funds”. This is duly corroborated by the memo of dishonour (Ext.CW1/B) in which the reason for dishonour has been mentioned as “insufficient funds” and “stop payment”. Himanshu Negi (CW1) stated that the cheque was presented by the complainant, but it was dishonoured with endorsement “insufficient funds”. This part of his statement was not challenged in the cross- examination and is deemed to be accepted. Further, there is a presumption attached to the memorandum of dishonour regarding its correctness. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore, (2010) 3 SCC 83; (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 625; (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1; 2010 SCC OnLine SC 155, that the memo issued by the Bank is presumed to be correct and the burden is upon the accused to rebut the presumption. It was observed at page 95: “24. Section 146, making a major departure from the principles of the Evidence Act, provides that the bank's slip or memo with the official mark showing that the cheque was dishonoured would, by itself, give rise to the

presumption of dishonour of the cheque, unless and until that fact was disproved. Section 147 makes the offences punishable under the Act compoundable.”

27. In the present case, the accused did not claim that she had sufficient funds in her account, and the cheque was wrongly dishonoured by the bank. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held that the cheque was dishonoured, with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’.

28. The complainant asserted that he had issued a notice to the accused, which was duly served upon her. This is duly corroborated by the acknowledgement (Ext.CW2/D) which bears the signatures of the accused. Thus, learned Courts below had rightly held that the notice was served upon the accused.

29. In any case, it was laid down in C.C. Allavi Haji vs. Pala Pelly Mohd. 2007(6) SCC 555, that the person who claims that he had not received the notice has to pay the amount within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the summons from the Court and in case of failure to do so, he cannot take advantage of the fact that notice was not received by him. It was observed: “It is also to be borne in mind that the requirement of giving notice is a clear departure from the rule of Criminal Law, where there is no stipulation of giving notice before filing a complaint. Any drawer who claims

that he did not receive the notice sent by post can, within 15 days of receipt of summons from the court in respect of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, make payment of the cheque amount and submit to the Court that he had made payment within 15 days of receipt of summons (by receiving a copy of the complaint with the summons) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be rejected. A person who does not pay within 15 days of receipt of the summons from the Court, along with the copy of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice as required under Section 138, by ignoring the statutory presumption to the contrary under Section 27 of the G.C. Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act. In our view, any other interpretation of the proviso would defeat the very object of the legislation. As observed in Bhaskaran’s case (supra), if the giving of notice in the context of Clause (b) of the proviso was the same as the receipt of notice, a trickster cheque drawer would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by adopting different strategies and escape from the legal consequences of Section 138 of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied)

30. The accused did not claim that she had repaid the money to the complainant, and it was duly proved on record that the accused had failed to repay the amount despite the receipt of the notice.

31. Therefore, it was duly proved on record that the accused had issued a cheque to discharge her liability, which was dishonoured with an endorsement “insufficient funds”, and the accused failed to repay the money despite the receipt of a notice of demand. Hence, all the ingredients of the

commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied, and the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act.

32. The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months and pay a fine of ₹2,50,000/-. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 138, that the penal provision of Section 138 is deterrent in nature. It was observed at page 203: “6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable instruments, including cheques, and to encourage and promote the use of negotiable instruments, including cheques, in financial transactions. The penal provision of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable instruments such as cheques without serious intention to honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.”

33. Keeping in view the deterrent nature of the punishment, the sentence of six months cannot be said to be excessive.

34. In the present case, the cheque was issued on 10.08.2020, and the sentence was imposed on 21.07.2022 after the lapse of about 2 years. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75, that the Courts should uniformly levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum. It was observed at page 291: -

19. As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf of the respondent, we are conscious of the settled principles that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA is not only punitive but also compensatory and restitutive. The provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal liability for the dishonour of a cheque as well as civil liability for the realisation of the cheque amount. It is also well settled that there needs to be a consistent approach towards awarding compensation, and unless there exist special circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy fines up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest @ 9% p.a. [R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260, para 20: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 520]”

35. The learned Trial Court had awarded compensation of ₹50,000/- on the cheque amount of ₹2,00,000/-. The complainant had to engage an Advocate to prosecute the complaint; he lost the interest that he would have gained by depositing the money in the bank, and he was entitled to be compensated for it. Thus, the amount of ₹50,000/- ordered to be paid as compensation cannot be said to be excessive, requiring any interference from the Court.

36. No other point was urged.

37. In view of the above, the present revision fails, and it is dismissed.

38. The present revision stands disposed of, and so do the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge 2nd November, 2026 (Nikita)