CRP(MD)/78/2026 of N.Selvaraj Vs V.Arasayee Ammal on 30 October 2026

ORDER

The Civil Revision Petition has been filed against the Fair and Decreetal Order dated 01.11.2025 made in I.A.No.1 of 2025 in ASSR.No.670 of 2025 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Musiri.

2. The Petition in I.A.No.1 of 2025 was originally allowed by the trial Court on 01.11.2025, against which, civil revision petition filed in CRP(MD)No.78 of 2026 and the same was allowed on 26.02.2026. Against which Civil Appeal No.9187 of 2026 filed by the respondents before the Apex Court and the Apex Court disposed of the same with a direction to this Court by setting aside the order passed by this Court and remit the matter to decide the Civil Revision Petition of the decree holder in accordance with law as early as possible, preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order by the High Court Registry.

3. The revision petitioners are the plaintiffs in O.S.No.293 of 2008, instituted seeking a declaration of their right to use the pathway through the ‘B’ Schedule property and a consequential injunction. According to the revision petitioners, despite the interim injunction

granted by the trial Court restraining the respondents from putting up any construction, the respondents proceeded to construct a building. The respondents also instituted O.S.No.31 of 2009 seeking issuance of patta and a consequential injunction, and the said suit was dismissed. O.S.No.293 of 2008 was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the decree, the respondents preferred an appeal in A.S.SR.No.670 of 2025 before the Subordinate Court, Musiri, along with an application seeking condonation of the delay of 263 days in filing the appeal.

4. The revision petitioners contend that the suit was decreed on 31.7.2024 but the respondents filed the application for certified copies only on 05.04.2025, nearly eight months after the judgment and decree were passed. The copies were made ready on 15.05.2025 and were received by the respondents/appellants on 02.06.2025. However, the appeal was filed only on 17.07.2025, with a delay of 263 days. In the affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.1 of 2025, the respondents attributed the delay to the failure of their trial Court counsel to inform them about the judgment and to their inability to obtain the case papers in time. The revision petitioners contend that the said explanation is neither satisfactory nor sufficient to justify the inordinate delay.

5. The revision petitioners further contend that, pursuant to the decree passed in the suit, an order relating to the cancellation of house tax was served on the respondents, and the first respondent acknowledged receipt of the same. According to them, this establishes that the first respondent had knowledge of the judgment and decree as early as 16.08.2024.

6. The revision petitioners further submit that they had filed a caveat on 18.09.2024, which was allegedly served on the respondents and that the respondents had received the caveat notice. They contend that the respondents were thus aware of the proceedings and the adverse decision. Further, the water connection provided to the respondents was disconnected, and the relevant order was served on them on 30.11.2024. According to the revision petitioners, these circumstances demonstrate that the respondents had knowledge of the consequences flowing from the decree well before filing the appeal.

7. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners further submits that the District Revenue Officer passed an order on 07.01.2025 directing the removal of the encroachment. The revision petitioners also initiated execution proceedings for enforcement of the decree, and notice

in the execution petition was stated to have been served and the respondents 1 to 3 entered appearance on 30.1.2025.

8. The revision petitioners filed an additional counter, enclosing the aforesaid documents in support of their contention that the respondents had knowledge of the judgment and decree well before filing the appeal. They submit that, despite having knowledge of the proceedings and the consequences of the decree, the respondents have now sought to attribute the delay to the failure of their advocate to inform them about the judgment and the delay in obtaining the case papers. According to the revision petitioners, the explanation offered is vague, lacks bona fides and does not satisfactorily account for the entire period of delay. They therefore contend that the respondents have failed to establish sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 263 days and that the application for condonation of delay is liable to be dismissed.

9. The learned counsel for the petitioners produced the following judgments reported in

1) 2025 (5) MLJ – 214 (S.Sivakumar Vs. M/s.Essjohn Pharma, rep. By its Proprietor ) wherein, in paragraph Nos.11 to 14 it has been held as follows :

“11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Basawaraj's case (referred herein supra) has held that in a condonation of delay application, the Applicant has to explain as to what 'sufficient cause' prevented the Applicant to approach the Court within a period of limitation and further held that a party found to be negligent or for want of bona fides on his part or not having acted diligently, then the delay cannot be condoned. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that if there is no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court in time, then condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever would amount to violating the statutory provisions and tantamounting to only a show of disregard to the legislature.

12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thirunagalingam's case (referred hereing supra), has held that the first and foremost duty of the Court is to ascertain the bonafides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation, rather than the merits of the matter and only if sufficient cause has been assigned for the delay and the opposition of other side is equally balanced or stand on equal footing, the Court can consider the merits of the main matter, for the purpose of condoning the delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held that the delay cannot be condoned as an act of generosity and pursuit of doing substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposite parties.

13. In A.S.Jahangir's case (referred herein supra), this

Court held that when false averments have been made, discretionary power conferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should not be extended to the Applicant who is guilty of making such false statement.

14. In M/s.Escorts Finance Limited's case, (referred herein supra), it was also arising out of a summary suit and a delay of 33 days was sought to be condoned. The Delhi High Court found that the delay was only occasioned because of 'ipsi dixit' of the Applicant and no sufficient cause was shown and the Application was held to be lacking in bonafides.”

2. 2025(1) MWN Civil 420 (D.V.Venkatesan and another Vs. N.R.Subramanian and another) wherein, in paragraph Nos.13, 14, 17 and 21 it has been held as follows : “13. It has been consistently held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also been consistently reiterating that the court must consider the reason for the delay rather than the duration of the delay. The discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In Ramlal vs. Rewa Coal Fields Ltds, reported in AIR 1962 SC 361, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that once the period of limitation expires, then the applicant has to explain the delay made

thereafter for day by day and if he is unable to explain the delay even for a single day delay, it would be deemed that the party did not have sufficient cause for delay.

14. No doubt, the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this Court have repeatedly held that the length of delay is immaterial, however, the applicant, who seeks condonation of delay, has to show sufficient or just cause. Such proof of sufficient or just cause is a pre-condition for entertaining the application for condonation of delay. The discretion to allow an application for condonation of delay is different from the satisfaction of the requirements of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The discretion cannot be exercised by a Court when the applicant seeking condonation of delay is unable to satisfy the Court that he had just or sufficient cause for not approaching the Court earlier and that the delay was occasioned beyond his control, there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or any lack of bonafides. If the petitioners are able to show and satisfy the Court, in the absence of the above militating factors, then they are entitled to discretion being exercised in his favour. However, in the case on hand, this Court is of the view that the petitioner has not shown sufficient cause to condone the huge delay. That apart, condoning the long delay in the absence of sufficient reason would cause prejudice to the other parties. Further, when the defence of limitation is raised by the parties, the Court cannot accept the application beyond the period of limitation. ……

17. Left with no other choice, it appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocates who were appearing for the revision petitioners in the trial court. Even if this Court assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief. …..

21. It is well settled principle that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to bar the remedy for those who seek dilatory tactics to enforce their remedy within the period stipulated by the legislature. When the statute prescribes certain acts to be done in a proper manner within a particular time litigant cannot be so negligent despite having appeared in the Court and make bald allegations at later point of time. The rules of limitation thus will only bar the remedy but does not extinguish the right. Therefore, when the remedy is extinguished under the operation of law, the same cannot be re-opened at the later point of time.”

3. 2013 (14) SCC 81 (Basawaraj and another Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer) wherein, in paragraph Nos.12 and 15 it has been held as follows : “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. …….

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted

diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

10. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners would submit that the Hon’ble High Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court have repeatedly held that, once the period of limitation has expired, the applicant is duty-bound to satisfactorily explain the delay. In the present case, the respondents have failed to explain the delay, even for a single day, and have not established sufficient cause for condoning the same. Hence, the learned counsel prayed that the Civil Revision Petition be allowed and the order passed by the trial Court be set aside.

11. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that the respondents had not put up any construction during the subsistence of the order of injunction, but had

obtained a building plan from the concerned authorities in August 2008 and thereafter constructed the building. It is further submitted that the trial Court had decreed the suit in favour of the revision petitioners/plaintiffs without any supporting material. Though the revision petitioners relied upon several documents, they had not properly produced the same before the trial Court, which nevertheless permitted them to be marked. Mere marking of a document does not amount to proof of its contents. The respondents were not afforded an opportunity to establish the genuineness of the documents and, according to them, had no knowledge of the same. It is therefore contended that the trial Court rightly allowed the application, leaving it open to the respondents to establish their case before the appellate Court. Accordingly, the learned counsel prayed for dismissal of the Civil Revision Petition.

12. Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials available on record.

13. A perusal of the materials placed before this Court would reveal that the revision petitioners had referred to several documents in their additional counter and had also filed a list of documents along with the same. The materials indicate that certified copies of the relevant

records had been obtained from the trial Court. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the revision petitioners had not formally marked the documents, they had specifically set out the relevant events and circumstances in their counter. However, the respondents did not file any reply controverting those averments. The trial Court, while considering the application, failed to advert to the specific averments contained in the counter or examine whether the respondents had satisfactorily explained the delay. In paragraph 7 of the impugned order, the trial Court observed that the respondents had not stated anything regarding the cause of delay and had merely narrated the facts of the case. However, the revision petitioners had elaborately set out the relevant events at each stage to demonstrate that the respondents had knowledge of the proceedings and the subsequent developments.

14. The common judgment in O.S. Nos. 293 of 2008 and 31 of 2009 was pronounced on 31.07.2024. However, no application for a certified copy was filed immediately thereafter. The copy application was filed only on 05.04.2025, and the certified copy was obtained on 02.06.2025. Even thereafter, the appeal was filed only on 17.07.2025. The trial Court failed to consider these circumstances and the specific averments made in the counter. Instead, it passed a cryptic order

observing that the respondents could ventilate their grievances before the appellate Court. The trial Court, however, failed to examine the crucial question as to whether the respondents had disclosed sufficient cause in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay. The failure to consider the material averments and the circumstances relevant to the question of limitation renders the impugned order unsustainable.

15. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners emphasise that an applicant seeking condonation of delay must furnish a satisfactory explanation for the delay and establish sufficient cause for not approaching the Court within the prescribed period of limitation. Though a liberal approach may be adopted while considering an application for condonation of delay, such an approach cannot dispense with the statutory requirement of establishing sufficient cause. The length of the delay is not, by itself, decisive; what is material is whether the explanation offered is bona fide and satisfactory. The Court is also entitled to consider the materials available on record while determining whether the applicant had knowledge of the proceedings and whether the delay was deliberate or attributable to circumstances beyond the applicant’s control. In the present case, the revision petitioners had

placed relevant materials before the trial Court in support of their objections. However, the trial Court failed to consider those materials and did not record any reasoned finding on the objections raised by the revision petitioners. The impugned order, having been passed without considering the material averments and the relevant circumstances, suffers from non-application of mind and is liable to be set aside.

16. A perusal of the averments made in the counter would indicate that the respondents had knowledge of the proceedings . Despite such knowledge, they did not take any steps to challenge the judgment until the revision petitioners/plaintiffs initiated execution proceedings. The explanation offered in the affidavit accompanying the application, namely, that their advocate had not informed them about the judgment, cannot, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, be accepted as a satisfactory explanation for the entire period of delay, particularly in the absence of a convincing explanation for the subsequent inaction. The respondents have failed to establish sufficient cause warranting condonation of the delay.

17. Accordingly, this Court finds that the application for condonation of delay ought not to have been allowed by the trial Court.

The impugned order is therefore liable to be set aside, and the Civil Revision Petition deserves to be allowed.

18. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the order dated 01.11.2025 made in I.A.No.1 of 2025 in ASSR.No.670 of 2025 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Musiri is set aside. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.

30.10.2026 Index : Yes / No NCC : Yes / No RM To The Subordinate Court, Musiri. Copy to

1. The Section Officer, ER/VR Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.

R. POORNIMA,

J.

RM C.R.P(MD)No.78 of 2026 30.10.2026