CRP(MD)/1953/2026 of M.A. Anandakumar Vs K.K. Sakunthala (died) 1. K. on 27 October 2026

O R D E R

This Civil Revision Petition has been filed to set aside the order, dated 06/07/2026 passed in I.A.No.7 of 2026 in O.S.No.34 of 2016 by the V Additional District Judge, Madurai.

2. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners/defendants 3 to 5 submitted that the petitioners are subsequent purchasers of the suit property from the first defendant, one of the sons of late Thulasi Ammal. According to the petitioners, they initially purchased the property from the first defendant on 23/12/2014. However, the title deeds relating to the property were not handed over to them at the time of purchase. Subsequently, upon making enquiries with the legal heirs of late Thulasi Ammal, the petitioners were furnished with a Muchalika, purportedly executed between the two sons of late Thulasi Ammal, namely, Thulasiram and Janarthanan. It is their further case that upon the death of Thulasi Ammal, the property was to be divided equally between her two sons. The petitioners, therefore, sought to produce the said document before the trial Court. However, the trial Court rejected the same on the ground that it was insufficiently stamped and unregistered.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the disputed document is merely a family arrangement or agreement recording an

arrangement already arrived at between the family members and therefore, does not require compulsory registration. It is further contended that the document is sought to be produced only to establish the existence of an earlier arrangement among the family members concerning the future enjoyment and division of the property, and not for the purpose of establishing title or creating an independent right over the property.

4. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 21 strongly opposed the marking of the said document. According to the learned counsel, the petitioners seek to rely upon the document to establish a substantive right and share in the suit property. Therefore, an unstamped and unregistered document cannot be received in evidence for the purpose for which the petitioners seek to rely upon it.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the other respondents submitted that the plaintiffs and the first defendant are admittedly co-sharers. It is further submitted that the first defendant had executed a Power of Attorney in favour of the second defendant. Acting in his capacity as the power agent of the first defendant, the second defendant executed a sale deed in favour of defendants 3 to 5, who are his three sons. Consequently, defendants 3 to 5 claim title and

rights over the suit property under the sale deed executed by the second defendant as the power agent of the first defendant.

6. The learned counsel further submitted that although the second defendant entered appearance in the suit, he did not file any written statement. The third defendant alone filed a written statement in the year 2017, which was subsequently adopted by defendants 4 and 5. However, the said written statement contains no averment whatsoever regarding the disputed document now sought to be relied upon by the petitioners. It is contended that the petitioners introduced the said document, describing it as a settlement or family arrangement, only after a lapse of nearly seven to eight years. The genuineness, validity and admissibility of the document are seriously disputed by the plaintiffs.

7. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents further submitted that the disputed document is stated to have been executed pursuant to a family settlement. According to the case set up by the petitioners, a panchayat was convened, pursuant to which the property was agreed to be divided into two equal shares, one half being allotted to the first defendant and the other half to the second defendant. However, the specific case of the plaintiffs is that Thulasi

Ammal was the absolute owner of the suit property and that the suit property forms part of the property originally purchased by her. In this regard, it was submitted that Ex.A1 is the sale deed dated 29/08/1955, under which the property was purchased in the name of Thulasi Ammal. Subsequently, she executed a registered settlement deed in favour of her younger son, Janarthanan, under Ex.A2 dated 29/11/1968. Janarthanan thereafter sold a portion of the property to third parties and executed a Will dated 18/05/2001, marked as Ex.A4, in respect of the remaining portion in favour of the second plaintiff, who was his unmarried sister.

8. It is further submitted that Thulasi Ammal had five daughters and two sons. Of the five daughters, three had married and predeceased their mother and their respective legal representatives were impleaded as plaintiffs. The remaining two daughters, who were unmarried at the time of institution of the suit, were arrayed as plaintiffs 1 and 2. The younger son, Janarthanan, had also predeceased the institution of the suit. As he was unmarried and had no direct legal heirs, his remaining share in the property was claimed in the suit. During the pendency of the suit, plaintiffs 1 and 2 and the first defendant also died, and their respective legal representatives were subsequently brought on record.

9. The learned counsel further submitted that the original written statement filed by the third defendant contained no averment as to the manner in which the first defendant had acquired title to the property. The defendants had merely pleaded that the first defendant had contributed a sum of Rs.1,000/- towards the purchase of the suit property, while his father had contributed a sum of Rs.2,000/-, and that the property had nevertheless been purchased in the name of their mother. This was the only plea raised by the defendants concerning the first defendant’s alleged contribution towards the purchase of the property. After a lapse of nearly eight years, the defendants filed I.A.No.6 of 2026, seeking permission to file an additional written statement. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs made an endorsement stating that the application could be allowed, subject to proof, relevancy, validity and admissibility of the allegations contained in the additional written statement. Accordingly, the application was allowed. Therefore, the learned counsel contended that the newly raised plea regarding the alleged family settlement could be adjudicated only at the stage of trial, subject to proof, relevancy, validity and admissibility.

10. The learned counsel further submitted that after the plaintiffs had closed their evidence, defendants 3 to 5 were directed to adduce their evidence.

However, despite being granted several opportunities, they failed to commence their evidence, compelling the trial Court to close their evidence. Thereafter, the other defendants, who are the legal representatives of the first defendant, were directed to adduce evidence. The sixth defendant was examined as D.W.1, following which their evidence was also closed. In the meantime, the defendants filed applications seeking to set aside the order closing their evidence. The matter ultimately came before this Court by way of C.R.P. (MD)No.1211 of 2026. Upon considering the submissions made on both sides, this Court, by order dated 02/06/2026, allowed the application, subject to payment of costs of Rs.15,000/-, and specifically directed the defendants to adduce their evidence without causing any further delay. This Court also directed the trial Court to dispose of the suit and pronounce judgment on or before 31/07/2026. However, the suit could not be disposed of within the stipulated time. In the above circumstances, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the present revision petition ought to be considered in the light of the earlier orders and directions issued by this Court, as well as the conduct of defendants 3 to 5 in failing to avail themselves of the repeated opportunities granted to them to adduce evidence.

11. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents further contended that the petitioners seek to rely upon a document dated 10/11/1968, purportedly executed pursuant to a panchayat held among the family members. According to the petitioners, the parties to the said document were Thulasi Ammal, the original owner of the property, and her two sons, namely, Thulasiram and Janarthanan. It was contended that the document purportedly records an arrangement among the family members concerning the division of the properties.

12. The learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that subsequent to the alleged panchayat, Thulasi Ammal executed a registered settlement deed dated 29/11/1968 in favour of her son, Janarthanan. In this regard, the learned counsel drew the attention of this Court to the relevant recitals contained in the said settlement deed, which are extracted hereunder:- 'vd;Dila gu;jh fpU\;za;au; mtu;fSf;F ahnjhU tUkhdKk; ,y;yhky; cd;Dila tUkhdj;jpd; Ngupy; FLk;g fhyN\hrk; ele;J tUtij Kd;dpl;Lk; vd;Dila Fkhuj;jpfspy; fy;ahzk; nra;jpUf;fpw %d;W ngz; Fkhuj;jpfs; Nghf kPjk; fy;ahzk; Mfhky; ,Uf;fpw K.K.rFe;jyh kw;Wk; K.K.,e;jpuh ,tu;fSf;F fy;ahzk; nra;a Ntz;bapUg;gjhYk; i\ ,uz;L ngz; kf;fspd;

fy;ahz RgNrhgdhjp tifawhf;fis ePNa nra;J Kbf;f NtZnkd;W ehd; cd;dplk; Nfl;L mjw;F ePAk; rk;kjpj;J i\ vdJ Fkhuj;jpfSk; cdf;F rNfhjupfSkhd rFe;jyh and ,e;jpuh ,tu;fspd; fy;ahz RgNghgdhjp tifawhf;fs; ePNa nra;J Kbf;f Ntz;baij mDrupj;Jk; vdf;F ghj;jpakhdJk; kJiu 3-tJ rfpjk; lTd; k`hypy; 8 tJ njUtpypUf;Fk; ypq;fk; ehl;lhik ed;idau; Fkhuu; rPjhuhka;au; tpifawh Ngu;fsplk; 1955 k; tU\k; Mf];L khjk; 29 Njjpapy; ehd; Rahu; [pjkhf fpiuak; ngw;W i\ fpiua gj;jpuk; kJiu up[p];juhu; MgP]; 1955k; tU\j;jpa 1 ek;gu; G];jfk; 1504 thy;ak; 405 to 407 tiu gf;fq;fspy; 3944 ek;gu; j];jhNt[hf gjptha; ,Uf;fpw fpiua gj;jpug;gb ehd; vd;Dila RthjPd mDNghfj;jpy; itj;Jf; nfhz;L ru;t Rje;jpu ghj;jpakhAk; epuhN\gizahAk; mDgtpj;J tUfpw kid tPL tifawhtpy; fl;Lg;gl;lJk; ,jdbapy; fz;lJk; &. 13000/- &gha; gjp%d;W Mapuk; ngUkhdJkhd ,jdbapy; fz;lkid tPL tifawhit ,J %ykhf cdf;F ghj;jpag;gLj;jp ,e;j nrl;by;nkz;l gj;jpuk; ehd; vOjpf; nfhLj;J i\ ,jdbapy; fz;l kid tPL tifawhitAk; cd;Dila RthjPdj;jpy; xg;Gtpj;J tpl;lgbahy; ,d;W Kjy; i\ ,jdbapy; fz;l kid tPL tifawhit eP ru;tRje;jpu ghj;jpakha; jhdhjp tpdpka tpf;fpuaq;fSf;F Nahf;fpakha; Gj;jpu nghsj;jpu thupRfs; guk;giuau; Kdprpgy; tup tifawh KjyhdJfs; cd; NgUf;F khw;wpf; nfhz;L ,\;lg;gb Mz;L mDgtpj;Jf; nfhs;thahfTk;.'

13. According to the respondents, the registered settlement deed contains no reference whatsoever to any prior panchayat or family arrangement allegedly entered into on 10/11/1968.

14. It is further submitted that the General Power of Attorney executed by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant also contains no recital referring to any partition or family arrangement pursuant to the alleged panchayat. Similarly, the sale deed executed by the second defendant in favour of defendants 3 to 5 makes no mention of any such family arrangement.

15. The learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that even the written statement filed by the third defendant on 30/10/2017 contains no reference to the alleged panchayat or family arrangement. On the contrary, the defendants had specifically pleaded that the first defendant was the principal earning member of the family and had contributed substantial amounts towards the purchase of the property. It is, therefore, contended that the plea of a family arrangement has been introduced for the first time after a lapse of nearly eight years, by way of an additional written statement, solely to substantiate the claim of title put forth by defendants 3 to 5.

16. The learned counsel for the respondents accordingly contended that the alleged family arrangement is evidenced by an unstamped and unregistered instrument, which is inadmissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. It is further submitted that if the instrument itself creates, declares, assigns, limits or extinguishes any right, title or interest in immovable property, it requires compulsory registration under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908, and its admissibility would consequently be barred by Section 49 of the said Act.

17. In support of the aforesaid contentions, the learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yellapu Uma Maheswari and another Vs. Buddha Jagadheeswararao and others, reported in (2015) 16 SCC 787. In the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the nomenclature assigned to a document is not determinative of its legal character; rather, the nature and substance of the document must be ascertained from its recitals and contents. The Court further held that an instrument which, by its own terms, creates, declares, assigns, limits or extinguishes any right, title or interest in immovable property is compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908. At the same time, the Court recognised that an unregistered document may,

subject to compliance with the applicable provisions of the Stamp Act, including payment of the requisite stamp duty and penalty, be admitted in evidence for a genuinely collateral purpose, provided that such purpose does not itself require registration.

18. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of this Court in Saritha Vs. M.A. Shanmugham and others, in C.R.P.(PD)No.945 of 2017, dated 25/03/2022, wherein it has been held in paragraphs 16 and 17 as follows:- “16.An examination of the aforementioned provision leads to the following conclusions:-

(i) .An unstamped or inadequately stamp document cannot be admitted in evidence for any purpose in accordance with Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1988 unless it is properly stamped.

(ii) .It can be stamped and admitted in evidence provided, penalty under Clause A of Section 35 of the Act, is paid.

(iii) .A document which creates or assigns any right either in the present or in the future in any immovable property has to be compulsorily registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908.

(iv) .A document which has to be compulsorily registered cannot be received in evidence with respect to any transaction relating to that particular property mentioned in the document in view of the prohibition under Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908.

17...This document, therefore, comes squarely under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, as a document which has to be compulsorily registered and under Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, a document which has to be compulsorily registered cannot be admitted in evidence.”

19. The learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of this Court in M.Ahamed Jesimabanu and another Vs. A.Mohamed Maideen and others, reported in 2025 (2) L.W. 309. In the said decision, this Court held that where an unregistered document is relied upon for establishing title over immovable property, such reliance cannot be characterised as being for a collateral purpose. The Court further held that an unregistered document can be relied upon for a collateral purpose only when the collateral purpose itself does not require registration and after compliance with the requirements relating to stamp duty and penalty.

20. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of this Court in Ganesan Vs. Saravanakumar and others, in C.R.P.(MD)No.1655 of 2021, dated 23/06/2025, wherein this Court held that an unregistered document cannot be received in evidence for collateral purposes when the real purpose of producing the document is to establish title over the suit property. It is further held that a document which is inherently inadmissible for want of registration cannot be made admissible merely by permitting payment of deficit stamp duty. In view the above said circumstances, the counsel appearing for the respondents 2 to 21 prays for the dismissal of the civil revision petition.

21. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, in reply, submitted that the persons who witnessed the panchayat were the husbands of the married sisters. According to the petitioners, a family arrangement had been arrived at among the family members, whereby it was agreed that after discharging the debts incurred by the family and upon the death of the mother, the properties would be divided equally between the two sons.

22. The learned counsel further submitted that the petitioners are bona fide purchasers who had approached the family members and obtained the said document. It is contended that the recitals contained in the document were

matters to be established during the course of trial and that at the stage of receiving the document, the petitioners were not required to conclusively establish the truth of its recitals. It is further submitted that the document was not relied upon to establish title to the suit properties, but only to prove the existence of an arrangement among the family members concerning their future partition. The learned counsel also contended that the document did not require registration. As regards stamp duty, he submitted that, as already undertaken before this Court on 17/09/2026, the petitioners were ready and willing to pay the requisite stamp duty. Therefore, it is contended that the question of stamp duty alone could be determined at this stage, leaving the questions of validity and admissibility of the document open for consideration at the time of trial.

23. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment in The Board of Revenue, Madras Vs. M.Swaminatha Chettiar, reported in AIR 1980 Mad 97 (FB), wherein this Court considered a document recording an arrangement suggested by panchayatdars and held as follows:- “It is common ground that whether an instrument is an instrument of partition or an agreement to that effect, it would nevertheless attract the same stamp duty as provided in Section 2(15) of the ACL Therefore it is necessary for us to look into the recitals of the document to find out whether the

document in question in an instrument of partition or an agreement to divide property in severalty between co-owners. In the order of the Board of Revenue, the document in question has been looked into and its salient and necessary recitals set out. It refers to an arrangement suggested by the Panchayatdars, which by itself was on a reference made to them by persons who are setting up competing claims over Properties, which were owned in common by them. The Panchayatdars made a suggestion regarding the divisibility of such properties. In effect, therefore, the mode of division of the properties in order to set at rest the controversy between the rival claimants was suggested by the Panchayatdars in the award. The contesting claimants accepted the said arrangement, but made the important addition at the end of the said document by stating that they have accepted the arrangement made by the Panchayatdars and that suitable documents. will be executed in due course.”

24. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kale and others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, reported in (1976) 3 SCC 119, wherein it has been held in paragraphs 42 to 44 as follows:- “42.Finally in a recent decision of this Court in S. Shanmugam Pillai case (supra) after an exhaustive consideration of the authorities on the subject, it was observed as follows:

"Equitable principles such as estoppel, election, family settlement, etc. are not mere technical rules of evidence. The have an important purpose to serve in the administration of justice. The ultimate aim of the law is to secure justice. In the recent times in order to render justice between the parties, courts have been liberally relying on those principles. We would hesitate to narrow down their scope. As observed by this Court in T. V. R. Subbu Chetty's Family Charities' case (supra), that if a person having full knowledge of his right as a possible reversioner enters into a transaction which settles his claim as well as the claim of the opponents at the relevant time, he cannot be permitted to go back on that agreement when reversion actually falls open." In these circumstances there can be no doubt that even if the family settlement was not registered it would operate as a complete estoppel against respondents 4 & 5. Respondent` No. 1 as also the High Court, therefore, committed substantial error of law in not giving effect to the doctrine of estoppel as spelt out by this Court in so many cases. The learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance- upon a number of authorities in Rachcha v. Mt. Mendha,(1) Chief Controlling 6 Revenue Authority v. Smt. Satyawati Sood and others(2) and some other authorities, which, in our opinion have no bearing on the issues to be decided in this case and it is therefore not necessary for us to refer to the same Finally it was contended by the respondents that this Court should not interfere because there was no error of law in the judgment of the High Court or that of Respondent No.1. This argument is only stat ed to be rejected.(1) AIR 1947 All. 177. (2) AIR 1972 Delhi

171. In view of our finding that the family settlement did not contravene any provision of the law but was a legally valid and binding

settlement in accordance with the law, the view of Respondent No. 1 that it was against the provisions of the law was clearly wrong on a point of law and could not be sustained. Similarly the view of the High Court that the compromise required registration was also wrong in view of the clear fact that the mutation petition filed before the Assistant Commissioner did not embody the terms of the family arrangement but was merely in the nature of a memorandum meant for the information of the Court. The High Court further in law in not giving effect to the doctrine of estoppel which is always applied whenever any party to the valid family settlement tries to assail i The High Court further erred in not considering the fact that even if the family arrangement was not registered it could be used for a collateral purpose, namely, for the purpose of showing the nature and character or possession of the parties in pursuance of the family settlement and a o for the purpose of applying the rule of estoppel which followed from the conduct of the parties who having taken benefit under the settlement keep their mouths shut for full seven years and later try to resile from the settlement. In Shyam Sunder and others v. Siya Ram and another (1) it was clearly held by the Allahabad High Court that the compromise could have been taken into consideration as a piece of evidence even if it was not registered or for that matter as an evidence of an antecedent title. The High Court observed as follows: "The decision in Ram Gopal v. Tulshi Ram,-AIR 1928 All. 641 (FB)-is clear that such a recital can be relied upon as a piece of evidence. It is clear, therefore, that the compromise can be taken into consideration as a piece of evidence. x x x To sum up, therefore, we are of the view that the compromise could have been relied upon as an admission of antecedent title."

In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a bona fide family arrangement may be oral and that a memorandum subsequently prepared merely for the purpose of recording or informing the Court of an already completed family arrangement does not require registration, provided it does not itself create or extinguish rights in immovable property. The Court further held that, where the terms of the family arrangement are reduced to writing and the document itself creates or extinguishes rights, the question of compulsory registration would arise.

25. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents and perused the materials available on record.

26. The suit was originally instituted by the plaintiffs seeking partition of the suit properties into six shares and allotment of four such shares to the plaintiffs by metes and bounds; a declaration that the registered General Power of Attorney dated 21/04/2009, executed by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant, is false, invalid, void, unenforceable and not binding upon the plaintiffs; setting aside the sale deed dated 23/12/2014, executed by the second defendant, as the power agent of the first defendant, in favour of defendants 3 to 5, in respect of the entire property covered under the sale deed dated 29/08/1955; and a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from

further encumbering the suit properties, together with other consequential reliefs.

27. The petitioners herein are defendants 3 to 5 in the suit. They filed their written statement in October 2017, contending that the first defendant had contributed towards the purchase of the suit property in the name of his mother in the year 1955. They also disputed the settlement deed alleged to have been executed by Thulasi Ammal in favour of Janarthanan. However, the written statement contains no reference whatsoever to the alleged family arrangement or panchayat said to have taken place in the year 1968.

28. The specific case of the petitioners is that, pursuant to the alleged family arrangement, the first defendant acquired rights over the suit property and thereafter executed a Power of Attorney in favour of the second defendant, who, in turn, executed the sale deed in favour of defendants 3 to 5. Thus, the document dated 10/11/1968 is not relied upon as an independent or collateral document having no bearing upon the title claimed by the petitioners. On the contrary, the document is relied upon as the very foundation of the title claimed by the petitioners through their predecessor-in-interest.

29. The petitioners have not produced any other independent document to establish that the first defendant acquired title to, or a transferable interest in, the suit property pursuant to the alleged family arrangement. Significantly, neither the Power of Attorney nor the subsequent sale deed contains any reference to the alleged family arrangement. In such circumstances, the contention that the document is sought to be marked only for a collateral purpose cannot be accepted merely on the basis of the description or nomenclature assigned to it by the petitioners.

30. The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kale and others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, reported in (1976) 3 SCC 119, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, does not advance their case. The principle laid down therein applies where a bona fide family arrangement has already been concluded and a subsequent memorandum merely records the arrangement, without itself creating or extinguishing any right in immovable property. In the present case, however, the petitioners seek to rely upon the document to establish the very source of the right claimed by their predecessor-in-interest. The distinction between the two situations is material and cannot be overlooked.

31. Likewise, the decision in Board of Revenue, Madras Vs. M. Swaminatha Chettiar, reported in 1980-1-MLJ-312, is distinguishable on facts. In that case, the document contemplated the subsequent execution of appropriate instruments for vesting or divesting title. It was, therefore, treated as recording the proposed mode of future division. In the present case, however, the petitioners seek to rely upon the document dated 10/11/1968 as the basis for establishing the right of the first defendant over the suit property and, consequently, the title claimed by defendants 3 to 5. The principle laid down in the said decision cannot, therefore, be applied to the facts of the present case.

32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Yellapu Uma Maheswari and another Vs. Buddha Jagadheeswararao and others, reported in (2015) 16 SCC 787, has reiterated that the nomenclature of a document is not decisive in determining its legal character. The Court must examine the nature and substance of the transaction disclosed by the recitals in the document. Where the document itself operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in immovable property, registration is compulsory. An unregistered document, in such circumstances, cannot be received in evidence to prove the transaction affecting such rights, subject to the statutory exceptions permitting its use for a legally permissible collateral purpose.

33. In the present case, the petitioners, being subsequent purchasers, seek to establish that their vendor, or predecessor-in-interest, acquired rights over the suit property pursuant to the alleged family arrangement. The document is, therefore, relied upon not merely to explain an incidental or collateral circumstance, but to establish the very source of the title claimed by the petitioners. Permitting the document to be received in evidence for that purpose would amount to allowing them to establish the title of their predecessor-in- interest through an unregistered instrument, notwithstanding the legal restrictions governing its admissibility.

34. The conduct of the petitioners also assumes relevance in the present context. Though the alleged family arrangement is stated to have taken place in the year 1968, there is no reference to it in the original written statement filed in October 2017, in the General Power of Attorney, or in the sale deed under which the petitioners claim title. The plea regarding the alleged family arrangement was introduced only subsequently by way of an additional written statement. In these circumstances, the trial Court was justified in examining the document in the light of the pleadings, the nature of the rights asserted, and the purpose for which the document was sought to be produced.

35. It is true that the application seeking permission to file the additional written statement was allowed subject to proof, relevancy, validity and admissibility. However, such an order cannot be construed as conferring an automatic right upon the petitioners to mark a document which is otherwise inadmissible in law. The question whether an additional pleading may be received is distinct from the question whether a document relied upon in support of that pleading is legally admissible in evidence. The former does not dispense with the requirement of satisfying the latter.

36. The decision in M.Ahamed Jesimabanu and another Vs. A. Mohamed Maideen and others, reported in 2025-2-L.W.309, also supports the above proposition. An unregistered document relied upon to establish title cannot be brought within the scope of the expression “collateral purpose” merely by describing the purpose of its production in such terms. The exception permitting the use of an unregistered document for a collateral purpose is available only where the collateral transaction is distinct from the transaction required by law to be registered and does not itself require registration.

37. Similarly, in Ganesan Vs. Saravanakumar, decided in C.R.P.(MD) No.1655 of 2021, dated 23.06.2025, this Court reiterated that an unregistered

document relied upon to establish title cannot be received in evidence merely on the ground that it is sought to be used for a collateral purpose. The admissibility of such a document must be determined with reference to its true nature, the transaction embodied therein, and the purpose for which it is sought to be relied upon.

38. In the present case, the petitioners have failed to demonstrate any independent collateral purpose for which the document dated 10/11/1968 is sought to be received in evidence. Their claim is founded upon the alleged family arrangement, which, according to them, conferred rights upon the first defendant and ultimately enabled the second defendant to execute the sale deed in their favour. The document is thus directly connected with the title and substantive rights asserted by the petitioners. It cannot be treated as a mere memorandum of a concluded family arrangement, severable from the transaction affecting rights in immovable property.

39. Further, the document is admittedly unstamped and unregistered. The objections relating to stamp duty and registration cannot be brushed aside merely by postponing the question of admissibility to a later stage of the trial. The Court is required to examine whether the document is legally receivable in

evidence, having regard to the applicable statutory provisions. An instrument chargeable with stamp duty but not duly stamped is subject to the statutory restrictions on its admission in evidence, including the procedure for impounding and payment of the requisite duty and penalty, wherever legally permissible. Likewise, the consequences of non-registration must be determined in accordance with the Registration Act, 1908. The two objections are distinct and must be considered in accordance with the respective statutory requirements.

40. The Court is also conscious of the fact that the trial Court had earlier been directed to dispose of the suit expeditiously and that the parties had already been afforded several opportunities to adduce evidence. The attempt to introduce the document after several years, particularly when it finds no reference in the original pleadings or in the subsequent instruments relied upon by the petitioners to establish their title, must be considered in the light of the overall circumstances of the case.

41. On a careful consideration of the pleadings, the documents relied upon by the parties, and the decisions cited by the learned counsel, this Court is of the considered view that the document dated 10/11/1968 is not sought to be

produced merely as a memorandum recording a concluded family arrangement for a collateral purpose. On the contrary, the document is relied upon to establish the right and title allegedly acquired by the first defendant and, consequently, the title claimed by defendants 3 to 5 under the sale deed dated 23/12/2014. The document is, therefore, sought to be used to establish the very transaction from which the petitioners claim title, rather than for any independent collateral purpose permissible in law. Accordingly, the document cannot be received in evidence for the purpose for which it is sought to be relied upon, subject to the statutory consequences arising from its being unstamped and unregistered. The trial Court has, therefore, rightly rejected the application.

42. This Court finds no infirmity or illegality in the order dated 06/07/2026 passed by the learned V Additional District Judge, Madurai, in I.A No.7 of 2026 in O.S. No.34 of 2016. The order does not warrant interference by this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

43. In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. Considering that the suit is of the year 2016 and that the trial Court has already been directed to dispose of the same expeditiously, the learned V Additional District Judge, Madurai, is directed to proceed with the trial and dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible, without granting unnecessary adjournments to either party. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 27/10/2026 Index:Yes/No Internet:Yes/No er

R.POORNIMA,

J.

er To The V Additional District Court, Madurai. C.R.P.(MD)No.1953 of 2026 and C.M.P(MD)No.9325 of 2026 27.10.2026