CRL RC/2403/2026 of Aadharsh Jain Vs The State Rep. by, The Inspector of Police on 26 October 2026

ORDER

1. This Criminal Revision Case is filed to set aside the order, dated 26.02.2026, framing charges against the Revision Petitioner, for the offences, under Section 420 of IPC and Section 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2000 in CC.No.145 of 2025, by the Judicial Magistrate No.IV, Coimbatore.

2. The case of the Prosecution is that the defacto complainant was induced by certain persons, through WhatsApp and Telegram Communications, to participate in online tasks, on the promise of earning money and that believing the representations made by the persons, communicating with him, the defacto complainant had transferred amounts to the bank accounts specified by them. Out of the amounts so transferred, a sum of Rs.5,28,000/- was allegedly credited to the ICICI Bank Account, bearing No.747105500088, linked with the mobile number, i.e. 9594522784, which stands in the name of the Revision Petitioner.

3. During the course of the investigation, it was allegedly found that the transactions, aggregating to Rs.2,53,54,365/- had taken place in the aforesaid bank account of the Revision Petitioner on the incident dates, namely, 13.12.2023 and 14.12.2023 and that the amounts credited to the account had been transferred through the net banking to various other bank accounts. The Prosecution further had relied upon the particulars of the mobile number, linked to the bank account and alleged that the transactions were carried out, with the knowledge of the Revision Petitioner. Since the involvement of the other persons allegedly connected with the transactions, was yet to be ascertained, the Prosecution had submitted a preliminary charge sheet, dated 05.12.2024, invoking Section 193(9) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, before the Trial Court. The case was taken on file in CC.No.145 of 2025, by the Trial Court.

4. Thereafter, the Revision Petitioner had filed a discharge petition, in CMP.No.6078 of 2025, on 20.06.2025, before the Trial Court. By the order of the Trial Court, dated, 28.08.2025, the said discharge petition was dismissed on the ground that the case of the Revision Petitioner could be decided, only after a full trial. As against the same, the Revision Petitioner had filed Crl.RC.No.1661 of 2025, before this Court. This Court, while dismissing the said Criminal Revision Case, by the order dated, 22.01.2026, had granted liberty to the Revision Petitioner to file a discharge petition, if he is able to make out a case for discharge, after filing of the final report.

5. While so, by the impugned order, dated 26.02.2026, in CC.No.145 of 2025, the Trial Court had framed charges against the Revision Petitioner for the offences under Sections 420 of IPC and Section 66D of the IT Act. As against the same, the Revision Petitioner had filed Crl.RC.No.1272 of 2026, which was dismissed, as withdrawn, with a liberty to file a fresh affidavit well drafted, on 30.06.2026. Thereafter, the present Criminal Revision Case has been filed by the Revision Petitioner.

6. During the pendency of this Criminal Revision Case, the Prosecution had filed a clarification report, dated 31.08.2026, stating that investigation was completed and a preliminary charge sheet was filed on 05.12.2024 and that since the other accused could not be traced, the preliminary charge sheet may be taken as the final report.

7. This Court heard Mr.G.R.Deepak, the learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner and Mr.M.Dinesh, the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) for the Respondent.

8. It is contended by the learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner that the Revision Petitioner had neither induced the defacto complainant to part with the money nor derived any wrongful gain from the transactions, inasmuch as the amount credited to his account was immediately and entirely transferred to numerous other accounts on the same day, without any retention or utilisation thereof, by the Revision Petitioner and that the Revision Petitioner had also made a complaint before the concerned Cyber Crime Authorities, regarding the transactions, even before the present complaint made by the defacto complainant and that his bank account had been used, without his knowledge and that the materials on record do not disclose the commission of the alleged offences, by the Revision Petitioner.

9. The learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner has further submitted that in Crl.RC.No.1661 of 2025, filed by the Revision Petitioner as against the order dated, 28.08.2025, in CMP.No.6078 of 2025, in CC.No.145 of 2025, this Court, while dismissing the said Criminal Revision Case, by the order dated, 22.01.2026, had granted liberty to the Revision Petitioner to file a discharge petition, if he is able to make out a case for discharge, after filing of the final report.

10. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner that when a final report/ supplementary report has not been filed by the Respondent Police, the Trial Court, by the impugned order, had erroneously proceeded to frame charges against the Revision Petitioner, without waiting for a supplementary charge sheet/final charge sheet. The learned counsel has further submitted that only a preliminary report under Section 193(9) of BNSS, dated 05.12.2024, stating that since the accused cheated the complainant online and obtained money, the accused had committed the offences punishable under Section 420 of IPC and Section 66D of the IT Act, 2000 and the accomplices of the accused in this case are yet to be identified, was filed and hence, before completion of the investigation, it cannot be treated as a final report, satisfying the requirements of Section 193 of BNSS and hence, the impugned order, framing of charges based on such an incomplete report or a preliminary report is unsustainable in law. Also, the liberty given to the Revision Petitioner, by this Court, to seek discharge under Section 262 of BNSS after completion of investigation and filing of the the final charge sheet, was denied. Hence, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

11. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) has submitted that the materials, collected during the investigation disclose the receipt of substantial amounts in the bank account, attributed to the Revision Petitioner and the subsequent transfer of those amounts to various other accounts. It is further submitted that the allegations relating to the transactions, the linkage of the bank account and mobile number to the Revision Petitioner and the alleged knowledge of the transactions, provide sufficient grounds to proceed against the Revision Petitioner and that therefore, the impugned order, framing charges, against the Revision Petitioner, for the offences under Section 420 of IPC and Section 66D of the IT Act, does not warrant interference by this Court.

12. This Court considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the entire materials placed on record.

13. Now, the question that arises for consideration is as to whether the impugned order, framing charges against the Revision Petitioner, based on the preliminary charge sheet and in the absence of a supplementary or further final report, warrants interference, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

14. At the outset, it is relevant to refer to Section 420 of IPC (Section 318(4) of BNS) and Section 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which read as under:- Section 420 of IPC:- Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. Section 66-D of Information Technology Act, 2000:- Punishment for cheating by personation by using computer resource.- Whoever, by means of any communication device or computer resource cheats by personation, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees."

15. Section 193 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, reads as follows:- “193. Report of police officer on completion of investigation:-

(1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay.

(2) The investigation in relation to an offence under sections 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 or under sections 4, 6, 8 or section 10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 shall be completed within two months from the date on which the information was recorded by the officer in charge of the police station.

(3) (i) As soon as the investigation is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward, including through electronic communication to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form as the State Government may, by rules provide, stating- (a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the information;

(c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom; (e) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether the accused has been released on his bond or bail bond; (g) whether the accused has been forwarded in custody under section 190; (h) whether the report of medical examination of the woman has been attached where investigation relates to an offence under sections 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70 or section 71 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023;

(i) the sequence of custody in case of electronic device;

(ii) the police officer shall, within a period of ninety days, inform the progress of the investigation by any means including through electronic communication to the informant or the victim;

(iii) the officer shall also communicate, in such manner as the State Government may, by rules, provide, the action taken by him, to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given.

(4) Where a superior officer of police has been appointed under section 177, the report shall, in any case in which the State Government by general or special order so directs, be submitted through that officer, and he may, pending the orders of the Magistrate, direct the officer in charge of the police station to make further investigation.

(5) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under this section that the accused has been released on his bond or bail bond, the Magistrate shall make such order for the discharge of such bond or bail bond or otherwise as he thinks fit.

(6) When such report is in respect of a case to which section 190 applies, the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate along with the report-(a) all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation;(b) the statements recorded under section 180 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses.

(7) If the police officer is of opinion that any part of any such statement is not relevant to the subject matter of the proceedings or that its disclosure to the accused is not essential in the interests of justice and is inexpedient in the public interest, he shall indicate that part of the statement and append a note requesting the Magistrate to exclude that part from the copies to be granted to the accused and stating his reasons for making such request.

(8) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (7), the police officer investigating the case shall also submit such number of copies of the police report along with other documents duly indexed to the

Magistrate for supply to the accused as required under section 230:Provided that supply of report and other documents by electronic communication shall be considered as duly served.

(9) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section

(3) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form as the State Government may, by rules, provide; and the provisions of sub-sections (3) to (8) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (3): Provided that further investigation during the trial may be conducted with the permission of the Court trying the case and the same shall be completed within a period of ninety days which may be extended with the permission of the Court. ”

16. In this case, as per the clarification report, dated 31.08.2026, filed by the Prosecution, the investigation was already completed and the preliminary charge sheet was filed on 05.12.2024, based on which the impugned order, framing charges against the Revision Petitioner for the offences under Section 420 of IPC and Section 66D of the IT Act, was passsed by the Trial Court. It is also stated in the said clarification report that since the Revision Petitioner/first accused has not extended proper cooperation and since the other accused could not be traced, the preliminary charge sheet may be taken as the final report. Thus, the said preliminary charge sheet can be treated as the final report.

17. In 2018 13 SCC 455 (State by the Inspector of Police, Chennai Vs. S.Selvi and another), wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has relied on its various decisions, regarding the scope of powers of revision, and has held as under:- “6. It is well settled by this Court in a catena of judgments, including Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] , Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra[Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 310] , Sajjan Kumar v. CBI [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371] , State v. A. Arun Kumar [State v. A. Arun Kumar, (2015) 2 SCC 417 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 96 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 505] , Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta[Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 265] , State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2003) 2 SCC 711 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 688] , Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya [Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 47] and Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairsv. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038], that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 of the Code in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his rights to discharge the accused. The Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the statements and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the materials as if he was conducting a trial.

7. In Sajjan Kumar v. CBI [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371] , this Court on consideration of the various decisions about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, laid down the following principles: (SCC pp. 376-77, para

“(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.”

8. This Court in State v. A. Arun Kumar [State v. A. Arun Kumar, (2015) 2 SCC 417 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 96 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 505] , Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta [Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 265] , State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2003) 2 SCC 711 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 688] and State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan[State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721] has reiterated almost the aforementioned principles. However, in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , relied upon by the counsel for Respondent 1 is not applicable to the facts of the case inasmuch as the said matter arose out of the judgement of the High Court quashing the entire criminal proceedings inclusive of the registration of first information report. The said matter was not concerned with the discharge of the accused.

10. If on the basis of the material on record, the Court would form prima facie opinion that the accused might have committed the offence, it can frame charge, though for conviction it is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. At the time of framing of charges, the probative value of the material on record has to be gone into and the Court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant conviction. The Court is required to evaluate the material on record at the stage of Sections 227 or 239 of the Code, as the case may be, only with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at the face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the Court has to proceed with the presumption that materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate such material with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose existence of the ingredients of the offence.“

18. In 2012-9-SCC-460 (Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander), the Honourable Supreme Court had explained the principles, governing the exercise of revisional jurisdiction in criminal proceedings and held that interference with an order framing charges is warranted, where the order suffers from a patent legal infirmity or where the materials, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the ingredients of the alleged offence.

19. If there is a strong suspicion, which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused, which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not, as has been held in 2015 2 SCC 417 (State Vs. A.Arun Kumar).

20. In 2024-14-SCC-122 (Sharif Ahmed Vs. State of UP), the Honourable Supreme Court was pleased to observe, as under:- “”15. On the submission of the police report, Dablu Kujur [Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, (2024) 6 SCC 758 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 356] refers to an earlier decision of this Court in Bhagwant Singh v. CBI [Bhagwant Singh v. CBI, (1985) 2 SCC 537 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 267] , and discusses the power and the role of the Magistrate when he receives the police report and the options available to him, in the following words: (Dablu Kujur case [Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, (2024) 6 SCC 758 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 356] , SCC pp. 764-65, para 15) “15. When such a police report concludes that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons, the Magistrate has three options:

(i) he may accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process,

(ii) he may direct further investigation under sub-section (3) of Section 156 and require the police to make a further report, or

(iii) he may disagree with the report and discharge the accused or drop the proceedings. If such police report concludes that no offence appears to have been committed, the Magistrate again has three options:

(i) he may accept the report and drop the proceedings, or

(ii) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or

(iii) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-section (3) of Section 156.”

26. In support of our reasoning, we would refer to the very next paragraph in the judgment of Shetty, J. in K. Veeraswami [K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] which reads as under: (SCC p. 716, para 76) “76. The charge-sheet is nothing but a final report of police officer under Section 173(2)CrPC. Section 173(2) provides that on completion of the investigation the police officer investigating into a cognizable offence shall submit a report. The report must be in the form prescribed by the State Government and stating therein: (a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the information; (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom; (e) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether he had been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; and (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under Section 170. As observed by this Court in Satya Narain Musadi v. State of Bihar [Satya Narain Musadi v. State of Bihar, (1980) 3 SCC 152 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 660] that the statutory requirement of the report under Section 173(2) would be complied with if the various details prescribed therein are included in the report. This report is an intimation to the Magistrate that upon investigation into a cognizable offence the investigating officer has been able to procure sufficient evidence for the court to inquire into the offence and the necessary information is being sent to the court. In fact, the report under Section 173(2) purports to be an opinion of the investigating officer that as far as he is concerned he has been able to procure sufficient material for the trial of the accused by the court. The report is complete if it is accompanied with all the documents and statements of witnesses as required by Section 175(5). Nothing more need be stated in the report of the investigating officer. It is also not necessary that all the details of the offence must be stated. The details of the offence are required to be proved to bring home the guilt of the accused at a later stage i.e. in the course of the trial of the case by adducing acceptable evidence. This paragraph examines the contents of the charge-sheet and on elaboration of the same holds that it is in accordance with the terms of Section 173(2) of the Code as well as the provisions of the penal enactment. In furtherance of this, reference is made to Satya Narain Musadi v. State of Bihar [Satya Narain Musadi v. State of Bihar, (1980) 3 SCC 152 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 660] , in stating that the charge- sheet should comply with the statutory requirements, and the various details prescribed therein should be included in the report. ”

21. Section 420 of IPC:- The material should disclose cheating and dishonest inducement to deliver property, or to make, alter or destroy a valuable security, as specified by the Section.

22. Section 66D of the IT Act:- The material should disclose cheating by personation through a communication device or computer resource. Mere use of the internet or a false identity, without the necessary elements of the offence, is not automatically sufficient.

23. It is also relevant to add at this stage that the expressions “charge-sheet” or “final report” is not used in the BNSS, but only the expression “Report” is used. But, it is understood from the Police Manuals of the States that a report filed by the Police is described as a “charge-sheet”.

24. When the Trial Court is of the opinion on analysis of the materials collected during the investigation that there is “strong suspicion” against the accused and there is a ground for “presuming” that the accused has committed the alleged offence, there is no impediment for the said Court to frame charges even on a preliminary charge sheet or preliminary report, provided that it shall meet the requirments of Section 193 of BNSS and it must be in the form prescribed by the State Government.

25. It is also to be noted that, at the stage of framing charges, the Court is required to examine as to whether the materials collected by the Prosecution disclose a prima facie case or give rise to sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. The defence of the accused and the evidentiary value of the materials relied upon by the Prosecution cannot be subjected to a full- fledged adjudication, at this preliminary stage.

26. In the present case, the Prosecution materials disclose that an amount of Rs.5,28,000/- was allegedly credited to the bank account, attributed to the Revision Petitioner and that the amounts were, thereafter, transferred to various other bank accounts. The Prosecution further relied upon the transactions aggregating to Rs.2,53,54,365/- in the said account, during the relevant period and also the particulars of the mobile number linked to that account. The investigating officer has specifically alleged that the transactions were carried out with the knowledge of the Revision Petitioner.

Thus, the preliminary report, prima facie, discloses sufficient grounds and necessary ingredients to proceed against the Revision Petitioner, for the offences under Section 420 of IPC and Section 66D of the IT Act.

27. The main contention of the Revision Petitioner is relating to non-filing of the final report and the effect of the preliminary charge sheet dated 05.12.2024. The mere fact that the investigating agency proposes to conduct further investigation to identify other persons allegedly involved in the transactions does not, by itself, invalidate a report that otherwise satisfies the statutory requirements. Further investigation may be undertaken in accordance with law, and the materials subsequently collected may be placed before the competent Court by way of a further report, wherever permissible.

28. In the present case, the Prosecution has placed reliance upon the preliminary charge sheet, dated 05.12.2024, which contains specific allegations, regarding the bank account attributed to the Revision Petitioner, the substantial transactions recorded therein, the subsequent transfer of funds and the alleged knowledge of the transactions. If, upon examination of the original records, the said report is found to satisfy the applicable statutory requirements and the materials accompanying it, disclose sufficient grounds for proceeding against the Revision Petitioner, the mere fact that further investigation remains pending in respect of the other accused or the absence of final report, would not, by itself, furnish a ground for setting aside the impugned order, framing charges.

29. As stated above, as per the clarification report, dated 31.08.2026, stating that investigation was completed and that since the other accused could not be traced, the preliminary charge sheet be taken as the final report, filed by the Prosecution, the preliminary charge sheet, dated 05.12.2024, can be construed as a final report or final charge sheet, as it satisfied the requirements of Section 193 of BNSS and contained sufficient grounds and necessary ingredients to proceed against the Revision Petitioner and hence, the mere description “preliminary charge sheet” may not necessarily invalidate it. In such view of the matter, the Trial Court is justified in passing the impugned order, framing charges based on the preliminary charge sheet, dated 05.12.2024, which was later described as “final charge sheet” or “final report”, by the Prosecution, by the clarification report, dated 31.08.2026.

30. The contention that the Revision Petitioner did not derive any wrongful gain also requires consideration in the context of the entire Prosecution case. The mere transfer of the amounts to other accounts does not, by itself, establish that the Revision Petitioner acted innocently. However, the Court is concerned with the existence of sufficient grounds and necessary ingredients for the offences alleged against the Revision Petitioner to proceed against him and not with a final verdict of guilt or innocence of the Revision Petitioner.

31. The further contention that the Revision Petitioner had lodged a complaint before the Cyber Crime Authorities also does not, by itself, conclude the issue. The contents of the complaint, the circumstances, in which it was lodged and its relationship to the transactions in question are matters to be considered along with the other evidence.

32. In so far as the contention of the learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner, relating to the order, dated 22.01.2026 passed in Crl.R.C.No.1661 of 2025 by the Coordinate Bench of this Court, is concerned, this Court, while dismissing the said Criminal Revision Case, challenging the rejection of the earlier discharge petition, had granted liberty to the Revision Petitioner to file a discharge petition, if he was able to make out a case for discharge, after the filing of the final report. The said order did not record any finding on the ultimate guilt or innocence of the Revision Petitioner and it did not also contain any express direction, restraining the Trial Court from framing charges, against the Revision Petitioner, before the final report. The earlier order cannot be construed, as dispensing with the statutory requirements for framing charges. The fact that liberty was granted to seek discharge after the filing of the final report does not, by itself, determine whether the impugned order is legally sustainable.

33. The contentions raised on behalf of the Revision Petitioner, relating to his knowledge, intention, participation in the alleged transactions and the absence of direct inducement, non-retention of the amounts and the alleged use of his account, without his knowledge, involve questions that must be considered in the light of the Prosecution materials as a whole and after a full trial. If the materials disclose a prima facie case, those contentions of the Revision Petitioner do not, by themselves, warrant interference, with the impugned order, framing charges. Accordingly, the impugned order is liable to be confirmed.

34. In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court finds no sufficient ground to interfere with the impugned order, framing charges, against the Revision Petitioner, merely on the basis of the contentions advanced by the Revision Petitioner. The contentions of the Revision Petitioner are matters to be adjudicated on the basis of the evidence, in accordance with law.

35. In the result, this Criminal Revision Case is dismissed. The impugned order, dated 26.02.2026, passed in CC.No.145 of 2025, by the Judicial Magistrate No.IV, Coimbatore, is confirmed. There is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is closed. The Trial Court shall proceed with the case, in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any of the observations made in this order.

36. The Registry of this Court is directed to send a copy of this order to the Trial Court concenred, for its compliance and information, immediately. 26-10-2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes/No SRCM

To

1. Judicial Magistrate No.IV, Coimbatore

2. The Inspector of Police, District Cyber Crime II Police Station, Coimbatore.

SHAMIM AHMED, J. SRCM CRL RC No. 2403 of 2026 26-10-2026