CR.A/563/2012 on 29 October 2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 563 of 2012 Reserved on: 08.10.2026 Date of Decision: 29.10.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Charan Singh ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Appellant : Mr Pawan Kumar Nadda, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr N.S. Chandel, Senior Advocate with M/s Amit Dhumal and Parul Negi, Advocates. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 23.08.2012 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Barsar, District Hamirpur (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant Vikrant Kumar (PW4) and his friend Vishal Dhatwalia (PW6) were riding a motorcycle bearing registration No. HR-01K-8821 on 17.04.2010. A pickup bearing registration No. HP-21A-3958 came from Chakmoh at about 10:50 a.m. and hit the motorcycle. The motorcycle fell, and its riders sustained injuries. The driver of the pickup identified himself as Charan Singh, the present accused. The accident occurred because of his negligence and the high speed of the pickup. The injured were taken to the hospital, and an entry (Ext.PW7/A) was recorded at the Police Station. HC Purshottam Dass (PW7) went to the hospital for verification. He recorded the informant's statement (Ext.PW4/A) and sent it to the police station, where FIR (Ext.PW10/A) was registered. Ranbir Singh (PW1) took the photographs (Ext.P1 to Ext.P3). HC Purshottam Dass (PW7) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW7/C)

and seized the pickup bearing registration No. HP-21A-3958 and the motorcycle bearing registration No. HR-01K-8821 along with the documents vide memos (Ext.PW1/A and Ext.PW2/A). Ramesh Chand (PW5) mechanically examined the vehicles and found that there was no mechanical defect in them that could have led to the accident. He issued the reports (Ext.PW5/A and Ext.PW5/B). Duni Chand (PW9), the owner of the pickup, issued a certificate (Ext.PW7/D) that the accused was driving the pickup at the time of the accident. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined ten witnesses to prove its case. Ranbir Singh (PW1) did not support the prosecution's case. Mansa Ram (PW2) witnessed the recovery. Dr Lavneesh (PW3)

conducted the medical examination of the injured. Vikrant Kumar (PW4), the informant/injured and Vishal Dhatwalia (PW6) were riding the motorcycle. Ramesh Chand (PW5) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicles. HC Purshottam Dass (PW7) investigated the matter. Ashok Kumar (PW8) proved the entry in the daily diary. Duni Chand (PW9) is the owner of the pickup. Baldev Singh (PW10) signed the FIR.

5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that Vikrant and his friend Vishal were going from Bijhar to Chakmoh on the motorcycle bearing registration number HR-01K-8821 on 17.04.2010; they had sustained injuries, and they were taken to the hospital. He stated that photographs were taken after moving the vehicles. He admitted that a certificate was issued stating that he was driving the pickup on the date of the accident. He also admitted that the vehicles were mechanically examined. He stated that the motorcycle came at a high speed. The pillion rider extended his hands. The hand hit the side mirror of the pickup, and the motorcycle fell on the unpaved portion of the road. He examined Atul Kumar (DW1) to prove his defence.

6. The learned Trial Court held that the accused cannot be presumed to be negligent merely because an accident had taken place. The statements of the prosecution’s witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. The defence taken by the accused that the pillion rider had extended his hands and had hit the side mirror of the pickup was probable. The pickup was loaded, it was going uphill, and it could not have been driven at a high speed. The prosecution version was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court discarded the testimonies of prosecution witnesses without any cogent reasons. The accused was overtaking a tempo on a curve at a fast speed. He swerved his vehicle and hit the pillion rider. The minor discrepancies cannot be used to discard the prosecution version. The defence version that the pillion rider had extended his hands and hit the side mirror of the pickup was not probable, and the learned Trial Court erred in accepting it. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

8. I have heard Mr Pawan Kumar Nadda, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Amit Dhumal and Ms. Parul Negi, learned counsels for the respondent/accused.

9. Mr Pawan Kumar Nadda, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in rejecting the statements of the motorcyclists. The site plan and the photographs show that the motorcycle was being driven on the unpaved portion of the road, which supports the prosecution version that the accused had driven the pickup towards the wrong side of the road while overtaking another vehicle. The learned Trial Court had accepted the defence taken by the accused that the pillion rider had extended his arms outside the motorcycle without any evidence. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

10. Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent/accused, submitted that the statements of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other. The defence taken by the accused that the position of the vehicles was moved before taking the photographs or preparing the site plan was duly corroborated on record. Hence, no reliance can be placed upon the photographs and the site plan. The injury was caused to the pillion rider and not to the driver of the motorcycle, which corroborated the defence taken by the accused that the pillion rider had extended his hands. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal, even if another view is possible. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal:

26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater.

27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also

does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.”

28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not a technical rule; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence.

29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.”

30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses.

31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.

32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.

33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so.

13. The present appeal is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

14. The informant, Vikrant Kumar, stated that he was riding a motorcycle bearing registration number HP-01K-8821 on 17.04.2010. A pickup came from Chakmoh at a high speed. He took the motorcycle towards the roadside. The driver of the pickup overtook another vehicle, swerved the pickup, and the pickup hit the left side of the motorcycle. Vishal Dhatwalia also sustained injury on the left side. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused.

15. The informant’s statement that the damage was caused to the left side of the motorcycle is contrary to the initial version recorded in the statement (Ext.PW4/A) in which it was mentioned that the pickup had hit the right side of the motorcycle. Otherwise, the Rules of the Road Regulation require that a vehicle should be driven towards the left side of the road or as close to the left as is possible. Therefore, the right side of the person would be exposed to the oncoming traffic. The fact that the damage was caused to the left side of the motorcycle, as per the informant, would make the prosecution's case suspect that the accident had occurred in a manner suggested by the prosecution.

16. Ranbir Singh (PW1) stated that he had taken the photographs (Ext.P1 to Ext.P3). No other proceedings were conducted in his presence. He was permitted to be cross- examined, and he admitted his signatures on the seizure memo. He admitted that the police had seized the vehicles along with the documents. He stated in his cross-examination that the photographs of the vehicles were taken after moving them. This part of the statement was not challenged by re-examining the witness and would make the prosecution's case suspect that the vehicles were in the same position before taking the photographs, and it was rightly submitted on behalf of the accused that no reliance can be placed upon the photographs in view of the statement of this witness.

17. Vishal Dhatwalia (PW6) stated that he was riding the motorcycle. A pickup came from the opposite side at a high speed. The motorcyclist applied the brakes. The driver of the pickup swerved the pickup and hit the motorcycle. He fell and regained consciousness after 2 days. He admitted in his cross- examination that the motorcycle had hit the side of the pickup.

18. The statement of this witness does not show the negligence of the accused. He admitted that the motorcycle had hit the side of the pickup. He claimed that the motorcyclist had swerved and that the pickup was overtaking another vehicle. The site plan shows that 6 feet of road was available towards the left side of the pickup, including the unpaved road in the description, which is not sufficient to enable the accused to overtake another vehicle. The photographs (Ext.P1 to Ext.P3) do not show that the road was so wide as to enable the driver of the pickup to overtake another vehicle. Thus, the testimony of Vishal that the accused was overtaking another vehicle is suspect.

19. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the accused that the use of the term high speed is not sufficient to infer negligence unless the approximate speed is mentioned by a witness. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal, 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.”

20. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, and it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.”

21. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.”

22. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: - “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.”

23. Therefore, the accused cannot be held liable because the witness had used the term high speed.

24. The statements of the witnesses that the accused was negligent are also not sufficient. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a

Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed at 595: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.”

25. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn based on evidence led before the Court.”

26. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the statements that the accident had occurred because of the negligence of the accused.

27. Learned Trial Court had rightly noticed that in the present case both the motorcycle riders had not sustained injuries and only the pillion rider had sustained the injuries, which made probable the defence taken by the accused that the pillion rider had extended his arms and the arm had hit the side of the pickup causing the accident. This fact was proved by the statement of Atul Kumar (DW1). Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence led before it, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible.

28. No other point was urged.

29. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

30. In view of the provisions of Section 437 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish bail bond in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

31. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge 29th October, 2026 (Nikita)