WP/6040/2022 of T.Jeyas Vs The Deputy chief Labour commissioner (Central) and on 15 October 2026

ORDER

The present writ petition has been filed seeking payment of salary for a period of six months. In this regard, the petitioner has submitted representations to the fourth and fifth respondents on 15.12.2020 and 16.12.2020, respectively.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the aforesaid representations have to be considered by the fourth and fifth respondents.

3. However, the learned Government Advocate appearing for the third and fourth respondents would contend that the petitioner was appointed by the management and, therefore, the question of considering the petitioner's representation by the official respondents does not arise. The learned Government Advocate would further submit that the representation has to be considered, if at all, by the fifth respondent.

4. In addition to the above submissions, the learned counsel appearing for the fifth respondent would contend that the fifth respondent college is a self- financing institution and that the petitioner has already been terminated from service. It is also his submission that, since the fifth respondent institution is a self-financing college and cannot be termed as “State” , the petitioner cannot maintain the present writ petition against the said institution.

5. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made on either side.

6. The principal submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that he has submitted representations to the fourth and fifth respondents and that, even if the fifth respondent cannot be construed as “State”, a duty is cast upon the fourth respondent to consider the petitioner's representations.

7. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in St. Mary's Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava reported in (2023) 4 SCC 498, wherein it was held as follows: “75. We may sum up our final conclusions as under:

75.1. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving the public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public.

75.2. Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through a writ petition under Article

226. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State” within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action complained of has public law element.

75.3. It must be consequently held that while a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to judicial review by a Constitutional Court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An educational institution may perform myriad functions touching various facets of public life and in the societal sphere. While such of those functions as would fall within the domain of a "public function" or "public duty" be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service.

75.4. Even if it be perceived that imparting education by private unaided the school is a public duty within the expanded expression of the term, an employee of a nonteaching staff engaged by the school for the purpose of its administration or internal management is only an agency created by it. It is immaterial whether “A” or “B” is employed by school to discharge that duty. In any case, the terms of employment of contract between a school and nonteaching staff cannot and should not be construed to be an inseparable part of the obligation to impart education. This is particularly in respect to the disciplinary proceedings that may be initiated against a particular employee. It is only where the removal of an employee of nonteaching staff is regulated by some statutory provisions, its violation by the employer in contravention of law may be interfered by the court. But such interference will be on the ground of breach of law and not on the basis of interference in discharge of public duty. 75.5 From the pleadings in the original writ petition, it is apparent that no element of any public law is agitated or otherwise made out. In other words, the action challenged has no public element and writ of mandamus cannot be issued as the action was essentially of a private character.”

8. A perusal of the above judgment makes it clear that the mere existence of a supervisory role on the part of the official respondents would not, by itself, confer a right upon the petitioner to maintain a writ petition against the fifth respondent. The present writ petition does not concern the discharge of any public duty by the fifth respondent; rather, it relates to a service dispute between the petitioner and the fifth respondent institution.

9. Therefore, the petitioner's contention that the fourth respondent should be directed to consider his representations does not, by itself, render the present writ petition maintainable.

10. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the fifth respondent, the fifth respondent is a self-financing institution and cannot be construed as “State” for the purpose of maintaining the present writ petition. Admittedly,

the petitioner was appointed by the fifth respondent institution. In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the present writ petition is not maintainable.

11. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. 15-10-2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes/No JRS

To

1. The Deputy chief Labour commissioner (Central) and Chennai Government of India Ministry of Labour and Employment office of the Dy Chief Labour commissioner (Central) and Chennai 5th Floor shastri bhawan Chennai 06

2. The commissioner of Labour Government of Tamil Nadu Department of Labour, DMS Compound Teynampet, Chennai

3. The Director Collegiate Education E.V.K Sampth street D.P.I compound, Kalluri salai Nungambakkam Chennai 08

4. The Joint director Collegiate Education Chennai circle, Chennai

5. The president Guru Nanak College Guru Nanak Salai Velachery , Chennai 42

6. The Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras.

C.KUMARAPPAN J. JRS WP No. 6040 of 2022 15-10-2026