WP(MD)/27852/2025 of Raja Vs The Superintending Engineer on 13 October 2026

ORDER

The petitioner, working as a Commercial Inspector in TANGEDCO, has been issued with a charge memo dated 14.05.2025 and the same is challenged in this writ petition.

2. The case of the petitioner is that when he was working as a Commercial Inspector, a criminal case has been registered against him in Crime No.7 of 2010 that he demanded a bribe of Rs.1,000/- from one Avudaiyappan for providing EB meter. The said criminal case has been tried by the learned Special Judge for Trial of Cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, Sivagangai, in Spl.S.C. No.63 of 2014 and he was acquitted from the criminal case, by Judgment dated 29.11.2024. For the said criminal case registered in the year 2010, the impugned charge memo has been issued in the year 2025, (i.e.) after 15 years.

3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was acquitted from the criminal case in Spl.S.C.No.63 of 2014, however, he has been issued with the impugned charge memo on the same set of allegations. He further submits that the witnesses in Spl.S.C.No.63 of 2014 are the witnesses cited in the charge memo also. The veracity of these witnesses was already considered in Spl.S.C. No.63 of 2014 by the Special Court and their evidence were rejected by the Special Court, in its judgment dated 29.11.2024. While so, initiating disciplinary proceedings on the same set of allegations and witnesses is unnecessary.

4. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent TANGEDCO submits that the concerned documents have been seized by the Vigilance and Anti Corruption Department in Crime No.7 of 2010 and the same were filed before the Special Court in Special S.C.No.63 of 2014. Therefore, for want of documents, they could not proceed with the disciplinary proceedings as against the petitioner. The learned Standing Counsel, by relying on the orders of this Court passed in W.P. (MD)No.13258 of 2021 dated 16.05.2025, submits that delay cannot be a ground for quashing the charge memo. He also pointed out that mere acquittal in a criminal case, based on benefit of doubt, would not affect the disciplinary proceedings.

5. This Court considered the rival submissions made and also perused the materials.

6. The petitioner has involved in a trap case, for which, a criminal case has been registered against him in Crime No.7 of 2010. Pursuant to the same, the petitioner has now been issued with the impugned charge memo dated 14.05.2025.

7. The pendency of a criminal case is not a bar for the conduct of disciplinary proceedings. For the conduct of simultaneous disciplinary proceedings, the Government has issued directions from the year 1973 onwards itself, vide G.O.1344, Public (Services-B) Department dated 16.05.1973. The same was reiterated in the following Government Orders and Letters:

(a) G.O.Ms.No.124, Personnel and Administrative Reforms (PER.N) Department dated 22.02.1983.

(b) G.O.(Ms.)No.40, Personnel and Administrative Reforms (N) Department dated 30.01.1996

(c) Government Memorandum No.74332A/76-1, Personnel and

Administrative Reforms (Personnel-N) Department dated 06.01.1997.

(d) Government Letter (Ms.)No.321, Personnel and Administrative Reforms (N) Department dated 12.08.2004.

(e) G.O. (Ms.)No.66, Human Resources Management (N) Department dated 06.07.2022.

(f) G.O.Ms.No.81, Human Resources Management (N) Department, dated 04.08.2022.

8. However, in this case, for the reasons best known to the Department, they have not preferred to conduct the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The Department has blamed the Vigilance Department that the relevant documents were seized during the investigation and therefore, they could not proceed with the disciplinary proceedings. Such reasons are not acceptable, when the Department can very well get copies of the relevant documents from the Vigilance Department. This Court is witnessing these type of delays, particularly in cases registered by the Vigilance Department. The Vigilance Department, in all fairness, can furnish a copy of the documents, which are seized, with an attestation. However, it is not done by the Vigilance Department and the concerned departments also are not taking any effort to obtain a copy of the documents. This is creating a ground for not proceeding with the disciplinary proceedings. Such type of delay needs to be avoided and this issue has to be addressed by the Government by issuing necessary directions to the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department to provide copies of the documents, which were seized during the investigation, to the concerned Departments, so that they can proceed with disciplinary proceedings.

9. The petitioner has taken a ground that for the criminal case registered against him in the year 2010, the impugned charge memo has been issued with a delay of 15 years. The other ground taken by the petitioner is that he was acquitted in the criminal case and therefore, he cannot be penalised again by conducting disciplinary proceedings.

10. With regard to delay in initiation of departmental proceedings, it is a settled position that Courts should not quash the charge sheet merely on the ground of delay, especially when the allegations are serious in nature. The gravity of the charges and the relevant facts should be considered in such cases. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Ministry of Defence v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha [(2012) 11 SCC 565], has held as follows:- “8.The law does not permit quashing of charge- sheet in a routine manner. In case the delinquent employee has any grievance in respect of the charge- sheet, he must raise the issue by filing a representation and wait for the decision of the disciplinary authority thereon. In case the charge-sheet is challenged before a court/tribunal on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings or delay in concluding the proceedings, the court/tribunal may quash the charge- sheet after considering the gravity of the charge and all relevant factors involved in the case weighing all the facts both for and against the delinquent employee and must reach the conclusion which is just and proper in the circumstance. …..

12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the charge-sheet cannot generally be a subject-matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the charge-sheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings.”

11. Further, in Chairman, LIC of India and Others v. A.Masilamani [(2013) 6 SCC 530], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “18. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is de hors the limitation of judicial review. In the event that, the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by court. The same principle is applicable, in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question, have to be examined, taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of charges involved therein. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration, all relevant facts and to balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is infact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the judicial proceedings are allowed to be terminated, only on the ground of delay in their conclusion.

19. The word “consider”, is of great significance. Its dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard as”, or “deem to be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that, there must be active

application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority, should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself, should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority, and proceed to affirm its order.”herefore, considering the serous nature of allegations as against the petitioner,

12. Therefore, considering the serious nature of allegations as against the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to accept the ground of delay raised by the petitioner.

13. Further, it is a settled position that acquittal in a criminal case, by itself, is not a ground to interfere with the departmental proceeding, inasmuch as the disciplinary enquiry is governed by the rule of preponderance of probabilities and not by proof beyond reasonable doubt or by strict rules of evidence, which is governing criminal trials.

14. In State of Rajasthan and Others v. Heem Singh [2021 (2) CTC 332], it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that acquittal in a criminal trial does not bar the conduct of disciplinary proceedings and the relevant portion is extracted hereunder: “34.In the present case, we have an acquittal in a criminal trial on a charge of murder. The judgment of the Sessions Court is a reflection of the vagaries of the administration of criminal justice. The judgment contains a litany of hostile witnesses, and of the star witness resiling from his statements. Our precedents indicate that acquittal in a criminal trial in such circumstances does not conclude a disciplinary enquiry. In Southern Railway Officers Association v. Union of India, this Court held: “37. Acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The High Court did not say that the said fact had not been taken into consideration. The revisional authority did so. It is now a well- settled principle of law that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent official had been acquitted of the criminal charge.” In Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram, a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that unless the accused has an “honorable acquittal” in their criminal trial, as opposed to an acquittal due to witnesses turning hostile or for technical reasons, the acquittal shall not affect the decision in the disciplinary proceedings and lead to automatic reinstatement. But the penal statutes governing substance or procedure do not allude to an

“honourable acquittal”. Noticing this, the Court observed: “Honourable acquittal:

24. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal [(1994) 1 SCC 541 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 594 : (1994) 26 ATC 619] . In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame”, “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.

25. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India [AIR

1964 SC 787] it was held that even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari [1972 SLR 44 (SC)] this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor [ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168] which is as follows: “8.…‘The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term “honourably acquitted”.’” ... ... ... ...

35. In the present case, the respondent was acquitted of the charge of murder. The circumstances in which the trial led to an acquittal have been elucidated in detail above. The verdict of the criminal trial did not conclude the disciplinary enquiry. The disciplinary enquiry was not governed by proof beyond reasonable doubt or by the rules of evidence which governed the criminal trial....”

15. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to accept the ground raised by the petitioner that he was acquitted in the criminal trial and hence, disciplinary proceedings cannot be conducted as against him.

16. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed with a direction to the respondents to conclude the disciplinary proceedings contemplated as against the petitioner, within the time limit stipulated in G.O.Ms.No.81, dated 04.08.2022. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. 13-10-2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes/No ogy

To

1. The Superintending Engineer TANGEDCO/TNPDCL, Sivagangai Electricity Distribution Division, Sivagangai, Sivagangai District.

2. The Executive Engineer TANGEDCO/TNPDCL, Karaikudi Electricity Distribution, Sivagangai District.

3. The Inspector of Police Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Sivagangai, Sivagangai District,

B.PUGALENDHI, J. ogy WP(MD) No. 27852 of 2025 13-10-2026