WP/3514/2024 of M/S. CHETTINAD ACADEMY OF RESEARCH AND EDUCATION Vs Superintending Engineer on 21 September 2026

1. Superintending Engineer Area- VII (Ambattur ) Chennai Metropolitan Water supply and Sewerage Board, No.1, T.S. Krishna Nagar, Mogappair East, Anna Nagar Chennai 37

2. The Tahsildhar Area VII ( Ambattur) , Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board No.1,T.S.Krishna Nagar, Mogappair East, Anna Nagar, Chennai 37 ..Respondent(s) W.P.No.3415 of 2024 M/s. Chettinad Academy Of Research And Education, Rep. by its Authorized signatory, Sivaramakrishnan Hariharan, No.603, 5th Floor, Chettinad Towers, Anna Salai, Chennai 06 ..Petitioner(s) Vs

1. Deputy Commissioner (Revenue And Finance) Greater Chennai Corporation, (Zone- 7/ Revenue Section ), Chennai 03

2. The Assistant Revenue Officer Zonal Office - 7, Greater Chennai Corporation, MTH Road, Ambattur, Chennai-53 ..Respondent(s) W.P.No.8743 of 2025 M/S.Chettinad Academy of Research and Education Represented by its Authorized signatory Mr.Sivaramakrishnan Hariharan No.603, 5th Floor,

Chettinad Towers,Anna Salai, Chennai-600006 ..Petitioner(s) Vs

1. Superintending Engineer Area VII (Ambattur) Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and sewerage Board, No.1 T.S. Krishna Nagar, Mogappair East, Anna Nagar, Chennai-37.

2. The Tahsildhar, Area VII Ambattur Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board No.1,T.S.Krishna Nagar Mogappair East, Anna Nagar,Chennai 600037 ..Respondent(s)

In W.P.No.16299 of 2025 Chettinad Academy Of Research And Education No.603, 5th Floor, Chettinad Towers, Anna Salai, Chennai-600 006 ..Petitioner(s) Vs

1. Deputy Commissioner Revenue And Finance No.603, 5th Floor, Chettinad Towers, Anna Salai, Chennai-600 006 Greater of Chennai Corporation, Zone 7 Revenue Section, Chennai 600 003.

2. The Assistant Revenue Officer Zonal Office - 7, Greater Chennai Corporation, MTH Road, Ambattur, Chennai- 600 053 ..Respondent(s) In W.P.No.33083 of 2025 M/s.Chettinad Academy of Research and Education Rep. by its Authorized signatory Sivaramakrishnan

Hariharan, No.603, 5th Floor, Chettinad Towers, Anna Salai, Chennai-600 006 ..Petitioner(s) Vs

1. The Senior Revenue Officer Zonal Office-7, Greater Chennai, Corporation, MTH Road, Ambattur, Chennai-600 053.

2. Deputy Commissioner Revenue and Finance Greater Chennai Corporation, (Zone-7/Revenue Section), Chennai- 600 003. ..Respondent(s) In W.P.No.22915 of 2026 Ms CHETTINAD ACADEMY OF RESEARCH AND EDUCATION Represented by its Authorised Signatory, Mr. Sivaramakrishnan Hariharan No.603, 5th Floor, Chettinad Towers, Anna Salai, Chennai-600 006 ..Petitioner(s) Vs

1. Greater Chennai Corporation (gcc) Represented by its Commissioner, Ripon Building, Chennai-600 003

2. The Assistant Commissioner (Senior Grade) ZOnal Officer, ZONE - VII, Greater Chennai Corporation, C.T.H. Road (Opp. Dunlop), Chennai - 600 053.

3. The Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority(CMDA) Represented by its Member Secretary, Thalamuthu Natarajan Building, No. 1, Gandhi Irwin Road, Egmore, Chennai - 600 008.

4. Deputy Commissioner (Revenue and Finance) Greater Chennai Corporation, Zone - 7/Revenue Section, Chennai - 600 003. ..Respondents

Prayer in W.P.No.3514 of 2024: Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for records on the file of the 2nd Respondent and Quash the impugned order i.e. Japthi Notice dated 2.2.2023 signed on 2.2.2024, issued by the 2nd Respondent insofar as the Petitioner is concerned and consequently direct the 1st respondent not to take any action insofar as the Petitioner is concerned pursuant to the alleged demand dated 26.12.2024. Prayer in W.P.No.3415 of 2024: Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari to a) call for records on the file of the 1st respondent and Quash the order dated 01.07.2023 passed by the 1st Respondent in Z.O.VII.C.NO.R1/162/ 2023 as against the Petitioner with regard to the schedule mentioned property b) call for records on the file of the 2nd respondent and Quash the Notice of demand dated 27.01.2024 issued by the 2nd Respondent as against the Petitioner vide Form 4 (Rule 269(1) demanding property tax amount of Rs. 7,87,51,122 /- and consequently direct the respondents not to initiate any property tax proceedings/assessment and recovery for the period 2013-14 to 2023-24 as against the Petitioner herein. Prayer in W.P.No.8743 of 2025: Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari to call for records of the 1st Respondent with respect to the letter dated 26.02.2025 issued by it vide Lr. No.CMWSSB/Area-VII/B and C/D-086N)/W and ST/15122/2024 and QUASH the same. Prayer in W.P.No.16299 of 2025: Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for records on the file of the 2nd Respondent with respect to the letter dated 21.03.2025 issued by it vide Z.O. VII.R.D.C.No.R1/1500/2024 and

QUASH the same and consequently DIRECT the Respondents herein not to intiate any action against the Petitioner in pursuance to the impugned letter dated 21.03.2025 issued by the 2nd Respondent. Prayer in W.P.No.33083 of 2025: Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for records of the 1st Respondent with respect to the impugned letter dated nil vide Z.O.VII. R.D.C. No.Rl/ 2559/ 2025 issued by the it and QUASH the same and consequently, DIRECT the Respondents herein to effect the name transfer in respect of Property Tax Assessment No.07-086-01695 in the name of the Petitioner herein in pursuance to the Petitioners representation issued on 24.07.2025 vide CH-39/2025 Prayer in W.P.No.22915 of 2026: Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records relating to the impugned order bearing Z.O.VII.C.No.0138 /2026 dated 04.06.2026 on the file of the 2nd Respondent herein, to quash the same as being illegal, arbitrary, without jurisdiction, and consequently direct the Respondents 1 and 2 herein to grant permission to the Petitioner to demolish the existing structures falling within the setback area of the subject property, within such time as this Hon’ble Court. In all WPs For Petitioner(s): Mr.Nithyaesh Natraj for M/s.Vaibhav R.Venkatesh For Respondent(s): Mr.P.V.Balasubramaniam, AAG, Assisted by Mr.P.Prithvi Chopda, SC for GCC in WP Nos.3415/2024 &16299/2025 Mr.P.V.Balasubramaniam, AAG Assisted by Mr.E.C.Ramesh, SC for GCC in WP No.33083/2025 & for R1,R2&R4 in WP No.22915/2026

Mr.T.Gowthaman, AAG Assisted by Ms.V.Vijayalakshmi, SC for CMWSSB in WP Nos.3514/2024& 8743 of 2025.

COMMON ORDER

All these writ petitions concern a property admeasuring about 165 grounds and comprised in multiple survey numbers forming part of plot Nos.18 to 20(SP) Industrial Estate, Ambattur, Chennai-600 058 (the Property). The Property was earlier owned by RR Infopark Private Limited (RR Infopark). Said entity had availed of credit facilities from several lenders. On account of default in fulfilment of obligations relating thereto, the account became a non- performing asset (NPA). The NPA was partly assigned to the Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited (ARCIL). Said ARCIL, acting as the authorised officer of lenders, executed sale certificate dated 13.03.2023 in favour of the petitioner. The sale was effected on “as is where is, as is what is, and whatever there is” basis without recourse to ARCIL. The sale was also made with all known and unknown encumbrances.

2. After the petitioner purchased the Property under the above mentioned sale certificate, proceedings were initiated either against the petitioner or RR Infopark by the Greater Chennai Corporation (the GCC) or the Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (the CMWSSB). Orders and notices demanding property tax or water and sewerage tax and charges relating thereto, both in relation to the period prior to the date of purchase and the period subsequent thereto, form the subject of these six writ petitions.

3. Mr.Nithyaesh Natraj, learned counsel for the petitioner, advanced arguments. His arguments may be summarised as under:

(i) The Tamil Nadu Urban Local Bodies Act, 1998 (the TNULB Act) and the rules framed thereunder do not empower GCC to impose liability on the petitioner in respect of property tax dues arising prior to the date of purchase by the petitioner. The charging provision should be construed strictly and tax cannot be imposed by implication or inference.

(ii) Rule 256(4)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Urban Local Bodies Rules, 2023 (the TNULB Rules) cannot be relied upon to impose or fasten liability on the petitioner in respect of the dues of RR Infopark.

(iii) There can be no estoppel against law. Therefore, liability cannot be imposed on the petitioner merely because the petitioner made part payments in response to the demand for past dues. Such payments were made under threat of and to avert distraint proceedings.

(iv) The disclosure in the sale notice and sale certificate cannot create liability with regard to pre-purchase dues in the absence of statutory sanction.

(v) By virtue of Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act, secured creditors have priority over government dues. The amount due and payable to the secured creditors exceeded the amount realised by way of sale proceeds. Therefore, upon enforcement of the charge by the senior charge holder, it is not open to the GCC to once again enforce the charge under Section 82(8) of the TNULB Act.

(vi) Order dated 01.07.2023, which is challenged in W.P.No.3415 of 2024, is without jurisdiction and invalid since said order was issued by the Deputy Commissioner and not the Commissioner.

(vii) Order dated 01.07.2023 was not issued in compliance with the requirements of Rules 256 to 259 of the TNULB rules. Rule 256(5) empowers the Commissioner to call upon the owner or occupier to file a return in Form –

1. Without issuing such notice, the GCC is not entitled to resort to assessment under Rule 259.

(viii) The petitioner filed Form – 3 for the period commencing from 01.04.2023. Therefore, an assessment should have been carried out in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Rule 257.

(ix) Order dated 01.07.2023 was signed on 28.07.2023 and served along with the Form – 10 assessment notice dated 03.08.2023. This contravenes the procedure prescribed in Rule 259.

(x) As per Rule 256(3)(a), the return in Form – 3 is required to be filed within three months from the date of registration of the transfer deed. Reckoned from 04.10.2023, the period for filing a return under Rule 256(3)(a) expired only on 04.01.2024, whereas proceedings under Rule 259 were initiated on 31.03.2023 and 20.04.2023.

(xi) In the alternative, the order dated 01.07.2023 should be treated as a draft and the petitioner should be granted leave to file objections to said draft.

(xii) The orders impugned in relation to the demands made by the CMWSSB were not preceded by an opportunity of hearing or a show cause notice. The demand was made in the name of RR Infopark and not in the name of the petitioner.

(xiii) The Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board Act, 1978 (the CMWSSB Act) does not confer power on authorities to initiate japthi proceedings in relation to immovable property.

(xiv) Mechanical reliance on the annual value of the property concerned cannot be the basis of assessment under Sections 34 and 35 of the CMWSSB Act.

4. The following judgments were relied upon by Mr. Nithyaesh Natraj in support of the above contentions:

(a) . Mathra Parshad and Sons v. The State of Punjab and Others, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 139; (b). Rukmini Amma and Others v. Rajeswary (Dead) through Lrs. And Others, (2013) 9 SCC 121;

(c) . State of Uttar Pradesh and Another v. Uttar Pradesh Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangarsh Samiti and Others, (2008) 12 SCC 675;

(d) . Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India and Others, (1976) 2 SCC 241;

(e) . CIT v. B.C.Srinivasa Setty, (1981) 2 SCC 460; (f). Mathuram Agrawal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999) 8 SCC 667 (Mathuram Agarwal);

(g) . ISPAT Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai (2006) 12 SCC 583; (h). Shiv Steels v. State of Assam & Others, 2025 SCC OnLine

SC 2006 (Shiv Steels); and

(i) . Adani Power Limited & another v. Union of India & others, (2026) 3 SCC 143.

5. The contentions of Mr.P.V.Balasubramanian, learned Additional Advocate General, on behalf of the GCC, may be summarized as under:

(i) The sale notice was issued on “as is where is, as is what is, and whatever there is” basis and the property tax dues of Rs.10.83 crore were disclosed therein.

(ii) The sale certificate conveyed the property along with encumbrances. Having purchased the property along with expressly mentioned property tax dues, it is not open to the petitioner to refute liability.

(iii) In communication dated 29.03.2023, the petitioner requested for a one time settlement in relation to property tax dues, including dues for the period prior to the date of purchase. This is also captured in the minutes of the meeting held on 05.04.2023.

(iv) Under communication dated 05.09.2023, the petitioner categorically asserted that the payment of Rs.25 lakhs was being made as an advance towards one time settlement.

(v) Because the sale was made in favour of the petitioner along with encumbrances, notwithstanding the enforcement of the charge by ARCIL, the charge is also enforceable by the GCC.

(vi) Section 57(4) of the TNULB Act enables the Commissioner to delegate powers and functions. A delegation in favour of the Deputy Commissioner was made pursuant thereto.

(vii) Form – 3 is filed under Rule 256(3)(a) for the limited purpose of providing particulars of the transferee. Unlike Forms 1 and 2, Form -3 does not constitute the basis for thereafter undertaking an assessment of the property.

(viii) Unless all property tax dues, both past and present, are cleared, name transfer cannot be effected as per Rule 256(3)(c).

(ix) The petitioner’s plea for demolition was considered subject to the outcome of writ petitions relating to liability to pay property tax. Therefore, the writ petition relating thereto is subject to the outcome of the other writ petitions.

6. Mr.Gowthaman, learned Additional Advocate General, made submissions on behalf of the CMWSSB. His submissions may be summarised as under:

i) Section 74 of the CMWSSB Act empowers the Board to recover taxes, charges and the like as if it were arrears of land revenue. Therefore, the water and sewerage taxes and charges relating thereto are recoverable from the petitioner. The clean slate theory, which is applicable in relation to a successful resolution applicant in the corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP), is inapplicable to a purchaser under the SARFAESI Act. Paragraphs 54 and 55 of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Cotton Casuals India (P) Ltd. v. The State of West of Bengal & others, 2025 SCC Online Cal 8203 is relied on in this connection.

ii) As per Section 34(2) of the CMWSSB Act, the Board is empowered to levy water tax and sewerage tax based on the assessed annual value of the premises. The annual value was determined by the GCC. Demand notices were issued on such basis to the petitioner. Discussion, analysis and discussion

7. On consideration of the contentions advanced by the parties to these matters, several issues arise for considerations. A preliminary issue was raised by the petitioner that some orders of the GCC were not issued by the Commissioner. This contention was responded to by relying on the power of delegation in Section 57(4) of the TNULB Act, and on a document delegating power to the Deputy Commissioner. Although it was contended by the petitioner that this delegation was made subsequently, nothing turns on this objection because such delegation is ratifiable. Put differently, in light of the statutory power to delegate, any prior delegation may be ratified subsequently. With this, I turn to the first issue regarding the liability of the petitioner in relation to property tax dues for the period prior to the date of purchase by the petitioner. Liability in relation to past dues

8. It is common ground between the parties that the petitioner purchased the Property under sale certificate dated 13.03.2023. Notwithstanding the date of purchase, it was contended on behalf of the GCC that the petitioner is liable in relation to past dues. In order to determine this issue, it is necessary to turn to the provisions of the TNULB Act.

9. The power of taxation forms a part of Chapter-VI of the TNULB Act. Sections 82 and 100 thereof deal with taxation. The levy of property tax is expressly dealt with in Section 82. Section 82 reads as under: “82. Levy of property tax.—(1) The property tax shall be levied on all lands, buildings, telecommunication towers and storage structures built on, or attached to, land within the municipality.

(2) (a) In relation to any building newly constructed or where any addition or alteration has been made to any existing building, the owner or occupier of such buildings; (b) where the title of any building or land is transferred, such transferee; and

(c) in relation to any building or land, in the event of death of the person primarily liable to the payment of property tax, the person on whom the property is transferred; shall furnish to the Commissioner within such date as may be prescribed, a return for such building or land containing such details as may be prescribed for the assessment or reassessment of the property tax to the said building or land.

(3) In the case of reassessment or general revision of any property tax leviable under this Act, the owner or occupier of any building or land shall furnish to the Commissioner within such time as may be prescribed, a return in such form containing such details as may be prescribed for the assessment of property tax to such building or land.

(4) If any owner or occupier of any building or land fails to furnish a return as required under sub-section (2) or sub- section (3) or furnishes an incomplete or incorrect return, the Commissioner or any person authorised by him in this behalf, shall cause an inspection to be made and also to make such local enquiries as may be considered necessary, and based on such inspection and information collected, shall prepare a return and a copy of the return shall be furnished to the owner or occupier of the building or land.

(5) On receipt of a return under sub-section (2) or sub- section (3) or on the basis of the return prepared by the Commissioner under sub-section (4) and after considering the objections, if any, received, the Commissioner shall determine the property tax payable in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall send an intimation to that effect to the person concerned.

(6) In the case of failure to furnish a return under sub- section (2) or under sub-section (3), the Commissioner shall, in addition to the tax determined under sub-section (5), direct the owner or occupier of any building or land to pay by way of penalty a sum of rupees two thousand or five percent of the property tax determined under sub-section (5), whichever is higher.

(7) For the purpose of assessment of property tax for any building or land in the municipality, the Commissioner or any officer authorised by him in this behalf may enter, inspect, survey and measure any building or land, after giving due notice to the owner or occupier before such inspection and the owner or occupier shall be bound to furnish necessary information required for this purpose.

(8) The property tax on building and land shall, subject to the prior payment of the land revenue, if any, due to the Government thereon, be a first charge upon the said building or land and upon the movable property, if any, found within or upon such building or land and belonging to the person liable to pay property tax.” (emphasis added)

Sub-section (1) of Section 82 stipulates that property tax shall be levied on all lands, buildings, telecommunication towers and storage structures built on or attached to land within the municipality. Under clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 82, an obligation is imposed on the owner or occupier of the building, which is newly constructed or in relation to which an addition or alteration is made, to file a return containing prescribed details for the assessment or reassessment of the property tax relating thereto. Sub-section (3) imposes a similar obligation on the owner or occupier in relation to reassessment or general revision of property tax. As can be seen from the above, obligations in relation to property tax are imposed under statute on the owner or occupier. Hence, it becomes necessary to examine the definition of owner and occupier.

10. The expressions ‘owner’ and ‘occupier’ are defined in sub-sections 23 and 26, respectively, of Section 2 of the enactment. Said definitions are set out below: “(23) “occupier” includes,—

(a) any person for the time being paying or liable to the owner the rent or any portion of the rent of the land or building or part of the same in respect of which the word is used or damaged on account of the occupation of such land, building or part; and (b) a rent-free occupant ; ….

(26) “owner” includes,—

(a) the person for the time being receiving or entitled to receive whether on his own account or as agent, trustee, guardian, manager or receiver for another person, or for any religious or charitable purpose the rent or profits of the property in connection with which the word is used; and (b) the person for the time being in-charge of the animal or the vehicle, in connection with which the word is used;”(emphasis added) Both the above definitions use the expression “includes”, thereby indicating that they are not exhaustive. Put differently, a person not falling within the express terms of such definitions may nonetheless qualify as occupier or owner. This is, however, subject to the caveat that the extension should not militate against the text of either definition. Consequently, it becomes necessary to examine the language used in sub-sections (26) and (23) closely.

11. Both the definitions use the phrase “for the time being”. The owner is defined as the person receiving or entitled to receive rent in relation to the property for the time being and occupier is defined as the person for the time being paying or liable to pay rent to the owner or a rent free occupant for the time being. The conclusion that follows on a conjoint reading of Section 82 and Section 2(26) and 2(23) is that liability in relation to property tax is imposed on the owner or occupier for the time being of the relevant property. Before recording definitive conclusions in this regard, it is necessary to examine whether the other sub-sections of Section 82 or the rules framed thereunder point in a different direction.

12. Sub-section (2) of Section 82 also uses the expression “person primarily liable to the payment of property tax”. This expression is not defined in the statute. Therefore, it is necessary to turn to the relevant rules. Taxation is dealt with in Chapter-VIII of the TNULB Rules. Rule 255, which deals with the levy of property tax, reads as under: “255. Levy of property tax.—

(1) The property tax shall be levied on all lands, buildings, storage structures and telecommunication towers, built on, or attached to, land within the municipality as follows:- (a) In case of all lands, buildings and storage structures, the tax shall primarily be levied upon the owner thereof; and (b) In case of telecommunication towers, the tax shall be primarily levied on the owner of the land or building on which such tower is erected.

(c) In case of land leased out by the Government or the municipality under any agreement or licensing arrangement, and the building or storage structure is built by the lessee, the tax shall be primarily levied upon the lessee: Provided that the assessment order shall specify the ownership of the land and no right of title shall be claimed by the assessee: Provided further that no property tax shall be levied in respect of premises owned by the municipality and occupied by any person on payment of rent under the Act and Rules.

(2) Property tax shall be paid by the person on whom it is primarily leviable.

(3) The liability of the several owners of any land, building or storage structure constituting a single unit of assessment, which is, or purports to be, severally owned in parts including flats or rooms, for payment of property tax, payable during the period of such ownership, shall be joint and several: Provided that the Commissioner may apportion the amount of property tax on such land, building or storage structure among several co-owners.

(4) Wherever the person primarily liable to pay such tax is absent or untraceable or has failed to pay the tax or the tax cannot be recovered from him, the occupier shall be liable for payment of property tax and shall also be entitled to the incentive, if admissible: Provided that if there is more than one occupier, the amount of tax may be apportioned and recovered from each of such occupiers in proportion to the total assessed annual value of the premises as occupied by him.

(5) If the occupier fails to pay the amount due, he shall be deemed to be a defaulter and the said amount may be recovered from him in accordance with section 116-A of the Act and these Rules.

(6) If any amount is recovered from any occupier under these Rules, such occupier shall, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, be entitled to recover the same from the owner and may deduct the same from any rent then or thereafter due by him to the owner.” (emphasis added) Thus, as can be seen from sub-rule (2) read with clause (a) of sub-rule (1), property tax is liable to be paid by the owner, who is the person primarily liable in relation thereto. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 255 deals with a situation where the person primarily liable to pay tax is absent or untraceable or has failed to pay the tax or the tax cannot be recovered from such person. In any of those situations, the occupier becomes secondarily liable to pay property tax. Interestingly, sub-rule (6) of Rule 255 enables the occupier to recover payments made towards property tax by such occupier from the owner unless there is a contract to the contrary.

13. Relying on sub-rule (4) of Rule 256, learned Additional Advocate General contended that it imposes liability on the transferee of the property. In order to test this contention, it becomes necessary to set out sub-rules (3) and

(4) of said Rule, which read as under: “(3) (a) Whenever the title of any person primarily liable to pay property tax on any premises to or over such premises is transferred, the person to whom the same shall be transferred (‘transferee’) shall file a return as per Form 3 to the Commissioner within three months of registration of the transfer deed.

(b) In the event of the death of any person primarily liable as aforesaid, the person to whom the title of the deceased shall be transferred as heir (‘transferee’) or otherwise shall file a return to the Commissioner within one year from the date of death as per Form 3.

(c) The name of the transferee shall only be entered against the property in the municipality’s property records when any outstanding property tax dues till that half-year have been cleared by the transferee or the transferor: Provided that no transfer shall be made in the name of the transferee if there is a civil suit related to the property’s ownership pending in any court of law: Provided further that nothing will prevent the municipality from implementing any court order relating to the said property unless there is a stay granted by any competent court.

(4) Every person who makes a transfer as aforesaid without filing a return to the Commissioner shall, in addition to any other liability which he may incur through such neglect, continue to be liable for the payment of the property tax assessed on the premises transferred until he has given notice or until the transfer shall have been recorded in the municipal registers, but nothing in this section shall be held to affect,–

(a) the liability of the transferee for the payment of the

said tax; or

(b) the prior claim of the municipality under sub-section

(8) of section 82 of the Act.” (emphasis added) As per sub-rule 3(a), in case the title of the person primarily liable to pay tax is transferred, the transferee is required to file a return in Form-3 to the Commissioner within three months of the registration of the transfer deed. Under sub-rule (4), the transferor continues to be liable for the payment of property tax in relation to the transferred property until he has given notice of the transfer or until the transfer is recorded in the municipal registers. Clause (a) thereof should be read and understood in this context. Clause (a) of sub-rule

(4) provides that the liability of the transferee for the payment of the said tax shall not be affected by the continuing liability of the transferor. Given the constitutional mandate of Article 265, tax liability cannot be imposed on a person without express authorisation under statute. Keeping this in mind and taking into account the conclusions recorded earlier with regard to liability for property tax under Section 82, the only reasonable interpretation of sub-rule 4(a) of Rule 256 is that the transferee is liable in relation to the property tax payable from the date of purchase notwithstanding the fact that a return in Form-3, as mandated by sub-rule (3)(a), was not filed by said transferee. Such liability would be in addition to the liability imposed on the transferor in those circumstances under sub-rule (4).

14. In this connection, it also pertinent to refer to the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for the construction of tax statutes. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on multiple judgments in this regard. It is unnecessary to multiply authorities. In Mathuram Agrawal, at paragraph 12, in relevant part, the Supreme Court held as under: “The intention of the Legislature in a taxation statute is to be gathered from the language of the provisions particularly where the language is plain and unambiguous. In a taxing Act it is not possible to assume any intention or governing purpose of the statute more than what is stated in the plain language. It is not the economic results sought to be obtained by making the provision which is relevant in interpreting a fiscal statute. Equally impermissible is an interpretation which does not follow from the plain, unambiguous language of the statute. Words cannot be added to or substituted so as to give a meaning to the statute which will serve the spirit and intention of the legislature. The statute should clearly and unambiguously convey the three components of the tax law i.e., the subject of the tax, the person who is liable to pay the tax and the rate at which the tax is to be paid. If there is any ambiguity regarding any of these ingredients in a taxation statute then there is no tax in law. Then it is for the legislature to do the needful in the matter.” Likewise, in Shiv Steels, at paragraph 15, it was held as under: “15. In construing fiscal statutes and in determining the liability of a subject to tax one must have regard to the strict letter of law. If the revenue satisfies the court that the case falls strictly within the provisions of the law, the subject can be taxed. If, on the other hand, the case is not covered within the four corners of the provisions of the taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter.” In light of the above discussion and analysis, I conclude that the TNULB Act and the rules framed thereunder do not empower the imposition of property tax on a person in relation to liabilities arising prior to the date of purchase of the relevant property by such person. Implications of transfer with encumbrances

15. Mr.P.V.Balasubramanian, learned Additional Advocate General, relied heavily on the sale notice and sale certificate to contend that the transfer to the petitioner was with the encumbrances. He highlighted the fact that the property tax dues of Rs.10.83 crore were expressly disclosed in the sale notice and that said sale notice was issued on “as is where is”, “as is what is”, “whatever there is” and “without recourse” basis. According to him, the import of incorporation of the property tax dues is that the petitioner becomes liable for past dues. The sale notice and sale certificate incorporate the terms of the contract of sale between the vendor and purchaser. For reasons discussed earlier, tax liability can only be imposed by statute and, in the absence of statutory prescription, such liability cannot be imposed on the petitioner on the basis of conditions imposed in the sale notice or disclosures made therein of liabilities or potential liabilities by the vendor. The disclosures made in the sale notice and sale certificate are, however, not irrelevant to the adjudication of these matters. The relevance of such disclosures fall for discussion next. Implications of the disclosures made in the sale notice and sale certificate:

16. Sub-section (8) of Section 82 creates a first charge upon the building or land. Charges over immovable property are dealt with in Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (the TP Act). Section 100 reads as under: “100. Charges.—Where immovable property of one person is by act of parties or operation of law made security for the payment of money to another, and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage, the latter person is said to have a charge on the property; and all the provisions herein before contained which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be, apply to such charge. Nothing in this section applies to the charge of a trustee on the trust property for expenses properly incurred in the execution of his trust, and, save as otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, no charge shall be enforced against any property in the hands of a person to whom such property has been transferred for consideration and without notice of the charge.”(emphasis added) The proviso to Section 100 stipulates that a charge cannot be enforced against any property in the hands of a person to whom such property was transferred for consideration if notice of the charge was not given to such person. The primary clause of Section 100 extends all the rights of a simple mortgagee to a charge holder subject to the qualification contained in the proviso. Consequently, unless notice of the charge had been given to the petitioner as the transferee, the charge would be unenforceable against the property in the hands of the petitioner.

17. In relation to the mandatory notice requirement under Section 100 of the TP Act, it is sufficient to cite Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v.Haji Abdulgafur Haji Hussenbhai , 1971 SCC Online SC 101. In the sale notice, encumbrances/dues known to ARCIL were expressly set out. These included property tax dues of Rs.10.83 crores and water & sewerage tax dues of Rs.0.63 crore. The sale certificate records that the sale of the secured assets was made with all encumbrances and liabilities (known and unknown) except the financial facilities of the secured creditors. In these circumstances, the conditions imposed in the proviso to Section 100 of the TP Act stand satisfied. Whether the statutory charge is enforceable in the facts and circumstances remains to be considered.

Charge under Section 82(2)

18. Relying on sub-section (8) of Section 82, it was contended on behalf of the GCC that there is a first charge upon the building or land subject to the prior payment of land revenue, if any. Since such charge attaches itself to the immovable asset, it was contended that the charge may be enforced notwithstanding the transfer of the asset from RR Infopark to the petitioner. Responding to this contention, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, particularly Chapter-IVA thereof. This aspect warrants close consideration.

19. Section 26-D and 26-E of the SARFAESI Act are set out below: “26D: Right of enforcement of securities.:- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, from the date of commencement of the provisions of this Chapter, no secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise the rights of enforcement of securities under Chapter III unless the security interest created in its favour by the borrower has been registered with the Central Registry. 26-E: Priority to secured creditors. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, after the registration of security interest, the debts due to any secured creditor shall be paid in priority over all other debts and all revenues, taxes, cesses and other rates payable to the Central Government or State Government or local authority. (emphasis added) Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, it is hereby clarified that on or after the commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), in cases where insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings are pending in respect of secured assets of the borrower, priority to secured creditors in payment of debt shall be subject to the provisions of that Code.” Chapter IVA, including Sections 26-D and 26-E, came into force on 24.01.2020. The sale by ARCIL to the petitioner was subsequent thereto. Under Section 26-D, a secured creditor is not entitled to exercise the rights of enforcement of securities under Chapter III unless the security interest created in its favour by the borrower has been registered with the Central Registry. It is evident from the text of Section 26-D that the restriction against enforcement under Chapter III is applicable only to a secured creditor. The expression “secured creditor” is defined in section 2(zd) of the statute. Said definition is set out below: “2(zd)secured creditor" means-

(i) any bank or financial institution or any consortium or group of banks or financial institutions holding any right, title or interest upon any tangible asset or intangible asset as

specified in clause (l);

(ii) debenture trustee appointed by any bank or financial institution; or

(iii) an asset reconstruction company whether acting as such or managing a trust set up by such asset reconstruction company for the securitisation or reconstruction, as the case may be; or

(iv) debenture trustee registered with the Board and appointed for secured debt securities; or

(v) any other trustee holding securities on behalf of a bank or financial institution, in whose favour security interest is created by any borrower for due repayment of any financial assistance;”

20. The petitioner has enclosed evidence of registration of the charge over the relevant immovable property with the Central Registry of Securitisation Asset Reconstruction and Security Interest of India (CERSAI). Said registration appears to have been effected on 20.07.2012. Consequently, the security interest in favour of ARCIL, as the representative of the lenders, becomes enforceable under Chapter-III of the SARFAESI Act. In addition, as per Section 26-E, the debts due to such secured creditors are required to be paid in priority to all other debts and other liabilities, particularly debts due to the Central Government, State Government or local authority.

21. Upon considering these provisions, there is no doubt that ARCIL was entitled to priority in relation to the discharge of its dues by enforcing the security. The registration of the security interest with CERSAI is in relation to a sum of Rs.270 crores. On examining the sale certificate, it is clear that the total sale consideration was a sum of Rs.225 crores. In effect, the total consideration received by ARCIL from and out of the sale proceeds of the mortgaged asset is less than the amounts claimed by ARCIL as due and payable to the secured creditors. The implications of this fall for consideration next.

22. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court considered the question relating to priority under Chapter-IVA of the SARFAESI Act and whether a statutory creditor can enforce the charge over the relevant asset after such charge had been enforced by the secured creditor. Paragraphs 21 to 23 of the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Purushottam Prabhakar Chavan v. Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (GST) and others, judgment dated 03.05.2024 in W.P.No.3477 of 2024, are set out below: “21. Once the mortgage is enforced against a secured asset, there would be no scope left for any further enforcement against the same asset. The competing and subservient charge enjoyed by creditors with lower priority (in this case, the DCST) would then move to the proceeds of the enforcement after such proceeds have been deployed towards discharging the claim enjoying higher priority in full. The residual amount of such proceeds would then go to the creditor with the next priority. Consequently, the auction proceeds of the Walkeshwar Flat would first go towards discharging the dues owed to Encore ARC. The residue, if any, after discharging the dues of Encore ARC, may flow to the DSCT, in the proportion of Bharat's interests in the estate of the Late Mrs. PY Shah. There can be no claim whatsoever by the DCST against the Petitioner (the auction purchaser), or for that matter, against the Walkeshwar Flat (the Secured Asset that is already enforced against).

22. The aforesaid legal position in respect of priority of security interests is an integral element of any as-is-where-is; as-is-what-is; or whatever-there-is condition imposed as a term of the auction of the Walkeshwar Flat. The enforcing lender, the bidder, and the tax authorities are all bound by the law declared. Therefore, such a stipulation of such a condition in the auction (which is conventional in enforcement auctions under the SARFAESI Act) is of no relevance in the adjudication of this Writ Petition.

23. The DCST would indeed be free to chase other properties of SMI that are not the subject matter of a security interest registered ahead of them. If there are no assets left to chase, the DCST would still have the position of an unsecured creditor, with a right to continue proceedings to recover their dues from SMI and its partners, in accordance with law.”

23. In paragraph 21 above, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court concluded categorically that once the mortgage is enforced against the secured asset, the subservient charge holder may only take from the surplus, if any, of sale proceeds, but cannot once again enforce the charge against the same asset. I

agree with this conclusion as regards past dues as explained below. In respect of dues relating to the period prior to the date of purchase by the petitioner, a contractual charge, in the form of an equitable mortgage, operated in favour of the secured creditors. As regards the GCC, a statutory charge under Section 82(8) operated. By virtue of Section 26-E of the SARFAESI Act, priority is given to the dues of the secured creditor. By availing of the benefit of such priority as the senior charge holder, ARCIL appropriated the entire sale proceeds because such proceeds were lower than the liabilities of the borrower to the consortium of lenders represented by ARCIL. Hence, a second enforcement at the instance of the subservient charge holder is not permissible. This can be better understood through an illustration. It is common practice that a particular asset forms the security for a consortium of lenders. If one of those lenders is the senior charge holder and the others have secondary or tertiary charges over the asset, any recovery by the person holding subordinate charges would be contingent on a surplus being available after appropriation by the senior charge holder from and out of the sale proceeds. The same principle would apply by analogy to the charge sought to be enforced by the GCC in terms of Section 82(8). Being a statutory charge that fastens on the asset by operation of law, however, a fresh charge would be created in favour of the GCC in relation to dues for a subsequent period. This, being a distinct issue, is dealt with later.

Demands raised by the CMWSSB:

24. The principal ground on which the demand notices issued by the CMWSSB were challenged is that such demands were not preceded by an assessment. In response to this contention, Mr. Gauthaman, learned AAG, relied on sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the CMWSSB Act. Section 34, in relevant part, reads as under: “34. Taxes leviable by the Board.-(1) For the purposes of this Act, the Board shall levy on premises situated within its area —

(a) a water tax; and

(b) a sewerage tax.

(2) The taxes mentioned in sub-section (1) shall be levied at such rates as may be prescribed, which in the case of water tax shall not be more than twenty per cent and in the case of sewerage tax shall not be more than ten per cent of assessed annual value of the premises.

(3) The Board may, with the sanction of Government, exempt any local area from the whole or portion of the water tax and sewerage tax on the ground that such area is not deriving any or the full benefit from the water supply or sewerage system. The Board may remit a portion of such taxes not exceeding one half on the ground that the premises concerned has remained vacant. Explanation.-For the purposes of this chapter the expression "premises" shall mean any land or building.

(4) Where water tax or drainage tax is comprised in the property tax or house tax levied and collected by the existing authority such existing authority shall reduce the property tax or house tax by an amount equal to the amount attributable to water tax and drainage tax.” (emphasis added)

25. As is evident from the above, sub-section (1) empowers the Board to levy water tax and sewerage tax on premises situated within its area. Sub- section (2) prescribes the ceiling relative to the assessed annual value of the premises. Since sub-section (2) merely prescribes a maximum percentage leviable with reference to the assessed annual value of the premises, it is insufficient to state that water tax and sewerage tax were fixed in terms of sub- section (2). Reliance was also placed on the Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board’s Water Tax and Sewerage Tax (Levy and Collection) Regulations, 1991 (the CMWSSB Regulations), in this regard. Said regulations constitute subordinate legislation framed in exercise of powers under Sections 34, 35, 36 and 81 of the above mentioned statute. Regulation 7 thereof specifies the rate of taxes. Said Regulation 7 reads as under: Regulation – 7. Rates of taxation.

(1) The rate of tax shall be as below on each premises per annum:

(i) Water tax 1.5 per cent of assessed annual value; and

(ii) Sewerage tax 5.5 per cent of assessed annual value.

(2) In the case of any land which is not appurtenant to any building or which is occupied by or appurtenant to huts the authorised authority may assess the land or premises, as the case may be, with reference to extent in lieu of annual value and at such rates as he may himself determine subject always to the following maximum per ground of land measuring 220 square metres. Rs.

(a) Water Tax 1/-

(b) Sewerage Tax 2/- The demand notices do not specify that the rate specified in the above regulation was applied. WP Nos. 8743 of 2025 and 3514 of 2024 (demands by CMWSSB):

26. In W.P.No.8743 of 2025, the petitioner challenges a letter dated 26.02.2025 and a notice dated 06.03.2025. Letter dated 26.02.2025 contains a demand for an aggregate sum of Rs.77,61,640/- for the half-yearly periods commencing from the second-half of 2022-2023. A break-up is provided with regard to the demand relating to each half-yearly period. By way of illustration, as regards the second-half of 2022-2023, the demand is for a sum of Rs.16,51,322/-. The letter contains an annexure. Said annexure indicates that the demand for the second-half of 2022-2023 is for a sum of Rs.13,99,570/- and the surcharge is for a sum of Rs.2,51,752/-. These amounts add up to

Rs.16,51,322/-. Apart from this break-up as between demand and surcharge, the letter does not contain the basis for arriving at the demand, whether in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the governing statute or under Regulation 7 of the above mentioned regulations.

27. On this issue, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of this Court in Madras Sanskrit College & S.S.V. Patasala v. CMWSSB and another. At paragraph 15 of said judgment, this Court concluded that the demand notices impugned therein were unsustainable because an assessment had not been carried out in terms of Section 34 of the statute. Because the impugned letter and notice in W.P. No.8743 of 2025 do not contain the basis on which water and sewerage taxes were computed and demanded, reconsideration is necessary. W.P. No.3514 of 2024 also deals with the demand made by the CMWSSB. In this case, a notice issued on 02.02.2023 demanding a sum of Rs.2,49,36,370/- is assailed. On perusal of the notice, it appears that the notice pertains to water tax arrears. Beyond that, it is unclear as to the period to which such notice relates or the basis for arriving at the amount demanded. For reasons recorded in relation to the impugned demand in W.P.No.8743 of 2025, reconsideration is warranted in relation to the notice impugned in W.P.No.3514 of 2024 also.

28. Without prejudice to contentions advanced, on instructions, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner agrees to pay 15% of Rs.1,18,92,777/- within three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order as an ad hoc payment towards the assessment to be made for the period commencing from the date of purchase by the petitioner. It is needless to say that this amount should be adjusted against the assessed dues towards water tax & charges and sewerage tax & charges. Liability in relation to property tax dues for the period commencing from the date of purchase by the petitioner:

29. The petitioner purchased the Property under sale certificate dated 13.03.2023. Such purchase falls within the second-half of assessment period 2022 – 2023. With effect from said date, the petitioner is the person receiving or entitled to receive rent in relation to relevant property. As such, the petitioner falls within the scope of the expression “owner” in Section 2(26) of the TNULB Act. In any event, the petitioner does not dispute liability to pay property tax for the period commencing from the date of purchase. The challenge is with regard to the manner of assessment and quantum. In W.P.No.3415 of 2024, an order dated 01.07.2023 and demand notice dated 27.01.2024 are challenged. Said order directs the petitioner to pay property tax along with arrears. The order contains separate tables relating to property tax for the period running from the first-half of 2011 – 2012 to the second-half of 2021 – 2022 and from the first- half of 2022 – 2023 onwards. For the earlier period, property tax was computed at Rs.32,21,079/- per half-year. For the later period, property tax was computed at Rs.48,26,069/-. On account of the conclusion that property tax is not leviable on the petitioner for the period prior to its purchase of the property, the demand made up to the first-half of 2022 - 2023 cannot be sustained. What remains is the computation from the second-half of 2022 – 2023.

30. Order dated 01.07.2023 records that the property fell within the jurisdiction of the Ambattur Municipality originally. It also records that a property tax calculation sheet was prepared on the basis of details available in the database and that such calculation sheet was provided to the petitioner. The order also records that such calculation sheet was prepared on the basis that Tower-1 had 16 floors and a headroom and lift room. It records further that the property was inspected by the City Revenue Officer along with the Zonal Assistant Revenue Officer and Assessor. Pursuant to a meeting on 19.05.2023, it is stated that the details of property tax dues were conveyed to representatives of the petitioner and that they were called upon to pay the tax. The objections raised by the petitioner are recorded in the order. One of the objections is that only the ground floor and six floors of Tower-1 are ready to use and that the remaining portions and Tower-2 are unfinished. After taking note of these objections and after noticing that no plan sanction was obtained, property tax was re-calculated for the built-up area consisting of the ground floor and six floors. The half-yearly property tax set out earlier was computed for this revised built up area of 4,07,328 square feet as compared to the earlier assessed built up area of 8,29,305 square feet. The above mentioned order dated 01.07.2023 was signed on or about 20.07.2023. The final assessment notice appears to have been issued shortly thereafter on 03.08.2023. As against the half-yearly property tax of Rs.48,26,069/- in order dated 01.07.2023 for the period commencing from the first-half of 2022 – 2023, the final assessment notice fixes the half- yearly property tax for the same period at Rs.49,58,480/-.

31. Referring to Rules 256 and 259 of the TNULB Rules, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the procedure prescribed therein was not followed. Relying on Clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 259, he contends that the Commissioner is required to prepare a return arriving at the property tax payable and pass an assessment order calling upon the owner to pay the amount within 15 days. He also submitted that a copy of the assessment order along with the return is required to be served on the assessee and that not less than 15 days' time should be provided for purposes of raising objections, if any.

32. The petitioner is the transferee of the Property under a sale effected by ARCIL under the SARFAESI Act. Consequently, the petitioner was liable to file a return in Form-3 under sub-rule (3)(a) of Rule 256 within three months from the date of registration of the transferee. This obligation was clearly not fulfilled by the petitioner. The case of the petitioner is that a return in Form-3 was filed on or about 11.02.2025. Said return is a ‘nil’ return and records that the land is vacant. This prima facie contradicts the objections raised earlier by the petitioner that the building consisted of a ground and six floors and not sixteen floors plus a headroom and lift room. Under Section 100 of the TNULB Act, an appeal lies to the Taxation Appeal Committee from the assessment order. The final assessment order contains the property tax computation for the period running from the second-half of 2011-2012 to the second-half of 2021- 2022. As regards this period, property tax has been arrived at in a sum of Rs.32,21,080/- per half year. For reasons set out earlier, the demand in relation to this period is unsustainable.

33. As regards the period commencing from the first-half of 2022-2023, the demand is unsustainable up to the first-half of 2022-2023, whereas, in the facts and circumstances outlined above, no case is made out to interfere with the demand for the period subsequent to purchase by the petitioner in judicial review because principles of natural justice were adhered to prior to computation. Moreover, the computation of property tax for the period subsequent to the date of purchase by the petitioner is dependent on the built-up area, the extent of completion of the building and related factual aspects. These aspects are best considered and determined under the statutory mechanism and not in summary proceedings before this Court. Because the order dated

01.07.2023 covers both pre-purchase and post-purchase periods, in the interest of clarity, it is appropriate that a fresh demand notice be issued by the GCC for amounts due from the date of purchase. One final aspect, which was alluded to briefly earlier, warrants a brief discussion next.

34. While it was concluded that the statutory charge under Section 82(8) was no longer enforceable in relation to the past dues on account of the enforcement of the charge by ARCIL on behalf of secured creditors, a distinct statutory charge operates in relation to the Property with regard to all dues pertaining to the period from the date of purchase by the petitioner. A sum of about Rs.2,50,00,000/- was remitted by the petitioner in relation to the dues at different points of time. If the half yearly tax of Rs.49,58,480/- is used as the benchmark, the amount payable by the petitioner for the period commencing from the date of purchase would exceed the sum of Rs. 2,50,00,000/-. The GCC may retain and adjust this amount towards dues for the period commencing from the date of purchase by the petitioner. In W.P. No.33083 of 2025, a communication refusing to enter the petitioner's name in the property tax assessment was challenged. This communication was based on Rule 256(3)(c) of the TNULB Rules. Taking into account the conclusion drawn herein that the petitioner is liable to pay property tax, as per statute, only from the date of purchase, the expression “any outstanding tax dues” in Rule 256(3)(c) shall be limited to dues payable by the petitioner. Hence, subject to payment of all dues from the date of purchase, name change shall be effected by the GCC. In W.P.No.22915 of 2026, an order dated 04.06.2026 rejecting the application for approval of a demolition plan was challenged. While the writ petition was pending, on the basis of an interim order, the application was accepted. Therefore, the grievance of the petitioner in said writ petition stands redressed. This concludes the discussion and analysis and all that remains is to dispose of matters in terms thereof.

35. For reasons aforesaid, these writ petitions are disposed of as follows:

(i) W.P.No. 3415 of 2024 is disposed of by partly setting aside order dated 01.07.2023 and notice dated 27.01.2024 insofar as they pertain to demands in relation to the period prior to 13.03.2023. The GCC shall issue a fresh demand notice for the period commencing from the date of purchase, whether on 'without prejudice' basis or otherwise. Subject to the retention of the sum of Rs.2.50 crore by the GCC, the petitioner is granted leave to file a statutory appeal in relation to the periods commencing from the date of purchase. Such appeal shall be filed within two weeks from the date of receipt of the fresh demand notice. If so filed, the appellate authority is directed to receive and dispose of the same on merits without going into the question of limitation.

(ii) W.P.No.16299 of 2025 is disposed of by leaving it open to the petitioner to challenge the general revision by way of a statutory appeal. Such appeal shall be filed within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. If so filed, the appellate authority is directed to receive and dispose of the same on merits without going into the question of limitation.

(iii) W.P.No.33083 of 2025 is disposed of by directing the respondents to effect the name transfer subject to the petitioner discharging dues for the period commencing from the date of purchase as determined finally in proceedings initiated by the petitioner.

(iv) W.P.No.22915 of 2026 stands disposed of subject to the observations contained in this order.

(v) W.P.Nos.3514 of 2024 & 8743 of 2025 are disposed of by setting aside the notices and letters impugned therein subject to the payment of 15% of Rs.1,18,92,777/- by the petitioner, as agreed to, within three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order as an ad hoc payment towards dues for the period subsequent to purchase. These matters are consequently remanded for reconsideration. After providing a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, a fresh assessment shall be undertaken in relation to water tax & charges and sewerage tax & charges for the period commencing from the date of purchase by the petitioner.

36. There will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.

21-09-2026 Index: Yes Speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes KAL

To

1. Superintending Engineer Area- VII (Ambattur ) Chennai Metropolitan Water supply and Sewerage Board, No.1, T.S. Krishna Nagar, Mogappair East, Anna Nagar Chennai 37

2. The Tahsildhar Area VII ( Ambattur) , Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board No.1,T.S.Krishna Nagar, Mogappair East, Anna Nagar, Chennai 37

3. Deputy Commissioner (Revenue And Finance) Greater Chennai Corporation, (Zone- 7/ Revenue Section ), Chennai 03

4. The Assistant Revenue Officer Zonal Office - 7, Greater Chennai Corporation, MTH Road, Ambattur, Chennai-53

5. Greater Chennai Corporation (GCC) Represented by its Commissioner, Ripon Building, Chennai-600 003

6. The Assistant Commissioner (Senior Grade) Zonal Officer, ZONE - VII, Greater Chennai Corporation, C.T.H. Road (Opp. Dunlop), Chennai - 600 053.

7. The Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority(CMDA) Represented by its Member Secretary, Thalamuthu Natarajan Building, No. 1, Gandhi Irwin Road, Egmore, Chennai - 600 008.

8. Deputy Commissioner (Revenue and Finance) Greater Chennai Corporation, Zone - 7/Revenue Section, Chennai - 600 003.

SENTHILKUMAR RAMAMOORTHY, J. KAL WP Nos. 3514, 3415 of 2024, 8743, 16299 & 33083 of 2025 & 22915 of 2026 & WMP Nos.3766, 3770, 3773, 3677, 3679,3680, 3681 of 2024, 9792, 9795, 9797, 9800, 18428, 18431, 37146, 37147, 3719 of 2025, 24817& 24819 of 2026 21-09-2026