CMA(MD)/342/2019 of THE BRANCH MANAGER Vs PARVATHY on 2 November 2026

J U D G M E N T

The second respondent in M.C.O.P. No.1026 of 2017, on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai has filed the present C.M.A.(MD).No.342 of 2019, challenging the award dated 22.11.2018 passed in M.C.O.P. No.1026 of 2017.

2. Facts of the case:

2.1. The claimant is a construction coolie worker. According to her, on 05.11.2005 at about 10.30 p.m., after completing her work, she was travelling along with her husband in an auto-rickshaw bearing Registration No.TN-59-Q- 5972 on the Usilampatti–Theni Road. At that time, the offending mini lorry bearing Registration No.TN-60-5925 was driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the auto-rickshaw. In the accident, the claimant sustained grievous injuries, particularly to her right hand, besides injuries to other parts of the body.

2.2. Immediately thereafter, she was admitted in the Government Rajaji Hospital, Madurai on 06.11.2005 and underwent treatment till 01.03.2006. According to her, owing to the serious injury sustained to her right hand, she was unable to attend to her normal day-to-day activities and was also unable to continue her avocation as a construction coolie.

2.3. The claimant further stated that, owing to her poverty, ignorance and

lack of proper guidance regarding the legal remedies available to her, she could not approach the Claims Tribunal immediately. Consequently, she filed the claim petition only on 04.07.2017, nearly twelve years after the accident, claiming a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- as compensation with interest.

2.4. The Insurance Company filed a counter disputing the claim and, principally, contended that the claim petition was hopelessly barred by limitation. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Purohit and Company v. Khatoon Bee and another reported in (2017) 4 SCC 783. The Insurance Company also disputed the manner of the accident, the nature and extent of the injuries and the quantum of compensation claimed by the claimant.

2.5. Before the Tribunal, on the side of claimant, the claimant examined herself as P.W.1 and examined the doctor as P.W.2. Exs.P1 to P11 were marked on her side. The disability certificate was marked as Ex.C1, while Exs.X1 and X2, including the treatment records and treatment register, were produced through the concerned medical witness. There is no oral (or) documentary evidence adduced on the side of the respondents.

3. Findings of the Tribunal:

3.1. Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, the

Tribunal fixed negligence on the driver of the offending vehicle and awarded a sum of Rs.6,09,245/- as compensation.

3.2. The Tribunal initially awarded interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of the claim petition. However, considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding the belated filing of the claim petition, the interest was directed to be calculated only from the date of the award, i.e., 22.11.2018. Sl.No. Heads Amounts in Rs.

Loss of income (Partial Permanent Disability 60%) 5,44,000/-

Medical expenses as per Ex.P.9 8,245/-

Pain and sufferings 30,000/-

Extra Nourishment 20,000/-

Transportation expenses 1,000/-

Damage to clothing and accessories 1,000/-

Person

who

was accompained during the medical treatment 5,000/- Total Compensation Awarded Rs.6,09,245/-

3.3. Aggrieved by the said award, the appellant / Insurance Company has preferred the present appeal.

4. Submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the

appellant/Insurance Company:

4.1. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant/Insurance Company submitted that the claim petition was filed nearly twelve years after the accident and was therefore liable to be rejected on the ground of limitation. Placing reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Purohit and Company v. Khatoon Bee and another reported in (2017) 4 SCC 783, it was contended that such a stale claim ought not to have been entertained by the Tribunal. It was therefore argued that the award passed against the Insurance Company is liable to be set aside.

4.2. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the Tribunal had assessed 100% loss of earning capacity, whereas the disability certificate assessed the claimant's partial permanent disability only at 60%. According to the learned counsel, the Tribunal ought not to have mechanically treated the physical disability as equivalent to 100% loss of earning capacity.

5. Submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/claimant:

5.1. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the claimant submitted that the claimant is a indigent and illiterate woman who was working as a construction coolie. She had sustained a serious injury to her right hand and had

undergone prolonged treatment from 06.11.2005 to 01.03.2006. Owing to her poverty, lack of legal knowledge and absence of proper guidance, she could not approach the Tribunal within a reasonable period.

5.2. It was further submitted that the delay was neither deliberate nor intended to defeat any legitimate defence of the Insurance Company. The FIR, Motor Vehicle Inspector's report and medical records relating to the treatment of the claimant were available. The claimant had also produced the relevant records before the Tribunal through competent witnesses. Therefore, no prejudice had been caused to the appellant on account of the delay.

5.3. Learned counsel further submitted that the claimant was a construction coolie and her right hand had been seriously damaged. Having regard to the nature of her avocation, the functional disability was much higher than the percentage of physical disability mentioned in the disability certificate. Since she could not effectively use her right hand for carrying out the work of a construction coolie, the Tribunal was justified in assessing the loss of earning capacity at 100%.

6. Points for Consideration:

6.1. The following questions arise for consideration in the present appeal:

(i) Whether the Tribunal was justified in entertaining the claim petition

filed nearly twelve years after the accident?

(ii) Whether the assessment of compensation, particularly the assessment of loss of earning capacity, calls for interference?

7. Discussion and findings:

Point No.(i) – Delay in filing the claim petition:

7.1. The accident occurred on 05.11.2005, whereas the claim petition was presented on 04.07.2017. There is, therefore, a substantial delay of nearly twelve years.

7.2. It is true that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Purohit and Company vs. Khatoon Bee and another, reported in (2017) 4 SCC 783, considered the question relating to stale claims and the statutory limitation applicable to claims under the Motor Vehicles Act. However, the question whether a belated claim is liable to be rejected cannot be decided in isolation from the facts and circumstances of the individual case, particularly where the claimant places material before the Court explaining the circumstances for the delay and where the delay has not caused prejudice to the opposite party.

7.3. In the present case, the background of the claimant assumes significance. She was a indigent woman working as a construction coolie. The evidence discloses that she sustained a serious injury to her right hand and

remained under treatment from 06.11.2005 to 01.03.2006. The nature of the injury and the prolonged treatment are supported by the medical records produced before the Tribunal.

7.4. More importantly, the delay has not resulted in the obliteration of the material evidence necessary for adjudication of the claim. The FIR relating to the accident was available. The Motor Vehicle Inspector's report was also available. The treatment records relating to the claimant were produced before the Tribunal, and the concerned medical evidence was adduced. The claimant herself was examined as P.W.1 and the doctor was examined as P.W.2.

7.5. Thus, the Tribunal had before it the material evidence necessary to determine the occurrence of the accident, the negligence, the nature of the injuries, the treatment undergone by the claimant and the resultant disability. The appellant has not demonstrated that, merely because the claim petition was filed belatedly, any material evidence had been lost or that any specific prejudice had been caused to its defence.

7.6. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation intended to provide just compensation to victims of motor accidents. At the same time, a claimant cannot be permitted to explain every delay merely by referring to poverty or lack of legal knowledge. The explanation must be considered in the factual context of each case.

7.7. In the present case, the claimant's status as a poor construction worker, the serious injury suffered by her right hand, the prolonged treatment from 06.11.2005 to 01.03.2006, and the availability of the material contemporaneous records are relevant circumstances. The Tribunal has also taken note of the peculiar circumstances while directing that interest should be calculated only from the date of the award, namely, 22.11.2018.

7.8. In these peculiar facts and circumstances, the delay by itself cannot be treated as sufficient to non-suit the claimant, particularly when the appellant has not established any prejudice caused to its defence and the claim has been adjudicated on the basis of the available evidence.

7.9. Therefore, the finding of the Tribunal entertaining the claim petition does not warrant interference.

8. Point No.(ii) – Loss of Earning Capacity 8.1.The next contention of the appellant concerns the assessment of 100% loss of earning capacity, whereas the disability certificate assessed the claimant's partial permanent disability at 60%.

8.2. The percentage of physical disability cannot, in every case, be mechanically equated with the percentage of loss of earning capacity. The relevant consideration is the effect of the disability upon the claimant's capacity

to perform the particular avocation in which she was engaged.

8.3. In the present case, the claimant was working as a construction coolie. The injury is to her right hand, which is an important and essential limb of the body for performing manual construction work. The medical evidence and treatment records disclose the seriousness of the injury and the prolonged treatment undergone by the claimant.

8.4. Therefore, even though the disability certificate assessed the physical disability at 60%, the Tribunal was entitled to examine the functional impact of the injury on the claimant's actual avocation. However, the assessment of functional disability must necessarily be supported by the medical and occupational evidence available on record.

8.5. The Tribunal, consequently assessed the loss of earning capacity at 100%.

8.6. This Court has to find out whether 100% disability is correct?

8.7. There is no sufficient material on record to establish that the claimant had become completely incapable of pursuing any avocation whatsoever. Therefore, the assessment of 100% loss of earning capacity made by the Tribunal, though understandable having regard to the nature of her manual occupation and the injury to the right hand, is on the higher side.

8.8. Having regard to the nature of the claimant's avocation, the injury sustained, the medical evidence and the 60% partial permanent disability assessed by the competent medical board, this Court considers it appropriate to assess the functional loss of earning capacity at 80% instead of 100%.

8.9. Accordingly, the compensation towards loss of earning capacity is recalculated as follows: Rs.3,000 × 12 × 15 × 80% = Rs.4,32,000/- 8.10.The compensation awarded under the remaining heads does not warrant interference. The amounts awarded by the Tribunal are therefore confirmed as follows: Sl.No Heads Amount awarded by the Tribunal Rs. Re-quantified amount by this Court Rs. Status

Loss

of income 5,44,000/- 4,32,000/- Reduced

Medical expenses 8,245/- 8,245/- Confirmed

Pain

and sufferings 30,000/- 30,000/- Confirmed

Extra Nourishment 20,000/- 20,000/- Confirmed

Transportatio n expenses 1,000/- 1,000/- Confirmed

Damages for Cloth

and Articles 1,000/- 1,000/- Confirmed

Attendant charges 5,000/- 5,000/- Confirmed Total 6,09,245/- 4,97,245/- Reduced

9. Result:

9.1. Accordingly, C.M.A.(MD).No.342 of 2019 is partly allowed.

9.2. The award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in M.C.O.P. No.1026 of 2017 dated 22.11.2018 is modified and the compensation is hereby reduced from Rs.6,09,245/- to Rs.4,97,245/-, together with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of the claim petition.

9.3. The appellant/Insurance Company is directed to deposit the modified reduced award amount of Rs.4,97,245/- together with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from 22.11.2018, the date of the award, till the date of deposit, after adjusting the amount, if any, already deposited.

9.4. On such deposit, the claimant is permitted to withdraw the same, together with accrued interest and costs, in accordance with law. No order as to costs.

02.11.2026

NCC :Yes/No Index :Yes/No Internet :Yes/No aas To

1. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Madurai.

2. The Section Officer, VR Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.

K.K.RAMAKRISHNAN,J. aas