MS MURALI KRISHNA INFRACON BANGALORE PVT LTD vs BANK OF BARODA on 30 October 2026

ORDER

1. 1. The present Miscellaneous Application No.1/2026 has been filed by the applicants on 29.12.2025 seeking review of the order dated 28.11.2025 and consequential directions for restoration of TSA No.7/2022 for adjudication on merits.

2. 2. The applicants contend that the impugned order suffers from errors of procedure, facts and law apparent on the face of the record and that the proceedings were dismissed on technical grounds without adjudication of the substantive issues.

3. The applicants submit that the Securitisation Application was presented before DRT-II, Bengaluru on 19.10.2022 within the prescribed period of Limitation. It is contended that, pursuant to a Memo filed by the applicants' advocate, the Registrar of the DRT-II directed transfer of the matter to DRT-I, Bengaluru. According to the applicants, the four days delay recorded in the impugned order arose solely on account of transfer and was not attributable to any latches on the part of the applicants. It is further contended that no separate application for condonation of delay was necessary, as the application had originally been presented within limitation.

4. The applicants further submit that no opportunity was afforded to explain the circumstances necessitating the transfer and that the matter was not listed for clarification before dismissal. It is contended that TSA No.7/2022 remained pending for approximately three years and that the pleadings had been completed; hence, the matter ought to have been adjudicated on merits rather than dismissed on a procedural ground.

5. In support of the application, the applicant relied upon K. Ajit Babu Vs. Union of India (1977) 6 SCC 473; Standard Chartered Bank vs. MSTC Ltd (2020 (13) SCC 618); Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal (1980 Supp SCC 420); Shri Amarchand Inani Vs. Union of India (1973 (1) SCC 115); Oil & Natural Gas Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Modern

Construction & Co (2014) SCC 648; and M/s EXL Careers Vs. Frankfirnn Aviation Services (P) Ltd (2020 12 SCC 667; The applicants invoke these authorities in support of the propositions concerning review jurisdiction, procedural fairness, Limitation and the legal consequences of the proceedings instituted before or transferred from another forum.

1. 6. The respondent bank has opposed the application, contending that the applicants have not challenged the impugned order before the Debt Recovery Appellant Tribunal and have instead invoked the review jurisdiction of this Tribunal. It is submitted that an alternative appellate remedy was available and that the present application amounts to an abuse of the process of law. The bank has also raised an objection regarding maintainability on the ground that the applicants have failed to exhaust the alternative remedy.

2. 7. Heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and peruse the material available on record.

3. 8. The points that arise for consideration are:

1. (i) Whether the applicants have established an error on the face of the record warranting review of the order dated 28.11.2025;

(ii) Whether the original prosecution of the Securitisation Application before DRT-II and its subsequent transfer to DRT-I disclose a reviewable error in the finding concerning limitation; and

(iii) Whether the relief of restoration sought by the applicants can be granted in the present review proceedings;

9. The power of review is limited in nature and cannot be exercised as an appellate jurisdiction. In K. Ajit Babu Vs. Union of India(1977) 6 SCC 473, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the restricted scope of review and held that review cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise. The applicants must establish a recognized ground for review, such as an error apparent on the face of the record and cannot obtain a rehearing merely by seeking a different interpretation of facts or law already considered.

10. In the present case, the impugned order dated 28.11.2025 records the original filing date of the Securitisation Application before DRT-II as well as the subsequent transfer to DRT-I. The contention that these circumstances were altogether overlooked is, therefore, not borne out by the order itself. The applicants' grievance essentially concerns the legal effect attributed to the original presentation and subsequent transfer while determining limitation.

11. The applicants assert that the application was presented before DRT-II on 19.10.2022 within the limitation and that the four days delay arose solely because the matter was subsequently transferred to DRT-I. The original date of presentation is a material circumstance. However, the mere fact that the application was initially presented before DRT-II does not, by itself, conclusively establish that the subsequent proceedings before DRT-I were within limitation. The legal effect of the original presentation and transfer must be determined with reference to the applicable statutory provisions and the circumstances borne out by the record.

12. The absence of a separate application for condonation of delay must likewise be examined in its proper prospective. If, in law, the proceedings are to be treated as having been instituted within limitation by reason of the original presentation, a separate application for condonation may not be necessary. Conversely, if the applicable law requires condonation of a delay in the circumstances of the case, such requirement cannot be dispensed with merely on equitable considerations. The question is, therefore, not resolved solely by the absence of a condonation application, but, by determining the legal effect of the original presentation and subsequent transfer.

A-

13. The applicants have also relied upon Shri Amarchand Inani Vs. Union of India (1973 (1) SCC 115) and Oil & Natural Gas Corp. Ltd. Vs. Modern Construction & Co (2014) SCC 648, in support of the contentions relating to limitation and the consequences of proceedings before an inappropriate forum or the return of proceedings. The decision in M/s EXL Careers Vs. Frankfirnn Aviation Services (P) Ltd (2020 12 SCC 667) has also been relied upon in relation to the procedural consequences of returning proceedings for prosecution before the competent forum. The principles laid down in these Authorities must be applied with reference to their actual ratio and the statutory framework governing the proceedings in question. The rules concerning the return of a plaint under the Code of Civil Procedure cannot automatically be equated with the transfer of a Securitisation Applicant between the Debt Recovery Tribunals.

14. The applicants' reliance upon Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal (1980 Supp SCC 420) and the principle that procedural rules are intended to advance the cause of justice has also been considered. Procedural fairness is an important component of adjudication. Nevertheless, the principle that the procedure is the handmaid of justice does not authorize a Tribunal to disregard Statutory Limitation requirements or to exercise a power not vested in it by law.

Similarly, the fact that the TSA remained pending for approximately three years and that the pleadings had been completed does not, by itself, constitute a ground for review or cure a statutory defect of limitation.

15. A further aspect arising from the applicants' own case concerns the competence of DRT-I to entertain TSA No.7/2022 following the transfer. It is stated that the bank's original application was pending before DRT-II, which had jurisdiction over the matter and that the file was transferred to DRT-I by the Registrar of DRT-II pursuant to the request of applicants' advocate. Admittedly, no order of transfer was passed by the Hon'ble Chairperson of the DRAT, Chennai.

16. Section 17A(2) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 provides for transfer of cases from one DRT to another by the Hon'ble Chairperson of the DRAT having jurisdiction. The applicants' request for transfer cannot, by itself, confer the statutory power of transfer upon the Registrar. The validity and legal effect of the transfer must be determined with reference to the applicable statutory provision and circumstances of the case. The fact that the transfer was requested by the applicants' own advocate does not, by itself, validate an order made by an authority lacking the requisite statutory power.

A.

17. The decision of the Hon'ble Telangana High Court in M/s Intan Global Impex Vs. Debts Recovery Tribunal-I in WP No.29695/2021, decided on 13.4.2022, concerning the authority of a DRT Registrar to effect an inter-Tribunal transfer under Section 17A(2), is relevant to this aspect. The jurisdictional question arising from the transfer, however, is distinct from the question whether the impugned order dated 28.11.2025 suffers from an error apparent on the fact of the record. The existence of an irregularity in the transfer cannot, without further examination, be treated as automatically establishing a ground for review of the dismissal orders.

18. The applicants' reliance on Standard Chartered Bank vs. MSTC Ltd (2020 (13) SCC 618) has also been considered to the extent of the proposition for which the authority has been cited. The decision must be applied in accordance with its actual ratio and the statutory provisions governing the present proceedings. The mere citation of judicial authorities does not, by itself, establish a ground for review, the applicants must demonstrate how the ratio of the relevant authority discloses a patent error in the impugned order.

19. The objection of the respondent bank regarding the availability of an appellate remedy is also considered. The existence of an alternative remedy does not, by itself, conclusively determine the maintainability of a review application. However, review cannot be employed as a substitute for an appeal. Where the applicants seek reconsideration of a finding already recorded, without establishing an error apparent on the face of the record, the limited review jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely because an appellate challenge has not been pursued.

20. In the present case, the original filing date and the subsequent transfer were noticed in the impugned order. The applicants have not demonstrated, merely by reiterating these circumstances, that the finding of limitation suffers from a patent error apparent on the face of the record. The contention that the four days delay arose from the transfer may be relevant to the correctness of the limitation finding, but, its acceptance would require examination of the legal effect of the transfer and the applicable statutory provisions. Review Jurisdiction cannot be exercised merely to undertake such reconsideration in the absence of an established reviewable error.

21. The prayer for restoration of the TSA No.7/2022 before DRT-I also cannot be granted merely on the ground that the applicant seeks adjudication on merits. The validity of transfer is a separate jurisdictional issue and cannot be resolved solely by the applicants' request or by the fact that the proceedings had remained pending for a considerable period. In the present review proceedings, the applicants must first establish a legally sustainable ground for interference with the order under review.

22. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Tribunal finds that the grounds urged in the present Miscellaneous Application do not establish an error apparent on the face of the record warranting review of the order dated 28.11.2025. The applicants, are, in substance, seeking reconsideration of the conclusions recorded in the impugned order, which is beyond permissible scope of review jurisdiction.

23. The MA No.1/2026 seeking review of the order dated 28.11.2025 is dismissed. Consequently, the prayer for restoration of TSA No.7/2022 in the present review proceedings is rejected.

24. No order as to costs.

*[Dictated to my PS, transcribed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Tribunal on this the 30^th day of October, 2026]*

[ IMTIAZ ALI ] PRESIDING OFFICER