SA(MD)/216/2013 of ARAMANAI RAMAN CHETTIAR ANNA Vs NARAYANA PADAYACHI(DIED AFTER on 5 November 2026

JUDGMENT

This Second Appeal has been filed against the Judgment and Decree dated 07.12.2012 made in A.S.No. 19 of 2009 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Kumbakonam confirming the Judgment and decree dated 17.02.1999 made in O.S.No.51 of 1985 on the file of the 1st Additional District Munsif Court, Kumbakonam.

2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

(i) The case of the plaintiff is that the suit property, consisting of a thatched house, belongs to the plaintiff Trust, and that the defendant was inducted as a tenant under a rental agreement dated 04.12.1960, agreeing to pay an annual rent of Rs.50/- in two instalments of Rs.25/- each, payable on 15th February and 15th August every year. According to the plaintiff, the defendant committed default in payment of rent from the year 1977 onwards, resulting in arrears of Rs.400/- for the period from 1977 to 1984. However, the plaintiff restricted the claim to Rs.150/- towards three years' arrears of rent. The plaintiff further contended that, after issuing a notice dated 25.06.1984, the tenancy was terminated by a subsequent notice dated 16.08.1984, calling upon the defendant to vacate and hand over possession of the suit property. It was further contended that the suit was not barred under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act or other rent control enactments, as the suit property belonged to a Trust. Hence, the plaintiff filed the suit seeking recovery of possession, arrears of rent and future mesne profits.

(ii) The defendant resisted the suit contending that the plaintiff had not established his title over the suit property or his authority as

Managing Trustee to institute the proceedings. The defendant denied the execution of the rental agreement dated 04.12.1960 and contended that the same was a fabricated document. According to the defendant, he had been in possession of the property from the year 1947 and had constructed a residential house thereon in or about 1949, which was subsequently enlarged with the consent of the then landowner, by spending considerable amounts. The defendant further contended that he had regularly paid the agreed annual rent of Rs.50/- through the agents of the landowner, namely, Govindaraj, Natarajan and Balan, up to the year 1983, and that no arrears of rent were due. It was also contended that the defendant was entitled to the benefits available under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act, and that the suit was barred by limitation and was not maintainable. The defendant further disputed the validity of the notice terminating the tenancy, the plaintiff's entitlement to recover possession and the correctness of the description of the suit property.

(iii) During trial, on the side of the plaintiff, two witnesses were examined as PW.1 and PW.2 and Exs. A1 to A5 were marked. On the side of the defendant, two witnesses were examined as DW.1 and DW.2 and Exs.B1 to B15 were marked.

(iv) Upon considering the oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Court dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff preferred an appeal, which was also dismissed by the First Appellate Court.

3. Challenging the concurrent findings of the Courts below, the appellant / plaintiff has preferred the present Second Appeal.

4. The Second Appeal was admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law:- (a) Whether the first Appellate Court can go beyond the act and G.O.Ms.No.1998 Home, dated 12th August 1974 arid can hold that the suit by the Public Trust Plaintiff is not maintainable when the same is not denied and impliedly admitted in the written statement of the defendant?

(b) Whether the first Appellate Court without considering the fact that the defence by the defendant is to the effect that the plaintiff Trust is not represented by the proper Trustee after the death of the Trustee who signed the Deed of lease.

(c) Whether the suit for possession by the plaintiff against the Tenant is rightly considered by the Courts below?

5. Heard Mr.M.V.Santharaman, learned counsel appearing for the appellant / plaintiff and Mrs. N. Krishnaveni, learned Senior counsel appearing for Mr. P.Thiyagarajan for the respondents / defendants and perused the materials available on record.

6. The case of the appellant / plaintiff is that the suit property belongs to the appellant / plaintiff Trust and that the respondents / defendants were inducted as tenants in respect of the said property. In support of its claim, the appellant / plaintiff relied upon Ex.A1, a rental agreement dated 04.12.1960, executed between the appellant / plaintiff Trust and the respondents / defendants. As per the said agreement, the annual rent was fixed at Rs.50/-. It is the further case of the appellant / plaintiff that a notice dated 15.08.1984 was issued terminating the tenancy and calling upon the respondents / defendants to deliver vacant possession of the suit property. Since the respondents / defendants issued a reply notice disputing the claim, the appellant / plaintiff Trust was constrained to institute the suit for recovery of possession and arrears of rent.

7. The respondents/defendants disputed the appellant / plaintiff's claim of ownership and contended that no document had been produced to establish that the suit property belonged to the appellant / plaintiff Trust. It was further contended that the appellant / plaintiff had not produced any material to establish the constitution of the Trust, the number of trustees, the manner in which its affairs were administered or the authority of the person who instituted the suit on behalf of the Trust. She further contended that Ex.A1 rental agreement was a fabricated document and that the 1st defendant had entered into possession of the suit property as a tenant as early as in the year 1947. According to them, the superstructure measuring and extent of 45’ x 60’ feet was constructed by the first defendant at his own expense. It was also contended that the rent had been regularly paid to the agents of the Trust, who used to collect the same without issuing receipts. In support of their possession and enjoyment, the respondents / defendants produced house tax receipts relating to the period from 1976 to 1996 and sought for dismissal of the

suit.

8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff submitted that the appellant is a Public Trust and that the suit property is exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Act by virtue of Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Therefore, the appellant / plaintiff is entitled to maintain a suit for recovery of possession against the respondents / defendants before the Civil Court. He further submitted that the respondents / defendants have admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant and the payment of annual rent of Rs.50/-. Therefore, once the tenancy is admitted, the respondents / defendants cannot dispute the appellant / plaintiff's entitlement to seek recovery of possession. He also contended that the respondents / defendants had a right to seek protection under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act, 1921, subject to the provisions of the said Act. However, by virtue of the amendment introduced by Act 2 of 1996, the appellant / plaintiff Trust is exempted from the applicability of the relevant provisions of the said Act. Hence, the respondents / defendants cannot claim any statutory protection against the appellant / plaintiff's suit for recovery of possession. In support of his contentions he relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2009 (2) SCC 75, in the case of National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Rattani and others wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the principles relating to the discharge of the burden of proof in respect of admitted facts and held that, where a fact is admitted, there is no necessity to insist upon direct evidence to prove the same.

9. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2007 (5) CTC 881, in the case of S. Bagirathi Ammal Vs. Palani Roman Catholic Mission wherein this Court considered the applicability of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act, as amended by Act 2 of 1996, to religious institutions and religious public charities. The learned counsel further placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.2928 of 2014, in the case of Shivanna and Others v. B.S. Puttamadaiah (Dead) through LRs, to contend that the Court is empowered to mould the relief taking into consideration subsequent events.

10. Per contra, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents / defendants submitted that the appellant / plaintiff had failed to establish its title and ownership over the suit property. Though the appellant / plaintiff claimed that the property belonged to the Trust, no document was produced to establish the constitution of the Trust, its nature, the particulars of the trustees or the authority under which the suit had been instituted. She further submitted that the appellant / plaintiff had also failed to establish the authority of the person representing the Trust, particularly in view of the death of the Managing Trustee who had executed the rental agreement. The learned Senior counsel further contended that Ex.A1 rental agreement was rightly disbelieved by the Courts below, particularly in view of the admissions elicited from P.W.1 during cross-examination. It was also submitted that the respondents / defendants had been in possession of the property from the year 1947 and had constructed the superstructure at their own expense. The house tax receipts produced by the respondents / defendants would establish their long-standing possession and enjoyment of the property. Therefore, in the absence of acceptable evidence establishing the appellant / plaintiff's right to seek recovery of possession, the concurrent findings of the Courts below do not warrant interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of their contentions, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents / defendants relied upon the following judgments:

(i) The Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 392 in the case of Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu and Another.

(ii) The Judgment of this Court reported in 2019 (1) MLJ 301 in the case of Ayapadi Chavadi Dharmam, Private Family Trust vs. Habibunnisa,

11. The principal issue that arises for consideration is whether the appellant / plaintiff Trust has established its entitlement to seek recovery of possession of the suit property from the respondents / defendants and whether the concurrent findings of the Courts below suffer from any perversity or legal infirmity warranting interference under Section 100 CPC.

12. It is the specific case of the appellant / plaintiff that the suit property belongs to the Trust and that the respondents / defendants were inducted as tenants under Ex.A1 rental agreement dated 04.12.1960. Though the appellant / plaintiff relies upon the said document to establish the jural relationship between the parties, the Courts below have concurrently found that the appellant / plaintiff failed to establish its claim through acceptable oral and documentary evidence. It is relevant to note that the respondents / defendants have admitted their occupation of the suit property as tenants and have also admitted the annual rent of Rs.50/-. However, the respondents / defendants have disputed the genuineness of Ex.A1 and contended that they entered into possession as early as in the year 1947. They have further asserted that the superstructure was constructed by them and that they have been regularly paying the rent to the agents of the Trust.

13. In this regard, the admission of the respondents / defendants regarding the tenancy and the payment of rent assumes significance. The learned counsel for the appellant / plaintiff has relied upon the judgment reported in 2009 (2) SCC 75, contending that admitted facts need not be proved by direct evidence. There can be no quarrel with the settled proposition that facts admitted by the parties need not be independently proved. However, such admission has to be considered in its proper context. The admission of the landlord-tenant relationship by itself would not dispense with the necessity of establishing the authority of the person instituting the suit on behalf of the Trust, particularly when such authority and the constitution of the Trust have been specifically disputed.

14. The appellant / plaintiff has also contended that the suit property is exempted from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings

(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, under Section 29 of the said Act. He has further relied upon the amendment introduced by Act 2 of 1996 to the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act, 1921, and contended that the respondents / defendants are not entitled to claim the protection available under Section 9 of the said Act. Though the question of statutory exemption from the provisions of the Rent Control Act and the applicability of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act may have a bearing on the rights and remedies available to the parties, such statutory exemptions cannot, by themselves, establish the appellant / plaintiff's title or its authority to institute the suit on behalf of the Trust. The appellant / plaintiff is required to establish its entitlement to maintain the proceedings through competent and acceptable evidence.

15. A perusal of the evidence reveals that the appellant / plaintiff has not produced sufficient materials to establish the constitution and nature of the Trust, the particulars of its trustees and the manner in which its affairs are administered. Further, no satisfactory evidence has been placed before the Court to establish the authority of the person who instituted and prosecuted the suit on behalf of the Trust. It is also relevant to note that the suit was instituted by Ramanathaswamy in his capacity as Managing Trustee. After his demise, his brother Bhadrusamy continued the proceedings. However, no satisfactory material has been produced to establish that Bhadrusamy was duly authorised by the Trust to prosecute the suit. No resolution of the Trust authorising him to continue the proceedings has been placed before the Court. Further, the legal representatives of the deceased Managing Trustee have not been impleaded, nor has any satisfactory explanation been offered for their non-impleadment.

16. In this context, the judgment relied upon by the respondents / defenants in Ayapadi Chavadi Dharmam’s case, assumes relevance. In the said decision, this Court considered the necessity of establishing the authority of the person representing the Trust and the requirement of impleading necessary trustees in proceedings instituted on behalf of the Trust. It was held that, in the absence of sufficient material establishing the authority of the person prosecuting the proceedings and the proper representation of the Trust, the findings of the Courts below cannot be interfered with in a Second Appeal. In the present case also, the appellant / plaintiff has failed to establish through acceptable evidence the constitution of the Trust, the particulars of its trustees and the authority of the person who prosecuted the suit. The mere assertion that the suit property belongs to the Trust cannot substitute the requirement of establishing the legal capacity of the person instituting the proceedings.

17. Further, the respondents / defendants have produced house tax receipts relating to the period from 1976 to 1996 to substantiate their possession and enjoyment of the suit property. Though payment of property tax, by itself, may not establish title, the said documents are relevant to consider the nature and continuity of the respondents / defendants possession, particularly when they have contended that they constructed the superstructure at their own expense.

18. The contention of the appellant / plaintiff that the respondents / defendants are tenants and, therefore, liable to surrender possession upon termination of the tenancy also requires consideration in the light of the evidence available on record. The appellant / plaintiff has relied upon the notice dated 15.08.1984 terminating the tenancy. However, the termination of tenancy alone would not entitle the appellant / plaintiff to a decree for possession unless its entitlement to seek such relief through a duly authorised representative is established.

19. The judgment relied upon by the appellant in Shivanna’s case with regard to the power of the Court to mould the relief on the basis of subsequent events, does not advance the case of the appellant / plaintiff in

the absence of proof of its foundational entitlement to the relief sought for and Ramanuja Naidu’s case which was relied upon by the respondents / defendants, has also been considered. However, the determination of the present appeal ultimately rests upon the failure of the appellant / plaintiff Trust to establish the necessary facts and legal authority to maintain the suit on behalf of the Trust.

20. As regards the claim for arrears of rent, the appellant / plaintiff has restricted its claim for a period of three years and sought recovery of a sum of Rs.400/-. Though the annual rent of Rs.50/- is not seriously disputed, the appellant / plaintiff has not placed satisfactory evidence to establish the arrears claimed. The assertion that the respondents / defendants had not paid rent, coupled with the absence of rent receipts or other acceptable supporting materials, is insufficient to grant the monetary relief claimed, particularly when the respondents / defendants have specifically contended that rent was regularly paid to the agents of the Trust.

21. On an overall consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, this Court finds that the appellant / plaintiff has failed to establish the necessary facts to sustain the suit for recovery of possession and arrears of rent. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 CPC is confined to substantial questions of law. This Court cannot interfere with concurrent findings of fact merely because another view is possible. Unless such findings are shown to be perverse, contrary to the evidence on record or based upon an erroneous application of law, interference in a Second Appeal is not warranted.

22. In the present case, the appellant / plaintiff has not demonstrated any perversity or legal infirmity in the concurrent findings of the Courts below. The failure to establish the constitution of the Trust, the authority of the person representing it and the entitlement to seek the reliefs claimed is fatal to the appellant / plaintiff's case. Therefore, this Court finds no valid ground to interfere with the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below.

23. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below. There shall be no order as to costs. 05-11-2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes/No

T. RAJAPRABA To

1. The Principal Subordinate Court, Kumbakonam

2. The 1st Additional District Munsif Court, Kumbakonam.

3. The Section Officer VR Section Madurai Bench of Madras High Court Madurai. THIRUMAGAL CHANDRASEKAR, J. T. RAJAPRABA

05-11-2026