WA(MD)/1436/2025 of The Government of Tamilnadu Vs DCW Limited on 3 November 2026

JUDGMENT

(By G.R. SWAMINATHAN J.) The Government is on appeal challenging the order dated 26.02.2024 passed by the learned single Judge in WP(MD)No.11192 of 2017.

2. The Government of Tamil Nadu granted lease of an extent of 978.38 acres of land in Punnakayal, Sernthamangalam, Kayalpattinam North and Authoor Cusba villages in Tiruchendur Taluk vide G.O Ms.No.76 dated 07.01.1959. The value of the lands were to be fixed on the basis of the then market value. The lease rent to be fixed at an amount calculated at 6% of the capital value of the land. The lessee was also to pay certain other charges. The period of lease was thirty years. The lessee was obliged to purchase the leased lands either during the lease period or within six months from the date of expiry of the lease. The purpose of the lease was to facilitate the establishment of a Caustic Soda factory.

3. Disputes arose between the company and the Government over the years. The bone of contention was whether the company was liable to pay local cess and local cess surcharge. WP No.3151 of 1978 filed by the company in this regard was dismissed on 21.01.1980. WA No.236 of 1980 was also dismissed on 30th September 1980.

4. Even during the currency of the lease, the company called upon the government on multiple occasions to permit them to pay the land cost so that they can continue to be in possession. There was however no response to this request. Instead, the accent was more on collection of the arrears of local cess and local cess surcharge due from the company. According to the local administration, the company was in arrears of lease rent. There were also issues regarding the interest payable on account of the belated payment of certain dues. The lease expired in the year 1989. The government had determined the land cost at Rs.3,91,233.91/-, in the communication dated 18.05.1973 sent by the Board of Revenue. This amount was deposited by the company in the year 1989. They then filed WP No.8369 of 1993 for directing the Government to assign the leased lands. The stand of the company was that since they had remitted the land cost, assignment should follow. This writ petition was disposed of on 27.04.1993 with a direction to the Government to consider the company’s request for assignment. Nine years later, the Tahsildar by notice dated 27.07.2002 called upon the petitioner to remit the lease amounts for the lands along with local cess and local cess surcharge for the period between 1989 and 1993 with interest. The lessee was threatened with eviction in the event of failure on their part to pay the amount demanded. Challenging the said demand, the said company filed WP No.33008 of 2002. The writ petition was disposed of on 13.03.2003 with a direction to the Government to dispose of the lessee’s appeal dated 23.07.1992 seeking assignment within a period of four weeks. The authorities were restrained from enforcing their demand for payment of lease rental arrears in the meanwhile.

5. Correspondence between the Government and the lessee continued. Finally, vide G.O Ms.No.85 Revenue Department dated 31.03.2017, the Government rejected the request for the assignment of lands. Not only collection of the rental arrears with interest but also resumption of 793 acres of land was ordered. Assailing the same, the lessee filed WP(MD)No.11192 of 2017. The learned Single Judge vide order dated 26.02.2024 disposed of the writ petition in the following terms : “14. In view of the above observations and discussions, this Court is issuing the following directions:-

a) The impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the respondents for fresh consideration.

b) The respondents shall provide sufficient opportunity to the petitioner and fix the land cost for the lands required by the petitioner Company within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, depending upon the market value of the land as on date, as per the order of grant and the existing Rules.

c) The petitioner is at liberty to make a fresh request to the first respondent to the exact extent of lands required by them at Punnakayal, Sernthamangalam, Kayalpatnam, identify the survey numbers, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

d) The respondents shall also provide sufficient opportunity to the petitioner to make the payment of the land cost by providing easy instalments to the petitioner, considering the fact that this petitioner has made huge investments in the Government lands, believing the words of the Government in G.O.Ms.No.76, Revenue Department, dated 07.01.1959.” Challenging the said order of the learned Single Judge, the Government has filed this writ appeal. It means that the writ petitioner/lessee has accepted the direction that the land cost will have to be determined with reference to the current market value. They have thus given up their plea that the land cost will have to be reckoned on the basis of the market value of the lands obtaining on the date of the grant of lease.

6. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the Government stands by the decision to resume the lands. Relying on the decisions reported in (2023) 20 SCC 747 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Sharwan Kumar Kumawat), (2024) 9 SCC 680 (Rewa Tollway Private Limited Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh) & (1996) 5 SCC 273 (State of Haryana Vs. Rajpal Sharma), he submitted that the rule of legitimate expectation will not come to the writ petitioner’s rescue. This is more so because the writ petitioner was in fact heard before the impugned decision was taken. According to him, it is open to the Government to go back on its original stand and resume the land, possession of which was given to the writ petitioner. Since a policy decision has been taken, the writ court cannot interfere. He called upon us to set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and allow this writ appeal.

7. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner submitted that the order of the learned Single Judge is well reasoned and that it does not call for any interference.

8. We carefully considered the rival contentions and went through the materials on record. Before we discuss further, let us delineate the conceptual contours of the doctrine of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel. The doctrine of legitimate expectation presupposes a clear and unambiguous representation by the State followed by reliance and detriment. It is essentially a shield against arbitrariness (State of H.P v. OASYS Cybernatics (P) Ltd., (2026) 3 SCC 348). It is rooted in the ideals of fairness, non-arbitrariness and transparency in executive action. It arises when a public authority, either through a consistent past practice, an express promise or a statutory policy, creates an expectation in the mind of an individual or class of persons that a certain course of action will be followed. While such expectations does not amount to a legal right in the strict sense, courts have consistently held that it may nonetheless warrant judicial protection where its denial results in manifest unfairness or arbitrariness, thereby violating the fundamental principles of natural justice. However, the doctrine cannot override an express provision of law or the Constitution. It is not a rigid rule and must be conceded where a superseding public interest or a statutory or constitutional bar exists. While legitimate expectation may guide how discretionary powers are exercised, it cannot be invoked to compel an authority to act contrary to a binding legal or constitutional command. It does not clothe a party with an enforceable right in itself (K.Purushottam Reddy v. UOI (2025) 9 SCC 722). The doctrine does not impede or hinder the power of the public authorities to lay down a policy or withdraw it. Courts are cautious in interfering with a bona fide decision of public authorities which denies legitimate expectation provided such a decision is taken in the larger public interest. Public interest serves as a limitation on the application of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Courts have to determine whether the public interest is compelling and sufficient to outweigh the legitimate expectation of the claimant. It is a balancing exercise that has to be performed. There are issues of burden and standard of proof required to dislodge the claim of legitimate expectation (Tej Prakash Pathak v. High Court of Rajasthan (2025) 2 SCC 1. The doctrine grants an applicant the right to a fair hearing before a decision that negates a promise or withdraws an undertaking from which an expectation of certain outcome or treatment arises. But it does not create an absolute right to the expected outcome. It is only an expectation of a benefit, relief or remedy. It must be reasonable, logical and valid. But it no way vests any enforceable legal right (Rewa Tollway (P) Ltd., v. State of M.P (2024) 9 SCC 680.

9. In Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma (2024) 16 SCC 598, the following features were culled out : “63.1. First, legitimate expectation must be based on a right as opposed to a mere hope, wish or anticipation; 63.2. Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise either from an express or implied promise; or a consistent past practice or custom followed by an authority in its dealings; 63.3. Thirdly, expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be treated as a legitimate expectation; 63.4. Fourthly, legitimate expectation operates in relation to both substantive and procedural matters; 63.5. Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in the realm of public law, that is, a plea of legitimate action can be taken only when a public authority breaches a promise or deviates from a consistent past practice, without any reasonable basis.

63.6. Sixthly, a plea of legitimate expectation based on past practice can only be taken by someone who has dealings, or negotiations with a public authority. It cannot be invoked by a total stranger to the authority merely on the ground that the authority has a duty to act fairly generally.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court added that the doctrine does not extend to and cannot govern the operation of contracts between private parties wherein the doctrine of promissory estoppel holds the field.

10. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sivanandan C.T. v. High Court of Kerala (2024) 3 SCC 799 declared the position as follows : “27. A claim based on the doctrine of procedural legitimate expectation arises where a claimant expects the public authority to follow a particular procedure before taking a decision. This is in contradistinction to the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation where a claimant expects conferral of a substantive benefit based on the existing promise or practice of the public authority...

46. From the above discussion, it is evident that the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation is entrenched in Indian administrative law subject to the limitations on its applicability in given factual situations. The development of Indian jurisprudence is keeping in line with the developments in the common law. The doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation can be successfully invoked by individuals to claim substantive benefits or entitlements based on an existing promise or practice of a public authority. However, it is important to clarify that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot serve as an independent basis for judicial review of decisions taken by public authorities. Such a limitation is now well recognised in Indian jurisprudence considering the fact that a legitimate expectation is not a legal right. [Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn., (1993)

3 SCC 499; Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO, (2005) 1 SCC 625; Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1; Union of India v. P.K. Choudhary, (2016) 4 SCC 236 : State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd., (2023) 10 SCC 634.] It is merely an expectation to avail a benefit or relief based on an existing promise or practice. Although the decision by a public authority to deny legitimate expectation may be termed as arbitrary, unfair, or abuse of power, the validity of the decision itself can only be questioned on established principles of equality and non-arbitrariness under Article

14. In a nutshell, an individual who claims a benefit or entitlement based on the doctrine of legitimate expectation has to establish : (i) the legitimacy of the expectation; and

(ii) that the denial of the legitimate expectation led to the violation of Article 14.”

11. In a recent decision reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 932 (State of H.P v. M/s.Kundlas Loh Udyog), the principles governing the doctrine of promissory estoppel have been culled out as follows : “59. Upon a conspectus of the above authorities discussed in IFGL Refractories Ltd. (supra) and other cases as dealt above, the following principles governing the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be regarded as well-settled:

(i) The doctrine of promissory estoppel is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice. It operates not in the realm of contract, nor within the technical confines of estoppel under the law of evidence, but upon the broader considerations of fairness, justice and good conscience;

(ii) Where one party, by words or conduct, makes to another a clear, unequivocal and unambiguous promise, intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon, and it is in fact so acted upon, the promise becomes binding upon the promisor;

(iii) The doctrine of promissory estoppel is a doctrine whose foundation is that an unconscionable departure by one party from the subject matter of an assumption which may be of fact or law, present or future, and which has been adopted by the other party as the basis of some course of conduct, act or omission, should not be allowed to pass muster. And the relief to be given in cases involving the doctrine of promissory estoppels contains a degree of flexibility which would ultimately render justice to the aggrieved party;

(iv) The doctrine is not merely defensive in nature. Under Indian law, it may itself furnish a cause of action and can be affirmatively enforced where equity so requires;

(v) It is not necessary, in order to attract the doctrine, that the promisee should prove actual detriment. It is sufficient that the promisee has altered his position, acting in reliance upon the promise;

(vi) The alteration of position may consist in making substantial investments, incurring liabilities, establishing industrial infrastructure, entering into agreements, or otherwise rearranging one's affairs on the faith of the representation;

(vii) The doctrine applies with full force against the State, its departments, statutory corporations and instrumentalities, including authorities falling within Article 12 of the Constitution, which cannot arbitrarily resile from a solemn representation upon which another has acted;

(viii) Where the State or its instrumentalities frame industrial or fiscal incentive schemes with the avowed object of attracting investment and establishing industries, the representations contained therein are intended to induce entrepreneurs to act upon them, and such representations are enforceable. Once an entrepreneur, relying upon such representation, establishes an industrial unit, commences commercial production, or otherwise satisfies the eligibility conditions during the currency of the scheme, and the State agencies recognise them as being eligible, the promise crystallises, and an enforceable equity arises in its favour.

Whether a benefit has accrued or not in such cases depends on the facts and circumstances of each case;

(ix) The grant of an exemption, concession or incentive under a statutory scheme is ordinarily defeasible, and the Government is competent to modify or revoke the same in exercise of the very power under which it was granted. Thus, what is granted can ordinarily be withdrawn. However, the Government may be precluded from doing so on the ground of promissory estoppel, which principle itself remains subject to considerations of equity and public interest.

(x) Where a specific sanction or approval of incentive, or eligibility certificate has been issued in favour of an individual enterprise, and the enterprise has acted thereon by making a substantial investment, the promisor is all the more firmly bound by its representation;

(xi) The doctrine rests upon the larger constitutional principle that State action must be fair, non-arbitrary, and consistent; governmental assurances are not empty declarations, but solemn representations on the faith of which citizens regulate their affairs; and

(xii) The ultimate object of the doctrine is to prevent manifest injustice and to ensure that a party, particularly the State, does not act inconsistently to the prejudice of one who has relied upon its promise and altered his position irretrievably.” We should however bear in mind the doctrine being an equitable one must yield when equity so requires (2020) 20 SCC 698.

12. In K.B. Tea Product Pvt.Ltd v. CTO, Siliguri (2023 SCC Online SC 615), the Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that the doctrine of legitimate expectation and the doctrine of promissory estoppel are two separate principles and as such the blanket ban on promissory estoppel against statute cannot be applied to legitimate expectation. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is a remedy in private law. The doctrine of legitimate expectation is a remedy in public law rooted in Article 14. When a law enters the public sphere and affects the rights of the society, it becomes liable to a stricter level of scrutiny and as such becomes more susceptible to judicial review. In State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd (2020 SCC OnLine SC 968), the doctrinal difference between the concepts of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectations was clarified. The doctrine of legitimate expectation, a public law concept, is premised on the principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness in State action. The doctrine is a facet of Article 14. On the other hand, promissory estoppel, being a private law concept, can be invoked if the State has entered into a private contract with another entity but is inapplicable where a representation has been made by the State in the discharge of its public functions.

13. While breach of legitimate expectation by itself cannot serve as a cause of action, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not limited in its application only to defence but it also furnish a cause of action. In other words, it can by itself be the basis of action. To invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the claimant must show that by acting on the

promise made by the other party, he altered his position. The alteration of position by the promisee is a sine qua non for the applicability of the doctrine. He need not prove damage, detriment or prejudice. On the other hand, in the case of legitimate expectation, detriment must be established (Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd v. UOI (2012) 11 SCC 1).

14. Though it has been highlighted more than once by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the doctrine of legitimate expectation and the doctrine of promissory estoppel are distinct and cannot be conflated, the writ petitioner has interchangeably invoked both. A brief note on the pleadings in writ proceedings may be in order. In a writ petition or in the counter affidavit not only the facts, but also the evidence and proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it (vide Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana (1988 AIR SC 2181). Pleading of a party may be alternative and inconsistent, but once the party has taken a definite stand and the court has proceeded to decide on that basis, he cannot turn around and take an inconsistent plea. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This is based on the doctrine of election. (vide R.N.Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir (1992) 4 SCC 683). No amount of proof can substitute pleading which are the foundation of claim of a litigating party (Abubakar Abul Inamdar v. Harun Abdul Inamdar

(1995) 5 SCC 612). Though this strict rule regarding pleading is somewhat relaxed when it comes to writ proceedings, when a party proposes to rely on the doctrine of legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel, pleading is absolutely essential. Mere pleading would not do. The affidavit filed in support of the writ petition will have to spell out as to how the essential ingredients of the doctrine relied upon are met. In M.P Jain and S.N.Jain’s Principles of Administrative Law, it has been opined that a clear, sound and positive foundation is laid in the petition. Bald assertions, averments or allegations without any supporting material are not sufficient to press into aid the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

15. The writ petitioner must take a definite stand at some point of time. Even in the first instance, he must clarify if he is projecting his case in the alternative. He must demonstrate the presence of all the essential ingredients of whatever type of estoppel he relies on. Borrowing the language from an English decision [ Crabb v. Arun District Council (1975) ], he cannot manufacture a third and new hybrid type of estoppel by an eclectic application of some of the ingredients of each. In a writ petition, the time for election would arrive at the time of arguments since by then pleadings would have been complete.

16. The writ petitioner appears to invoke both the doctrines in the same breath. That in our view may not be in order. The learned Additional Advocate General tried to impress upon us that neither of the doctrines can prevail over the paramount power of the Government. We, however, intend to anchor our decision on a more nuanced principle. We are of the view that the principle of proprietary estoppel is more apposite.

17. This principle was formally named in the 26th Edition (1966) of Snell’s Equity. The foundation was laid by Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v. Dyson [(1866) LR 1 HL 129 : 14 WR 926] as follows : “The rule of law applicable to the case appears to me to be this : If a man, under a verbal agreement with a landlord for a certain interest in land, or what amounts to the same thing, under an expectation, created or encouraged by the landlord that he shall have a certain interest, takes possession of such land, with the consent of the landlord, and upon the faith of such promise or expectation, with the knowledge of the landlord, and without objection by him, lays out money upon the land, a Court of equity will compel the landlord to give effect to such promise or expectation.” Snell’s Equity was cited in E. R. IVES INVESTMENT LTD. v. HIGH, [1967] 2 Q.B. 379. Two ingredients of the doctrine were alluded to. The party relying on this principle must have relied on the arrangement with the opposite party. There must have been acquiescence on the part of the other.

18. In re Basham, Decd. (1986) 1 WLR 1498, the principle was explained in the following terms : “...The plaintiff relies on proprietary estoppel, the principle of which, in its broadest form, may be stated as follows: where one person, A, has acted to his detriment on the faith of a belief, which was known to and encouraged by another person, B, that he either has or is going to be given a right in or over B's property, B. cannot insist on his strict legal rights if to do so would be inconsistent with A's belief. The principle is commonly known as proprietary estoppel, and since the effect of it is that B. is prevented from asserting his strict legal rights it has something in common with estoppel...”

19. The next leading decision is Thorner v. Major and others, [2009] 1 WLR 776. One of the Law Lords identified three main elements as requisite for a claim based on proprietary estoppel (i) a representation made or assurance given to the claimant (ii) reliance by the claimant on the representation or assurance and (iii) some detriment incurred by the claimant as a consequence of that reliance. It was laid down that the representation or assurance would need to have been sufficiently clear and unequivocal ; the reliance reasonable in all circumstances ; and the detriment sufficiently substantial to justify the intervention of equity. Another Law Lord qualified the first element that the assurance must be clear and unequivocal. The effect of words or actions must be assessed in their context. Proprietary estoppel is based on silence and inaction, rather than any statement or action. It is sufficient for the claimant to establish that he reasonably understood the statement or action to be an assurance on which he could rely.

20. In Andrew Morris Davies v. Debra Ann Davies, [2012] EWCA Civ 1641, the following principles have been laid down : “i) Deciding whether an equity has been raised and, if so, how to satisfy it is a retrospective exercise looking backwards from the moment when the promise falls due to be performed and asking whether, in the circumstances which have actually happened, it would be unconscionable for a promise not to be kept either wholly or in part: Thorner v. Major, [2009] UKHL 18

ii) The ingredients necessary to raise an equity are (a) an assurance of sufficient clarity (b) reliance by the claimant on that assurance and (c) detriment to the claimant in consequence of his reasonable reliance: Thorner v. Major at.

iii) However, no claim based on proprietary estoppel can be divided into watertight compartments. The quality of the relevant assurances may influence the issue of reliance; reliance and detriment are often intertwined, and whether there is a distinct need for a “mutual understanding” may depend on how the other elements are formulated and understood: Gillett v. Holt, [2001] Ch. 210 at 225;

iv) Detriment need not consist of the expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment, so long as it is something substantial. The requirement must be approached as part of a broad inquiry as to whether repudiation of an assurance is or is not unconscionable in all the circumstances.

v) There must be a sufficient causal link between the assurance relied on and the detriment asserted. The issue of detriment must be judged at the moment when the person who has given the assurance seeks to go back on it. The question is whether (and if so to what extent) it would be unjust or inequitable to allow the person who has given the assurance to go back on it. The essential test is that of unconscionability: Gillett v. Holt at 232.

vi) Thus the essence of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel is to do what is necessary to avoid an unconscionable result: Jennings v. Rice, [2002] EWCA Civ 159.

vii) In deciding how to satisfy any equity the court must weigh the detriment suffered by the claimant in reliance on the defendant's assurances against any countervailing benefits he enjoyed in consequence of that reliance: Henry v. Henry at [51] and [53].

viii) Proportionality lies at the heart of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel and permeates its every application. In particular there must be a proportionality between the remedy and the detriment which is its purpose to avoid: Jennings v. Rice. This does not mean that the court should abandon expectations and seek only to compensate detrimental reliance, but if the expectation is disproportionate to the detriment, the court should satisfy the equity in a more limited way.

ix) In deciding how to satisfy the equity the court has to exercise a broad judgmental discretion. However the discretion is not unfettered. It must be exercised on a principled basis, and does not entail what HH Judge Weekes QC memorably called a “portable palm tree”: Taylor v. Dickens, [1998] 1 FLR 806 (a decision criticised for other reasons in Gillett v. Holt).”

21. Those academically inclined may usefully consult the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of England in Guest v. Guest (2022) UKSC 27. The historical evolution of the doctrine has been exhaustively captured. All the noted authorities have been referred to. We also would invite the attention of those interested to the scholarly article titled

“Estoppel Advent” written by Sri Salman Khurshid, Senior Advocate in (1981) 3 SCC J-33. The learned author succinctly captures the difference between the equitable estoppel of the promissory kind and the equitable estoppel of the proprietary kind as follows : “Equitable estoppel of the promissory kind where there is an existing legal relationship and a promise not to enforce all rights under it Equitable estoppel of the proprietary kind where there is a promise to grant an interest in land and consequent expenditure on the land by the other party. This estoppel comes closest to the rules of unjust enrichment.”

22. There are conceptual differences between promissory and proprietary estoppel. Promissory estoppel arises only out of a representation or promise that is clear or precise and unambiguous. Proprietary estoppel, on the other hand, can arise where there is no actual promise. Proprietary estoppel comes into play if the assurance relates to an identified property owned by the opposite party. Proprietary estoppel is based on an existing legal relationship, usually a contract, but not necessarily one relating to land. Proprietary estoppel need not be based on an existing legal relationship but it must relate to an identified property (land).

23. Let us conclude the discussion on the law by citing Chitty on Contracts. It is opined therein that proprietary estoppel arises in certain situations in which a person has done acts in reliance on the belief that he has or that he will acquire rights in or over another’s property. Where the requirements of the doctrine are satisfied, the land owner is precluded from denying the existence of the rights in question and may indeed be compelled to grant them. Because the estoppel precludes him from denying the existence of rights in property, it has come to be known as proprietary estoppel.

24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P (1979) 2 SCC 409 makes a reference to the aforesaid concept. But under the influence of CRABB v. Arun District Council, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also observed that there is qualitative difference between the concepts of proprietary and promissory estoppel since both are offsprings of equity. Subsequent decisions including State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd. (2023) 10 SCC 634 merely quote some of the English decisions.

25. Let us now apply the principles to the facts on hand. Lease was granted in favour of the writ petitioner vide G.O.Ms.No.76, Revenue

Department, dated 07.01.1959. It does not appear to be a contract. Any government contract will have to conform to certain formalities which are absent in this case. The grant was subject to certain conditions. The grantee, namely, the writ petitioner was obliged to purchase the lands during the currency of the lease or within six months from the date of expiry of the lease. Though the Government had not explicitly promised to sell the land, the language set out in the G.O must be appropriately construed. The purpose of grant was to enable the grantee to set up caustic soda factory. The raw material for the company is salt. The leased lands were meant to be used as salt pans.

26. The company had written to the Government to determine the land cost so that they can remit the same and take the land on assignment. There has been extensive correspondence between the parties. The earliest letter addressed by the writ petitioner to the Government is dated 08.01.1981. The Government did not respond. It remained silent. That is why, the writ petitioner on their own remitted the cost of land which was determined by the Government in the year 1973. They filed WP No.8369 of 1993 for directing the Government to assign the land since the land cost has already been remitted. Though the High Court directed the Government to take a call within four weeks, the Government did nothing. Instead, it was focussed more on collecting the rental arrears. The order directed to be passed within four weeks came some twenty four years later. The writ petitioner placing reliance on the assurance and promise given by the Government vide G.O.Ms.No.76, Revenue Department, dated 07.01.1959 set up their factory. It is still functioning. It employs a few thousand people. It is generating foreign exchange. It is a profitable unit. If the lands are resumed, certainly, it will have an adverse impact on the company. The writ petitioner has thus shown that they would suffer detriment if the Government were to go back on their promise which in this case was precise and unambiguous. What can be put against the petitioner is that they did not purchase the property within six months after the lease period was over. But then, they cannot be blamed. They had expressed their intention to buy even before the expiry of the lease. They even deposited a certain sum though it represented the land value of the year 1973. It is the government that has to be blamed for having been inactive. They cannot thus take advantage of their own wrong.

27. The learned Single Judge has in clear terms held that the writ petitioner must pay the market value for the lands as determined by the Government. Of course, the company has to be put on notice and associated in the process of valuation. We are however of the view that there is no need to grant the facility of payment in easy instalments. Even as on date the land value does not appear to be on the high side. The company can very well afford to pay at one go.

28. All the ingredients of the principle of proprietary estoppel stand fulfilled in this case. There is unequivocal promise on the part of the Government to assign/sell the lands. The writ petitioner set up their factory by placing reliance on the said promise. They would suffer detriment if the Government goes back on its assurance. As already noted, the detriment is to be measured at the moment when the person was given the assurance seeks to go back on it.

29. High Court while acting in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India also exercises equitable jurisdiction (vide Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI (2007) 8 SCC 449). Whenever the question of enforcing equity arises, the court will apply the test of unconscionability. Applying the said test, we come to the conclusion that permitting resumption of the leased lands will lead to an unjust result. That is why, the learned Single Judge rightly quashed the impugned G.O. We endorse the reasons assigned by the learned Judge.

During the course of arguments, the learned AAG submitted that the company is in possession of very large tracts of land in the vicinity and that the resumption will not impair their functioning. This ground was not set out in the impugned G.O. Long ago, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that a public order must speak for itself and that reasons cannot be supplemented during arguments.

30. Looked at from any angle, we do not find any merit in this writ appeal. It stands dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. (G.R.S.,J.) (M.D.S.,J.) 03-11-2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes/No SKM To

1. The Represented by its Secretary, Revenue Department,Fort St.Geroge, Chennai - 9

2. The Principal Secretary and Commissioner of Land Administration, Ezhilagam, Chepauk, Chennai -5.

3. The District Collector Collectorate, Tuticorin District.

4. The District Revenue Officer Tuticorin District.

5. The Tahsildar, Taluk Office, Tiruchendur.

G.R.SWAMINATHAN, J. AND M.D.SUMATHI, J. SKM WA(MD) No. 1436 of 2025 03-11-2026