WP/10586/2023 of Sri Sabyaschi Pandey, Constable / GD Vs Union of India on 3 November 2026

ORDER

This Writ Petition has been filed seeking issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records of the respondents and quashing the order passed by the second respondent dated 07.04.2021, the order passed by the Appellate Authority/fourth respondent dated 08.07.2020, and the original order passed by the third respondent dated 04.11.2020.

2. The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of the present Writ Petition are that the petitioner was appointed as a Constable in the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). While he was on deputation with BOI, Delhi (IB), a charge memorandum dated 24.03.2020 was served on him. The charge memorandum contained two charges, to which the petitioner submitted his explanation. Not being satisfied with the explanation, the disciplinary authority, viz., the fourth respondent, appointed an Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer conducted a departmental enquiry and submitted the enquiry report on 06.06.2020, holding that both the charges were proved.

2.1. Upon considering the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of removal from service by order dated 08.07.2020. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which confirmed the order of the disciplinary authority by order dated 04.11.2020. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a revision, which was also dismissed by order dated 07.04.2021. Not being satisfied with the aforesaid orders, the petitioner preferred another appeal, which was rejected on 07.09.2021. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed W.P.No.27496 of 2021. By order dated 08.08.2022, this Court granted liberty to the petitioner to challenge the final order dated 08.07.2020. Pursuant to the said order, the present Writ Petition has been filed.

3. Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials available on record.

4. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that the charges framed against the petitioner relate to cognizable offences, namely, human trafficking and corrupt practices. However, in the present case, the authorities have not even registered an FIR. Instead, they have initiated disciplinary proceedings on the basis of vague charges. It is his contention that, when allegations of human trafficking have been levelled against the petitioner, the absence of an FIR itself indicates the lack of supporting material. Further, with regard to the alleged disproportionate assets, though the respondent authorities have stated that a substantial amount of Rs.56.31 lakhs was credited to the petitioner's two SBI credit accounts, the said allegation has not been substantiated by the respondents. They have merely relied upon certain bank entries, whereas the petitioner submitted a detailed explanation supported by relevant documents. Without considering those documents, the disciplinary authority arrived at an erroneous conclusion.

4.1. The learned Senior Counsel would further contend that the entire disciplinary proceeding originated from the seizure of the petitioner's cell phone and the data retrieved therefrom. Having initiated the proceedings on that basis, the respondent authorities failed to follow the procedure contemplated under Section 12 read with Rule 14 of the Central Industrial Security Force Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the “CISF Act”). It is his further contention that no witnesses having direct knowledge of the alleged incidents were examined.

Though the alleged occurrence took place in Delhi, the enquiry was conducted at Sivagangai, thereby depriving the petitioner of an effective opportunity to cross-examine the relevant witnesses. The learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the documents were marked without examining the relevant witnesses and, therefore, their veracity was not established in the manner known to law.

4.2. The learned Senior Counsel would further contend that, as per Section 21(3) of the CISF Act, any proceedings against CISF personnel for the alleged delinquency ought to have been initiated within a period of three months. Therefore, the present disciplinary proceedings are barred by limitation. He would further contend that, as per Section 8, Rule 21 and Appendix A, the President of India is the appointing authority of the petitioner. In the absence of proper authorisation from the President of India, the order of removal from service passed by the fourth respondent is non est in law. He would also contend that the disciplinary, appellate and revisional authorities have failed to record findings on each of the articles of charge after taking into consideration the defence raised by the petitioner. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the following judgments:

(i) State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 772;

(ii) Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan and Others, reported in (2024) 1 SCC 175; and

(iii) Dr. J. Nelson Samuel Jebastin v. State of Tamil Nadu (W.P.No.39645 of 2024 dated 29.09.2026).

5. Per contra, the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondents would submit that the factual contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner cannot be examined in detail in writ proceedings. According to him, this Court can examine the correctness of the procedure followed by the authorities, but not reappreciate the correctness of the decision itself. He would further contend that the failure to initiate criminal prosecution cannot, by itself, be a ground for the petitioner to escape the charges levelled against him. It is his further contention that the objection raised by the petitioner regarding the non-preparation of a mahazar is not applicable to the present departmental proceedings, as the relevant provision deals with the procedure to be followed by CISF personnel when an offence is committed in their presence.

5.1. The learned Additional Solicitor General would further contend that, though the agreement under Section 8, Rule 21 and Appendix A was executed by a person on behalf of the President of India, Section 32 of the CISF Act deals with the power of disciplinary authorities. In the case of the petitioner, who is a Constable, the competent disciplinary authority is specified in Schedule I.

According to Schedule I, a Senior Commandant or Deputy Commandant is empowered to impose the punishment of removal from service on enrolled members of the Force, except Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors. In the present case, the petitioner, being a Constable, was subjected to disciplinary action by the competent authority. It is also his contention that, though the respondent authorities disputed the alleged seizure of the cell phone, the petitioner himself admitted during cross-examination that the cell phone had been seized. Therefore, the petitioner cannot raise any grievance in that regard. Hence, he prayed to dismiss the present Writ Petition.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made on either side.

7. Before proceeding to examine the factual aspects of the case, it would be appropriate to consider the legal defences raised by the petitioner. The first and foremost contention raised by the petitioner relates to Section 12 read with Rule 14 of the CISF Act. It is his contention that, whenever an offence is committed and any property is seized, a mahazar has to be prepared in accordance with Rule 14. In the present case, since the entire issue arose from the seizure of the petitioner's cell phone, the absence of a seizure mahazar renders the seizure liable to be doubled.

8. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to Section 12 of the CISF Act, which reads as follows:- “12. Power to search without warrant.—(1) Whenever any member of the Force, not below the prescribed rank, has reasons to believe that any such offence as is referred to in section 11 has been or is being committed and that a search warrant cannot be obtained without affording the offender an opportunity of escaping or of concealing evidence of the offence, he may detain the offender and search his person and belongings forthwith and, if he thinks proper, arrest any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed the offence.

(2) The provisions of the 42[Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)] relating to searches under that Code shall, so far as may be, apply to searches under this section.”

9. On a reading of Section 12 of the CISF Act, it is evident that the provision prescribes a certain procedure to be followed when an offence is committed or comes to the notice of CISF personnel while discharging their duties. However, in the present case, the CISF personnel himself, being a member of the Force, came under adverse notice for the commission of certain irregularities and misconduct, which came to light through WhatsApp communications. Therefore, as rightly contended by the learned Additional Solicitor General, Section 12 of the CISF Act is not stricto sensu applicable to

the present departmental proceedings. Without prejudice to the aforesaid finding, it is also relevant to note that, when the petitioner was cross-examined by the Presenting Officer on behalf of the management, he answered Question No.2 as follows:- “Q.No.2 PW-1 Insp/Min, S.Ravichandran in his statement stated that an enquiry reported received from IB HQ, New Delhi through DIG SZ HQ Chennai along with your posting order? What is the reason for conducting enquiry by IB against your? Ans: During deputation, IB authorities seized my mobile No.9910149673 from mobile bag during duty hours and conducted enquiry on the documents i.e. copies of visas, passport and travel itinerary of Indian and Nepal Passengers, seemingly of the passengers travelling to and from IGI Airport New Delhi have been found storing in my phone.”

10. Thus, the petitioner has categorically admitted the seizure of his cell phone. Therefore, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that a seizure mahazar ought to have been prepared, in view of the petitioner's admission regarding the seizure of the cell phone, this Court does not find any serious infirmity in the disciplinary proceedings on that ground.

11. The next contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner relates to Section 21(3) of the CISF Act. Here again, it is contended that any disciplinary proceedings against CISF personnel must be initiated within a period of three months. For ready reference, this Court deems it appropriate to extract Section 21(3) of the CISF Act: “21. Protection of acts of members of the Force._(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any legal proceeding, whether civil or criminal, which may lawfully be brought against any member of the Force for anything done or intended to be done under the powers conferred by, or in pursuance of, any provision of this Act or the rules thereunder shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have been committed and not otherwise; and notice in writing of such proceeding and of the cause thereof shall be given to the person concerned and his supervisory officer at least one month before the commencement of such proceeding.”

12. The heading of Section 21(3) of the CISF Act relates to the “Protection of acts of members of the Force.” On a harmonious reading of Section 21 of the CISF Act, it is evident that, while CISF personnel discharging their duties, if any third parties “body or property” affected, and if such act gives rise to any civil or criminal proceedings to those persons, such proceedings must be initiated within the prescribed period of three months. As rightly contended by the learned Additional Solicitor General, the said provision cannot be pressed into service by the CISF personnel for their misconduct. To put it precisely, they above provision only applies to proceedings arising out of acts done by CISF personnel in the discharge of their duties. Therefore, the contention that the present disciplinary proceedings are barred by limitation is also liable to be rejected.

13. Another legal defence raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner relates to Section 8 read with Rule 21 and Appendix A of the CISF Act. Relying upon these provisions, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that, since the President of India is the appointing authority of the petitioner, any final, appellate or revisional order passed by the respondents, in the absence of a delegation of power by the President of India, is without authority. However, the learned Additional Solicitor General would draw the attention of this Court to Rule 32(1) of the CISF Rules. For ready reference, the same is extracted hereunder:- “32. Disciplinary Authorities._ (1) The disciplinary authority in respect of an enrolled member of the Force for the purpose of imposing any particular penalty or the passing of any disciplinary order shall be the authority specified in this behalf in Schedule I under whose administrative control the enrolled member is serving and shall include any authority mentioned in the said Schedule superior to such authority.”

14. According to Section 32(1) of the CISF Act, the disciplinary authority in respect of enrolled members of the Force is specified in Schedule I. As per Schedule I, the Senior Commandant and Deputy Commandant are empowered to impose the punishment of removal from service on enrolled members of the Force, except Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors. Therefore, since the present disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, who was serving as a Constable, this Court finds no reason to hold that the impugned order suffers from any infirmity on the ground of lack of competence, as the same is in accordance with Section 32(1) of the CISF Act.

15. Now let us analyse to the factual aspects of the case. The learned Senior Counsel would contend that the alleged occurrence took place in Delhi, whereas the enquiry was conducted at Sivagangai, and no witness having direct knowledge of the alleged incidents was examined. He would further contend that the Enquiry Officer merely marked the documents produced through the departmental witnesses and recorded findings without proper proof of the same. However, this Court is unable to accept the above submission.

16. A perusal of the charge memorandum reveals that the persons through whom the documents were proposed to be proved. Even if the witnesses did not have direct knowledge of the alleged occurrence, the relevant question is whether the documents relied upon by the management, being official records, were properly proved through the witnesses concerned. The departmental witnesses could explain the records, which they came to know through the same. Therefore, the mere fact that the witnesses did not have direct knowledge of the occurrence does not, by itself, establish that the documents were not proved.

17. Though the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner relies upon the judgment in Saroj Kumar Sinha (cited supra), that case involved a situation where no witnesses had been examined. In the present case, witnesses were examined, through whom the documents were marked. Apart from that, the petitioner himself submitted a letter dated 23.07.2018, wherein he categorically admitted that he had facilitated passengers during immigration in return for handsome amounts of money. He also admitted that he had received money from various persons in India and from foreign countries. Though the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would contend that the said letter was obtained by coercion and duress, but the petitioner has miserably failed to establish the same by placing relevant material on record. But, the learned Senior Counsel would submit that the fact that the petitioner's thumb impression was obtained in addition to his signature in the letter would demonstrate that the letter was obtained through coercion and duress. However, the mere fact that both the signature and thumb impression were obtained would only show alertness of the respondent and not the coercion or duress.

18. Further, during cross-examination, the petitioner admitted that substantial amounts had been credited to his bank account. Though the petitioner contended that the amounts had been received from his father, mother and brother, he fairly admitted that no documents were available to substantiate the same. Admittedly, the amounts were not transferred through the bank accounts of his father, mother or brother; rather, the transactions involved either cash deposits or transfers from other accounts. Furthermore, the petitioner's failure to disclose the purchase of a flat worth Rs.15 lakhs also lends support to the case of the respondents.

19. Another contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that, in the absence of criminal prosecution for the alleged offences of human trafficking and corruption, the disciplinary proceedings cannot be sustained. In support of this contention, he relies upon the judgment in Ram Lal (cited supra), contending that, when an acquittal entitles an employee to be discharged from disciplinary proceedings, the absence of any criminal prosecution should also render the disciplinary proceedings liable to be interfered with. This Court is unable to accept the said submission.

20. The service rules do not mandate that a criminal complaint must be lodged whenever a charge is framed against an employee, even the alleged misconduct may also give rise to criminal prosecution. What is essential is whether the charges framed against the delinquent employee have been established in accordance with law. In the present case, the petitioner has admitted the seizure of his cell phone. It is also an admitted fact that details relating to 280 passengers were identified in the cell phone, and this fact was not seriously disputed by the petitioner.

21. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to set out the contours of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings. In this regard, this Court would like to refer to the following judgments:-

(i) B.C.Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749

(ii) Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) Vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava reported in (2021) 2 SCC 61.

(iii) The Indian Oil Corporation & Ors., Vs. Ajit Kumar Singh & Anr., reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 478. Through the above judgements, the following principles would emerge:-

(i) Power of Judicial review is not like an appeal. But such power is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and the compliance of natural justice.

(ii) The power of judicial review is not like an appellate remedy to substitute its own finding, unless the findings of the Original Authority and Appellate Authority is perverse and without evidence.

(iii) The High Court had no jurisdiction to review the penalty, unless the same is shockingly disproportionate.

(iv) The mere possibility to arrive at yet another finding, cannot be a reason to substitute the finding of the disciplinary Authority.

(v) The judicial review is meant only to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion.

(vi) While exercising the power of judicial review, so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the original authority, the same has to be sustained.

22. In the present case, as already discussed, there is material available against the petitioner. He has failed to satisfactorily explain to the authorities about the source of the substantial amounts credited to his account and the circumstances in which the three credits referred to in the proceedings were received. In view of the aforesaid factual position, as rightly contended by the learned Additional Solicitor General, this Court is of the view that, it cannot interfere with the findings of the disciplinary authority unless the same are shown to be perverse or vitiated by a recognised ground for judicial review. On a consideration of the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, this Court does not find any such perversity in the impugned order.

23. The learned Senior Counsel would further contend that the orders passed by the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority do not contain adequate reasons and are, therefore, liable to be interfered with. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in AAI v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee, reported in (2025) 4 SCC 111. The relevant portion of the said judgment is extracted hereunder:- “35. It is trite law that in disciplinary proceedings, it is not necessary for the disciplinary authority to deal with each and every ground raised by the delinquent officer in the representation against the proposed penalty and detailed reasons are not required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment if he accepts the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. Our view stands fortified by the decision of this Court in Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank [Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank, (2021) 3 SCC 806 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 624] , wherein it was held : (SCC p. 810, para 11) “11. … Further, it is well settled that if the disciplinary authority accepts the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and passes an order, no detailed reasons are required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment. The punishment is imposed based on the findings recorded in the enquiry report, as such, no further elaborate reasons are required to be given by the disciplinary authority.

36. All that is required on the part of the disciplinary authority is that it should examine the evidence in the disciplinary proceedings and arrive at a reasoned conclusion that the material placed on record during the course of enquiry establishes the guilt of the delinquent employee on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. This is precisely what was done by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority while dealing with the case of the respondent.” According to the above ratio, the primordial requirement is the application of mind.

24. This Court has perused the orders passed by the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority and finds that they contain a detailed discussion of the respective charges and that there is sufficient material to demonstrate the application of mind by the authorities concerned. Therefore, even the aforesaid contention is liable to be rejected in view of the principles laid down in the above judgment.

25. In view of the foregoing detailed discussion, this Court does not find any merit in the present Writ Petition. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. No costs. 03-11-2026 Index: Yes Speaking Order Neutral Citation: Yes KV To

1. Union of India Service through Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi- 110 001.

2. The Inspector General CISF South Sector Headquarters Ch Pt. Campus, Chennai, pin- 600 009.

3. The Deputy Inspector General CISF, SZ -I, HQ. Chennai, D Block, Rajaji Bhawan, Vasant Nagar, Chennai- 600 090.

4. The Commandant CISF,4th RB Sivagangai, P.O, Amaravathipudur, DT Sivagangai, Tamil Nadu, Pin- 630 301.

C.KUMARAPPAN J. KV Pre-Delivery in W.P No.10586 of 2023 03-11-2026