WP(MD)/17696/2021 of GOVINDAN. G Vs CANARA BANK on 3 November 2026

ORDER

This writ petition is filed by the petitioner seeking issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records pertaining to the order of dismissal in Ref.No.MDUC HRM 3626/2020 dated 29.01.2020 passed by the 4th respondent/Disciplinary Authority, and the consequential order dated 29.12.2020 passed by the 3rd respondent/Appellate Authority, to quash the same as illegal, and for a direction to reinstate the petitioner notionally from the date of dismissal and to confer all terminal benefits reckoned from his date of retirement, viz., 31.01.2020.

2. The petitioner joined the respondent Bank as a Clerk on 25.02.1985 and thereafter, having risen up the ladder, was serving as Senior Manager at the Thirunagar-Madurai Branch from 12.11.2018 and worked there till his suspension on 01.11.2019, holding the first set of double lock keys of the Safe Deposit Locker during his tenure. The second set was held by other officers of the branch.

3. On 24.01.2019, Sri K.Velmurugan, Armed Guard of the branch, found a purse of gold and silver articles that was left behind by a customer at the strong room and handed it over to Sri. Sathish Kumar, one of the key holders. The articles weighed at 385.90 grams in the presence of the two key holders, Sri. Sathish Kumar and Smt.Suganya D, were placed in the safe custody locker under Sl.No.SC/01/2019, along with a letter dated 25.01.2019 recording the weight. On 25.09.2019, the customer, Sri N.Nagaprakasam, holder of Locker No.A-18, lodged a complaint stating that he had misplaced gold and silver items while operating his locker on 24.01.2019. On opening the safe custody packet pursuant to the complaint, the articles were found to weigh only 38.50 grams, the weight recorded in the accompanying letter having been altered from 385.90 grams to 38.50 grams. The petitioner was on leave from 29.09.2019 to 08.10.2019 and rejoined duty on 09.10.2019. A search conducted over three days preceding his return did not locate the articles, and the petitioner was directed by the Chief Manager to trace the original packet after he returned.

4. On 09.10.2019, though the petitioner had sought permission to visit the Taluk Office, he instead operated his personal locker at another branch. On 14.10.2019, he produced a packet from the double lock room, representing that the missing article had been traced. On enquiry, he admitted to having substituted the article with his own jewels, and, by two letters dated 29.10.2019, admitted the substitution and sought return of his own jewels weighing 38.50 grams. The original articles were returned to the customer on 29.10.2019.

5. On these findings, the petitioner was issued a charge memo dated 09.01.2020 (Ref.No.MDUC HRM CS-02/2020), with two charges which are extracted hereunder:- “1. Sri G Govindan was holding the 1st set of keys on various dates during his tenure in the branch. Sri G Govindan had taken advantage of holding the 1st set of double lock keys and had taken out the unclaimed articles of 385.90 grams kept in the safe custody locker; replaced it with his own jewels of lesser weight of 38.50 grams by altering the weight mentioned in one of the letters enclosed /annexure to Safe deposit unclaimed article, which is dated 25.01.2018 (prepared on 25.01.2019) kept along with the safe custody article. Sri G Govindan had falsified the records with a dishonest intention to gain pecuniary benefits.

2. Sri G. Govindan had not ensured compliance with the guidelines stipulated for handling unclaimed articles and other items found in the of ice premises.”

6. A departmental enquiry was held on 20.01.2020, in which 23 documents were marked and 4 witnesses were examined. This was followed by the Presenting Officer's brief on 21.01.2020, the Defence Representative's reply on 23.01.2020, and the Inquiring Authority's findings on 24.01.2020 holding both charges proved. The petitioner's representation was submitted on 28.01.2020, and the 4th respondent/Disciplinary Authority imposed the punishment of dismissal, by order dated 29.01.2020, served on the petitioner on 30.01.2020, one day prior to his scheduled retirement. The petitioner preferred an appeal on 12.03.2020 which was rejected by the 3rd respondent/Appellate Authority by order dated 29.12.2020, and his subsequent request for review on 19.02.2021, was also rejected by the Reviewing Authority by order dated 16.04.2021. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.

7. It is the case of the petitioner that the charge is untenable since the locker could not be opened with the first set of keys alone, and the second key holder was never investigated. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the admission letters, both dated 29.10.2019, on which the finding of guilt rests, were extracted from him under coercion and that the letters are inconsistent with his own statement dated 15.10.2019. He further contends that the entire process, from the commencement of the enquiry to the order of dismissal, was completed in nine calendar days, in breach of Regulation 6(21)(i) of the Canara Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter ‘the Regulations’), and is squarely covered by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in The General Manager, Canara Bank and Others v. S.V.Mothilal, (W.A. (MD) No.932 of 2021, dated 28.03.2025), involving the same respondent Bank, deprecating a disciplinary proceeding concluded in a similarly short span. The relevant part of the judgment is extracted hereunder:- “9. ...The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2024) 1 SCC 632 (Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa) had used the expression “whirlwind proceedings” since the entire process had been wrapped up by the authority concerned in flat 39 days. It was further noted that the undue haste demonstrated by the Committee for bringing the enquiry to a closure, cannot justify curtailment of the right of the appellant to a fair hearing. In the case on hand, the entire proceedings were concluded within two weeks. The expression “whirlwind proceedings” used by the Hon'ble Supreme Court would aptly apply to the case on hand also.

10. From the sequence of events, we are led to conclude that some sort of assurance would have been given to the petitioner that if he cooperates, he would be let of lightly. Otherwise, no delinquent would willingly participate in the enquiry proceedings even without submitting his defence statement. The fact that the reply was submitted to the enquiry of icer immediately also goes to show that some sort of persuasion was exercised on the delinquent. The writ petitioner has been led like a lamb to be mercilessly slaughtered. We are of the view that the principle of estoppel by conduct cannot be invoked against the delinquent. When it comes to adherence to principles of procedural fairness, we would expect the employer to be an exemplar. They cannot take advantage of the acquiescence on the part of the employee. By no stretch of imagination can the process that had taken place in this case held to be fair. On this sole ground, interference is justified.” (emphasis supplied)

8. It is the further case of the petitioner that the Bank's own Staff Accountability Guidelines under Circular No.72 of 2012, bar disciplinary action for a mere procedural lapse absent fraud or mala fides, and no such finding was recorded, the customer having received his articles in full with no loss to the Bank. The petitioner further contends that the Appellate Authority's order dated 29.12.2020 extracted a finding regarding “wrongly credited proceeds of other regular bills to fake bills” (at page number 2 of the order), a charge that was never levelled against the petitioner, showing non-application of mind under Regulation 17(4) of the Regulations to consider whether the penalty was proportionate. The petitioner further contends that the punishment of dismissal, imposed a day before retirement after 35 years of service and after the jewels had been traced and returned to the customer's satisfaction, is disproportionate and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and that a finding

of guilt cannot rest on an admission alone, relying on Article 20(3) of the Constitution, Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

9. Per Contra, the learned counsel for respondents would submit that the petitioner's service was not without blemish, he having earlier been punished with reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for one year with cumulative effect, by order dated 07.05.2018, for some irregularities while he was posted at the Vilangudi Branch and that the petitioner as the Senior Manager was holding the first set of keys and had access to the double lock even in the absence of the second key holder, as shown by his unaccompanied access on 14.10.2019 and his visit to his personal locker at another Branch on 09.10.2019 under the pretext of visiting the Taluk Office. He further contends that the jewel appraiser, Sri Raja, confirmed that the substituted articles of 38.50 grams had earlier been given to him by the petitioner for weighing, and a cover containing thread, needle, candle, matchbox, wax seal, and a bunch of keys was found in the petitioner's table drawer. He further contends that the admission letters dated 29.10.2019 were voluntary and that no objection as to coercion was raised at any stage, the plea of coercion being an afterthought. The learned counsel would further submit that the standard of proof in a disciplinary proceeding is one of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt, relying on Suresh Pathrella v. Oriental Bank of Commerce, (2006) 10 SCC 572.

10. The learned counsel for the respondents would further contend that the reference to “fake bills” in the Appellate Authority's order is a typographical error and the same does not vitiate the order, since the Appellate Authority has otherwise specifically dealt with the charges and grounds of appeal and that this Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, does not re-appreciate evidence recorded in a domestic enquiry, relying on B.C.Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 and that, given the gravity of the charges touching upon the petitioner's honesty and integrity, and his prior disciplinary record, the punishment of dismissal is proportionate and cannot be one which would shock the conscience of the Court.

11. I have perused the affidavit, counter-affidavits and typed set of papers and given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side.

12. At the outset, it must be borne in mind that a departmental enquiry is not a criminal trial. The standard of proof required to establish a charge in disciplinary proceedings is not proof beyond reasonable doubt, but one of preponderance of probabilities. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suresh Pathrella v. Oriental Bank of Commerce (supra), observed thus: “11. ... It is a well settled principle of law that the yardstick and standard of proof in a criminal case is dif erent from the disciplinary proceeding. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is a proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities.” Equally, the strict rules of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, do not govern a domestic enquiry. In State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible.…”

The question, therefore, is whether the material before the Inquiring Authority, taken as a whole, makes it more probable than not that the petitioner committed the misconduct alleged.

13. I am unable to accept the contention that the finding of misconduct rests solely on the two admission letters dated 29.10.2019. The petitioner's visit to his locker at the Gnanavolipuram Branch on 09.10.2019, backed by the CCTV footage, under the stated pretext of visiting the Taluk Office, and his production of the traced packet from the double lock room on 14.10.2019, to which he alone had access on that occasion, are circumstances independent of the admission letters. The jewel appraiser's confirmation that the substituted jewels had earlier been handed to him by the petitioner for weighing is a further circumstance of the same kind. Article 20(3) of the Constitution protects a person from being compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution, and Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, excludes a confession made to a police officer from being proved against the accused in such a prosecution. Neither provision governs the appreciation of evidence in a departmental enquiry, and regardless, the finding here does not rest solely on the admission letters.

14. The plea that the admission letters were extracted under coercion was also not raised at any stage of the enquiry, where the letters were marked with the petitioner's own consent. I am not persuaded, on the material on record, that the admission was involuntary. The petitioner's further contention that the second key holder was never identified or investigated does not support him either. This was not put forward as a specific defence before the Inquiring Authority, and, in any event, it is the petitioner's own unaccompanied access to the double lock on 14.10.2019 that stands established on the record. I accordingly find no reason to interfere with the finding that the petitioner was responsible for the substitution of the unclaimed articles with jewels of lesser weight.

15. That, however, does not conclude the matter. The charge memo is dated 09.01.2020, and the enquiry commenced and concluded in a single sitting on 20.01.2020, in which 23 documents were marked and 4 witnesses were examined. The Regulations command a different trajectory. Regulation 6(8) requires the Inquiring Authority to ask the officer employee whether he pleads guilty. Where he does not, Regulation 6 (9) requires the Inquiring Authority to adjourn the case to a later date not exceeding 30 days. Regulation 6 (10) further requires the Inquiring Authority, while adjouring, to record an order enabling the officer employee to prepare his defence, to complete inspection of the documents listed against him, to submit a list of the documents and witnesses he wants for the inquiry, and to seek discovery or production of those documents.

16. It is not the respondents' case that the petitioner pleaded guilty before the Inquiring Authority as such. On the contrary, evidence was recorded and the charges were contested. Yet the case was not adjourned at all. The petitioner was thus denied the time and opportunity that is contemplated under the Regulations in order to inspect the documents relied on against him, to gather his own evidence and to prepare his defence. The mere fact that the petitioner and his Defence Representative went along with this course does not absolve/expiate the defect as also laid down in the case of S.V.Mothilal (supra), the employer cannot take undue advantage of the acquiescence on the part of the employee.

17. In order to set the timelines in proper perspective, the dates and events are tabulated below: Sl.No Date Event Days from charge memo

1. 09.01.2020 Charge memo issued (Ref.No.MDUC HRM CS-02/2020) -

2. 20.01.2020 Enquiry commenced and concluded in a single sitting; 23 documents marked and 4 witnesses examined 11th day

3. 21.01.2020 Brief of the Presenting Officer 12th day

4. 23.01.2020 Reply of the Defence Representative 14th day

5. 24.01.2020 Findings of the Inquiring Authority holding both charges proved 15th day

6. 28.01.2020 Representation of the petitioner on the findings 19th day

7. 29.01.2020 Order of dismissal passed by the 4th respondent 20th day

8. 30.01.2020 Order of dismissal served on the petitioner 21st day

9. 31.01.2020 Date of the petitioner's superannuation 22nd day

The above table provides a very clear picture. The entire process, from the charge memo to the order of dismissal, was completed in twenty days. The inquiry proper was disposed of in a single sitting. The order of dismissal was passed the day after the petitioner's representation was received, and it was served on him a day before he was to retire. It is therefore irrefutably clear that the proceedings were concluded in absolute haste.

18. The Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, in The General Manager, Canara Bank and Others v. S.V.Mothilal (supra), was confronted with the same respondent Bank's conduct of concluding a disciplinary proceeding within two weeks, and this Court held, adopting the expression used by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa, (2024) 1 SCC 632, that such proceedings amounted to “whirlwind proceedings”, and that undue haste in bringing an enquiry to a close cannot justify curtailment of the delinquent's right to a fair hearing. This applies with equal force in the present case. Nonetheless, the present case differs from S.V.Mothilal (supra) in one material aspect. In S.V.Mothilal (supra), the finding of guilt was in itself the product of the hurried inquiry that was conducted. In the present case, the finding also rests on the letters given on 29.10.2019, more than two months before the charge memo was issued, and in any event, the finding is independently supported by the circumstantial evidence which were weighed in the inquiry which have been mentioned in paragraph 13. The haste with which the proceedings were conducted does not, therefore, vitiate the finding of guilt. It does however have a direct bearing on the punishment, as the process concluded within twenty days, and on the eve of retirement, there was no real room for the Disciplinary Authority to consider if the dismissal was the appropriate penalty.

19. As regards the order of the Appellate Authority dated 29.12.2020, apart from the reference to proceeds of regular bills having been credited to fake bills (at page number 2 of the order), a matter wholly extraneous to the charges, the order otherwise deals with the charges and the grounds of appeal raised by the petitioner. I accept the respondents’ explanation that the particular reference to fake bills is in fact a typographical error, and it does not, by itself, vitiate the order.

20. That, however, does not dispose of the question whether the punishment of dismissal is proportionate to the misconduct proved, to which I now turn. Regulation 4 of the Canara Bank Officer Employees'

(Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 sets out the penalties that may be imposed on an officer employee for acts of misconduct. It does not prescribe a particular penalty for a particular misconduct, but provides a graded range of penalties from which the Disciplinary Authority must choose. Regulation 4 reads as follows:- “4. PENALTIES: The following are the penalties, which may be imposed on an officer employee, for acts of misconduct or for any other good and/or sufficient reasons. MINOR PENALTIES:

(a) Censure;

(b) Withholding of increments of pay with or without cumulative effect;

(c) Withholding of promotion;

(d) Recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Bank by negligence or breach of orders; (e) Reduction to a lower stage in time scale of pay for a period not exceeding 3 years, without cumulative effect and not adversely affecting the officer’s pension. MAJOR PENALTIES:

(f) Save as provided for in (e) above, reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a specified period, with further directions as to whether or not the officer will earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction and whether on expiry of such period the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay; (g) Reduction to a lower grade or post; (h) Compulsory retirement;

(i) Removal from service, which shall not be a disqualification for future employment;

(j) Dismissal, which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment.…” Dismissal is thus the last and the most severe of the penalties under the Regulations. Though dismissal is a permissible penalty, it does not, however, mean that it must follow upon every misconduct that is proved. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer to a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 INSC 639, where it was held as follows: “106. Dismissal from service is the severest form of penalty which can be inflicted on a delinquent employee in service jurisprudence. It brings the relationship of employer and employee to an end permanently, and ordinarily deprives the employee of the incidents of past service, including retiral benefits. It does not lead merely to the loss of the existing source of income for the employee but also for the dependent family members. Thus, it will have a devastating effect not only on the dismissed employee but also on all those who are dependant on the employee. Because of the severity of its impact not only on the employee but also to his dependents, the disciplinary authority must be very careful in seeking to impose the severest form of punishment of dismissal. ...

109. Even where the Regulations include dismissal as one of the permissible punishments for acts of misconduct, the authority is not relieved of its duty to consider all relevant factors to see whether the facts of the case truly warrant the most extreme form of penalty. The mere fact that a proved act falls within the broad category of ‘misconduct’ under the Regulations does not mean that dismissal must follow as a matter of course.”

21. Though this Court is conscious of the fact that the scope of interference by a Court in matters relating to punishment is limited, and that interference is warranted only when the punishment imposed shocks the conscience of the Court, I am of the view that, in the present case, the punishment of dismissal is shockingly disproportionate. The articles in question were in fact found and restored to the customer's full satisfaction, no loss was occasioned to the Bank, and the petitioner had, by then, rendered 35 years of service. Moreover, the order of dismissal recites that it “shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment”. A consequence of this severity, imposed one day before retirement, in the opinion of this Court is shockingly disproportionate.

22. It is true that the petitioner's service was not without blemish. By order dated 07.05.2018, he was punished with reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for one year with cumulative effect, for monetary irregularity at the Vilangudi Branch. This circumstance weighs against him and distinguishes his case from one of an otherwise clean record cut short on the eve of retirement. However, the same cannot be held against him to the extent that the punishment is skewed to the capital punishment of dismissal from service, that too, one day prior to his retirement.

23. Notwithstanding the finding of misconduct, which this Court is not inclined to disturb, I am of the view that the ends of justice would be served by setting aside the punishment of dismissal and remitting the question of the appropriate quantum of punishment to the 4th respondent Disciplinary Authority for fresh consideration. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.C.Chaturvedi v. Union of India (supra), while holding that a writ court does not re-appreciate evidence recorded in a domestic enquiry, has also recognised that where a punishment is found to be disproportionate, the appropriate course is ordinarily to remit the matter to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of the penalty, rather than for the Court itself to substitute a penalty of its own, though in certain circumstances this Court can substitute the punishment.

24. The petitioner has also crossed the date on which he would ordinarily have retired, and reinstatement in service is accordingly no longer a viable option. The 4th respondent, in reconsidering the quantum of punishment, shall bear this in mind and consider a punishment short of dismissal that is capable of being given effect to notwithstanding the petitioner's retirement.

25. In the result, the writ petition is partly allowed.

(a) The punishment of dismissal imposed on the petitioner by the 4th respondent by order dated 29.01.2020 (Ref.No.MDUC HRM 3626/2020), as confirmed by the 3rd respondent by order dated 29.12.2020, is set aside.

(b) The finding that the petitioner committed the misconduct alleged against him under Charge 1 of the charge memo dated 09.01.2020 is not disturbed.

(c) The matter is remitted to the 4th respondent to reconsider the quantum of punishment to be imposed on the petitioner, having regard to his 35 years of service and the age of the petitioner. The 4th respondent shall pass fresh orders within a period of eight (8) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

(d) There shall be no order as to costs. 03.11.2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes/No rgm

To

1. Canara Bank, Rep., by its Managing Director and C.E.O., Head office, 112, J.C.Road, Bangaluru - 560002.

2. The General Manager, Canara bank, Personnel Management Section, Human Resources Wing, Head office, 112, J.C.Road, Bengaluru - 560002.

3. The Deputy General Manager / Appellate Authority, Canara Bank, Industrial Relations Section, Human Resources Wing, Head Office, 112,J.C.Road, Bengaluru – 560002.

4. The Assistant General Manager / Disciplinary Authority Canara Bank, Human resources Management Section, East Veli Street, Madurai - 625001.

RAJNISH PATHIYIL, J. rgm Pre-Devlivery Judgment in WP(MD) No. 17696 of 2021 and WMP(MD) No. 14600 of 2021 03.11.2026