WP(MD)/8271/2023 of Sasikala. S Vs The Director of Collegiate Education on 3 November 2026

ORDER

The writ petition has been filed seeking a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records pertaining to the order passed by the 3rd respondent in Ref.No.SSK/180/2021-22 dated 25.08.2021, by which the petitioner was removed from service, to quash the same, and to direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential monetary and service benefits.

2. It is the case of the petitioner that she was appointed as a Clerk in the 3rd respondent College on consolidated pay with effect from 01.06.2012. At the time of that appointment, she produced her 10th standard mark statement and typewriting certificate. Thereafter, by order dated 07.06.2013, she was appointed as Gardener against a permanent sanctioned vacancy with effect from 10.06.2013. The 3rd respondent College sent a proposal seeking approval of her appointment, along with those of six other non-teaching staff, but no orders were passed on it. The 3rd respondent College was therefore constrained to file W.P. (MD)No.1234 of 2014 before this Court.

3. By order dated 24.02.2015, this Court directed the 2nd respondent to consider the proposal within four weeks in light of the decision in C. Manikandan v. State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by its Secretary, Department of Higher Education and others, (2012) 4 MLJ 918 and the same is extracted hereunder: “22. From the categorical findings rendered by the Hon’ble Division Bench as well as the learned Single Judges of this Court as cited supra, it is clear that there is no necessity for the 5th respondent-college to seek prior permission before filling up the post in a sanctioned vacancy. The impugned order in this writ petition came to be passed only on two grounds, namely, that the 5th respondent-institution did not obtain minority status from the Government and that no prior permission was obtained before filling up the post. As I have found both reasons assigned by the respondents 1 to 3 in refusing to accord approval are unsustainable the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the respondents 1 to 3 are directed to approve the appointment of the petitioner as a Waterman in the 5th respondent-college from the date of his appointment and pay salary and other attendant benefits available to him within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.” The writ appeal preferred against the above order by the 1st and 2nd respondents in W.A.(MD)No.931 of 2018 was dismissed on 12.07.2018, and the Special Leave Petition preferred against the order was also dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 18.01.2019. In the contempt petition filed by the 3rd respondent College in Cont.P.(MD)No.128 of 2018, the respondents 1 and 2 produced the order dated 28.08.2019 approving all seven appointments, including that of the petitioner. By order dated 29.08.2019, this Court closed the contempt petition with a direction to release the monetary benefits within four weeks.

4. It is the case of the petitioner that her salary was not released despite the said direction and that she therefore made a representation enclosing her 10th standard mark statement, Aadhaar card, PAN card, driving licence and school identity card. All of these documents record her date of birth as 15.03.1983, whereas her birth certificate records it as 19.06.1984.

5. According to the petitioner, 19.06.1984 is her correct date of birth, as entered in the birth register. She states that, as advised by the management, she sought correction of her school records by requests dated 22.04.2013, 30.04.2013 and 19.06.2013. The Directorate of Examinations replied on 24.04.2013, and the Directorate of School Education also issued a communication on 16.05.2013. "

இக் கோ ரிக்கை விதிகளின்படி பரிசீலிக்கப்பட்டது. பள்ளி

சேர்க்கை யின்போ து மாணவனின்

பெ ற்றோ ரால் சரியான விவரங்கள்

கொ டுக்கப்பட்டு பள்ளியின் பதிவின்

போ து பள்ளி நிர்வாகத்தினரால் தவறு

செய்யப்பட்டிருந்தால் மட்டுமே திருத்தம் மே ற்கொ ள்ளப்படுமே யன்றி

பள்ளிப்படிப்பை முடித்து மதிப்பெ ண்

சான்றுகளை யும்பெ ற்றுக்கொ ண்டபின்

பள்ளிச்சான்றுகளில்பிறந்ததே தி /தந்தை

பெ யர்/

முகப்பெ ழுத்துமற்றும்சாதிதிருத்தம்

மே ற்கொ ள்வது என்பது தமிழ்நாடு

இடை நிலை க்கல்விச்சான்று விதி எண்-5--

ன்படிஏற்கத்தக்கதல்ல" She also states that the discrepancy was intimated to the 3rd respondent in 2013 itself. As the correction was a protracted process, she pressed for release of her salary.

6. In the meanwhile, a new Secretary assumed charge of the College and, according to the petitioner, began to cause her difficulty. She therefore filed a writ petition in W.P.(MD)No.4822 of 2020 seeking release of salary from 10.06.2013 in terms of the approval order dated 28.08.2019.

7. It is the further case of the petitioner that, after she sent a representation to the 2nd respondent on 09.03.2021, the 3rd respondent issued a memo dated 16.03.2021 alleging that she had secured appointment by producing a bogus certificate of date of birth. She sent a reply on 19.03.2021, pointing out that her writ petition was pending. A

show cause notice dated 09.04.2021 followed the earlier show cause notice, to which the petitioner sent a reply dated 19.04.2021 on the same lines as her earlier reply. On 03.05.2021, she was placed under suspension, which she challenged by filing a writ petition in W.P. (MD)No.13921 of 2021.

8. By notice dated 26.07.2021, the petitioner was called upon to appear for enquiry on 02.08.2021. It is the petitioner’s case that she could not attend the enquiry owing to ill health and informed the 3rd respondent by a letter of the same date. By a further notice dated 04.08.2021, she was called upon to appear on 16.08.2021. She was again unable to attend, owing to fever and severe cough, and informed the 3rd respondent accordingly. Without considering the same, the 3rd respondent passed the impugned order on 25.08.2021. Thereafter, W.P.(MD)No.13921 of 2021 was dismissed as infructuous in view of the order of termination, and W.P.(MD)No.4822 of 2020 was disposed of with a direction to consider the proposal.

9. The petitioner contended that the impugned order was passed ex parte, in violation of the principles of natural justice, and without following the procedure contemplated under the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 and the Rules framed thereunder. She further contended that she had herself produced both the birth certificate and the 10th standard mark statement to the management, and that no question of suppression or of a bogus certificate therefore arises.

10. The petitioner further contended that neither the Act nor the Rules prescribe any age limit for appointment, and that the 3rd respondent, being a minority institution, has made several other appointments without any age restriction. It was also contended that she was not paid subsistence allowance during the period of suspension. According to the petitioner, the impugned order, passed eight years after her appointment and after approval was granted pursuant to the orders of this Court, is actuated by malice on the part of the new Secretary.

11. The 2nd respondent has filed a counter-affidavit on his own behalf and on behalf of the 1st respondent. The 2nd respondent has taken a stand that the 3rd respondent is a linguistic minority college established in 1967 and governed by the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976. It is stated that the petitioner's initial engagement as a Clerk was a temporary posting on consolidated pay against a post that was not yet sanctioned. Her salary for that post was paid from the College's own funds, and no approval of the 2nd respondent was required.

12. It is further stated that, at the time of her appointment as a Gardener, the petitioner produced her 10th standard mark sheet to show that she could read and write Tamil, which is the basic qualification for the post. She also produced a birth certificate issued by the Municipality. The proposal for her appointment was received and approved by the 2nd respondent.

13. According to the 2nd respondent, the petitioner studied at Sri Rao Bahadur A.K.D. Dharmaraja Girls' Higher Secondary School, Rajapalayam, till 1999, and the school records, together with her PAN card and Aadhaar card, show her date of birth as 15.03.1983. The 2nd respondent contended that she obtained the birth certificate showing her date of birth as 19.06.1984 with the ulterior motive of showing her age to be below 30 years, which, according to the 2nd respondent, was mandatorily required to secure the appointment. It was further contended that she declared her date of birth inconsistently at different stages.

14. The 2nd respondent further contended that, after the approval, the 3rd respondent issued a notice in SSK/670/2019-20 dated 01.02.2020, calling upon the petitioner to produce copies of her PAN card and Aadhaar card to confirm her date of birth, which she delayed. A memo in SS/525/2020-2021 dated 16.03.2021 was then issued seeking her explanation. The petitioner replied that no explanation was necessary in

view of the pendency of W.P.(MD)No.4822 of 2020 seeking disbursal of salary from the date of appointment.

15. Thereafter, a show cause notice was issued on 09.04.2021 and an enquiry committee was constituted. The petitioner did not appear before the committee on 19.04.2021, again citing the pending writ petition. On the basis of the committee's report dated 19.04.2021, the College Committee found on 29.04.2021 that the petitioner had committed fraud by producing a bogus birth certificate and thus placed her under suspension on 03.05.2021.

16. According to the 2nd respondent, a notice of re-enquiry dated 26.07.2021 was issued along with a detailed charge memo. The 2nd respondent contends that the petitioner did not appear on 02.08.2021 or on 16.08.2021, and that the reasons she offered were unreasonable. She was accordingly set ex parte. The 2nd respondent had also conducted an enquiry of his own, upon notice to both parties in Na.Ka.No.83/Aa2/2021-2 dated 25.03.2021, which revealed that the petitioner had suppressed her date of birth to secure employment. On the basis of that report and the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the 3rd respondent passed the impugned order.

17. The 2nd respondent further contended that the petitioner has an effective alternative remedy of appeal under the Act against the impugned order, and that the writ petition is therefore not maintainable. He has further contended that a person who has secured employment by fraud and suppression of material facts cannot claim salary or other monetary benefits.

18. The learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the grounds raised in the writ petition. It was submitted that the birth certificate is a public document issued by the Municipality, that it has never been shown to be false, and that a discrepancy between the birth certificate and the school records does not by itself amount to fraud. In support of these submissions, the learned counsel relied on the decisions in Vikas Pratap Singh and others v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, (2013) 14 SCC 494, K. Muthuselvan v. The Additional Chief Secretary / Commissioner of Revenue Administration and others, W.P. (MD)No.8581 of 2026, dated 30.04.2026, and The Additional Chief Secretary, Commissioner of Revenue Administration and others v. Muthuselvan, W.A.(MD)No.850 of 2026, dated 18.06.2026.

19. The learned counsel for the respondents reiterated the averments in the counter affidavit. It was submitted that the petitioner secured her appointment by producing a birth certificate that is inconsistent with her school records, and that a person who obtains employment by suppression of material facts cannot claim continuance in service. In support of this submission, the learned counsel relied on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in A. Sivakumar v. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. and others, W.P.No.2478 of 2021, dated 17.12.2021.

20. I have given my anxious consideration to the contentions of the learned counsel on either side and perused the materials placed on record.

21. At the outset, the objection as to maintainability of the writ petition should be dealt with. The 2nd respondent contends that the petitioner ought to have availed the remedy of appeal provided by the Act. The counter-affidavit, however, does not identify the provision under which such an appeal lies. The writ petition has been pending since 2023, the pleadings are complete, and the matter has been heard on merits. The petitioner has also averred that the impugned order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice.

22. It is well settled that the availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of self-imposed restraint and not a bar to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an alternative remedy does not operate as a bar where the writ petition seeks enforcement of a fundamental right, where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice, or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is under challenge.

23. In the present case, the writ petition has been pending for over three years, and one of the grounds raised is a violation of the principles of natural justice. Having regard to the stage the matter has reached and the nature of the challenge, I do not consider it appropriate to relegate the petitioner to the appellate remedy at this point and thus, the objection that the writ petition is not maintainable is rejected.

24. Turning to the merits of the matter, the crux of the management’s case is that the petitioner has two dates of birth on record. Her school records, PAN card and Aadhaar card show 15.03.1983, while the birth certificate issued by the Municipality shows 19.06.1984. On that footing, the management has characterised the birth certificate as bogus and has concluded that the petitioner suppressed her real age to secure the appointment as Gardener. The question is whether this discrepancy, on its own, makes out fraud or suppression that would justify the petitioner's removal from service.

25. A charge of suppression lies on the presumption that a material fact was concealed from the employer. However, the counter-affidavit itself records in paragraph 5 that, at the time of her appointment as Clerk in 2012, the petitioner produced her 10th standard mark sheet, which shows her date of birth as 15.03.1983. In paragraph 4, it further records that, at the time of her appointment as Gardener, she produced her 10th standard mark sheet as well as the birth certificate issued by the Municipality. Both dates of birth were therefore before the management when it appointed the petitioner as Gardener and when it forwarded the proposal for approval.

26. It is also evident that the petitioner had applied for correction of her date of birth on 22.04.2013, 30.04.2013 and 19.06.2013 on the advice of the management itself, and the Directorate of Examinations and the Directorate of School Education responded to her requests on 24.04.2013 and 16.05.2013. Moreover, it is stated that this mismatch was intimated to the 3rd respondent in 2013 itself. These averments have not been specifically denied by the Respondents herein. The petitioner who has placed both documents before her employer, and who had openly sought for correction of one of them, cannot be said to have suppressed either.

27. Nor is there any material on record to show that the birth certificate is not genuine. The counter affidavit describes it as bogus, but does not state that the Municipality has disowned the certificate or that the corresponding entry in the register of births is false. No verification of the certificate with the issuing authority is referred to. On the contrary, the respondents contend that, if 19.06.1984 is the real date of birth, the petitioner ought to have taken steps to correct her records before obtaining employment. The grievance, therefore, is really limited to the extent that the petitioner did not have her school records corrected in time. In my opinion, the same can be treated only as a lapse and nothing more.

28. In this regard it is also pertinent to add that the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines “bogus” as “pretending to be real or true”, and gives “false” as its synonym. A document is bogus when the document itself is fake, that is, when it was never even issued by the authority whose name it bears, or when its contents have been fabricated. A genuine document issued by a competent authority cannot be termed bogus merely because its contents differ from another record. The case of the respondents does not fall within this meaning. The birth certificate was issued by the Municipality, and according to the petitioner, it reflects the entry in the register of births. What the respondents have pointed to is only a conflict between that certificate and the school records, and not any defect in the certificate itself.

29. The respondents have also levelled an allegation that the petitioner has committed forgery. This Court had occasion to consider a similar allegation in A. Deivendiran (Died) and others v. The Chairman, Gandhigram Institute of Rural Health and Family Welfare Trust and another, W.P.(MD)No.22530 of 2023, dated 09.10.2026. In that case, the employee was charged with having produced a bogus experience certificate, and it was held as follows: “6. ... Black’s Law Dictionary defines “forgery” as “the act of fraudulently making a false document or altering a real one to be used as if genuine”. Tested on the said definition, the respondents have misconstrued the facts by treating the experience certificate itself as a forged document. There is no allegation that the certificate was fabricated, that the issuing authority did not issue it, or that any genuine document was altered and thereafter used as genuine. The allegation rests solely on the premise that the period of study overlapped with the period of employment. The alleged overlap may constitute a discrepancy, but cannot, by itself, amount to forgery of the certificate. …

22. In such circumstances, I find that the very basis of the charge does not survive, as the charge memo which has been extracted in paragraph No.2 above, indicates that the charge was only in respect of the petitioner having produced a bogus certificate. For a document to be characterized as bogus, the Inquiry Officer should have come to a definite finding after examining the officers of the University or the previous employer and come to a conclusion that the petitioner had produced a bogus certificate. When neither the Madurai Kamaraj University nor the previous employer has resiled from the position by claiming that the certificates are bogus, the contention/allegation in the charge memo appears to be without any basis.” The present case stands on the same footing. There is no allegation that the Municipality did not issue the birth certificate, or that a genuine document was altered. The discrepancy between the two dates of birth may call for correction of the records, but it does not, by itself, amount to forgery.

30. Moreover, the evidentiary value of a date of birth extracted from the records of a local body was considered by this Court in K. Muthuselvan v. The Additional Chief Secretary / Commissioner of

Revenue Administration and others, in W.P.(MD)No.8581 of 2026, dated 30.04.2026. That case concerned a request by a Government servant, under Rule 49 of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules, to alter the date of birth in his service register on the strength of a birth certificate. The learned Single Judge observed as follows: "11. As seen from Clause (a) of Rule 49 of the General Rules, SSLC or Matriculation Register or School Records are taken as the basic documents for finding out the date of birth of a candidate. As seen from Clause (c), alteration of date of birth can be sought either basing upon the Secondary School Leaving Certificate, School, College or University records or birth extract from the records of the local bodies."

31. The above order was affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in The Additional Chief Secretary, Commissioner of Revenue Administration and others v. Muthuselvan, W.A.(MD)No.850 of 2026, dated 18.06.2026, wherein it was held as follows: "11. Admittedly, within five years from the date of his entry into service, by representations dated 24-12-1996 and 30-04-1997, the Writ Petitioner / respondent has sought alteration of his date of birth. The delay has occasioned only on the side of the appellants, who have negatived the request of the respondent only in February 2026. Rule 49 of the General Rules permits a request for alteration of date of birth, and it also stipulates a time period of five years from the date of entry into service. We also find that the appellants do not dispute the fact that the petitioner's birth certificate reflecting his date of birth as 05-07-1967 as being fabricated or false. In fact, the Commissioner of Revenue (Administration) has confirmed the date of birth of the Writ Petitioner as 05- 07-1967.

12. In such a view of the matter, we do not see any error committed by the Writ Court in allowing the Writ Petition. In fact, one of us (Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. Sathish Kumar), in W.P. No. 17374 of 2022, in the matter of T. Daisy Rose Light vs. The Additional Secretary and another, by order dated 29-08-2023, in similar facts and circumstances, has held that when a presumption can be attached to the birth extract and the certificate is not even disputed, there can be no impediment in acceding to the request for alteration of the date of birth. In fact, in the said order, the Government Circular in Letter No. 14914/S2/2018-1, dated 18-07-2018, has also been referred to, which speaks only about the requirement of having completed the age of 14 years at the time of appearing for the SSLC examination or 10th Standard, after the year 1978, and that mere suspicions cannot be a ground to negate the request for alteration of date of birth. The said decision will also be squarely applicable to the present case as well."

32. The petitioner, as an employee of an aided private college, is not governed by Rule 49 as such. The principle that emerges from these decisions is nonetheless merely instructive in nature. A date of birth extracted from the records of a local body is a recognised basis for a person's date of birth, independently of the school records. There is a presumption of genuineness that comes with it, and where genuineness is not disputed, a mere divergence from the school records is not a ground to disregard it, let alone treating the same as fraudulent. As observed in the Additional Chief Secretary v. Muthuselvan (supra), a mere suspicion cannot entirely replace proof.

33. I am also unable to countenance the motive that is attributed to the petitioner by the 2nd respondent that the petitioner relied on the birth certificate to show her age as below 30 years, which was mandatorily required for the appointment. On 10.06.2013, on the date of birth in her school records, the petitioner was 30 years and nearly three months old. On the date of birth in the birth certificate, she was almost 29 years old.

34. The respondents however have failed to identify the provision under which an age below 30 years was required for the post of Gardener in an aided private college. The petitioner has specifically averred that neither the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 nor the Rules framed thereunder prescribe any age limit, and that the 3rd respondent has made several other appointments without any age restriction. These averments have not been answered by the respondents. In the absence of any such age limit, the earlier date of birth would not have made the petitioner ineligible for the post. This in fact would imply that she therefore gained no advantage from the later date of birth, and the inference of an ulterior motive is not substantiated.

35. The learned counsel for the respondents also refers to an enquiry conducted by the 2nd respondent, pursuant to the notice dated 25.03.2021, which is said to have revealed that the petitioner suppressed her date of birth. The report of that enquiry has not been placed before this Court. The counter affidavit also does not indicate that it rests on any material apart from the discrepancy between the two dates of birth. It therefore does not advance the case of the respondents any further.

36. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on A. Sivakumar v. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. and others, W.P.No.2478 of 2021, dated 17.12.2021, wherein an Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court held as follows: "9. There is no doubt about it, that once verification form requires certain information to be furnished, the declarant is duty bound to furnish it correctly and suppression of material facts of submitting false information may by itself lead to termination of his service. The fraud and mis-representation vitiates a transaction and in case employment has been obtained on the basis of forged documents, as observed in ''M.Baskaran case'' [Union of India Vs. M.Baskaran (1995 SUPP 4 SCC 100)]. Therefore, if an appointment was procured fraudulently, the incumbent may be terminated from service. Therefore, the person who has suppressed the material information, cannot claim unfettered right for appointment or continuity in service. Hence, the Tribunal rightly upheld the termination. We find no reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal as there is no merit in the Writ Petition. Hence, the Writ Petition liable to be dismissed."

37. The above decision turns on its own facts where the employee had produced a school record sheet in support of his date of birth, and on verification the school authorities reported that they had no such records and had not issued the certificate. It was only later that a genuine transfer certificate showing a different date of birth was produced. Thus, the fabrication of the document was established on verification. In the present case, no such verification has been made, and the birth certificate has not been shown to be fabricated at any point in time. The school records were before the management from the outset, and no eligibility condition turned on the petitioner's age. The decision in A. Sivakumar v. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director (supra) is therefore distinguishable on facts.

38. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on Vikas Pratap Singh and others v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, (2013) 14 SCC 494, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:

"20. The pristine maxim of fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant (fraud and justice never dwell together) has never lost its temper over the centuries and it continues to dwell in spirit and body of service law jurisprudence. It is settled law that no legal right in respect of appointment to a said post vests in a candidate who has obtained the employment by fraud, mischief, misrepresentation or malafide. (See: District Collector and Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society, Vizianagaram and Anr. v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi (1990) 3 SCC 655, P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath and Ors. (1994) 1 SCC 1 and Union of India and Ors. v. M. Bhaskaran 1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 100). It is also settled law that a person appointed erroneously on a post must not reap the benefits of wrongful appointment jeopardizing the interests of the meritorious and worthy candidates. However, in cases where a wrongful or irregular appointment is made without any mistake on the part of the appointee and upon discovery of such error or irregularity the appointee is terminated, this Court has taken a sympathetic view in the light of various factors including bonafide of the candidate in such appointment and length of service of the candidate after such appointment (See: Vinodan T. and Ors. v. University of Calicut and Ors. (2002) 4 SCC 726; State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi and Ors. (2006) 1 SCC 667).

25. Admittedly, in the instant case the error committed by the Respondent-Board in the matter of evaluation of the answer scripts could not be attributed to the Appellants as they have neither been found to have committed any fraud or misrepresentation in being appointed qua the first merit list nor has the preparation of the erroneous model answer key or the specious result contributed to them. Had the contrary been the case, it would have justified their ouster upon re-evaluation and deprived them of any sympathy from this Court irrespective of their length of service."

39. The legal maxim fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant (fraud and justice never dwell together) applies where fraud is clearly established. Where it is not, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the bona fides of the appointee and the length of service rendered are relevant considerations, even where the appointment itself was found to be erroneous. In Vikas Pratap Singh (supra), the appointees were protected because no fraud or misrepresentation could be attributed to them. In the present case, fraud has not been established, and the appointment itself has not been shown to be irregular.

40. The petitioner has served the College since 2012, initially as a Clerk and, from 10.06.2013, as a Gardener. Her appointment was approved only after litigation that went up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Her removal, eight years after her appointment as a Gardener, solely relying on a discrepancy that was known to the management from the outset, cannot be sustained by this Court. It must also be borne in mind that the post of Gardener is a basic service post at the lowest rung of the

establishment of the College. Even according to the 2nd respondent, the only qualification required for the post is the ability to read and write Tamil. The petitioner’s date of birth had no bearing on that qualification, and no age limit has been shown to apply to the post. For an employee so placed, removal from service means the loss of her livelihood. In the present case, it is unfortunate that it comes after more than eight years of service, and where much of the service was rendered without disbursal of the salary attached to the post while the same was under litigation.

41. This Court also notes the sequence of events in the present case though they have not been weighed in arriving at a decision. The approval of the petitioner's appointment was secured through prolonged litigation that eventually culminated in the approval order dated 28.08.2019. The disciplinary action against her began only after a new Secretary assumed charge, and intriguingly, only after the petitioner approached this Court by a writ petition in W.P.(MD)No.4822 of 2020 seeking disbursal of her salary. In the view taken by this Court, it is not necessary to record a finding of mala fides, but this sequence cannot be overlooked.

42. The ex-parte findings rest entirely on the discrepancy between the two dates of birth, and that discrepancy, as found above, does not by itself establish fraud or suppression.

43. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the impugned order removing the petitioner from service is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside.

44. In the result, the writ petition is allowed, and the following directions are issued:

(i) The order passed by the 3rd respondent in Ref.No.SSK/180/2021-22 dated 25.08.2021 is set aside.

(ii) The 3rd respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner in service as Gardener within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

(iii) The petitioner shall be entitled to continuity of service and all consequential monetary and service benefits. The respondents shall disburse the monetary benefits within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

(iv) It is made clear that this order does not determine the petitioner's correct date of birth. It is open to the petitioner to pursue the correction of her school records in accordance with law. The date of birth to be entered in her service record shall be determined by the competent authority in accordance with law, after notice to the petitioner.

45. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 03-11-2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes/No psm

To

1. The Director of Collegiate Education College Road, Chennai.

2. The Joint Director of Collegiate Education Madurai Region, Madurai.

3. The Secretary Rajapalayam Rajus College, Rajapalayam, Virudhunagar District.

RAJNISH PATHIYIL, J. psm WP(MD) No. 8271 of 2023 AND WMP(MD) No. 7612 of 2023 03-11-2026