Central Administrative Tribunal
Sagar Kumar vs HOME AFFAIRS on 4 November 2026
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Sagar Kum
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Distt. Muz
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O.A. No.4115 o
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Order
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Hon’ble Mr. R.N. Sing Hon’ble Mr. Rajinder Kas mar, Nirdosh Kumar Itawa, Teh-Budhana, zaffarnagar, U.P. - 251309 Ct. (Dvr.) No. 2116/E, 8242581, Delhi Police, East Di ate: Ms. Esha Mazumdar) VERSUS ion of India rough Secretary (Home) nistry of Home Affairs, North lhi Police rough Commissioner of Police lhi Police Headquarters Singh Road, New Delhi-1100 puty Commissioner of Police, st District, Delhi Police, . Extension, Mandawali Fazalp puty Commissioner of Police cruitment. Delhi Police Lines ngsway Camp, New Delhi-1100 ff Selection Commission rough Its Chairmen ock 12, CGO complex, dhi Road, New Delhi-110003 ate: Ms. Leelawati Suman) tive Tribunal ench, hi of 2025 rs reserved on : 21.10.202 pronounced on : 04.11.202 gh, Member (J) shyap, Member (A) istrict, Delhi
...Applica S Block, New Delhi-110001 e pur, Delhi-110092.
….Responden ant nts
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O R D E R
Hon’ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A):
The applicant is aggrieved by the impugned termination order dated 23.09.2025 (Annexure A-1), issued by Respondent No. 3, whereby the respondents have terminated the applicant’s services.
2. By filing the present OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant is seeking the following reliefs:- “A. Call for records of the case; B. Quash and set aside the impugned termination order dated 23.09.2025 issued by Respondent No. 3 along with all consequential benefits including arrears with interest at GPF rates; C. Direct the Respondents to reinstate the Applicant in service forthwith with continuity of service, seniority, and full backwages from the date of termination till actual reinstatement; D. Award cost of the proceedings: and E. Pass any order/relief/direction(s) as this Hon’ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice in favour of the Applicant.”
3. Brief facts of the case are that the Staff Selection Commission ( in short ‘SSC’), Respondent No. 5, issued a recruitment notification dated 08.07.2022 inviting applications for recruitment to the post of Constable (Driver) (Male) in Delhi Police Examination, 2022 (Annexure A-2). 3.1 The applicant, being eligible, applied for the said post under the Scheduled Caste (SC) category. He appeared in the Computer-Based Examination held on 21.10.2022, , as is evident from his Admit Card (Annexure A-3), and was declared qualified in the result announced on 29.12.2022 for participation in the subsequent stages of the selection process, namely, the Physical Endurance and Measurement Test (PE&MT) and the Trade Test. Thereafter, the applicant appeared
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in the PE&MT held on 26.04.2023 and the Trade Test held on 06.11.2023 and was declared successful. He was also subjected to medical examination and declared medically fit {Annexure A-4 (Colly.)}. 3.2 Upon completion of the selection process, the final merit list was declared on 09.12.2023, in which the applicant was included among the successful candidates (Annexure A-5). 3.3 Thereafter, the applicant was required to submit an attestation form for verification of his character and antecedents. According to the applicant, he truthfully answered in the negative the question relating to pending criminal cases or prosecutions, as he was unaware of the registration of FIR No. 420/2023 dated 15.09.2023 at Police Station Budhana, Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh. He asserts that, prior to submitting the attestation form, he had neither received any notice or summons nor been informed of the registration of the said FIR. 3.4 Upon completion of the requisite formalities, the applicant received an offer of appointment, joined the service of Delhi Police and underwent basic training for approximately three months. Thereafter, he was posted in the East District, Delhi (Annexure A-6). 3.5 According to the applicant, it was only during the process of police verification conducted through Police Station Budhana, Muzaffarnagar, that he first came to know of the registration of FIR No. 420/2023 dated 15.09.2023 under Sections 308, 323, 325 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Annexure A-7). The applicant relies upon a written statement of the Investigating Officer, who allegedly
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confirmed that no notice or summons had been issued to him and that the applicant had neither been called nor visited by the Investigating Officer in connection with the said case. The said communication was stated to have been obtained by the concerned official of Delhi Police and incorporated into the verification report. 3.6 The applicant states that the aforesaid FIR arose out of a dispute between two groups belonging to different castes in his village. According to him, members of his caste had initially lodged FIR No. 409/2023 dated 07.09.2023 at Police Station Budhana under Sections 308, 323 and 506 of the IPC and Section 3(1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, against members of the other group (Annexure A-8). It is alleged that, in retaliation, the opposite group lodged FIR No. 420/2023 dated 15.09.2023, falsely implicating the applicant. The applicant maintains that he had no role in the alleged incident and that the criminal case was the outcome of the aforesaid village rivalry. 3.7 The applicant further states that the material collected during the investigation did not establish his involvement in the alleged offence. In this regard, he relies upon the charge-sheet filed before the Court of the learned ACJM, Muzaffarnagar, wherein, according to him, the Investigating Officer recorded that ‘the nomination found to be incorrect’ and placed his name in Column No.12 for want of sufficient evidence. The applicant also relies upon the statement of the complainant, Shri Ravi Kumar, recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, wherein the complainant allegedly stated
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that the applicant had no role in the incident. On this basis, the applicant averred that no specific act or involvement in the alleged offence was attributed to him [Annexure A-9 (Colly)]. 3.8 Upon receipt of the police verification report, Respondent No. 2 issued a communication to the Deputy Commissioners of Police, North-East and East Districts, Delhi, directing that the applicant be asked to appear before the competent authority. In compliance therewith, the applicant appeared before the DCP/Recruitment Cell, Police Headquarters, Delhi, and submitted his statement explaining the circumstances surrounding the registration of the FIR and reiterating that he had no prior knowledge of the same[Annexure A- 10 (Colly)]. 3.9 Subsequently, Respondent No. 3 issued a show-cause notice dated 22.08.2025, bearing Office No. 8356-58/SIP/East District, calling upon the applicant to explain the circumstances concerning the alleged non-disclosure of the criminal case in his attestation form. The applicant submitted a detailed reply on 28.08.2025 and also made a statement before the ACP, PG Cell, East District, Delhi, reiterating his defence that he had no knowledge of the FIR when he submitted the attestation form and had not deliberately suppressed any material information [Annexure A-11 (Colly)]. 3.10 Notwithstanding the explanation furnished by the applicant, Respondent No.3 passed the impugned order dated 23.09.2025, terminating the applicant's services on the ground of his alleged involvement in the criminal case and non-disclosure thereof in the
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attestation form. The applicant contents that the impugned order characterises the alleged non-disclosure as having been made with mala fide intention, without duly considering his explanation, his asserted lack of knowledge of the FIR at the relevant time, and the material relied upon by him concerning the investigation. The applicant further submits that the authority failed to give due consideration to the fact that, according to the charge-sheet relied upon by him, his name had been placed in Column No. 12 due to lack of evidence. 3.11 Hence, being aggrieved by the impugned termination order dated 23.09.2025, the applicant has filed this OA seeking the reliefs as quoted above.
4. Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal, the respondents have filed their reply opposing the claim of the applicant to which the applicant has filed his rejoinder.
5. During the course of hearing, Ms. Esha Mazumdar, learned counsel appearing for the applicant while assailing the legality and validity of the impugned termination order dated 23.09.2025, submitted that the action of the respondents is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. She contended that the impugned order had been passed with a predetermined mindset, without proper application of mind and without objectively considering the explanation and supporting material furnished by the applicant. According to the learned counsel,
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the impugned action is contrary to the principles of natural justice and fairness and is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 5.1 The learned counsel further submitted that there was no intentional suppression of any material information by the applicant in his attestation form. She contended that the applicant had no knowledge of FIR No. 420/2023, registered on 15.09.2023 at Police Station Budhana, Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh, when he submitted the attestation form, as he had neither received any notice or summons nor been informed of the registration of the said FIR. In support of this contention, the learned counsel drew attention to the written confirmation furnished by the Investigating Officer, who had stated that no notice or summons had been issued to the applicant and that he had neither called nor visited the applicant in connection with the said FIR. Learned counsel also submitted that the said communication formed part of the police verification report itself and was, therefore, available to the respondents for consideration. Despite this material, the respondents erroneously concluded that the applicant had deliberately concealed his alleged involvement in the criminal case while filing the attestation form. 5.2 The learned counsel further submitted that the respondents had also failed to appreciate the significance of the charge-sheet filed in the criminal case. According to the learned counsel, the Investigating Officer had recorded that the nomination of the applicant was found to be incorrect and had placed his name in Column No. 12 of the charge- sheet due to lack of evidence. The learned counsel further relied upon
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the statement of the complainant, Shri Ravi Kumar, recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, wherein the complainant had allegedly stated that the applicant had no role in the incident. She argued that these circumstances supported the applicant's defence that he had neither participated in the alleged incident nor knowingly withheld any information from the recruiting authority. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that the respondents had wrongly equated the applicant's implication in the FIR with deliberate suppression of material information. 5.3 By placing reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Avtar Singh v. Union of India, reported in (2016) 8 SCC 471, the learned counsel submitted that an employer cannot mechanically terminate an employee merely on the allegation of suppression but is required to consider the materiality of the information, the nature of the alleged offence, the circumstances of the case and the suitability of the candidate for the post in question. In this regard, the learned counsel relied upon paragraphs 35 and 36 of the said judgment, which read as under: “35. Suppression of "material" information presupposes that what is suppressed that "matters" not every technical or trivial matter. The employer has to act on due consideration of rules/instructions, if any, in exercise of powers in order to cancel candidature or for terminating the services of employee. Though a person who has suppressed the material information cannot claim unfettered right for appointment or continuity in service but he has a right not to be dealt with arbitrarily and exercise of power has to be in reasonable manner with objectivity having due regard to facts of cases.
36. What yardstick is to be applied has to depend upon the nature of post, higher post would involve more rigorous criteria for all services, not only to uniformed service. For lower posts which are not sensitive, nature of duties, impact of suppression on suitability has to be considered by authorities concerned considering post/nature of duties/services and power has to be exercised on due consideration of various aspects. ”
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5.4 The learned counsel argued that the respondents had failed to apply the principles laid down in Avtar Singh (supra) to the facts of the applicant's case. She also submitted that the authority concerned ought to have examined whether the applicant had knowingly suppressed any material information, particularly, when he maintained that he was unaware of the FIR and the material collected during the investigation did not establish his involvement. Thus, she contended that the respondents had failed to undertake an objective assessment of the circumstances surrounding the alleged offence and the applicant's suitability for appointment before resorting to the extreme measure of termination of service. 5.5 The learned counsel further submitted that the impugned order proceeded on an erroneous assumption that the applicant had deliberately concealed his involvement in the criminal case. She contended that the finding regarding deliberate concealment was recorded without sufficient evidence and without properly appreciating the applicant's detailed reply dated 28.08.2025 to the show-cause notice dated 22.08.2025. According to the learned counsel, the respondents ignored material circumstances favourable to the applicant and mechanically concluded that he had acted with mala fide intention. Such an approach, she argued, renders the impugned order arbitrary and unsustainable in law. 5.6 Learned counsel also contended that the FIR in question arose out of a dispute between two groups belonging to different castes in the applicant's village. The learned counsel submitted that FIR No.
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409/2023 had initially been registered on 07.09.2023 at the instance of persons belonging to the applicant's caste against members of the other group, whereas the impugned FIR No. 420/2023 was registered on 15.09.2023, only eight days thereafter, against the applicant. According to the applicant, the latter FIR was retaliatory in nature and was lodged to harass and falsely implicate him. Learned counsel contended that the applicant was not even present at the place of the alleged incident and had no role whatsoever in the occurrence. The learned counsel submitted that the respondents ought to have considered these circumstances instead of treating the mere registration of the FIR as sufficient justification for terminating the applicant's services. 5.7 The learned counsel also emphasised that the applicant had no criminal antecedents and that the allegations in the FIR had not been established against him. She submitted that the presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle of criminal law and that the applicant's service could not have been terminated mechanically merely because his name appeared in an FIR, particularly when the applicant asserted that he had no knowledge of the same at the time of filling up the attestation form. The learned counsel maintained that the applicant had neither knowingly furnished false information nor suppressed any material fact relating to his eligibility or suitability for appointment. 5.8 In support of the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi
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in Prashant Deep v. High Court of Delhi, W.P. (C) No. 1960/2019 decided on 15.04.2019, and drew attention to paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 thereof which read as under: “15. When we examine the impugned order of termination, as also the minutes of the meeting of the Selection Committee held on 31/01/2019, we find that none of the above factors have been considered and the termination order has been directed to be passed by simply holding that since there was suppression of material information by the petitioner, his services ought to be terminated. In our view, it was incumbent upon the respondent to consider the petitioner’s case on the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Avtar Singh (supra), which has not been done.
16. As noted hereinabove, the petitioner had not only brought the relevant facts to the knowledge of the respondent even before his joining service, but he also stood acquitted of the offences levelled against him way back in May, 2014 itself, i.e., much prior to his making an application in pursuance of the advertisement issued by the respondent. Before terminating his services, the respondents ought to have considered the aforesaid facts as also the young age of the petitioner at the time of the registration of the FIR against his entire family, which arose out of a trivial incident between neighbors that resulted in the registration of a cross FIR at the behest of the petitioner's father. The respondent ought to have also given due consideration to the fact that the offences levelled against the petitioner were not of such nature as to sprout serious concerns about his moral turpitude, gauging which is the sole purpose of inquiring into one’s criminal antecedents in matters of public employment. Needless to say, not every brush with the law, whether serious or trivial, has a bearing on one’s moral turpitude and the recruiting authority must always keep this in mind while ascertaining the suitability of a candidate for public employment.
17. In our view, the termination order having been passed without considering any of the aforementioned factors, is unsustainable and is, therefore, set aside. The respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits, except backwages, and reconsider his case in the light of the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Avtar Singh (supra). ”
5.9 Relying upon the aforesaid decision, the learned counsel submitted that the recruiting authority is required to consider the relevant facts and circumstances of each case and cannot adopt a mechanical approach by treating every instance of alleged non- disclosure as sufficient ground for termination. She argued that, in the present case, the respondents failed to undertake the requisite
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assessment in terms of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Avtar Singh (supra) and, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be interfered with by this Tribunal. 5.10 The learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Mahendra Solanki v. The Commissioner of Police & Anr., W.P. (C) No. 2219/2023 decided on 10.03.2023, and drew our attention to the following observations:- “13. It may also be observed that the Hon’'ble Supreme Court in Satish Chandra Yadav (supra) also took note of the judgment passed by the three Judge Bench in Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2019) 17 SCC 696 and the observations in para 67 of the judgment are apt to be reproduced:
“67. Thus, this Court took the view that although employment opportunity is a scarce commodity in the present times being circumscribed within a limited vacancies yet by itself may not suffice to invoke sympathy for grant of relief where the credentials of a candidate may raise any question regarding his suitability, irrespective of eligibility. However, at the same time, this Court observed that there should not be any mechanical or rhetorical incantation of moral turpitude to deny appointment in a government service simplicitor which would depend on the facts of each case. The judicial philosophy flowing through the mind of the judges is that every individual deserves an opportunity to improve, learn from the past and move ahead in life for self-improvement. To make past conduct, irrespective of all considerations, may not always constitute justice. It would all depend on the fact situation of the given case. ”
5.11 On the strength of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court, the learned counsel contended that the respondents were required to assess the applicant's suitability on the basis of the facts and circumstances peculiar to his case rather than mechanically invoking the concept of moral turpitude or treating the mere existence of an FIR as conclusive proof of unsuitability. She submitted that the nature of the allegations, the circumstances in which the FIR was registered, the applicant's asserted lack of knowledge, the material
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available in the investigation and the explanation submitted by the applicant ought to have been considered before taking an adverse decision. 5.12 The learned counsel reiterated that the police verification report itself contained the Investigating Officer's written confirmation that the applicant had not been contacted in connection with the FIR. She argued that the applicant had consistently maintained, through his written reply and statements before the concerned authorities, that he was unaware of the registration of the criminal case when he filled in the attestation form. Despite the availability of these materials, the respondents allegedly failed to consider them meaningfully and proceeded to terminate his services. According to the learned counsel, this omission demonstrates non-application of mind and renders the impugned order unsustainable. 5.13 Learned counsel also placed reliance on the decision of the coordinate Bench of this Tribunal in Papendra Singh vs. Commissioner of Police and another in OA No.1815/2022 decided on 23.05.2023. 5.14 Lastly, the learned counsel submitted that the applicant had undergone the prescribed selection process, qualified at every stage, and had been declared successful in the final merit list, received an offer of appointment, joined service and completed basic training. She contended that his service record remained unblemished and that his employment ought not to be brought to an end on the basis of allegations which, according to the applicant, were unsupported by the
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material collected during the investigation. The learned counsel, therefore, urged that the impugned termination order dated 23.09.2025 be quashed and set aside and that the instant OA be allowed.
6. Per contra, Ms. Leelawati Suman, learned counsel appearing for the respondents by referring to the counter reply submitted that the present OA is misconceived, devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. She contended that the respondents had taken the impugned action after examining the applicant's case in accordance with the applicable rules, instructions and the prescribed procedure governing recruitment to the post of Constable (Driver) (Male) in Delhi Police. 6.1 Learned counsel submitted that the recruitment was governed by Rule 17-A (XX) of the Delhi Police (Appointment and Recruitment) Rules, 1980, as amended from time to time, and the instructions contained in the relevant Standing Orders, including Standing Order No. HRD/12/2022 (Annexure R/1 Colly.), which deals with cases involving disclosure or concealment of criminal antecedents in the attestation form. The SSC had issued the recruitment notice dated 08.07.2022 for filling up 1,411 vacancies of Constable (Driver) (Male) in Delhi Police. The applicant participated in the selection process and was provisionally selected, subject to satisfactory verification of his character and antecedents, medical fitness and final verification of documents. She contended that the applicant submitted his attestation form on 13.12.2023 without disclosing the criminal case registered
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against him vide FIR No. 420/2023 dated 15.09.2023 under Sections 308, 323, 325 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, at Police Station Budhana, Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh. According to the learned counsel, the applicant thereby concealed material information despite the clear warning contained in the attestation form that furnishing false information or concealing relevant facts could render a candidate unfit for appointment. 6.2 Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant's character and antecedents were verified, and the report received from the Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarnagar, on 24.10.2024 revealed the registration of the aforesaid criminal case. Upon scrutiny of the records, the matter was placed before the Screening Committee constituted at Delhi Police Headquarters to assess the applicant's suitability for appointment. Learned counsel contended that the Screening Committee examined the relevant material and found that the applicant had been named in a criminal case involving serious allegations of attempt to commit culpable homicide, voluntarily causing hurt, grievous hurt and provocation with intent to breach public peace. According to the learned counsel, the Screening Committee observed that the applicant had allegedly ambushed and attacked the complainant with sticks and sharp weapons, causing severe injuries. She further concluded that the applicant had deliberately concealed his involvement in the criminal case in the relevant column of the attestation form. The Committee considered the nature and gravity of the allegations, the issue of suppression of
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material facts and the requirements of suitability for appointment to a disciplined law-enforcement organisation such as Delhi Police. Learned counsel submitted that, in view of the seriousness of the allegations and the applicant's alleged conduct, the Screening Committee did not recommend his case for continuation in service and advised that his services be terminated under the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. 6.3 Learned counsel submitted that, pursuant to the recommendation of the Screening Committee, the applicant's case, along with his dossier, was forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, East District, being the competent disciplinary authority, vide memorandum dated 23.05.2025 (Annexure R/2). Thereafter, a show-cause notice dated 22.08.2025 was issued to the applicant, calling upon him to explain why his services should not be terminated on account of his alleged involvement in the criminal case and deliberate suppression of material facts in the attestation form. The applicant submitted his reply on 28.08.2025, asserting that he had no knowledge of the FIR and had never received any summons or notice from the Investigating Officer or the criminal court. The explanation furnished by the applicant was duly examined but was not found tenable. She submitted that the applicant's plea of ignorance of the FIR did not satisfactorily explain his failure to disclose the criminal case in the attestation form, particularly, when the form contained an express warning regarding the consequences of furnishing incorrect information or concealing material facts. According to the learned
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counsel, the omission to disclose the criminal case, notwithstanding the warning, supported the conclusion that the applicant had deliberately withheld material information to secure appointment in Delhi Police. 6.4 Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant's reliance upon the written statement of the Investigating Officer, allegedly confirming that no notice or summons had been issued to him, did not warrant interference with the decision of the Screening Committee. She contended that the absence of service of a notice or summons, by itself, was not sufficient to displace the conclusion drawn by the competent authorities regarding the applicant's suitability and the alleged suppression of material information. Learned counsel maintained that the applicant had been specifically named in the FIR and that the allegations therein were serious in nature. Therefore, the respondents were justified in examining the applicant's antecedents independently for the purpose of determining his suitability for appointment to Delhi Police. 6.5 Learned counsel also opposed the applicant's reliance upon the fact that his name had allegedly been placed in Column No. 12 of the charge-sheet and upon the statement of the complainant recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. She submitted that the registration of the FIR, filing of the charge-sheet and statements recorded during investigation were matters forming part of the criminal proceedings and were subject to consideration by the competent criminal court. According to the learned counsel, the
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placement of the applicant's name in Column No. 12 of the charge- sheet did not, by itself, invalidate the assessment undertaken by the Screening Committee or compel the respondents to consider him suitable for appointment. 6.6 In this regard, the learned counsel submitted that the question before the respondents was not confined to the applicant's guilt or innocence in the criminal case but also concerned his suitability for appointment to a disciplined force. She argued that the competent authorities were entitled to assess the applicant's character and antecedents in the light of the nature of the allegations and the requirements of the post. She contended that even an acquittal or discharge in a criminal case does not automatically confer an indefeasible right to appointment, as the recruiting authority retains the discretion to examine the suitability of the candidate in accordance with the applicable rules and instructions. 6.7 Learned counsel further submitted that the respondents had acted in accordance with Standing Order No.HRD/12/2022, which prescribes the policy for dealing with provisionally selected candidates who disclose or conceal their involvement in criminal cases while furnishing information in the attestation form for verification of character and antecedents. She contended that the Screening Committee had considered the applicant's case in the light of the applicable policy and the relevant judicial precedents, including the principles governing recruitment to police services. Learned counsel maintained that the applicant's alleged concealment of material facts,
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coupled with the serious nature of the allegations in the FIR, rendered him unsuitable for continuation in service. 6.8 With regard to the applicant's reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Avtar Singh (supra), learned counsel submitted that the said judgment does not lay down an absolute proposition that every candidate who is implicated in a criminal case must be appointed or retained in service. She contended that the principles laid down therein require the employer to assess each case on its own facts and circumstances, having regard to the nature of the post, the character of the allegations, the circumstances surrounding the criminal case and the question of suppression of material information. According to the learned counsel, the respondents had undertaken such an assessment in the present case and had concluded that the applicant was unsuitable for service in Delhi Police. 6.9 The learned counsel further submitted that the judgments relied upon by the applicant, including Prashant Deep v. High Court of Delhi, W.P. (C) No. 1960/2019, and Mahendra Solanki v. The Commissioner of Police & Anr., W.P. (C) No. 2219/2023, were distinguishable on their respective facts and circumstances. She contended that the facts, nature of allegations, evidence and circumstances differ from case to case, and no two cases can be treated as identical merely because both involve an assessment of criminal antecedents or alleged suppression of information. The learned counsel maintained that the aforesaid judgments do not preclude the
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respondents from assessing the suitability of a candidate in accordance with the governing rules and the relevant facts of the individual case. 6.10 learned counsel denied the allegation that the impugned order had been passed with a predetermined mindset or without application of mind. She submitted that the applicant was afforded an opportunity to explain his position through the show-cause notice dated 22.08.2025, that his reply was considered by the competent authority, and that the decision to terminate his services was taken after examining the material available on record, including the findings of the Screening Committee and the report concerning his character and antecedents. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that the principles of natural justice had been duly observed and that the applicant's allegations of arbitrariness and procedural unfairness were unfounded. 6.11 Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant's contention that the FIR was lodged as a retaliatory measure arising out of caste rivalry in his village did not, in the respondents' view, sufficiently displace the findings of the Screening Committee. She argued that the applicant's assertions concerning the circumstances in which FIR No.420/2023 was registered, his alleged absence from the place of occurrence and the registration of the earlier FIR No. 409/2023 were not sufficient to invalidate the administrative assessment of his suitability. Learned counsel maintained that the respondents had to consider not only the applicant's explanation concerning the criminal case but also the alleged non-disclosure of the
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same in the attestation form and the standards of conduct expected of a member of Delhi Police. 6.12 Learned counsel also denied that the impugned order violated Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. She submitted that the action taken against the applicant was based on the applicable rules, the relevant Standing Orders and the assessment of the competent authorities. According to the learned counsel, the applicant had no absolute or indefeasible right to continue in service irrespective of the findings regarding his suitability and alleged suppression of material information. She also contended that the respondents' action was neither discriminatory nor arbitrary and that the termination order had been passed in accordance with the applicable provisions of law. 6.13 Learned counsel submitted that, upon consideration of the Screening Committee's recommendation, the applicant's reply to the show-cause notice and the material available on record, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, East District, passed the impugned order dated 23.09.2025 terminating the applicant's services with immediate effect under Rule 5(1)(a) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, read with Standing Order No. 39/2020. The applicant was also held entitled to an amount equivalent to one month's pay and allowances in lieu of notice, in accordance with the terms of the order. 6.14 In support of the above submissions, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court:-
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(i) State of U.P. and another vs. Dinesh Kumar, reported in 2026 INSC 49; and
(ii) Bappa Barai vs. Union of India and others, reported in 2026 INSC 882. 6.14 Lastly, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the impugned termination order is legal, valid and justified; that the applicant's explanation had been duly considered but was found insufficient to overcome the findings concerning his alleged suppression of material information and suitability for service in Delhi Police; and that the respondents had acted in accordance with the applicable rules and instructions. Therefore she prayed that the instant OA, being devoid of merit, be dismissed by this Tribunal.
7. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the applicant reiterated the submissions as noted above.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings available on record as well as the judgments on which reliance is placed by the parties’ learned counsel.
9. It emerges from the records that the applicant participated in the recruitment process initiated by the SSC pursuant to the recruitment notification dated 08.07.2022 for the post of Constable (Driver) (Male) in Delhi Police. He applied under the Scheduled Caste (SC) category and appeared in the Computer-Based Examination held on 21.10.2022, followed by the PE&MT held on 26.04.2023 and the Trade Test held on 06.11.2023. Upon qualifying the prescribed stages
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of selection and medical examination, his name was included in the final merit list declared on 09.12.2023. 9.1 It is not in dispute that the applicant submitted his attestation form on 13.12.2023 for verification of his character and antecedents. The applicant was subsequently offered appointment in Delhi Police, joined service and underwent basic training before being posted in the East District, Delhi. During the verification of his character and antecedents, the aforenoted FIR No.420/2023 came to the notice of the respondents through the police verification report received on 24.10.2024 from the concerned police authorities. 9.2 It is also an admitted position that FIR No.420/2023 dated 15.09.2023 had been registered at Police Station Budhana, Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh, under Sections 308, 323, 325 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. However, whereas the applicant maintained that he was unaware of the registration of the said FIR when he submitted the attestation form, the respondents alleged that the applicant deliberately concealed material information concerning the criminal case. 9.3 It is also not in dispute that the applicant was called upon to explain the circumstances relating to the registration of the said FIR and the alleged non-disclosure thereof in his attestation form. The applicant submitted his explanation, maintaining that he had no prior knowledge of the said FIR and had neither received any notice or summons nor been contacted by the Investigating Officer in connection with the said case.
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9.4 The respondents thereafter considered the applicant's case through the Screening Committee, which, on 06.05.2025, found him unsuitable for appointment in Delhi Police, having regard to the nature of the allegations in the FIR and the alleged concealment of the criminal case in the attestation form. The applicant, however, disputes the conclusion so arrived at and relies upon the material relating to the investigation, including the alleged placement of his name in Column No. 12 of the charge-sheet and the statement of the complainant recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 9.5 It is further an admitted position that a show-cause notice dated 22.08.2025 was issued to the applicant concerning the alleged non-disclosure of the criminal case, to which he submitted a reply dated 28.08.2025. The respondents considered the explanation furnished by him but did not find it satisfactory. Ultimately, Respondent No. 3 passed the impugned order dated 23.09.2025 terminating the applicant's services with immediate effect under Rule 5(1)(a) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, read with the aforesaid Standing Order. The applicant has challenged the said order in the present OA, seeking its quashing and setting aside, along with reinstatement and consequential service benefits. The respondents, on the other hand, defend the impugned action as lawful and justified on the grounds of alleged suppression of material information and the applicant's unsuitability for service in Delhi Police.
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10. The controversy in the present case is not merely whether FIR No. 420/2023 had been registered against the applicant before he submitted his attestation form on 13.12.2023. Its registration on 15.09.2023 is not disputed. The material questions are whether the applicant was aware of the registration of the FIR when he furnished the information in the attestation form and, independently, whether the respondents assessed his suitability for service in Delhi Police after taking into account the relevant circumstances.
11. The law governing suppression of criminal antecedents in public employment has been authoritatively explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Avtar Singh (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the information specifically sought in the attestation or verification form must be furnished truthfully and that suppression of material information may justify cancellation of candidature or termination of service in an appropriate case. At the same time, the employer is required to consider the special circumstances of the case, the applicable rules and instructions, the nature of the offence and the suitability of the candidate for the post concerned. The power cannot be exercised arbitrarily or mechanically.
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as far as possible and summarised in para 38. The relevant one is as noted in para 38.8, which provides that “If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the
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appointing authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime.” Thus, it is apparent that in a case situation where a criminal case was pending but was not known to the candidate at the time of filling up the form, even in such a situation the pending case may have an adverse bearing, and the appointing authority must take a decision after considering the seriousness of the crime. Further, in para 38.11 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that “Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him”. Meaning thereby, before a person is held guilty of suppression or furnishing false information, knowledge of the relevant fact must be attributable to that person. Thus, the absence of knowledge, if established, does not automatically confer a right to appointment or continuation in service; equally, deliberate suppression cannot be inferred merely from the existence of a criminal case without examining the circumstances bearing on the candidate's knowledge.
13. In the present case, the applicant has consistently maintained that he was unaware of FIR No.420/2023 when he submitted the attestation form. The said FIR was registered under Sections 308, 323, 325 and 504 of IPC, 1986. In support of this plea, the applicant relies upon the written communication attributed to the Investigating Officer stating that no notice or summons had been issued to him and that he had neither been called nor visited by the Investigating Officer in connection with the said case. He has also relied upon the charge-
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sheet, wherein his name is stated to have been placed in Column No.12 for want of sufficient evidence, as well as the complainant's statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which, according to the applicant, does not attribute any role to him.
14. We are conscious that the mere absence of a notice or summons does not conclusively establish that the applicant had no knowledge of the FIR. Similarly, the placement of his name in Column No. 12 of the charge-sheet, by itself, does not conclusively establish his innocence or confer an indefeasible right to appointment. The question of criminal culpability is distinct from the assessment of suitability for appointment to a disciplined police force. Nevertheless, the aforesaid circumstances are relevant material which cannot be disregarded while determining whether the omission in the attestation form amounted to deliberate concealment and while assessing the applicant's overall suitability.
15. The respondents, on the other hand, contended that the applicant was named in a criminal case involving allegations under Sections 308, 323, 325 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and that he failed to disclose the same despite the warning contained in the attestation form. They further rely upon the assessment of the Screening Committee dated 06.05.2025, which found the applicant unsuitable in view of the nature of the allegations and the alleged concealment of material information.
16. We find considerable force in the respondents' submission that recruitment to a police force stands on a distinct footing. A candidate
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seeking appointment to such a disciplined force is expected to possess the requisite character, integrity and suitability, and the appointing authority is entitled to examine his antecedents independently of the question whether criminal guilt has ultimately been established. However, the nature of the post, though an important consideration, does not dispense with the requirement of a fair and objective assessment of the individual case.
17. In State of U.P. v. Dinesh Kumar, 2026 INSC 49, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the importance of truthful disclosure in public employment and held that repeated non- disclosure of pending criminal cases, in the circumstances of that case, demonstrated deliberate concealment. Likewise, in Bappa Barai v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 882, decided on 18.08.2026, the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the discharge of candidates seeking appointment as constables in the Railway Protection Force and the Railway Protection Special Force, where pending criminal cases had been deliberately omitted from the verification forms. The Hon’ble Supreme Court applied the principles laid down in Avtar Singh (supra) and emphasised the significance of knowledge, deliberate omission and the applicable recruitment rules.
18. The aforesaid decisions do not, however, lay down that every non-disclosure must invariably result in termination irrespective of the circumstances. In Dinesh Kumar (supra), the repeated negative declarations concerning two pending criminal cases were material to the finding of deliberate concealment. In Bappa Barai (supra), the
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Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that the candidates had knowledge of the pending cases, had chosen not to disclose them and had not pleaded circumstances explaining their omission. The factual position in the present case requires separate consideration because the applicant has specifically pleaded lack of knowledge and has relied upon material which, according to him, supports that plea. The principles laid down in those decisions must therefore be applied to the facts of the present case rather than treated as an automatic answer to the controversy.
19. We may also refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 INSC 225, decided on 11.03.2026. The said case concerned the rejection of candidature for the post of Constable (Driver) in a police force on the basis of criminal antecedents. The Hon'ble Supreme Court recognised the broad discretion available to the employer and the Screening Committee in assessing the suitability of a candidate for police service, while reiterating that such discretion must not be exercised arbitrarily, unreasonably, whimsically or mala fide. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the scope of judicial review in such matters is limited and that the Court cannot substitute its own assessment for that of the competent authority where the decision is based on relevant considerations and is not arbitrary.
20. Applying the aforesaid principles, we are of the view that this Tribunal cannot itself decide upon the applicant's suitability for appointment in Delhi Police merely on the basis of the fact that his
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name was placed in Column No. 12 of the charge-sheet or that the complainant is stated to have denied his involvement. Such an assessment primarily falls within the domain of the competent recruiting authority. At the same time, the exercise of that discretion must be exercised having regard to the relevant facts and the governing principles of law.
21. The material before us shows that the Screening Committee considered the nature and gravity of the allegations in the said FIR and the alleged non-disclosure of the criminal case. However, the applicant's specific defence is that he was unaware of the said FIR at the time of submitting the attestation form, and he relies upon the Investigating Officer's communication and the material collected during investigation in support of that defence. The respondents contended that the explanation was considered and found unsatisfactory.
22. In our considered view, a distinction must be maintained between two separate questions: first, whether the applicant knowingly withheld information which he was required to disclose; and second, whether, irrespective of the applicant's knowledge or the absence of deliberate concealment, the nature of the allegations and the available material render him unsuitable for appointment to the police force. The former question must be examined in the light of the principle laid down in paragraph 38.11 of Avtar Singh (supra), while the latter must be assessed in accordance with paragraph 38.8 thereof and the subsequent decisions governing suitability for police service.
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23. We are, therefore, unable to accept either extreme proposition that the applicant is entitled to reinstatement merely because he asserts lack of knowledge and relies upon the charge-sheet, or that the impugned termination must necessarily be upheld solely because an FIR involving serious allegations had been registered against him. The competent authority is required to undertake an individualised assessment of the applicant's case, taking into account the nature of the allegations, the material relied upon by both sides, the applicant's explanation concerning his knowledge of the FIR, the contents of the attestation form and the applicable recruitment policy.
24. We find from communication dated 23.05.2025 issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Recruitment: Delhi addressed to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, East District, Delhi (Annexure R-2) in which they have stated as under:- “….The Screening Committee examined his case and observed that candidate was involved in serious offence of attempt to culpable homicide, voluntarily causing hurt, grievous hurt, provocation to break public peace and he was clearly named in the FIR. The candidate ambushed and attacked the complainant with sticks and sharp weapons, causing severe injuries. The candidate deliberately concealed the facts of his involvement in the criminal case in the relevant column of Attestation Form. The Committee also observed that the candidate was involved in heinous offences involving moral turpitude and a candidate having such conduct/record cannot be appointed in a law enforcing agency and disciplined force like Delhi Police. As such, the Committee keeping in view of the observation of Apex Court in various cases and provisions of Standing order did not find him suitable for appointment in Delhi Police and not recommended his case. The committed has also observed that the candidate has joined as Constable (Driver) in Delhi Police on 19.02.2024 and presently posted in East Distt. against Constabulary No. 2116/E; (PIS No. 28242581). Therefore, his services should be terminated under CCS (Temporary Services) Rules, by the present disciplinary authority immediately…”
24.1 We further observe that pursuant to above, the applicant was issued a show-cause notice dated 22.08.2025 to which he had
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submitted his reply dated 28.08.2025. The mere issuance of a show- cause notice and receipt of a reply, however, do not by themselves establish that all relevant circumstances were duly considered. What is required is a fair and objective consideration of the material issues raised by the applicant, followed by a reasoned decision in accordance with the applicable rules and judicial precedents. This is particularly important where the decision rests, at least in part, on an allegation of deliberate concealment which the applicant specifically disputes. For ascertaining the same, we also deem it appropriate to reproduce the contents of the impugned order dated 23.09.2025.
“A Show Cause Notice under the provisions of Rule 5 (1) (a) of CCS (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965 and S.O No.39/2020 for termination of service was issued to Ct. (Dvr.) Sagar Kumar, No. 2116/E, PIS No. 28242581 vide No. 8356-58/SIP/East District dated Delhi, the 22/08/2025 on the allegations that he concealed the facts of registration of a criminal case against him vide FIR No. 420/23 U/S 308/323/325/504 IPC, dated 15,09.2023 PS Budhana, Muzaffarnagar, U.P. These facts came into record during scrutiny of his records where it was revealed that Candidate Sagar Kumar [Roll No. 309000021] S/o Shri Nirdosh Kumar did not mention about the involvement in the above said Criminal Case in the relevant column of Attestation Form filled up by him on 13.12.2023 and joined the Department for the post in question on 19.12.2023. He concealed the facts of his involvement in the aforesaid criminal case despite giving clear warning on the top of the Attestation Form. His case was put-up before Sr. Officers and as per directions of Sr. Officers, his case was placed before the Screening Committee in Delhi Police Headquarters for accessing his suitability and given the recommendation as“ Not Recommended, Termination o f Service” .
Thus, he had suppressed the facts to get the appointment in the rank of Ct. (Dvr.) male in Delhi Police, which clearly reflects his malafide intention.
A copy of Show Cause Notice was served upon Ct (Dvr.) Sagar Kumar, No. 2116/E, PIS No. 28242581 with the direction to submit his written reply otherwise the matter will be decided on its merit, ex- parte. Accordingly, he submitted his written reply mentioning therein that he did not have even an iota of knowledge about the registration of any case FIR against him. He never received any summon notice from any IO or from any hon’ble court pertaining to this case. He stated that police would not have found any prima-facie evidence against me that is why I was never issued any summon notice by the police at any point of time. So, there is no question arise to inform my esteemed department while submitting my undertaking on 13.12.2023 about the registration of the said criminal case against me.”
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The undersigned carefully gone through all the documents and material available on the file as well as the written reply submitted by Ct (Dvr.) Sagar Kumar, No. 2116/E, PIS No, 28242581. As per report of Screening Committee which was held on 06.05.2025 under the chairpersonship of Smt. Nurzhat Hassan, Special commissioner of Police, H.R. Division, Delhi alongwith Smt. Suman Goyal, Jt. CP/Hdqrs, Delhi & Smt. Aslam Khan, Jt. CPA/vigilance, Delhi and enquiry conducted by ACP/PG Cell/ED. Therein the facts came into record and it was revealed that Ct. Dvr. Sagar Kumar, No. 2116/E, PIS No. 28242581 deliberately concealed the fact of his involvement in the criminal case in the attestation from despite clear warning that furnishing false information or concealing any facts in the attestation form may liable the candidate unfit for appointment. In this regard, a plea taken by Ct (Dvr) Sagar Kumar, No. 2116/E, PIS No. 28242581 is not tenable, as concealment of facts. In the form clearly reflects his malafide intention which has been proved in the enquiry already conducted into the matter.
Therefore, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, I ABHISHEK DHANIA, IPS, Deputy Commissioner of Police, East District, Delhi, hereby terminates Ct (Dvr.) Sagar Kumar, No. 2116/E, PIS No. 28242581 from the service of Delhi Police with immediate effect under the provisions of sub-rule Rule 5 (1) (a) of CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 and S.O No. 39/2020 and directed that he shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay and allowances for a period of one month (in lieu of the period of notice) calculated at the same rate at which he was drawing them immediately before the date on which this order is served or, as the case may be tendered to him. His Particulars are as under:- Name : Sagar Kumar, PIS NO. : 28242581 Belt NO. : 2116/E D.O.E.
: 19/02/2024 D.O.B.
: 06/05/2001 Father Name : Sh. Nirdosh Kumar Address : VPO Itawa Teh-Budhana, Distt. Muzaffarnagar, UP - 251309
25. From a plain reading of the aforesaid impugned order, we find that the competent authority has recorded a categorical conclusion that the applicant deliberately concealed the registration of the said criminal case and that such concealment reflected his mala fide intention. The impugned order further records that the applicant's explanation regarding his lack of knowledge of the FIR was considered but found untenable, primarily on the ground that the attestation form
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contained a clear warning against concealment of facts and that an enquiry had already been conducted into the matter. However, the reasoning recorded in the impugned order does not disclose the factual basis on which the applicant's plea of lack of knowledge was rejected. The existence of a warning in the attestation form undoubtedly required the applicant to furnish the information sought therein truthfully and completely. Nevertheless, the warning, by itself, cannot establish that the applicant had actual knowledge of the registration of the said FIR on the date of submitting the attestation form. The question whether the applicant knowingly withheld a material fact is distinct from the question whether the omission, irrespective of his state of knowledge, has a bearing on his suitability for appointment to the police force. We are conscious that the respondents have referred to the enquiry conducted by the ACP/PG Cell, East District, and the recommendation of the Screening Committee dated 06.05.2025, although the recommendations of the Screening Committee had been mentioned in the communication dated 23.05.2025, however, the same is not placed on record by the respondents. The impugned order, however, does not set out the material findings of the said enquiry or explain how the material relied upon by the applicant was evaluated while arriving at the conclusion that the omission was deliberate. In particular, the impugned order does not indicate whether the applicant's assertion that he had neither received any notice or summons nor been contacted by the Investigating Officer was examined in the light of the material placed by him in support thereof.
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We do not suggest that the absence of a notice or summons necessarily establishes that the applicant was unaware of the FIR. We only observe that, where lack of knowledge has been specifically pleaded, the conclusion of deliberate concealment ought to rest on an objective assessment of the relevant circumstances and not merely on the fact that the information was omitted from the attestation form. At the same time, we cannot lose sight of the nature of the post in question. The applicant sought appointment as a Constable (Driver) in Delhi Police, a disciplined force in which integrity, reliability and antecedent verification are matters of considerable importance. Even if deliberate concealment is not established, the competent authority remains entitled to assess independently whether the nature and gravity of the allegations, together with the material available on record, render the applicant unsuitable for appointment. Such an assessment falls primarily within the domain of the employer and must be undertaken in accordance with the applicable recruitment rules, standing orders and the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Avtar Singh (supra) and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav (supra). 25.1 We also pertinent to observe that the offences alleged against the applicant pertains to Section 308/323/325/504 IPC. Section 308 of IPC deals with attempt to commit culpable homicide, wherein a person does an act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that, if death had resulted, he would have been guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder; it is non-bailable where
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hurt is caused and bailable where no hurt is caused. Section 323 of IPC deals with voluntarily causing simple hurt, punishable with imprisonment up to one year or fine or both, and is bailable. Section 325 of IPC deals with voluntarily causing grievous hurt, such as fracture, dislocation of bone or injuries endangering life or causing prolonged severe bodily pain, punishable with imprisonment up to seven years and fine, and is bailable. Section 504 IPC deals with intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of public peace, punishable with imprisonment up to two years or fine or both, and is bailable. Thus, Sections 308, 323, 325 and 504 IPC are generally classified as bailable, except Section 308 IPC when hurt is caused, which is non-bailable. 25.2 We also find that, in the instant case, following the registration of the aforesaid FIR, the respondents’ authorities had appointed one Shri Rohit Choudhary as the Investigating Officer. However, upon his transfer, the investigation of the said case was entrusted to Shri Omendra Singh, SI, who, in the course of investigation, recorded his findings to the effect that the applicant and the other persons named therein were not the perpetrators of the incident. The relevant extract of the investigation report reads as under: “I did not include the names of Sagar, son of Nirdosh, Udayveer, son of Hapal, Ankit, son of Sohanveer, and Vishal, son of Keshpal, residents of village Etawah, Police Station Budhana, District M.Nagar, as perpetrators of the incident in the First Information Report. The First Information Report was not read to me. The names of the four individuals mentioned in my report are incorrect. Sagar, Udayveer, Ankit, and Vishal were not among those who assaulted me. It was dark and I couldn't identify the accused. A large crowd had gathered after the incident.”
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25.3 In view of the aforesaid statement recorded during investigation, we find that the Investigating Officer himself categorically disowned the identification of the applicant and the other named persons as assailants and specifically stated that they were not among those who had assaulted him. He further clarified that the incident had occurred in darkness and that he could not identify the accused persons. In such circumstances, it becomes pertinent to examine as to on what basis the respondents’ authorities arrived at the conclusion that the applicant was involved in the incident in question, particularly when the very person who was allegedly assaulted had subsequently disowned the identification of the applicant as one of the perpetrators. 25.4 Having regard to the above, we deem it appropriate to observe that, since most of the offences alleged against the applicant under the aforesaid FIR are bailable in nature, the respondents ought to have ascertained from the concerned police authorities and/or the competent criminal court the actual nature and gravity of the allegations, the status of the criminal proceedings and the circumstances in which bail was granted to the applicant, before arriving at an adverse conclusion regarding his suitability for appointment. The mere registration of an FIR or the fact that the applicant was named therein, without an objective assessment of the relevant circumstances, would not by itself be sufficient to conclusively determine his suitability for appointment. The Screening Committee was, therefore, required to undertake a fair, objective and reasoned
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assessment of the applicant's antecedents and the nature of his alleged involvement, rather than treating the mere pendency or registration of the criminal case as determinative.
26. In view of the foregoing discussion, the Original Application is allowed in part, to the following extent:
(i) The impugned order dated 23.09.2025 terminating the applicant's services is set aside, and the matter is remitted to the competent authority for fresh consideration of the applicant's case in accordance with law;
(ii) The competent authority shall undertake an objective assessment of the applicant's case, keeping in view the principles laid down in Avtar Singh (supra) and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav (supra), and the subsequent decisions referred to hereinabove. It shall specifically address the applicant's plea that he had no knowledge of FIR No. 420/2023 when he submitted the attestation form, the material relied upon by him concerning the investigation, the nature and gravity of the allegations, and the requirements of suitability for appointment to Delhi Police; and
(iii) The competent authority shall pass a reasoned and speaking order, preferably within eight weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, after affording the applicant a reasonable opportunity to place any relevant material on record.
27. We make it clear that the setting aside of the impugned order and remand of the matter shall not, by themselves, be construed as a
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declaration that the applicant is entitled to appointment or reinstatement. The question of his suitability and the consequential service benefits, if any, shall abide by the fresh decision of the competent authority in accordance with law.
28. There shall be no order as to costs.
29. Pending MA(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(Rajinder Kashyap)
(R.N. Singh) Member (A)
Member (J)
/ravi/
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