Lalit Sivach vs HOME AFFAIRS on 4 November 2026

Order

Orders p

Hon’ble Mr. R.N. Sing Hon’ble Mr. Rajinder Kas ch 8242610 Devendra Singh u Road, Gali No. 3, . 5/525, Baraut (Baghpat) desh- 250611 Ct. (Dvr.) No. 2572/NE, ce, North East District, Delhi. ate: Ms. Esha Mazumdar) VERSUS of India gh Secretary (Home) ry of Home Affairs Block, New Delhi-110001 Police gh Commissioner of Police Police Headquarters gh Road, New Delhi-110001 y Commissioner of Police, East District, Delhi Police, mpur, Main GT Road, Delhi-11 y Commissioner of Police tment. Delhi Police Lines way Camp, New Delhi-110009 election Commission gh Its Chairmen 12, CGO complex, Road, New Delhi-110003 ate: Ms. Leelawati Suman) tive Tribunal ench, hi of 2025 rs reserved on : 21.10.202 pronounced on : 04.11.202 gh, Member (J) shyap, Member (A)

...Applica S 10053

….Responden ant nts

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O R D E R

Hon’ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A):

The applicant is aggrieved by the order dated 11.11.2025 (Annexure A/1) passed by Respondent No. 3, whereby his services as Constable (Driver) in Delhi Police have been terminated.

2. By filing the present OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant is seeking the following reliefs:- “A. Call for records of the case; B. Quash and set aside the impugned termination order dated 11.11.2025 issued by Respondent No. 3 along with all consequential benefits including arrears with interest at GPF rates; C. Direct the Respondents to reinstate the Applicant in service forthwith with continuity of service, seniority, and full backwages from the date of termination till actual reinstatement; D. Award cost of the proceedings: and E. Pass any order/relief/direction(s) as this Hon’ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice in favour of the Applicant.”

3. Facts in brief are that Respondent No. 5, Staff Selection Commission (in short ‘SSC’), issued a recruitment notification dated 08.07.2022 inviting applications for recruitment to the post of Constable (Driver) Male in Delhi Police Examination, 2022 (Annexure A-2). The applicant applied for the said post under the General Category, claiming to fulfil the prescribed eligibility criteria. 3.1 The applicant appeared in the Computer-Based Examination held on 21.10.2022, as is evident from admit card at Annexure A- 3), and was declared qualified in the result announced on 04.12.2022 for the subsequent stages of the selection process, namely, the Physical

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Efficiency Test/Physical Standard Test and the Trade Test (Annexure A-4). He subsequently appeared in the Physical Endurance and Measurement Test on 26.04.2023 and the Trade Test on 06.11.2023 and was declared successful. Thereafter, he underwent a medical examination on 14.12.2023 and was declared medically fit. 3.1 The final merit list was declared on 09.12.2023 (Annexure A- 5), in which the applicant was included amongst the successful candidates. Upon completion of the selection process, the applicant was required to submit an attestation form for verification of his character and antecedents. In the said form, he answered “No” to the question concerning pending criminal cases or prosecutions. According to the applicant, he had no knowledge of any subsisting criminal proceedings against him, as the criminal case in question had already been closed by the competent court on 02.11.2019. He further claims that he had never received any summons or notice from the police or the court in connection with the said case. 3.2 Thereafter, the applicant received an offer of appointment dated 12.02.2024, joined the service of Delhi Police, underwent basic training for three months and was subsequently posted in the North- East District, Delhi. 3.3 During the process of verification of his character and antecedents, the respondents received a police verification report from the Superintendent of Police, Baghpat, Uttar Pradesh, through Police Station Baraut, indicating that FIR No.441/2017 had been registered against the applicant and certain other persons under Sections 363 and

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506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The applicant averred that he was neither called upon to participate in the investigation nor summoned to appear before the competent court in connection with the said FIR. 3.4 According to the applicant, the victim's statement was recorded before the Magistrate under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), wherein she stated that she had left her home following a quarrel with her mother and had gone to the house of her sister's friend in Karol Bagh, Delhi, on her own. She further stated that she returned home on the advice of her sister's friend after learning that an FIR had been lodged against the applicant and others. On the basis of the investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted Final Report No. 99/17 dated 05.06.2017, stating that no evidence had been found against the applicant. The applicant's name was placed in Column No. 12 of the final report. 3.5 The applicant further stated that the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baghpat, accepted the final report and closed the criminal proceedings by order dated 02.11.2019. He, therefore, maintains that the criminal case had been closed much before the recruitment process and submission of the attestation form and that he had no criminal antecedents warranting termination of his service. 3.6 Upon receipt of the police verification report, the respondents directed the applicant to appear before the DCP/Recruitment Cell, Police Headquarters, Delhi, and furnish an explanation regarding the said criminal case. The applicant appeared before the competent

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authority and submitted his statement explaining the circumstances surrounding the registration and closure of the FIR. 3.7 Subsequently, Respondent No. 3 issued a show-cause notice dated 18.06.2025 to the applicant regarding the alleged non-disclosure of the criminal case in his attestation form. The applicant submitted his detailed reply on 01.07.2025, contending, inter alia, that he had not deliberately concealed any material information, that the criminal proceedings had already been closed by the competent court in 2019, and that he had never been summoned or informed about the said proceedings. 3.8 However, by the impugned order dated 11.11.2025, Respondent No. 3 terminated the applicant's services on the ground of alleged deliberate suppression of information concerning his involvement in the said criminal case. The applicant averred that the authority mechanically concluded that the non-disclosure was actuated by mala fide intention without properly considering his explanation, the final report submitted by the Investigating Officer, the order dated 02.11.2019 accepting the final report, and the victim's statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC. Hence , this OA.

4. Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal, the respondents have filed their reply.

5. During the course of hearing, Ms. Esha Mazumdar, learned counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that the impugned order dated 11.11.2025 terminating the applicant’s services is arbitrary, illegal and unsustainable in law, being violative of Articles 14, 16 and

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21 of the Constitution of India. She contended that the respondents had acted with a predetermined mind and without due application of mind, thereby violating the principles of natural justice and fairness. 5.1 Learned counsel further submitted that there was no intentional or deliberate suppression of material information by the applicant in the attestation form. She contended that FIR No. 441/2017, registered under Sections 363 and 506 of the IPC, had culminated in the submission of Final Report No.99/17 dated 05.06.2017, wherein the applicant’s name was placed in Column No. 12 owing to the absence of evidence against him. The said final report was accepted by the competent court vide order dated 02.11.2019, much prior to the applicant’s submission of the attestation form. She further submitted that the applicant had neither been summoned nor served with any notice by the police or the court in connection with the said case and, therefore, had no knowledge of the proceedings. According to learned counsel, these circumstances clearly negate any allegation of deliberate concealment or mala fide intention on the part of the applicant. 5.2 Learned counsel argued that the respondents failed to appreciate the significance of the victim’s statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC, wherein she had stated that she left her home following a dispute with her mother and went to Karol Bagh, Delhi, of her own volition. She also submitted that neither the victim’s statement nor the final report attributed any incriminating role to the applicant. The applicant’s mere reference in the police records could

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not, in itself, be treated as proof of his involvement in the alleged offence or as a ground for drawing an adverse inference regarding his character and antecedents. 5.3 Learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Avtar Singh v. Union of India, reported in (2016) 8 SCC 471, particularly paragraphs 35 and 36 thereof, which read as under: “35. Suppression of "material" information presupposes that what is suppressed that "matters" not every technical or trivial matter. The employer has to act on due consideration of rules/instructions, if any, in exercise of powers in order to cancel candidature or for terminating the services of employee. Though a person who has suppressed the material information cannot claim unfettered right for appointment or continuity in service but he has a right not to be dealt with arbitrarily and exercise of power has to be in reasonable manner with objectivity having due regard to facts of cases.

36. What yardstick is to be applied has to depend upon the nature of post, higher post would involve more rigorous criteria for all services, not only to uniformed service. For lower posts which are not sensitive, nature of duties, impact of suppression on suitability has to be considered by authorities concerned considering post/nature of duties/services and power has to be exercised on due consideration of various aspects. ”

5.4 On the strength of the aforesaid decision, learned counsel contended that the respondents were required to undertake an objective assessment of the nature of the alleged offence, the outcome of the criminal proceedings, the circumstances surrounding the alleged non-disclosure and their bearing on the applicant’s suitability for appointment as Constable (Driver). She argued that the respondents had failed to undertake such an assessment and had proceeded to terminate the applicant’s services merely on the basis of the alleged

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suppression, without examining whether the non-disclosure was deliberate or whether the circumstances of the case warranted such an extreme action. 5.5 In support of the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Prashant Deep v. High Court of Delhi, W.P. (C) No. 1960/2019 decided on 15.04.2019, and drew attention to paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 thereof which read as under: “15. When we examine the impugned order of termination, as also the minutes of the meeting of the Selection Committee held on 31/01/2019, we find that none of the above factors have been considered and the termination order has been directed to be passed by simply holding that since there was suppression of material information by the petitioner, his services ought to be terminated. In our view, it was incumbent upon the respondent to consider the petitioner’s case on the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Avtar Singh (supra), which has not been done.

16. As noted hereinabove, the petitioner had not only brought the relevant facts to the knowledge of the respondent even before his joining service, but he also stood acquitted of the offences levelled against him way back in May, 2014 itself, i.e., much prior to his making an application in pursuance of the advertisement issued by the respondent. Before terminating his services, the respondents ought to have considered the aforesaid facts as also the young age of the petitioner at the time of the registration of the FIR against his entire family, which arose out of a trivial incident between neighbors that resulted in the registration of a cross FIR at the behest of the petitioner's father. The respondent ought to have also given due consideration to the fact that the offences levelled against the petitioner were not of such nature as to sprout serious concerns about his moral turpitude, gauging which is the sole purpose of inquiring into one’s criminal antecedents in matters of public employment. Needless to say, not every brush with the law, whether serious or trivial, has a bearing on one’s moral turpitude and the recruiting authority must always keep this in mind while ascertaining the suitability of a candidate for public employment.

17. In our view, the termination order having been passed without considering any of the aforementioned factors, is unsustainable and is, therefore, set aside. The respondent is directed to reinstate the

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petitioner in service with all consequential benefits, except backwages, and reconsider his case in the light of the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Avtar Singh (supra). ”

5.6 Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel submitted that the respondents were duty-bound to consider the relevant facts and circumstances of the applicant’s case, including the closure of the criminal proceedings before submission of the attestation form, the absence of any evidence implicating the applicant, and the nature of the alleged offence, before arriving at a decision to terminate his services. She contended that the impugned order, having been passed without such an objective assessment, is liable to be set aside. 5.7 The learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Mahendra Solanki v. The Commissioner of Police & Anr., W.P. (C) No. 2219/2023 decided on 10.03.2023, and drew our attention to the following observations:- “13. It may also be observed that the Hon’'ble Supreme Court in Satish Chandra Yadav (supra) also took note of the judgment passed by the three Judge Bench in Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2019) 17 SCC 696 and the observations in para 67 of the judgment are apt to be reproduced:

“67. Thus, this Court took the view that although employment opportunity is a scarce commodity in the present times being circumscribed within a limited vacancies yet by itself may not suffice to invoke sympathy for grant of relief where the credentials of a candidate may raise any question regarding his suitability, irrespective of eligibility. However, at the same time, this Court observed that there should not be any mechanical or rhetorical incantation of moral turpitude to deny appointment in a government service simplicitor which would depend on the facts of each case. The judicial philosophy flowing through the mind of the judges is that every individual deserves an opportunity to improve, learn from the past and move ahead in life for self-improvement. To make past conduct, irrespective of

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all considerations, may not always constitute justice. It would all depend on the fact situation of the given case. ”

5.8 Learned counsel argued that the aforesaid observations emphasise the need for a case-specific assessment of a candidate’s suitability and prohibit the mechanical rejection of a claim to public employment merely by invoking the concept of moral turpitude. He submitted that, in the present case, the respondents failed to consider the actual outcome of the criminal proceedings and the material placed by the applicant in his explanation. 5.9 Learned counsel also submitted that the applicant had, through his representations, statements and reply dated 01.07.2025 to the show-cause notice dated 18.06.2025, specifically brought the aforesaid circumstances to the notice of the respondents. However, according to him, the competent authority failed to consider these exculpatory materials and mechanically concluded that the applicant had deliberately concealed his alleged involvement in the criminal case. He submitted that the impugned order does not reflect due consideration of the applicant’s explanation or the relevant documentary evidence and, therefore, suffers from non-application of mind and arbitrariness. 5.10 Lastly, learned counsel submitted that the applicant had neither concealed any material fact nor made any false declaration with an intention to secure public employment. She maintained that the applicant’s character and antecedents remained unblemished and that the criminal case, which had been closed in 2019, could not be made the sole basis for terminating his services without an objective

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examination of the relevant circumstances. Therefore, she prayed that the impugned order dated 11.11.2025 be quashed and set aside and that the applicant be granted reinstatement with consequential benefits, along with such other reliefs as this Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.

6. Per contra, Ms. Leelawati Suman, learned counsel appearing for the respondents by drawing our attention to the reply filed on their behalf, submitted that the present OA is misconceived, devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed, as the applicant is seeking to challenge a decision taken by the competent authority after consideration of the relevant records, the report concerning verification of his character and antecedents, the recommendations of the duly constituted Screening Committee and his reply to the show-cause notice. She contended that the impugned order dated 11.11.2025 was passed in accordance with the applicable rules and instructions and does not suffer from arbitrariness, non-application of mind or violation of the principles of natural justice. 6.1 Learned counsel submitted that recruitment to the post of Constable (Driver) (Male) in Delhi Police is governed by Rule 17-A (XX) of the Delhi Police (Appointment & Recruitment) Rules, 1980, as amended from time to time, and the relevant departmental instructions, including Standing Order No. HRD/07/2022. Pursuant to the recruitment notice dated 08.07.2022 issued by the SSC for filling up 1,411 vacancies, the applicant participated in the selection process and was provisionally selected, subject to satisfactory

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verification of his character and antecedents, medical fitness and verification of documents. The applicant submitted his attestation form on 12.12.2023 and subsequently joined the department on 19.02.2024 on a provisional basis. 6.2 Learned counsel further submitted that, upon receipt of the character and antecedents verification report from the Superintendent of Police, Baghpat, Uttar Pradesh, on 24.10.2024, it came to light that FIR No.441/2017 had been registered against the applicant under Sections 363 and 506 of the IPC at Police Station Baraut, Uttar Pradesh. However, the applicant had not disclosed the said criminal case in the relevant column of his attestation form. According to learned counsel, the attestation form contained an express warning that furnishing false information or suppressing factual information could render a candidate unfit for government employment and that, if such suppression came to light during service, the employee's services would be liable to termination. She contended that, despite this specific warning, the applicant failed to disclose the criminal case and thereby breached the obligation of candour and transparency expected of a candidate seeking appointment to a disciplined police force. 6.3 Learned counsel also submitted that the applicant's case was placed before the Screening Committee at Police Headquarters, Delhi Police, for an assessment of his suitability for appointment and retention in service. The Screening Committee examined the relevant records and observed that the criminal case involved allegations of kidnapping and criminal intimidation against the applicant and other

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accused persons, arising from a complaint lodged by Ms. Puja Tomar, the victim's sister, alleging harassment of the victim. The Committee considered the nature of the allegations, the applicant's alleged non- disclosure of the criminal case in the attestation form and the standards of conduct and integrity expected of a member of a law- enforcement agency. It consequently found the applicant unsuitable for appointment in Delhi Police and recommended termination of his services under the the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. 6.4 Learned counsel further submitted that, on the basis of the Screening Committee's recommendation, the applicant's case was forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, North-East District, vide memorandum dated 23.05.2025 for necessary action. Thereafter, a show-cause notice dated 18.06.2025 was issued to the applicant, calling upon him to explain why his services should not be terminated under Rule 5(1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. The applicant submitted his reply, in which he acknowledged the registration of FIR No.441/2017 but asserted that he had been falsely implicated, that the Investigating Officer had submitted a final report and that the competent court had accepted the same vide order dated 02.11.2019. The applicant also claimed that the omission to disclose the case was inadvertent and not deliberate, and requested a lenient view on the ground that he had served in Delhi Police with an unblemished service record. 6.5 Learned counsel submitted that the applicant's reply was duly considered by the competent disciplinary authority. A legal opinion

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was also obtained from the Legal Adviser to the Commissioner of Police, Delhi, who, vide opinion dated 17.09.2025, concurred with the recommendations of the Screening Committee. After considering the character verification report, the Screening Committee's recommendations, the applicant's explanation and the legal opinion, the competent authority concluded that the applicant was unsuitable for continuation in service. Accordingly, in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 5(1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, the applicant's services were terminated with immediate effect vide order dated 11.11.2025, with entitlement to one month's pay and allowances in lieu of notice. 6.6 Learned counsel contended that the closure of the criminal case by the learned Trial Court did not, by itself, confer an automatic right upon the applicant to continue in service. She submitted that the question of criminal liability is distinct from the assessment of suitability for public employment, particularly in a disciplined force such as Delhi Police. According to her, even where criminal proceedings have culminated in discharge, acquittal or closure, the appointing authority retains the power to assess a candidate's antecedents and suitability in accordance with the applicable rules and departmental instructions. She argued that the Screening Committee had undertaken such an assessment in the present case and had found the applicant unsuitable, having regard to the nature of the allegations and the alleged suppression of the criminal case.

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6.7 In support of the above submissions, learned counsel relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Administration through its Chief Secretary v. Sushil Kumar, reported in (1996) 11 SCC 605, and the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mehar Singh, Parvez Khan and Pradeep Kumar. She submitted that the mere fact that a criminal case has ended in acquittal or closure does not automatically entitle a candidate to appointment or continuation in service, and that the employer is entitled to independently assess the suitability of a candidate whose antecedents raise concerns regarding his fitness for appointment to a police force. 6.8 Learned counsel also referred to Standing Order No. HRD/12/2025 and submitted that the departmental policy recognises the authority of the Screening Committee to examine cases involving disclosure or non-disclosure of criminal cases, including cases ending in acquittal or discharge, and to determine the suitability of the concerned candidates. She contended that the Screening Committee had considered the applicant's case in accordance with the relevant departmental instructions and had reached its conclusion after examining the available material. Thus, according to learned counsel, the applicant's reliance upon the closure report and the order dated 02.11.2019 does not, by itself, invalidate the respondents' decision. 6.9 Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant's contention that he had no knowledge of the criminal case and had never received any summons or notice was insufficient to negate the

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respondents' decision. She argued that the issue before the authorities was not confined to the applicant's criminal liability but also concerned the disclosure required in the attestation form and his suitability for appointment to the post of Constable (Driver) in Delhi Police. She contended that the applicant had been specifically warned of the consequences of suppressing factual information and that the respondents were justified in treating the omission as material while assessing his suitability for service. 6.10 With regard to the applicant's reliance upon Avtar Singh (supra), learned counsel submitted that the said judgment does not lay down that every candidate whose criminal case has ended in closure or acquittal must necessarily be appointed or retained in service. She contended that the principles laid down therein require an assessment of the facts and circumstances of each case, including the nature of the offence, the relevant recruitment rules, the nature of the post and the candidate's suitability. According to her, the respondents had duly considered these aspects and the applicant's case was decided on its own facts. She, therefore, denied that the impugned order is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 6.11 Learned counsel also sought to distinguish the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Prashant Deep v. High Court of Delhi, W.P. (C) No. 1960/2019, relied upon by the applicant. She submitted that each case must be assessed in the light of its own facts, circumstances and evidence and that the decision in Prashant Deep (supra) cannot be applied mechanically to the present case. She

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contended that the respondents had considered the applicant's antecedents and the circumstances of the criminal case through the Screening Committee and had thereafter taken a decision regarding his suitability. Similarly, with reference to Mahendra Solanki (supra), learned counsel submitted that the observations concerning the need for a case-specific assessment do not create an automatic right to appointment or continuation in service in every case involving closure of criminal proceedings. 6.12 Learned counsel denied the allegation that the respondents had acted with a predetermined mind or had violated the principles of natural justice. She submitted that the applicant was issued a show- cause notice, was afforded an opportunity to submit his explanation and his reply had been considered by the competent authority before the impugned order was passed. She further contended that the authority had considered the character verification report, the Screening Committee's recommendations and the legal opinion obtained in the matter. The decision, according to learned counsel, was taken as an administrative measure under Rule 5(1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, to assess the applicant's suitability for continuation in service and not as a disciplinary penalty under the CCS (CCA) Rules. 6.13 Learned counsel accordingly submitted that the applicant had failed to establish any violation of Articles 14, 16 or 21 of the Constitution of India or any illegality in the exercise of the powers vested in the respondents. She contended that the impugned order was

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passed in accordance with the applicable rules and departmental instructions, after due consideration of the relevant material and the applicant's explanation, and that no ground for judicial interference had been made out. She, therefore, prayed that the instant OA be dismissed as being devoid of merit.

7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings available on record as well as the judgments on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the parties.

8. We observe that Respondent No. 5, SCC, issued a recruitment notification dated 08.07.2022 for recruitment to the post of Constable (Driver) (Male) in Delhi Police. The applicant participated in the selection process, qualified the prescribed stages of examination, physical tests and trade test, was declared medically fit and figured in the final merit list declared on 09.12.2023. The applicant submitted his attestation form on 12.12.2023 and was appointed on a provisional basis vide offer of appointment dated 12.02.2024. He joined service on 19.02.2024 and thereafter underwent basic training before being posted in the North-East District, Delhi. 8.1 It is not in dispute that FIR No.441/2017 was registered at Police Station Baraut, Uttar Pradesh, under Sections 363 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Investigating Officer submitted Final Report No. 99/17 dated 05.06.2017, recording that no evidence had been found against the applicant, whose name was placed in Column No. 12. The learned Trial Court accepted the final report vide order dated 02.11.2019, much before the applicant submitted his attestation

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form, i.e., on 12.12.2023. During verification of the applicant’s character and antecedents, the respondents received a police verification report disclosing the aforesaid FIR. The applicant was called upon to explain the circumstances relating to the case and was subsequently issued a show-cause notice dated 18.06.2025 concerning the alleged non-disclosure of the said FIR in his attestation form. The applicant submitted his reply dated 01.07.2025, explaining that the criminal proceedings had already been closed by the competent court and that he had neither deliberately suppressed any material information nor knowingly furnished any false declaration. 8.2 Thereafter, Respondent No. 3 passed the impugned order dated 11.11.2025, terminating the applicant’s services under Rule 5(1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, on the ground of alleged suppression of information concerning the criminal case. Aggrieved thereby, the applicant has approached this Tribunal seeking quashing of the termination order and reinstatement in service with consequential benefits.

9. Having heard and perused the pleadings, we observe that the principal question which arises for our consideration is whether the applicant's involvement in the aforesaid criminal case, notwithstanding the filing and acceptance of the final report, could legitimately form the basis for an adverse assessment of his suitability for appointment as Constable (Driver) in Delhi Police.

10. At the outset, we may observe that the law governing verification of character and antecedents of candidates seeking

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appointment to public employment, particularly in disciplined forces, stands well settled. In Avtar Singh v. Union of India, reported in (2016) 8 SCC 471, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that verification of antecedents is an essential exercise for determining the fitness of an incumbent and that the employer is required to take an appropriate decision having regard to the nature of the post, the duties to be discharged, the nature of the criminal allegations and the circumstances in which the criminal proceedings have culminated.

11. The aforesaid principles, however, do not confer upon a candidate an absolute or indefeasible right to appointment merely because the criminal proceedings have culminated in his favour. The decision regarding suitability is required to be taken by the employer having regard to the nature of the post and the responsibilities attached thereto. In particular, the standards applicable to recruitment in a police force cannot be equated with those applicable to ordinary civil employment.

12. In this regard, we may profitably refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Administration v. Sushil Kumar, (1996) 11 SCC 605, wherein it was held that mere acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle a candidate to appointment in the police force, since the employer is entitled to independently assess whether the candidate possesses the requisite character and antecedents for such appointment. The aforesaid principle was reiterated in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court

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emphasised the importance of character verification in police recruitment and observed that the Screening Committee is entrusted with the responsibility of examining the nature and extent of a candidate's involvement in a criminal case and assessing whether his antecedents are compatible with the responsibilities of police service. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the Screening Committee is constituted to ensure that persons possessing impeccable character and integrity enter the police force. 12.1 Recently, in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, Civil Appeal No. 3279 of 2026, decided on 11.03.2026, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the employer, acting through its Screening Committee, possesses a substantial degree of discretion in evaluating the criminal antecedents of candidates seeking appointment to a disciplined force. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the nature of the allegations, the circumstances of the criminal proceedings and the manner in which the candidate stands acquitted are relevant considerations and that judicial review cannot ordinarily be invoked to substitute the opinion of the employer with that of the Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court accordingly restored the decision of the Screening Committee rejecting the candidature of the respondent therein for appointment as Constable (Driver). The relevant paras of the said judgment are reproduced as under:- “5.3. In Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr. Vs. Mehar Singh 1 (2013) 7 SCC 685, this court had on occasion to consider the question whether the candidature of the respondents who had revealed of their involvement in a criminal case by mentioning such fact in their application/attestation form while applying for a post of constable in Delhi Police, who were provisionally selected subject to verification of their antecedents and who were subsequently acquitted/discharged in

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the criminal case, could be cancelled by the screening committee of the Delhi Police on the ground that they were not found suitable for appointment to the post of constable.

5.3.1. This Court observed that the screening committee was within its right to cancel the candidature of a candidate even if the candidate was acquitted of the criminal charges, by taking into account the nature of acquittal. It was observed that persons involved in grave cases of moral turpitude could be properly kept out of police force even if they are acquitted or discharged.

5.3.2. Stated this Court thus, ‘It is only experienced officers of the screening committee who will be able to judge whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if appointed, to the post in a police force. The screening committee will have to consider the nature and extent of such person's involvement in the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause for worsening the law and order situation rather than maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the Delhi Police does not merit any interference from this Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only persons with impeccable character enter the police force.’ (Para 23)

5.3.3. It was emphasised that satisfactory character antecedent has to be insisted for, when a person wishes to join the disciplined force, ‘The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category.’ (Para 35)

5.4. The purpose and utility of verification of a character and antecedents to judge the suitability of a person to the post need not be overemphasized. In Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors. (2016) 8 SCC 471. It was observed that it is one of the important criteria which is necessary to be fulfilled before appointment is made and that an incumbent should not have antecedents of such a nature which may adjudge him unsuitable for the post.

5.4.1. It was stated,

‘The verification of antecedents is necessary to find out fitness of incumbent, in the process if a declarant is found to be of good moral character on due verification of antecedents, merely by suppression of involvement in trivial offence which was not pending on date of filling attestation form, whether he may be deprived of employment? There may be case of involving moral turpitude/serious offence in which employee has been acquitted but due to technical reasons or giving benefit of doubt.’ (Para 29)

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5.5. In Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & Ors. Vs. Pradeep Kumar & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 797, the respondents were declared successful in the recruitment for the post of constable in Chandigarh Police after clearing the physical efficiency test, physical measurement test, written test and interview. The respondents were prosecuted in criminal trial for the offences under Sections 323, 506 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and were acquitted by the trial court. When the matter was referred to the screening committee as per the recruitment guidelines, the screening committee found that the respondents were not suitable for appointment as constables.

5.5.1. The Tribunal set aside the order of the screening committee and directed the authorities to consider the case of the respondents for appointment to the said post. The High Court refused to interfere with the order of the tribunal. This Court however did not approve the view taken by the tribunal and the High Court and restored the order of the screening committee.

5.5.2. The following principles came to enunciated by this court, (a) The acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive of the suitability of the candidates in respect of the post concerned. Even if a person is acquitted or discharged, it cannot always been inferred that he was falsely involved or he had no criminal antecedents. (Para 10)

(b) Acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle a candidate for appointment to the post. Still, it is open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether the person is suitable for appointment to the post. (Para 13)

(c) In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. (Para 12)

5.5.3. It was reiterated that police service requires candidate with good character, integrity and clean antecedents, ‘Police service requires candidates of good character, integrity and clean antecedents. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force.’

(Para 11, 13)

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5.6. In Union Territory, Chandigarh administration (supra), this Court underlined that acquittal in criminal case is not always conclusive of the suitability of a candidate, ‘The acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive of the suitability of the candidates in the post concerned. If a person is acquitted or discharged, it cannot always be inferred that he was falsely involved, or he had no criminal antecedents.’ (Para 10)

5.7. The law is also well settled that even the departmental enquiry can proceed independent of the acquittal in criminal case and that mere exoneration in criminal case would not entitle an employee to be reinstated as a necessary sequitur to the acquittal. In Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi Vs. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541, this Court held that when the High Court acquitted the respondent employee by giving benefit of doubt, the bank rightly refused to reinstate him in service on the ground that it was not an honourable acquittal. Further, the criminal antecedents of an employee and the nature of his acquittal is considered germane to be applied by the employer even while determining the entitlement of pay and allowance for the period concerned to the employee or for treating the period of suspension on duty.

6. As is already stated, in the present case, the respondent was charged in respect of the offences under Sections 363, 366, 366/120B, 366A, 376(2)(c) which were the offences in the nature of grave moral turpitude. Every moral turpitude has its own counts and degree to become either abhorrent and unacceptable conduct, and would also amount to commission of offence under the law. In a given case, moral turpitude may not result into a legally proved guilt, and it may go unpunished for variety of reasons. Still however, it remains a conduct against decency, morality and norms practiced in the civil society inviting a serious discount and disability for such person in a given situation and given context.

6.1. In service law jurisprudence, mere involvement of a person in an offence or in a conduct amounting to moral turpitude without anything else may become relevant consideration to judge his fitness to the post and to assess credentials for allowing such a person into the employment.

7. The necessary conclusion from the parameters and principles summarised above, is that whether it is a question of recruiting a person into the service or continuing him in service or extending an employee some service benefit, his criminal antecedents, involvement in criminal activity, the conduct amounting to moral turpitude, registration of a criminal case as well as nature of his acquittal in a criminal case are all germane considerations to be applied. The employer who would be acting through a screening committee to sift such cases, has fairly a large realm of freedom to act, though without becoming arbitrary.

7.1. The area of discretion vested with the screening committee in this regard is wide enough to permit it to exclude a candidate or reject him for the purpose of giving appointment. In a given case where the facts are stark, mere involvement of a person in an alleged offence or in the act of moral turpitude may become sufficient enough to apply it as debilitating factor for such candidate to be offered employment.

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Antecedents of a candidate play an important role in the decision- making process by the screening committee. This dictum would operate with greater rigour when it comes to the recruitment and appointment to the disciplined force like police.

7.2. The position of law was highlighted again in the following observations by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Parvez Khan (2015) 2 SCC 591,

‘…it is clear that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must be worthy of confidence and must be a person of utmost rectitude and must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was completely exonerated. Persons who are likely to erode the credibility of the police ought not to enter the police force.’ (Para 13)

7.2.1. It was further stated,

‘No doubt the screening committee has not been constituted in the case considered by this Court, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, in the present case, the Superintendent of Police has gone into the matter. The Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority. There is no allegation of mala fides against the person taking the said decision nor the decision is shown to be perverse or irrational.’ (Para 13)

7.3. The domain of considering the fitness and suitability of a candidate for the purpose of taking him in service belongs to the employer. A host of relevant consideration would legitimately find a place in the process of such consideration by the employer to decide whether it is feasible and advisable to offer employment to an aspirant. Where the employer or the screening committee of the employer has acted to discard, exclude or reject the candidature by applying relevant considerations and has not acted arbitrarily or whimsically, the courts have no role to interpose. Of course, a demonstrably mala fide approach by the employer would give room to the courts to exercise the power of judicial review.

8. In Mehar Singh (supra) and in Parvez Khan (supra), this court opined that the decision of the screening committee must be taken as final unless as it is shown to be mala fide. The screening committee also must be alive to the importance of the trust reposed in it and must examine the candidate with utmost care for the candidate’s character.

9. But for the above limited considerations namely arbitrariness, unreasonableness, whimsicalness or mala fide approach, the scope of judicial review on this score is extremely limited. The courts are not expected to override the wisdom of the employer in judging the suitability of a candidate and in considering the relevance of the antecedents of the candidate and would not substitute its own view.

9.1. Reverting back to the facts of the instant case, the screening committee of the appellant rejected the candidature of the respondent for the post of constable (driver) in police force as per the decision

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dated 16.06.2017. What weighed with the screening committee was that the respondent was found to be involved in the serious offences such as kidnapping and abducting a minor girl and raping her, which was a conduct undoubtedly amounting to moral turpitude. The respondent, though acquitted in the criminal case, was exonerated only on the ground of benefit of doubt.

9.2. Learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the petition upholding the decision of the screening committee. The judgment and order of learned Single Judge of the High Court, which was eminently just and legal, came to be reversed by the Division Bench of the High Court for not good reason, directing that the acquittal ought to have been treated as an honourable acquittal and required the appellant- employer to consider the respondent for appointment to the post. The Division Bench of the High Court thereby intruded into the functional realm of the screening committee and trampled upon its discretion which was validly exercised by the Committee to treat the respondent unsuitable to be employed in the police force.

10. For the foregoing discussion and reason, the impugned judgment and order dated 20.07.2023 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court allowing Writ Appeal No. 297 of 2023 cannot be sustained in eye of law. The same is set aside.”

13. The aforesaid judgment is particularly relevant for the present controversy, as it concerns appointment to the post of Constable (Driver) in a police force and reiterates the limited scope of judicial review in matters relating to suitability of candidates on the basis of their criminal antecedents. It makes clear that even where criminal proceedings have culminated in acquittal, the competent authority is not precluded from independently examining the antecedents of a candidate and arriving at an appropriate conclusion regarding his suitability for appointment.

14. We are also conscious of the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Rahul v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 12239/2022, decided on 06.11.2025, wherein the Hon’ble High Court held that the mere non-disclosure of a criminal case cannot invariably be treated as deliberate suppression when the candidate had already

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been exonerated by the investigating agency before submission of the attestation form. The Hon’ble High Court, however, reiterated the principles laid down in Avtar Singh (supra) that the employer is required to act objectively and that the question of suitability must be determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The relevant paras of the same are reproduced as under:- “36. Having considered the rival submissions and perused the material placed on record, this Court finds that the pivotal issue for determination in the present case is whether the petitioner, whose candidature was cancelled on the ground of alleged suppression of a criminal case, can be denied appointment to the post of Constable (GD) in the RPSF, even though his name was deleted from the charge sheet prior to submission of the Attestation Form and a Final Report exonerating him had already been accepted by the competent court. The question, therefore, turns upon the correct application of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Avtar Singh (supra) and Satish Chandra Yadav (supra).

37. In Avtar Singh (supra), the Supreme Court undertook an exhaustive survey of the law governing suppression of criminal antecedents in verification and Attestation Forms. The three-Judge Bench observed that, while integrity is an indispensable attribute for government service, particularly in disciplined forces, fairness and proportionality must govern the decision of the employer. The Court cautioned against adopting a mechanical approach that treats every omission as suppression, and instead emphasised a context sensitive exercise of discretion. The Supreme Court held as follows:

“22. The employer is given ‘discretion’ to terminate or otherwise to condone the omission. Even otherwise, once employer has the power to take a decision when at the time of filling verification form declarant has already been convicted/acquitted, in such a case, it becomes obvious that all the facts and attending circumstances, including impact of suppression or false information are taken into consideration while adjudging suitability of an incumbent for services in question. In case the employer come to the conclusion that suppression is immaterial and even if facts would have been disclosed would not have affected adversely fitness of an incumbent, for reasons to be recorded, it has power to condone the lapse. However, while doing so employer has to act prudently on due consideration of nature of post and duties to be rendered. For higher

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officials/higher posts, standard has to be very high and even slightest false information or suppression may by itself render a person unsuitable for the post. However same standard cannot be applied to each and every post. In concluded criminal cases, it has to be seen what has been suppressed is material fact and would have rendered an incumbent unfit for appointment. An employer would be justified in not appointing or if appointed to terminate services of such incumbent on due consideration of various aspects. Even if disclosure has been made truthfully the employer has the right to consider fitness and while doing so effect of conviction and background facts of case, nature of offence etc. have to be considered. Even if acquittal has been made, employer may consider nature of offence, whether acquittal is honourable or giving benefit of doubt on technical reasons and decline to appoint a person who is unfit or dubious character. In case employer comes to conclusion that conviction or ground of acquittal in criminal case would not affect the fitness for employment incumbent may be appointed or continued in service.” (Emphasis Supplied)

38. The ratio decidendi in the above-mentioned paragraph makes it clear that each case must be examined on its individual facts. The employer cannot act arbitrarily or mechanically but must consider the nature of the offence, the status of the criminal proceedings, and whether the omission was deliberate or bona fide.

39. Further, the Supreme Court observed that, “Suppression of ‘material’ information presupposes that what is suppressed matters; not every technical or trivial matter.” This enunciation draws a distinction between “material” and “immaterial” suppression. Only the former, i.e., concealment of information that may have direct bearing upon a candidate’s integrity or suitability can justify termination; inadvertent or trivial omissions cannot attract such a consequence.

40. The core principle laid down in Avatar Singh (supra), has been dealt with by us in Srikanta Gorain v Union of India W.P.(C) 6191/2025, wherein it was held that:

“23. As would be clear from Avtar Singh , it has been clearly laid down that though a person who has suppressed the material information cannot claim unfettered right for appointment, he or she has a right not to be dealt with arbitrarily. The exercise of power has to be in a reasonable manner with objectivity and having due regard to the facts. In short, the ultimate action should be based upon objective criteria after due consideration of all relevant aspects.”

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41. From the above, it emerges that the exercise of power must be carried out reasonably, with objectivity, and in due regard to the facts in each case.

42. The respondents, however, have placed reliance on Satish Chandra Yadav (supra), whereby the Supreme Court upheld termination of candidates in the Central Reserve Police Force who had failed to disclose pending criminal cases. The respondents urge that the same principle applies here since the Final Report had not yet been formally accepted by the Magistrate when the petitioner submitted his Attestation Form.

43. This Court has carefully examined the ratio in Satish Chandra Yadav (supra). The said decision indeed reiterates that members of the various uniformed forces are expected to maintain unimpeachable integrity and that suppression of pending criminal cases amounts to lack of candour. However, the decision is distinguishable in light of the fact that it dealt with candidates who had knowingly and consciously withheld disclosure of pending criminal proceedings cases that were very much alive on the date of declaration. Hence, this decision is not applicable in the present case. The reliance placed by the respondents on Satish Chandra Yadav (supra) is, therefore, misplaced. That judgment cannot be read as laying down an inflexible rule that any non-disclosure, irrespective of intent or factual context, mandates cancellation. Rather, even in Satish Chandra Yadav (supra), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the applicability of the Avtar Singh (supra) principles that suppression must be deliberate and material to justify such action.

44. By contrast, the factual matrix in the present case is markedly different. The record reveals that the Final Report dated 20.06.2019 had already exonerated the petitioner before he submitted the Attestation Form on 23.07.2019. The Investigating Officer had categorically deleted the petitioner’s name from the charge sheet, and no summons, warrant, or notice had ever been issued to him. Thus, at the time of submitting the Attestation Form, there existed no pending criminal case in law against the petitioner.

45. Once a competent Court accepts a Final Report, it can be said that the conclusions therein attain judicial recognition. Accordingly, the exoneration of an accused in such report amounts to the competent court acknowledging/accepting the findings of the said report regarding involvement of such accused person. The respondents’ contention that the Final Report was accepted by the Magistrate only on 06.11.2019, does not materially alter this conclusion. The petitioner’s exoneration was complete in substance as of 20.06.2019, and the subsequent judicial acknowledgment merely formalised it. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that any case was “pending” within the meaning contemplated in the Attestation Form.

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46. Applying these settled principles to the present facts, this Court finds that the petitioner’s omission was neither deliberate nor material. The petitioner was not named in the charge sheet, and no criminal proceeding was pending against him when he submitted the Attestation Form. Hence, his declaration cannot be construed as false or misleading or would tantamount to suppression of any material facts.

47. The Speaking Order dated 03.09.2021 suffers from nonapplication of mind. The authority has merely reiterated earlier findings without examining whether, on the date of submission of the Attestation Form, any pending case actually existed against the petitioner. The impugned order does not reflect any consideration of the exoneration recorded in the Final Report. Further, the said order disregards the principle of proportionality.

48. Upon applying the higher threshold applicable to uniformed forces, as recognised in Avtar Singh (supra), the action of the respondents cannot be sustained. Fairness and proportionality are nonderogable principles even in such services, and disqualification of a candidate, who stood exonerated prior to submission of the Attestation Form, would amount to arbitrary exercise of discretion.

49. This Court accordingly holds that only conscious and deliberate suppression of a pending criminal case by a candidate possessing actual knowledge can justify cancellation of candidature. Where the omission is bona fide, and the proceedings have already concluded in the candidate’s favour, the doctrine of proportionality requires that the benefit be extended to such candidate.

50. In the present case, the petitioner’s declaration in the Attestation Form was consistent with the factual position at the time of its submission. The finding of suppression, as recorded by the respondents is, therefore, untenable in law and contrary to the ratio of Avtar Singh (supra). Further, the reliance on Satish Chandra Yadav (supra) by the respondents is misconceived, as that decision dealt with deliberate concealment of ongoing prosecutions, which is clearly distinguishable from the instant case.

51. For all the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is allowed.

52. The impugned order is accordingly quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner’s candidature without the FIR No. 125/2019 or the criminal trial acting as an aggravating factor against the petitioner and extend him consequential and attendant benefits, in accordance with law.”

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The aforesaid decision does not lay down an inflexible proposition that every candidate against whom a final report has been accepted must necessarily be appointed or continued in service. The issue of suitability continues to remain within the domain of the competent authority, subject to the requirement that its decision should not be arbitrary, unreasonable or founded upon irrelevant considerations. 14.1 We may further refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in The Commissioner of Police & Ors. v. Manoj Kumar, W.P.(C) No. 19316/2025, decided on 16.01.2026, wherein the Hon’ble High Court examined the cancellation of candidature for the post of Constable (Driver) in Delhi Police on account of non-disclosure of an earlier criminal case. The Hon’ble High Court, while considering the principles laid down in Avtar Singh, Mahendra Solanki and other authorities, reiterated that the assessment of suitability must be undertaken having regard to the nature of the allegations, the circumstances of the criminal proceedings and the nature of the post. The Hon’ble High Court declined to interfere with the Tribunal's decision in the facts of that case, which involved a concluded criminal case arising out of a private dispute. 14.2 We also deem it appropriate to refer the relevant paras of the Order/Judgment dated 20.03.2024 in OA No.332/2022, titled Jhabbu Kumar Ram vs. Union of India and others, which are as under:- “33. We are in seisin with the short issue which arises for consideration is “whether the respondents in passing the impugned orders are justified, whereby the services of the applicant was terminated on the ground of the suppression of the

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material information in the Attestation Form dated 23.05.2015, filled by the applicant?”

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has settled the legal prepositions, as such the issue on hand is squarely covered by the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Case Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and others Versus Ram Ratan Yadav, reported in (2003) 3 SCC 437. The relevant paragraph 11 and 12 reads as under:-

11. “It is not in dispute that a criminal case registered under Sections 323, 341, 294, 506 read with Section 34 IPC was pending on the date when the respondent filled the attestation form. Hence, the information given by the respondent as against columns 12 and 13 as “No” is plainly suppression of material information and it is also a false statement. Admittedly, the respondent is holder of BA, BEd and MEd degrees. Assuming even his medium of instruction was Hindi throughout, no prudent man can accept that he did not study English language at all at any stage of his education. It is also not the case of the respondent that he did not study English at all. If he could understand columns 1-11 correctly in the same attestation form, it is difficult to accept his version that he could not correctly understand the contents of columns 12 and 13. Even otherwise, if he could not correctly understand certain English words, in the ordinary course he could have certainly taken the help of somebody. This being the position, the Tribunal was right in rejecting the contention of the respondent and the High Court committed a manifest error in accepting the contention that because the medium of instruction of the respondent was Hindi, he could not understand the contents of columns 12 and 13. It is not the case that columns 12 and 13 are left blank. The respondent could not have said “No” as against columns 12 and 13 without understanding the contents. Subsequent withdrawal of criminal case registered against the respondent or the nature of offences, in our opinion, were not material. The requirement of filling columns 12 and 13 of the attestation form was for the purpose of verification of character and antecedents of the respondent as on the date of filling and attestation of the form. Suppression of material information and making a false statement has a clear bearing on the character and antecedents of the respondent in relation to his continuance in service.

12. The object of requiring information in columns 12 and 13 of the attestation form and certification thereafter by the candidate was to ascertain and verify the character and antecedents to judge his suitability to continue in service. A candidate having suppressed material information and/or giving false information cannot claim right to continue in service. The employer having regard to the nature of the employment and all other aspects had the discretion to terminate his services, which is made expressly clear in para 9 of the offer of appointment. The purpose of seeking information as per columns 12 and 13 was not to find out either the nature or gravity of the

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offence or the result of a criminal case ultimately. The information in the said columns was sought with a view to judge the character and antecedents of the respondent to continue in service or not. The High Court, in our view, has failed to see this aspect of the matter. It went wrong in saying that the criminal case had been subsequently withdrawn and that the offences, in which the respondent was alleged to have been involved, were also not of serious nature. In the present case the respondent was to serve as a Physical Education Teacher in Kendriya Vidyalaya. The character, conduct and antecedents of a teacher will have some impact on the minds of the students of impressionable age. The appellants having considered all the aspects passed the order of dismissal of the respondent from service. The Tribunal after due consideration rightly recorded a finding of fact in upholding the order of dismissal passed by the appellants. The High Court was clearly in error in upsetting the order of the Tribunal. The High Court was again not right in taking note of the withdrawal of the case by the State Government and that the case was not of a serious nature to set aside the order of the Tribunal on that ground as well. The respondent accepted the offer of appointment subject to the terms and conditions mentioned therein with his eyes wide open. Para 9 of the said memorandum extracted above in clear terms kept the respondent informed that the suppression of any information may lead to dismissal from service. In the attestation form, the respondent has certified that the information given by him is correct and complete to the best of his knowledge and belief; if he could not understand the contents of columns 12 and 13, he could not certify so. Having certified that the information given by him is correct and complete, his version cannot be accepted. The order of termination of services clearly shows that there has been due consideration of various aspects. In this view, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that as per para 9 of the memorandum, the termination of service was not automatic, cannot be accepted.”

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

35. But it is settled position of law that judgment has got no universal application rather the judgment is to be tested on the basis of fact of each case. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Subramanian Swamy versus State of Tamil Nadu and others, (2014) 5 SCC75. The relevant paragraph 47 which reads as under --- “47. It is a settled legal proposition that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and the case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. “The Court should not-place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact Situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.”

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[Emphasis supplied]

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

44. Accordingly the issue is decided. It is the trite Law that it is the prerogative of an employer to consider the antecedents of a candidate and in present case the employer in his own wisdom has decided not to consider the applicant for appointment on suppression of material information in the attestation form and on account of pendency of a Criminal case against him at time of filling up the attestation form dated 25.3.2015. Undisputedly the applicant answered in writing no criminal cases pending whereas applicant was convicted under Section 302 of IPC for life Imprisonment in year 2010 and as on 25.03.2015 was convicted person. The applicant suppressed the information as to criminal case and ignored warning given in clause no. 11 of appointment order dt. 13.03.2015 and warning no. 1,2 & 3 and 12 in the attestation form dated 25.03.2015 stipulates that furnishing of false information suppression of any material information in the attestation form would lead to disqualification of the applicant.

45. The appointing authority found applicant not suitable to the post on account of the material suppression of his criminal antecedents. The impugned orders have been passed on account of suppression of material information and obtaining appointment order fraudulently having bearing his continuity in the service and not due to conviction in the Sessions Trial no. 10/2007, hence acquittal has no bearing on the merit of the case.

46. We do not find any infirmity or irregularity in the impugned orders dated 13.02.2017 and orders dated 20/22.1.2020 and 16.2.2022 and interference in the present Original application is declined.

CONCLUSION

47. We have already analysed in detail the issue in light of aforesaid analysis. Accordingly, we decide the issue against the applicant. The impugned orders in the present OA are upheld being justified on ground of suppression of material in the Attestation Form and same do not suffer from any infirmity, remain unassailable and applicant is not entitled to the relief sought in the O.A.”

15. Having regard to the aforesaid legal position, we are unable to accept the applicant's contention that the bailable nature of the offences alleged against him, or the subsequent acceptance of the final report by the competent criminal court, by itself, renders the impugned action illegal. The classification of an offence as bailable is

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primarily relevant for the purpose of determining the entitlement of an accused to bail under criminal law. Such classification, by itself, cannot be treated as conclusive for determining suitability for appointment in a disciplined force.

16. It is equally pertinent to observe that the proceedings relating to verification of character and antecedents are distinct from criminal proceedings. The object of such verification is not to determine the guilt or innocence of a candidate, but to ascertain whether his antecedents and conduct are compatible with the nature of the post for which he is being considered. Consequently, the acceptance of a final report by the criminal court, although a relevant circumstance, does not necessarily obliterate the factum of the allegations or deprive the employer of its authority to undertake an independent assessment of suitability.

17. We are also unable to accept the proposition that the respondents were necessarily required to defer their decision until the criminal proceedings had reached a particular stage or that the acceptance of the final report automatically required the applicant to be treated as suitable for appointment. The competent authority is entitled to examine the material relating to the criminal case and to form its own opinion regarding suitability, provided such opinion is based upon relevant considerations and is not arbitrary or perverse.

18. In the present case, the applicant was seeking appointment to the post of Constable (Driver) in Delhi Police. The nature of the post and the responsibilities attached thereto necessarily require a high

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degree of integrity, discipline and public confidence. The applicant's contention that the respondents ought to have attached greater weight to the bailable nature of the offences and the acceptance of the final report cannot, in our considered opinion, be elevated to a legal requirement which would render the impugned decision unsustainable.

19. We may clarify that the mere registration of an FIR or the mere fact that a candidate has been named therein cannot, in every case, be treated as conclusive proof of unsuitability. Nevertheless, the employer is entitled to examine the circumstances in which the candidate was implicated, the nature of the allegations, the material available from the police authorities and the overall antecedents of the candidate. The decision of the competent authority must be viewed in the context of the responsibilities attached to the post and the requirement of maintaining public confidence in the police force.

20. The scope of judicial review in such matters is, therefore, limited. This Tribunal is not required to undertake a fresh assessment of the applicant's suitability as though it were the Screening Committee or the appointing authority. Interference would be justified only where the decision is shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, perverse, irrational or based upon irrelevant considerations. In the absence of any such infirmity, the opinion of the competent authority deserves due deference.

21. In view of the aforesaid discussion and having regard to the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Avtar Singh

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(supra), Sushil Kumar (supra), Mehar Singh (supra) and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav (supra) as well as the decision of Patna Bench of this Tribunal in OA 332/2022 (supra), we find no sufficient ground to interfere with the impugned order dated 11.11.2025. The applicant has failed to establish that the decision of the respondents suffers from any illegality, arbitrariness or perversity warranting interference by this Tribunal.

22. In view of the foregoing discussion, the instant Original Application is dismissed.

23. There shall be no order as to costs.

(Rajinder Kashyap)

(R.N. Singh) Member (A)

Member (J)

/ravi/

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