Naveen Dabas vs Govt. Of Nctd on 28 October 2026

1. Govt. of NCT of Delhi through its Chief Secretary, Delhi Secretariat, I.P. Estate, Delhi.

2. The Principal Secretariat, (Finance) Govt. of NCT of Delhi 'A' Wing, 4th Level Delhi Secretariat, I.P. Estate, New Delhi.

3. The Commissioner (VAT) Govt. of NCT of Delhi Department of Trade & Taxes Vyapar Bhawan (Vigilance Branch) I.P Estate, New Delhi-110002.

… Respondents

(By Advocate:- Mr. Amit Yadav with Mr. M Rehan)

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O R D E R (ORAL) By Hon’ble Mr. R. N. Singh, Member (J) We have heard the learned counsels for the parties and with their assistance, we have also perused the pleadings available on record.

2. In the present O.A., the applicant has prayed for the following reliefs:- “i) To declare the action of respondents in subjecting the applicant to disciplinary action on false allegations as illegal and set aside Charge Memo No. F4 (117)/Vig/2014/DTI/ 1257-1263 dated 8.09.2014 (A-3), Penalty Order No.F-4 (117) 2014/Vig/DTT/527 Dated 11.04.2017 (A-2) and Appellate Authority Order No. F.No.4 (117)/2014/Vig/DTT/ Pt.File 1713 dated 11/05/2018 (A-1) with further directions to reinstate the applicant in service with all consequential benefits including arrears of pay from the date of dismissal.

ii) To quash and set aside the impugned charge sheet, inquiry report removal order as well as Appellate Authority order dated 11.05.2018 with further directions to give all consequential benefits as accrued to applicant on quashing of impugned disciplinary proceedings including final penalty orders.

iii) To allow the OA with cost.

iv) Any other orders may also be passed as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the existing facts and circumstances of the case.”

3. The claim of the applicant has been contested by the respondent by filing counter reply and they have prayed for dismissal of the O.A. with cost. The applicant has filed the rejoinder and has reiterated his claim and grounds pleaded in support thereof.

4. It is undisputed that the applicant, working as LDC/Grade 4 (DASS), was departmentally proceeded against DHRUV MEHRA

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for allegations of committing irregularities in respect of preparation and withdrawal of salary in fictitious name with connivance of one, Mr. Chandra Shekhar, Data Entry Operator, hired from M/s ICSIL and obtained ECS No. from PAO-10 in the name of Mr. Parveen and had drawn salary for the month of May in 2014 in the name of Mr. Dharmendar Singh Pundir, whereas the said Mr. Pundir has already been relieved on 27.02.2014 as LPC was issued to him on 09.05.2014 and for the month of June, 2014, in the name of Mr. Rahul Kumar as VATO/Assistant Commissioner. For the alleged misconduct, a complaint was lodged with the Police vide FIR No. 36/2015 registered u/s 420/468/471/120 IPC with PS I P Estate, New Delhi.

5. The departmental enquiry against the applicant was initiated vide memorandum dated 08.09.2014. The applicant denied the allegations and IO and PO were appointed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 13.10.2016. The applicant submitted his defence representation and the Disciplinary Authority passed order dated 11.04.2017, inflicting penalty of removal from service. Aggrieved by such order of the Disciplinary Authority, the applicant submitted his detailed statutory appeal, which has been rejected by the Appellate Authority DHRUV MEHRA

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vide impugned order dated 11.05.2017 and thus, the present O.A.

6. Learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the impugned orders of penalty have been passed based on no evidence. He further submits that the Inquiry Officer has, though, recorded in its report dated 07.11.2016 that none of the witnesses specifically deposed anything against the applicant, however, the Inquiry Officer has returned findings of the allegations proved against the applicant on the basis of principle of preponderance of probability.

7. Mr. Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the applicant submits that it is trite law that in the departmental inquiry, strict proof of evidence beyond reasonable doubt may not be required, however, some evidence in support of allegations must be there. In this regard, he refers and places reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in M. V. Bijlani vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88, particularly Para 25 thereof and also in law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors. reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570, particularly Paras 14 to 18 thereof. DHRUV MEHRA

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8. On the other hand, Mr. Yadav, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, by referring to the assertions made in the counter reply, submits that for the alleged misconduct, a complaint has been lodged with Police which got registered as FIR No. 36/2015 with PS I P Estate, New Delhi u/s 420/468/471/120 IPC. He submits that the latest developments in the said case FIR is not known to him. By inviting our attention to Inquiry Officer’s report, he submits that though the Inquiry Officer has recorded that none of the witnesses specifically deposed against the applicant, however, the Inquiry Officer has rightly, in view of principle of preponderance of probability, returned findings of the charges as established, keeping in view the fact, the account holder to whom the salary was credited is the brother of the original applicant and Accounts Branch of the Department and has no cogent convincing reason to know the specific bank account number, branch of the bank, IFSC code, etc. without connivance between CO and the dealing assistant/Mr. Chander Shekhar, the then DEO.

9. Learned counsel for the respondents has further argued that the Courts and Tribunals in the matter of departmental inquiry are not expected to look into the matter as Appellate Authorities are supposed to. The limited DHRUV MEHRA

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jurisdiction of the Tribunals and Courts in such matters are only to look into the decision making process, whether any mandatory rules and provisions and principle of natural justice have been complied with or not. In this regard, he has placed reliance on the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of B C Chaturvedi vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 1995 (6) SCC 749.

10. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties.

11. As per the statement of charges, the allegations against the applicant are as under:- “ARTICLE-I Sh. Naveen Dabas, LDC/GR-IV (DASS) (Now Under suspension) while functioning as LDC, in the office of Accounts Branch, Department of Trade & Taxes, GNCT of Delhi, committed irregularities in respect of preparation of drawn of salary in fictitious name. A report dated 17.07.2014 of Sh. Harendar Singh, DDO, Trade & Taxes Department reveals that Sh. Naveen Dabas, LDC/Gr.-IV (DASS) (Now under suspension) with the connivance of Sh. Chander Shekhar, Data Entry Operator hired from M/s ICSIL, obtained the ECS No. from PAO-10 in the name of one Shri Parveen, resident of Main Qutub Garh Road, Ladpur, Delhi and drawn salary for the month of May-14 & June-14 (Rs.71,128/- in the month of May, 2014 & Rs.71,128/- in the month of June, 2014) in the name of Sh. Dharmendar Singh Pundir, VATO/Asstt. Comm., whereas Shri Dharmendar Singh Pundir was already relieved on 27.02.2014 (LPC issed to him on 09.05.14) and in the name of Shri Rahul Kumar as VATO/Asstt. Comm. which is fictitious. Sh. Naveen Dabas, LDC/GR-IV (DASS) was placed under suspension vide order No. F.4(117)/Vig/2014/DTT/849 dated 18.07.2014 of Commissioner (VAT), Department of Trade & Taxes, GNCT of Delhi. By doing so, the said Sh. Naveen Dabas, LDC/GR-IV (DASS), (Now Under suspension), committed misconduct and failed to DHRUV MEHRA

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maintain absolute integrity and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Govt. servant and thereby violated the provisions of Rule 3 of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.”

12. From the aforesaid allegations, it is apparent that the allegations against the applicant are two-fold:-

(i) That the applicant committed irregularity in respect of preparation of drawn salary in fictitious name.

(ii) Report dated 17.07.2014 of one, Mr. Harendar Singh, DDO, Trade & Taxes Department revealed that the applicant with connivance of one, Mr. Chander Shekhar, Data Entry Operator obtained ECF No. from PAO-10 in name of one, Mr. Parveen and drawn salary for the month of May and June, 2014.

13. With regard to the first limb of allegations, there is nothing on record including in the report of the Inquiry Officer that the responsibility of preparation of bills or drawing of salary bill was the duty of the applicant, if at all the same was the duty, in what manner he has committed any irregularity and how this irregularity could not be checked by the supervisory authority inasmuch as the applicant was working on the lowest post, i.e., LDC. DHRUV MEHRA

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14. With regard to second limb of allegations against the applicant, the main witness, i.e., Mr. Harendar Singh, whose report dated 17.07.2014 is the basis of second limb of allegations, in his deposition during the inquiry and in reply to cross question no. 2, has stated that he did not know when and where and by whom the two additional documents were prepared. In reply to cross question no. 3, he also stated that he did not conduct any inquiry in respect of two additional documents, which were produced at the later stage during the inquiry proceedings. In reply to cross question, the witness admitted that no inquiry was conducted in respect of entry/detail dated 15.07.2014 of the bank account statement related to Mr. Parveen. Once, the said Mr. Harendar Singh, who is stated to have submitted a report dated 17.07.2014, against the applicant has himself not proved the said report and/or the inquiry stated to have been conducted by him, we fail to understand on what basis the inquiry officer has applied the principle of preponderance of probability to return findings of allegations as to have been established.

15. It is also not in dispute that no witness has been examined to prove that the alleged withdrawal of the salary DHRUV MEHRA

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for the alleged two months was credited in the bank account of the brother of the applicant nor in any manner the applicant has admitted that he allowed in any manner crediting of any money in his brother’s bank account. There is no dispute that strict evidence is not required in the departmental inquiry, however, it is also not in dispute that there must be some evidence to indicate, at least, probability of committing the misconduct.

16. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M. V. Bijlani (supra), in Para 25, ruled as under:- “25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidences to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with.”

17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi (supra) in Paras 14 to 18, ruled as under:- “14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial function. The charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said DHRUV MEHRA

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documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence.

15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the Enquiry Officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. Appellant being an employee of the bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the Enquiry Officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left.

16. In Union of India vs. H.S. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718, it was held: "22. The two infirmities are separate and distinct though, conceivably, in some cases, both may be present. There may be cases of no evidence even where the Government is acting bona fide; the said infirmity may also exist where the Government is acting mala fide and in that case, the conclusion of the Government not supported by any evidence may be the result of mala fides, but that does not mean that if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorari will not issued without further proof of mala fides. That is why we are not prepared to accept the learned Attorney-General's argument that sine no mala fides are alleged against the appellant in the present case, no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of the respondent.

23. That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charged framed against the respondent has been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney-General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by he appellant is a reasonably possible view, this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondents case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against DHRUV MEHRA

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the respondent that charge No. 3 was proved against him ? In exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which dealt with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charges in question is proved against the respondent ? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance is well-founded because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence.

17. In Moni Shankar v. Union of India and Anr. [(2008) 3 SCC 484], this Court held: “17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The Court exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely - preponderance of probability. If on such evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality."

18. In Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors. (supra), whereupon both the learned counsel relied upon, this Court held: DHRUV MEHRA

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"26. In our opinion the learned Single Judge and consequently the Division Bench of the High Court did not pose unto themselves the correct question. The matter can be viewed from two angles. Despite limited jurisdiction a civil court, it was entitled to interfere in a case where the report of the Enquiry Officer is based on no evidence. In a suit filed by a delinquent employee in a civil court as also a writ court, in the event the findings arrived at in the departmental proceedings are questioned before it should keep in mind the following: (1) the enquiry officer is not permitted to collect any material from outside sources during the conduct of the enquiry. [See State of Assam and Anr. v. Mahendra Kumar Das and Ors. [(1970) 1 SCC 709]

(2) In a domestic enquiry fairness in the procedure is a part of the principles of natural justice [See Khem Chand v. Union of India and Ors. (1958 SCR 1080) and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Om Prakash Gupta (1969) 3 SCC 775]. (3) Exercise of discretionary power involve two elements (i) Objective and (ii) subjective and existence of the exercise of an objective element is a condition precedent for exercise of the subjective element. [See K.L. Tripathi v. State of Bank of India and Ors. (1984) 1 SCC 43]. (4) It is not possible to lay down any rigid rules of the principles of natural justice which depends on the facts and circumstances of each case but the concept of fair play in action is the basis. [See Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1986) 3 SCC 454] (5) The enquiry officer is not permitted to travel beyond the charges and any punishment imposed on the basis of a finding which was not the subject matter of the charges is wholly illegal. [See Director (Inspection & quality Control) Export Inspection Council of India and Ors. v. Kalyan Kumar Mitra and Ors. 1987 (2) Cal. LJ 344. (6) Suspicion or presumption cannot take the place of proof even in a domestic enquiry. The writ court is entitled to interfere with the findings of the fact of any tribunal or authority in certain circumstances. [See Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain (1969) 1 SCR 735, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police and Ors. (1999) 2 SCC 10]."”

18. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered view that the judgment in the case of B C Chaturvedi (supra) relied by the learned counsel for the respondents does not help the respondents whereas the judgments relied on behalf of the applicant fully supports arguments advanced on behalf of the applicant. Accordingly, the O.A. deserves to be allowed and the same is allowed with following orders:- DHRUV MEHRA

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(i) The Charge Memo dated 08.09.2014 (Annexure A- 3), Penalty Order dated 11.04.2017 (Annexure A-2) and Appellate Authority Order dated 11.05.2018 (Annexure A-1) are set aside.

(ii) The respondents shall reinstate the applicant from the date of removal from service.

(iii) The applicant shall be entitled for all consequential benefits, i.e., continuity of service, seniority, etc., however, the applicant shall be entitled for back wages only to the extent of 50% of admissible salary to him.

(iv) The aforesaid directions shall be complied with by the respondents as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of this Order.

19. No order as to costs.

(Sanjeeva Kumar)

(R. N. Singh) Member (A)

Member (J)

/dhruv/ DHRUV MEHRA

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