MR SUNIL KUMAR vs HIGHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENT on 3 November 2026

1. There is no representation for the applicant.

2. The applicant has filed the instant Miscellaneous Application seeking condonation of delay in filing the accompanying application for restoration of TA No. 117/2024, which came to be dismissed in default vide order dated 06.06.2025.

3. The applicant, in the application, has submitted that the matter was initially instituted before the Hon'ble High Court in the year 2007 and was subsequently transferred to this Tribunal in the year 2024. It is averred that on an earlier date of hearing, the counsel for the applicant could not appear as he was engaged before another Bench, whereas on 06.06.2025, when the matter was dismissed in default, he was indisposed and could not join the proceedings through video conferencing. It is further stated that the absence of counsel was neither intentional nor deliberate and that the applicant is interested in pursuing the matter. According to the applicant, he came to know about the dismissal only upon enquiring from his counsel, whereafter he applied for and obtained a certified copy of the order and filed the restoration application. It is prayed that the delay may be condoned in the interest of justice.

4. The respondents have opposed the application, contending that no sufficient cause has been disclosed either for the non-appearance on 06.06.2025 or for the subsequent delay in approaching this Tribunal. It is specifically submitted that the restoration application has been filed on 24.07.2026, whereas the TA was dismissed on 06.06.2025, and the applicant has failed to explain the intervening period which constituted delay of about 403 days. It is also pointed out that the matter pertains to a recruitment process initiated in the year 1997 and involves a long-standing dispute, while the relevant official records of the Department were destroyed in the fire that occurred in the Civil Secretariat on 11.07.2013, as acknowledged vide Government Order No. 277-HE of 2013 dated 30.12.2013.

5. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

6. The question which arises for consideration is whether the applicant has been able to demonstrate sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the restoration application.

7. At the outset, it is pertinent to notice that the TA was dismissed in default on 06.06.2025, whereas the accompanying restoration application has been filed on 24.07.2026. Thus, the application for restoration has been filed after a lapse of more than thirteen months from the date of dismissal. However, the applicant has neither specifically disclosed the exact period of delay nor furnished any cogent explanation accounting for the entire intervening period.

8. The explanation furnished by the applicant primarily relates to the inability of the learned counsel to appear on the date when the matter was dismissed. Even if the reason assigned for non-appearance on 06.06.2025 is accepted at its face value, the same, by itself does not explain the prolonged delay in approaching this Tribunal thereafter. The applicant was required to explain as to when he acquired knowledge of the dismissal order, what steps were taken thereafter, when the certified copy was applied for and obtained, and why the restoration application could not be filed within a reasonable period. No specific dates or particulars in this regard have been furnished.

9. The mere assertion that the applicant came to know about the dismissal upon making an enquiry from his counsel and thereafter obtained a certified copy of the order does not, in the absence of particulars, constitute a satisfactory explanation for the entire period of delay. The plea that the restoration application was filed immediately after obtaining the certified copy is also not sufficient, unless the applicant explains the time taken in acquiring knowledge of the dismissal and obtaining the certified copy in the first place.

10. It is well settled that the expression 'sufficient cause' must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, but such liberal approach cannot be extended to condone delay in a routine or mechanical manner. The applicant is required to establish that there existed a bona fide and reasonable explanation preventing him from approaching the Court within the prescribed period. The discretion to condone delay cannot be exercised merely on the basis of unsubstantiated assertions, particularly when a substantial period remains wholly unexplained.

11. The applicant has failed to explain the substantial period between 06.06.2025 and 24.07.2026. The application contains only general assertions and does not disclose any specific or convincing circumstances which prevented the applicant from approaching this Tribunal during the intervening period. Consequently, this Tribunal is unable to record a finding that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of delay.

12. In view of the foregoing discussion, the MA seeking condonation of delay is found to be devoid of merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.

13. Consequently, the accompanying application seeking restoration of TA No. 117/2024 also cannot be entertained on account of delay and shall stand rejected.

14. No order as to costs.

Diwakar Singh Member (J) Ram Mohan Johri Member (A) Rajat Pathania ( )