Animesh Paul vs CAG OF INDIA NEW DELHI on 6 November 2026

1. Mr. Ajesh Luthra, learned counsel assisted by Mrs. Sriparna Chaterjee, learned counsel, submits that the applicants herein are officials of the Indian Audit and Accounts Department, presently posted in various Overseas Audit Offices. He submits that the applicants are before this Tribunal assailing the order of the respondents dated 03.07.2026 and the subsequent letter dated 12.08.2026 rejecting the representations of the applicants for reconsidering the panel of posting in the Overseas Audit Offices.

2. The controversy in the present matter is that the applicants herein had undergone a rigorous selection process and thereafter, after having been appointed in the various Overseas Audit Offices with the terms and conditions contained in the letter dated 21.08.2024 which specifically states that the tenure of their posting will be initially for a period of two years from the date of assuming charge and further extendable for one more year on the basis of the review of their performance. The applicants herein were under the expectation that they would serve abroad for three years which also entails certain additional financial benefits on account of various allowances had relocated their entire family and in some cases their children were supposed to repeat the same classed in the foreign country and in one case the spouse had even left his job in India. It is submitted that many of the applicants have taken housing on lease and vehicle loans for three years and some of them have even foregone their promotion in the parent department. When suddenly, by way of the impugned order, the respondents have sought to have two categories of officials with respect to their overseas tenure as follows:- “2. In pursuance of the aboe decision, the tenure of Officers/Officials (IA&AS/Non-IA&AS) presently posted in the above Overseas Audit Offices shall be regulated as under:

A Officers/Officials who have already completed two years of their tenure in the Overseas Audit Offices and whose tenure has already been extended by one additional year The tenure of such Officers/Officials shall continue up to the expiry of the already approved extended period of one year (i.e., completion of the third year) B Officers/Officials who have not yet completed two years of their tenure in the Overseas Audit Offices. The tenure of such Officers/Officials shall stand restricted to a period of two years and shall come to an end on completion of their two year tenure. No extension beyond the two year tenure shall be granted. Note: Effective Date of implementation: Competent Authority’s Order dated 29.06.2026.”

3. Learned counsels for the applicants contends that there is a doctrine of legitimate expectation and all these applicants by the aforesaid actions have clearly demonstrated that they have taken the action only on the legitimate expectation that they would continue to work in the overseas audit offices especially when there are no adverse comments by the respondents on the performance of the applicants.

4. Learned counsel for the applicants has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court expounding the doctrine of promissory estoppel, namely, in the case of State of Punjab Versus Nestle India reported in 2004 SCC Online SC 616 dated 05.05.2004 in CA No. 6449/1998 and states that the doctrine of promissory estoppels has also been extended to service law. He has also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Court in case of Devi Multiplex and Anr. Versus State of Gujarat and Ors. in CA NO. 6478/2009 dated 13.05.2015. The relevant paragraphs of the same are quoted below:- “17. Clause 7 of the Scheme classifies projects in different categories and for a Large Scale Tourism Unit, with which we are presently concerned, fixed capital investment was required to be more than Rs.90 lakhs. The Scheme definitely promised an initial period for completion of the project under Clause 10 (a) as two years after the initial effective steps were under taken by the concerned unit. Clause 10 (b) further promised an extension for two years subject to State Level Committee being satisfied that an individual unit had experienced difficulties in implementing the project. A unit was therefore promised the availability of an opportunity, depending upon the individual fact situation, to pray for extension up to two years. Clause 10(C) further entitled such unit to approach the State Govt. even after the aforesaid aggregate period of four years for further extension. In our view, Clause 10 was one of the core features of the Scheme based on which eligible units were invited to make capital investment of more than Rs. 90 Lakhs with a promise of incentives under Clause 8. Having given such promise, based on which the appellants incurred capital expenditure, the question now arises as regards applicability of doctrine of Promissory Estoppel.

18. The law on the subject of Promissory Estoppel was recapitulated and succinctly dealt with by this Court in State of Punjab Vs. Nestle India Ltd.[1] It found the foundation of the doctrine laid in the decision in Collector of Bombay Vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay[2], the principle built upon in Union of India Vs. Anglo Afghan Agencies[3] and the superstructure of the doctrine, with its pre-conditions, strengths and limitations outlined in the decision in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of UP[4]. This Court then dealt with the discordant note in Jit Ram Vs. State of Haryana[5] and how that was firmly disapproved in Union of India Vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd.[6] by a bench of three judges. We deem it appropriate to quote paras 27, 28, 29, 34, 35 and 36 from the decision in State of Punjab Vs. Nestle India Ltd. (Supra):-

“27. However, the superstructure of the doctrine with its preconditions, strengths and limitations has been outlined in the decision of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P.3 Briefly stated: the case related to a representation made by the State Government that the petitioners’ [pic]factory would be exempted from payment of sales tax for a period of three years from the date of commencement of production. It was proved that the petitioners had, as a consequence of the representation, set up the factory in the State. But the State Government refused to honour its representation. It claimed sales tax for the period it had said that it would not. When the petitioners went to court, the State Government took the pleas:

(1) in the absence of notification under Section 4-A, the State Government could not be prevented from enforcing the liability to sales tax imposed on the petitioners under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act;

(2) that the petitioners had waived their right to claim exemption; and (3) that there could be no promissory estoppel against the State Government so as to inhibit it from formulating and implementing its policies in public interest.

28. This Court rejected all the three pleas of the Government. It reiterated the well-known preconditions for the operation of the doctrine:

(1) a clear and unequivocal promise knowing and intending that it would be acted upon by the promisee;

(2) such acting upon the promise by the promisee so that it would be inequitable to allow the promisor to go back on the promise." In the circumstances, we allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the High Court in so far as it held that the operative period of the Scheme came to an end on 30.11.2000 and that there could be no further extension of time limit. Since the appellants have already commenced commercial operations, it now needs to be assessed by the State Level Committee whether in the facts of the case the appellants could justifiably have claimed extension under Clause 10 of the Scheme. We direct the State Level Committee to make such assessment in accordance with Clause 10, in three months of the receipt of this decision. Needless to say, if such assessment is found in favour of the appellants, they shall be entitled to the incentives and benefits under the Scheme.”

5. Learned counsel for the applicants has also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of BSNL and Ors. Versus Tata Communications Limited dated 22.09.2022 in CA No. 1699- 1723/2015. The relevant paragraph of the same reads as under:- “The power to make retrospective legislations enables the Legislature to obliterate an amending Act completely and restore the law as it existed before the amending Act, but at the same time, administrative/executive orders or circulars, as the case may be, in the absence of any legislative competence cannot be made applicable with retrospective effect. Only law could be made retrospectively if it was expressly provided by the Legislature in the Statute. Keeping in mind the aforestated principles of law on the subject, we are of the view that applicability of the circular dated 12th June, 2012 to be effective retrospectively from 1st April 2009, in revising the infrastructure charges, is not legally sustainable and to this extent, we are in agreement with the view expressed by the Tribunal under the impugned judgment.”

6. Learned counsel for the applicants is also relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman Railway Board Versu CR Rangadhamaiah reported in (1997) 6 SCC 623.

7. The short point that the learned counsels have made is that any amendment in the existing policy should have a prospective effect and cannot have retrospective effect so as to change the goalpost while the game is still going on. He submits that if the Tribunal does not interfere in the impugned order, then there is a serious apprehension in the mind of the applicants, at least two of them, namely, Mr. Animesh Paul and Mr. Satender Kumar, whose names are appearing at serial number 1 and 8, and whose tenures are expiring on 12.11.2026 and 23.11.2026 that they will suffer irreverisble loss. On this ground, the learned counsel for the applicants is seeking grant of interim relief by way of restraining the respondents from taking any irreversible step solely on the basis of the impugned order dated 12.08.2026 that would render the present O.A. infructuous.

8. Issue notice to the respondents. Dr. SS Hooda, learned counsel, who appears on advance service, accepts notice. He vehemently opposes the applicants’ prayer for grant of interim relief. He submits that even as per the older policy there was no promise that a third year extension is automatic. The old policy entailed a secure tenure of two years followed by a further extension of one year subject to review of the performance of the applicants herein. He also submits that the ground

taken by the learned counsel for the applicants that the children of at least some of the applicants had to repeat classes in the school that they were admitted abroad is untenable as they already knew this as it was communicated to them by the letter dated 21.08.2024, specifically, at para 5 and 6 therein. He also submits that the Tribunal need not give interim protection without having the short reply from the respondents inasmuch as the impugned order being assailed herein were passed on 03.07.2026 and 12.08.2026 and this is a tactic on the part of the applicants to move the Court at the eleventh hour seeking interim relief knowing very well that their tenure was expiring shortly. Learned counsel for the respondents has also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court on transfer in the SL Abbas case to buttress his claim that posting and transfer is not a vested right with the government employee and it is always subject to the administrative exigencies and any transfer policy is only a guideline and is not a statutory provision which has be obeyed in letter and spirit by the respondents. He has also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab Communications Limited and Ors. Versus Union of India reported in 1999 (4) SCC 727 and states that change in any policy cannot be changing the legitimate expectation unless and until the policy itself is deemed to be irrational and perverse. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the judgments being relied upon by the applicants in the case of BSNL (Supra) and Nestle (Supra) are not applicable in the present case as they are relevant only for commercial establishments.

9. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties on the applicants’ prayer for grant of interim relief. I find that there is urgent imperative to interfere in the matter with regard to two applicants at serial number 1 and 8 whose tenure is ending soon.

10. Under these circumstances, as an interim measure, it is directed that the respondents may adopt the old policy in the case of the two applicants at serial number 1 and 8, namely, Mr. Animesh Paul and Mr. Satender Kumar, respectively, wherein the applicants were assured of a two year initial tenure and the third year was subject to the review of their performance. It is further directed that the applicant numbers 1 and 8 will not be relieved on the basis of the letter dated 03.07.2026 unless and until the review of their performance is completed and/or a decision is taken. Regarding the remaining seven applicants, learned counsel for the respondents is directed to file the short reply within two weeks.

11. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that he shall file the rejoinder, if any, within a week thereafter and shall not take any adjournment.

12. List on 30.11.2026.

13. Order “dasti”. B Anand Member (A) Deeksha Dhingra ( steno 'c' )