PRATHIBHA R DESAI vs BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LIMITED on 6 November 2026

O R D E R

PER: DR. SANJIV KUMAR, MEMBER (A)

1. This Original Application (OA) has been filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following reliefs: “8.1 Issue appropriate orders/Writ in the nature of Mandamus thereby directing the Respondent to extend the benefits accruing to the applicants in accordance with the judgment of the Apex Court in Medini C and Ors. Vs. BSNL and Ors., Civil Appeal No. 5811-5814/2021 dated 21/09/2021 as accorded by the Respondent to the Junior Hindi Translators and accordingly confer promotion to the applicants to the post of AD (OL) on regular basis in the E- 2 IDA pay scale with effect from 01/01/2003 in accordance with the Recruitment Rules, 2002. 8.2 Any other suitable relief which this Hon’ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case may also be given to the applicants along with the costs of litigation.”

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2. The applicants seek the aforesaid reliefs on the following grounds and legal propositions: “5.1 That the respondent being an entity of the State as per Article 12 of the Constitution of India, 1950 is expected to act in a fair and impartial manner. The actions of the Respondent in not accruing the benefits as applicable to the present Applicants in compliance of the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 21/09/2021 passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 5811-5814/2021 and in placing Junior Hindi Translators belonging to Grade-III above the present Applicants who belong to Grade-II, is per se untenable. It is pertinent to note that as per the letter published by the Department of Telecommunication bearing No. 35(1)/92-TE.II dated 05/12/2000 mentioned that while restricting the posts of ‘Hindi Translators’, all incumbents in the existing posts of Hindi Translator Grade III shall rank en-block Junior to those holding the post of Hindi Translator Grade-II, maintain their inter-se seniority within their respective previous grades before restructuring. 5.2 That, the Respondent has not acted in accordance with Recruitment Rules, 2002 and has denied promotion and allied benefits to the present Applicants. 5.3 It is trite law of service jurisprudence that, when a particular set of employees have been given relief by the Courts, then other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit and not doing so would amount to discrimination and tantamount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivatsava, (2015) 1 SCC 347 has held as under; “The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees are given a relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be

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Mikasha Suneja applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.” In the present case, the Respondent has accorded benefits of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Medini C (supra) to the Junior Hindi Translators vide Notification bearing No. MPCO-11/20(12)/2/2024-HR/AD dated 08/07/2024 but has not accorded the same benefits to the present Applicants despite the latter belonging to the cadre of Senior Hindi Translators, thereby deviating from settled principles of law as referred to above. 5.4 It is trite law that the State and its instrumentalities are expected to extend the benefits of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed employees without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of the Courts. 5.5 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, Railway Board and Ors. vs. C.R. Rangadhamaiah and Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 623 has held that as follows; “It can therefore be said that a rule which operates in futuro so as to govern future rights of those already in service cannot be assailed on the ground of retroactivity as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, but a rule which seeks to reverse from an anterior date a benefit which has been granted or availed of, eg. promotion or pay scale can be assailed as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution to the extent it operates retrospectively.” In the present case, the Applicants were promoted to the post of AD(OL) via local officiating basis and were provided pay in accordance with FR-22(I)(a)(i) and the reply to the clarification regarding the fixation of pay for officials in the cadre of AD(OL) promoted through local officiating arrangements vide Annexure-A8, clarified by the Respondent indicates that post completion of five (5) years in Grade-II, the pay of the Officer is fixed under FR-22(I)(a)(i) and not

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under the restrictive pay scale of FR-35. This connotes that the present Applicants were receiving pay under FR- 22(I)(a)(i), thereby indicating that their promotion to the post of AD(OL) which was on local officiating basis earlier, was regularised in accordance with the benefit granted under the Recruitment Rules, 2002. In such a scenario, the Respondent cannot seek to reverse the promotion or pay scale accruing to the present Applicants on the ground that the Recruitment Rules, 2002 were never implemented. The Recruitment Rules, 2002 were in supersession of the Recruitment Rules, 1994 and therefore, between 2002 and 2005 there could have not been a vacuum. The effect of removal of the restriction of officiating pay under FR-35 implied that there was regular cadre promotion made as the officials became due for promotion and fell within the zone of consideration and fulfilled all qualifications prescribed for promotion. 5.6 The present Applicants were provisionally promoted while in the Telecom Department as Assistant Director (OL) as early as 1998 but they were not regularised. However, Rule 10(iii) of the Recruitment Rules, 2002 categorically stated that as ‘a one-time measure’ all the vacancies in the Grade of AD(OL) in the first year of promotional quota or direct vacancies had to be filled by direct quota by following due procedure from amongst those officials who had been officiating as AD(OL) subject to their fulfilling the basic qualifications and experiences as prescribed, thus indicating that the Applicants had already enforced their vested rights regarding their regularisation and their respective posts as per the Recruitment Rules, 2002 on the basis of one-time measure that was envisaged under the said Rules. Thus, the Respondent cannot deny the rights of the Applicants when the present Applicants have already claimed their vested rights of promotion. 5.7 It is erroneous on the part of the Respondent to place Junior Hindi Translators above in position to that of the present Applicants who are Senior Hindi Translators, in gross disregard to the All India Combined Seniority List in respect of Senior and Junior Hindi Translators published by

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Mikasha Suneja the Respondent vide Notification bearing No.22-5/2004- Pers-II dated 05/01/2005 at Annexure-A10. 5.8 It is submitted that the Applicants would reserve liberty to urge additional grounds at the time of arguments with the permission of this Hon’ble Tribunal.”

3. The brief facts of the case, as set out in the synopsis filed by the applicants, are as follows: “ The Applicants are aggrieved by the Recruitment Rules, 2005, published by BSNL for the promotion to the post of ‘Rajbhasha Adhikari’ (vide Annexure-A1) wherein the Applicants herein who had been appointed to the posts of Grade-II Translators and were subsequently provided ad-hoc promotions to the post of the Assistant Director, Official Language in officiating capacity as per the relevant Recruitment Rules, 2002 as applicable to them (vide Annexure-A2) in accordance with Rule 10 (iii) which was not implemented; were made to undergo a Limited Internal Competitive Examination as per the Recruitment Rules, 2005 for the posts of ‘Rajbhasha Adhikari’ prescribed for the officials who are working/have worked as Assistant Director (OL) /Rajbhasha Adhikari on local officiating basis/ ad-hoc basis for 5 years despite the benefit provided as a one-time measure for the officials who were promoted on officiating basis, under the Recruitment Rules, 2002. Thereafter, the Applicants have been denied the benefits as accruing to them as per the judgment dated 21/09/2021 passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 5811-5814/2021 while the benefits have been extended to the Jr. Hindi Translators vide notification bearing number MPCO-11/20 (12)/2/2-24-HR/AD dated 08/07/2024 published by the Respondent in deviation of the All India Combined Seniority List in respect of Senior and Junior Hindi Translators published by the Respondent vide notification bearing number 22-5/2002-Pers-II dated 30/10/2003 and 22-5/2004-Pers-II dated 05/01/2005. It is submitted that as per service jurisprudence similarly situated persons must be treated alike and hence the benefits extended

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Mikasha Suneja to the officials belonging to the Kerala and Bhopal cadre, must be extended in favour of the present Applicants. Hence, this Original Application.”

4. Upon notice, the respondents entered appearance and filed their reply statement. The applicants thereafter filed a rejoinder. A memo containing certain judicial citations has also been placed on record.

5. The matter was taken up for final hearing on 26.10.2026. Ms. Keertana Swamynathan, learned counsel for the applicants, and Shri N. Amaresh, learned counsel for the respondents, appeared and were heard.

6. We have carefully perused the pleadings and documents on record and considered the rival submissions. The basic factual background is not in dispute. The controversy essentially concerns the applicants’ entitlement to the benefit of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Medini C. and others vs. BSNL and others, dated 21.09.2021, and whether their cases are factually and legally comparable to those of the appellants who obtained relief in that judgment.

7. The applicants initially joined the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) and were promoted as Hindi Translator Grade-II through a Limited Internal Examination in October 1995. Upon the formation of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) with

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Mikasha Suneja effect from 01.10.2000, the employees of DoT were given an option for permanent absorption in BSNL, which the applicants exercised. Thereafter, BSNL notified the Recruitment Rules, 2002, for the post of Assistant Director (Official Language), providing for filling up 50% of the vacancies by promotion and 50% by direct recruitment. The said Rules also incorporated a special one-time provision for filling up the vacancies in the first year of recruitment by promotion on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness from among eligible Hindi Translators, subject to fulfilment of the prescribed qualifications and experience. However, the Recruitment Rules, 2002, were not operationalised for making regular promotions, and no regular promotions were made under those Rules.

8. Subsequently, in supersession of the Recruitment Rules, 2002, BSNL re-designated the post of Assistant Director (Official Language) as Rajbhasha Adhikari and notified fresh Recruitment Rules on 05.08.2005. Under the 2005 Rules, promotion was prescribed through a Limited Internal Competitive Examination (LICE), failing which the vacancies were to be filled by direct recruitment. BSNL conducted LICE in 2008 in accordance with the Recruitment Rules, 2005. The applicants participated in the said examination and, having qualified, were promoted as Rajbhasha Adhikari. Upon the joining of the successful candidates, the selection process attained finality and the vacancies were filled through LICE-2008.

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Under both the Recruitment Rules, 2002 and 2005, the post of Assistant Director (OL)/Rajbhasha Adhikari is a Circle Cadre post, with vacancies being filled from among eligible officials working in the respective Circle. The applicants were working in the Karnataka Circle. A seniority list of Junior Hindi Translators/Senior Hindi Translators was circulated on 20.01.2005, inviting objections. However, the said list was provisional and was neither finalised nor operated for effecting promotions to the post of AD (OL).

9. Certain employees belonging to the Kerala Circle and Madhya Pradesh Circle challenged the filling up of vacancies through LICE before the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Courts, contending that vacancies which had arisen prior to the introduction of the Recruitment Rules, 2005, ought to have been filled under the Recruitment Rules, 2002. The said litigation ultimately culminated in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 21.09.2021 in Medini C. and others vs. BSNL and others, whereby relief was granted to the appellants therein. In compliance with the said judgment, promotions were considered and granted to the concerned appellants in accordance with the directions of the Hon’ble Court. The respondents contend that the relief granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was confined to the appellants before it. The applicants, on the other hand, contend that the judgment lays down a general principle and is a judgment in rem, and that all similarly situated

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Mikasha Suneja employees are consequently entitled to the same benefits. They further assert that they are senior to certain employees who obtained the benefit of the said judgment and are, therefore, entitled to similar treatment.

10. The respondents submit that the vacancies in other Circles, including the Karnataka Circle, had already been filled through LICE- 2008 under the Recruitment Rules, 2005. They accordingly contend that the applicants are fence-sitters who have approached the Tribunal after an inordinate delay. According to them, the cause of action arose in 2002, whereas the present OA was instituted in 2025, without any sufficient explanation for the delay warranting condonation. The respondents further contend that the mere notification of the Recruitment Rules, 2002, did not confer any vested or enforceable right upon the applicants. Those Rules were never implemented in their Circle for making regular promotions. The subsequent Recruitment Rules, 2005, were duly acted upon, and LICE-2008 was conducted and finalised. The applicants participated in the examination without protest, qualified and were promoted with effect from 07.11.2008. The selection process having attained finality, it cannot now be reopened after such a long lapse of time. It is further contended that, having consciously participated in LICE conducted under the Recruitment Rules, 2005, and having accepted promotion thereunder, the applicants acquiesced in the recruitment process and are estopped from seeking consideration under

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the superseded Recruitment Rules, 2002, after an inordinate lapse of time.

11. The respondents also rely upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in BSNL vs. Mishri Lal, reported in (2011) 14 SCC 739, wherein the validity of the Recruitment Rules, 2005, was upheld and it was categorically held that local officiating arrangements do not create vested rights to regular promotion. The applicants, on the other hand, rely upon Medini C. and others vs. BSNL, reported in (2022) 4 SCC 562, decided on 21.09.2021, contending that the Hon’ble Supreme Court granted relief to employees similarly placed and that the same benefit should be extended to them. The respondents submit that the applicants’ reliance on Medini C. is misplaced. According to them, that judgment was rendered on a distinct factual footing and was confined to the appellants therein, who had acquired a crystallised right in respect of vacancies arising prior to the Recruitment Rules, 2005. In the Kerala Circle, the Recruitment Rules, 2002, had demonstrably been acted upon through the issuance of corrigenda, removal of the restriction on pay under FR-35, and administrative recognition of the appellants’ officiating status. The applicants herein, according to the respondents, cannot claim the same benefit in the absence of comparable facts.

12. The respondents further distinguish the present case from Medini C. on the ground that, in the Karnataka Circle, the Recruitment

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Rules, 2002, were never operationalised for making regular promotions; no DPCs were held and no corresponding administrative implementation took place. The applicants, after serving under local officiating arrangements, participated in LICE-2008 conducted under the superseding Recruitment Rules, 2005, qualified and accepted promotion with effect from 07.11.2008. It is also pointed out that, unlike the appellants in Medini C., who had approached the Tribunal at the relevant time and enjoyed continuous judicial protection before the change in the recruitment regime, the present applicants remained silent for over two decades, accepted promotion under the subsequent Rules and thereafter retired or opted for VRS without protest. The respondents consequently contend that no vested or accrued right under the Recruitment Rules, 2002, ever crystallised in favour of the applicants. They are not similarly situated to the appellants in Medini C. and cannot claim parity merely on the basis of relief granted to employees belonging to other Circles. The judgment in Medini C., according to them, does not lay down a principle of universal application irrespective of the underlying facts. They also emphasise that the post is a Circle-level post and that no inter-Circle parity can be claimed in disregard of the distinct administrative circumstances prevailing in different Circles. It is, therefore, contended that no surviving cause of action exists.

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13. The respondents have also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble CAT, Jabalpur Bench, in Anwar Azim Khan vs. BSNL, OA No. 306/2012, decided on 28.06.2023. They submit that the claim raised therein was identical and that the reasoning and findings recorded by the Jabalpur Bench squarely apply to the present case. According to the respondents, the present OA is indistinguishable on facts and law and deserves to be dismissed on the same grounds.

14. The respondents have further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 17.09.2026 in Civil Appeal Nos. 12966- 12967/2026, The Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Another vs. G.N. Mani Ravinder and others, reported in 2026 INSC 1007, wherein the judgments in Mishri Lal and Medini C. have been examined in detail. According to the respondents, the central distinction emerging from the said judgment is that the employees in Mishri Lal were working on a local officiating basis in the post of Rajbhasha Adhikari, whereas the employees in Medini C. had been provisionally promoted. Their provisional promotions were preceded by the relevant administrative action, including DPC proceedings and removal of the FR-35 pay restrictions, followed by fixation of pay under FR-22. These circumstances resulted in the crystallisation of vested rights in respect of vacancies arising prior to the Recruitment Rules, 2005.

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The respondents contend that the present applicants stand on the same footing as the employees in Mishri Lal, having worked only under local officiating arrangements without any corresponding provisional promotion or regularisation under the Recruitment Rules, 2002. Consequently, they cannot claim any vested right under the said Rules.

15. We shall now examine the documents placed on record by the applicants and assess their claim in the light of the applicable Recruitment Rules and the judicial pronouncements relied upon by the parties.

(a) Annexure-A1, bearing No. 22-35/2001-Pers.II dated 05.08.2005, contains the Recruitment Rules for the post of Rajbhasha Adhikari in BSNL. The document is not disputed. Column 11, inter alia, prescribes recruitment: “By Limited Internal Competitive Examination (LICE) failing which by direct recruitment through an examination.” There is no dispute regarding the contents or applicability of these Rules.

(b) Annexure-A2, bearing No. 22-35/2001-Pers-II dated 24.12.2002, contains the Recruitment Rules for the post of Assistant Director (Official Language) in BSNL. These Rules incorporated a special provision, which reads as follows: “Special Provision:

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There are many Sr. Hindi Translators/Jr. Hindi Translators and group C officials who have been given local officiating promotions to the grade of AD (OL) in the field formations of BSNL. In order to avoid legal and administrative complications, as a one-time measure, it is provided that all the vacancies in the grade of AD (OL) in the 1st year of Recruitment, irrespective of vacancies earmarked for promotional quota or DR Quota, shall be filled up by promotion on Seniority – cum – Fitness basis, by following due procedures, amongst those officials who have been officiating as AD (OL) in BSNL subject to their fulfilling the basic qualifications and experiences as prescribed above.”

The existence of this special provision is not disputed. However, its scope and applicability require careful examination. The provision expressly uses the expression ‘one-time measure’ and qualifies the same by the words ‘in the 1st year of Recruitment’. These expressions cannot be read in isolation or treated as surplus age. They indicate that the special dispensation was intended to operate as a one-time exception during the first year of implementation of the Recruitment Rules, 2002, and not as a continuing avenue of promotion available to all persons who might become eligible in subsequent years. The provision must, therefore, be understood as a limited transitional arrangement intended to address the existing officiating arrangements at the time of introduction of the 2002 Rules. It cannot be construed as conferring an automatic or perpetual right to regularisation upon every employee who subsequently completed the prescribed length of officiating service.

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In our view, the benefit of this exception could be claimed only by those who fulfilled the prescribed conditions during the first year of recruitment under the 2002 Rules, i.e., 2002-03. Employees who became eligible only in subsequent years could not claim the same benefit as a matter of right.

(c) Annexure-A3 bearing No. Staff/2-63/II dated 26.09.1995, relates to the promotion and postings of some of the applicants in the cadre of Hindi Translator Grade-II. Annexure-A3A contains the promotion and posting particulars of certain other applicants.

(d) Annexure-A4, bearing No. 372-1/94-STG-II dated 15/28.04.1994, relates to the filling up of posts of Hindi Officer in field units on a local officiating basis. The relevant portion reads as follows: “Subject: Filling up of the posts of Hindi Officer in Field Units on local officiating basis.

In continuation of this office letter No. 372-24/91-STG-III dated 22.5.1992 on the above mentioned subject, and keeping in view the difficulties faced by the Circles in filling up of the posts as per existing provisions, the following procedure may be adopted for filling up of the posts on local officiating basis under powers delegated to the heads of Telecom Circles: The posts of Hindi Officer may be filled up from amongst the cadre of Hindi Translator Grade-I/Grade-II/ Grade-III with 3/5/8 years’ service in the respective grades in the Circle/District concerned. Failing which, the posts may be filled up from amongst all Group ‘C’ cadres based on length of service in the grade possessing the education and other qualifications prescribed for direct recruits in Col. 7, Col. 8 of the Recruitment Rules.”

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The aforesaid communication delegated powers to the Circle-level authorities to make local officiating arrangements in the posts of Hindi Officer from among eligible Hindi Translators, based on the prescribed length of service, educational qualifications and other eligibility conditions. There is no dispute regarding the existence or nature of this delegation. It is, however, significant that such arrangements were expressly described as local officiating arrangements and were made under administrative instructions.

(e) Annexure-A5, bearing No. P/3-104/97 dated 29.12.1998, relates to local officiating arrangements made in the Karnataka Telecom Circle. Under this communication, some of the applicants were given local officiating promotions and postings in the cadre of Hindi Officer. The relevant conditions governing these arrangements were as follows: “ The officiating arrangements ordered above are in the interest of service and subject to the following conditions:-

1. The above local officiating promotion is for a minimum period of 31 days not exceeding 90 days or the regular incumbent joins or till alternate arrangements are made whichever is earlier. In case the expiry of 90 days of officiating arrangements, the officials concerned will report back to parent unit of posting/post on reversion. In case of non-acceptance of the officiating promotion, the official concerned will report back to her parent unit of posting/post on reversion.

2. In case any disciplinary/vigilance case is pending against the officials now promoted, promotion of such official should not be given effect to and full facts be reported to this office.

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3. The officials ordered on officiating promotion shall report for duty at the place of posting within 15 days from the date of issue of this order and if the official does not report for duty within the specified time, it will be taken as that the official is not willing for the officiating promotion and has declined the same and therefore will not be eligible for consideration the officiating promotion subsequently for a period of six months. Necessary charge reports may be furnished to all concerned.”

These conditions clearly indicate the nature of the arrangement as a temporary local officiating arrangement, subject to specified limitations and conditions. Significantly, no subsequent document has been placed before us to establish what further action was taken in respect of these arrangements, particularly whether any of them were subsequently converted into provisional or regular promotions under the Recruitment Rules, 2002.

(f) Annexure-A6 is a communication bearing No. E.31- 6/II/JTO/PI/JAO/5 dated 15.09.1999, addressed to Shri M.G. Naik, Applicant No.5. It reads as follows: “Subject: Local officiating arrangement in the cadre of AD (OL) – Pay fixation regarding. Reference: Your representation dated 24.08.1999

With reference to your representation dated 24.08.1999, it is intimated that, as per the guidelines received from the Circle Office vide letter No. Staff/3-104/Hindi dated 31.08.1999, the pay of the officer is to be fixed under FR 22(I)(a)(i) with effect from 26.09.2000, i.e., on completion of five years’ service in the Grade II promotion. Till then, the pay is to be restricted under FR-35.”

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This document is particularly relied upon by the applicants in support of their contention that the restriction imposed under FR-35 was to be removed upon completion of five years of service in Grade-II, thereby enabling fixation of pay under FR-22(I)(a)(i). However, the existence of this communication by itself does not establish that the contemplated benefit was actually extended to the applicants. The material question is whether the restriction under FR- 35 was, in fact, removed in their individual cases and whether their pay was consequently fixed under FR-22(I)(a)(i). The applicants assert that they received this benefit. The respondents, however, categorically dispute the assertion. No individual pay-fixation order, corrigendum, DPC proceedings or other contemporaneous document has been produced by the applicants to establish that the restriction under FR-35 was actually waived in their cases and that their pay was thereafter fixed under FR-22(I)(a)(i). The applicants cannot establish the actual implementation of a general communication merely by producing the communication itself. The burden was upon them to demonstrate that the contemplated relaxation was actually extended to them. In the absence of such evidence, we cannot presume that the restriction under FR-35 was removed or that their officiating arrangements were thereby converted into provisional or regular promotions.

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We also notice that there are nine applicants before us and that their individual service particulars are not identical. Ideally, separate applications ought to have been filed if their claims depended upon materially different factual circumstances. Nevertheless, to avoid unnecessary multiplicity, we shall examine the available individual particulars, particularly those of one or two applicants, and assess whether the evidence supports the common claim. The findings will be based on the material available on record and the extent to which the applicants have established that they satisfy the conditions relied upon by them. The document must also be considered in conjunction with the special provision contained in the Recruitment Rules, 2002. As already discussed, that provision was expressly intended as a ‘one-time measure’ applicable ‘in the 1st year of Recruitment’. It did not contemplate automatic regularisation in subsequent years merely upon an employee completing five years of officiating service at a later point of time. The distinction assumes significance when the facts of Medini C. are examined. The appellants in that case had been appointed as Hindi Officers on officiating/ad-hoc basis much earlier, during 1993-95. They had completed the requisite period of service before or around the introduction of the Recruitment Rules, 2002, and the relevant administrative action was thereafter taken to remove the restrictions

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Mikasha Suneja imposed under FR-35 and to recognise their status through provisional promotions and pay fixation under FR-22. Thus, the appellants in Medini C. fulfilled the relevant conditions within the framework of the 2002 Rules and the contemporaneous administrative action taken in their favour. Their cases were not founded merely on the fact that they had worked on an officiating basis for some period. In contrast, the applicants before us were given local officiating arrangements during the period 1998 to 2001, as reflected in the documents placed on record. They had not completed five years of such service when the Recruitment Rules, 2002, came into force, and no material has been produced to show that the restriction under FR-35 was actually removed in their cases during the first year of implementation of those Rules. Consequently, they have not established that they fulfilled the conditions for the special one-time dispensation available under the 2002 Rules. Nor have they established that their local officiating arrangements were converted into provisional promotions in the manner demonstrated in Medini C. The factual foundation upon which relief was granted in Medini C. is, therefore, absent in the present case.

(g) Annexure-A7, bearing No. Staff/3-104/Hindi/2008 dated 07.11.2008, is the promotion order issued in respect of some of the

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Mikasha Suneja applicants after they qualified in LICE and were promoted as Rajbhasha Adhikari. The promotion order was subject to the final decision in CMD, BSNL & others vs. Shri Mishri Lal & others, then pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The respondents contend that the applicants participated in LICE without any reservation and did not challenge either the examination or the applicability of the Recruitment Rules, 2005, at the relevant time. They further point out that the position was different in Medini C., where the affected employees had challenged the LICE requirement and sought protection of their claims under the earlier Rules. We find merit in the distinction sought to be drawn by the respondents. The applicants participated in LICE-2008, qualified and accepted their promotions without any recorded protest or reservation. They thereafter joined the promoted posts and subsequently retired or opted for voluntary retirement. There is no material before us to establish that they continued to contest the applicability of the 2005 Rules or kept their claim under the 2002 Rules alive. This conduct is materially different from that of the appellants in Medini C., who had pursued their claims before the competent judicial forums at the relevant time.

(h) Annexure-A8 comprises a series of applications submitted by various applicants seeking extension of the benefits of the judgment of

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the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 21.09.2021 in Medini C. and others vs. BSNL. A perusal of these applications reveals that no contemporaneous material has been produced to demonstrate that, prior to 07.03.2023, the applicants had actively pursued their alleged right to regular promotion under the Recruitment Rules, 2002, or had challenged the subsequent recruitment process under the 2005 Rules. The earliest representation placed on record appears to be dated 07.03.2023. Some other applicants submitted representations on 07.03.2024 or on subsequent dates. The applicants have stated that they had made representations as early as 2002. However, neither copies of those representations nor the decisions taken thereon have been produced. Equally, there is no material to show what steps, if any, were taken by them thereafter to pursue the matter or challenge any adverse decision. In the absence of such material, we find no evidence of any sustained assertion or pursuit of the alleged rights before 2023. This is an important distinction between the applicants before us and the appellants in Medini C. The latter had approached the judicial forums at the relevant time, challenged the applicability of the 2005 Rules and the LICE requirement, and had obtained protection in the course of the litigation. The present applicants, on the other hand, did not challenge the subsequent recruitment process, participated in LICE-

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2008 and accepted the promotions granted thereunder. They approached the respondents for the first time, on the material placed before us, only after the judgment in Medini C. was delivered on 21.09.2021. The circumstances consequently indicate substantial delay and acquiescence on the part of the applicants. We may examine the individual particulars of Applicant No.1, Smt. Prathibha R. Desai, as reflected in Annexure-A8(A). Her representation is dated 07.03.2023. According to the particulars furnished therein, she was working as Junior Hindi Translator from 26.09.1995 and was promoted as Senior Hindi Translator on 28.11.2001. A-1 got officiating promotion as ADOL on 02.08.2002. Hence no material has been placed on record to establish that, in her case, the restriction under FR-35 was removed upon completion of the requisite five years of service and that her pay was actually fixed under FR-22(I)(a)(i), as contemplated in Annexure-A6. On the contrary, if her service particulars are considered in the light of Annexure-A6, the relevant period of five years in the Grade-II promotion would have been completed on 28.11.2006, whereas the Recruitment Rules, 2005, had already come into force on 05.08.2005. By then, the Recruitment Rules, 2002, had been superseded. Thus, on the basis of the material available, it cannot be concluded that the applicant had acquired any right to the benefit of the one-time

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Mikasha Suneja dispensation under the 2002 Rules during their first year of implementation. Nor is there any evidence of removal of the FR-35 restriction and actual fixation of pay under FR-22 before the 2005 Rules came into force. The comparison with Medini C. is particularly revealing. The appellants in that case had been appointed much earlier, during 1988- 89, and had received officiating promotions as AD (OL) during 1993-

95. In their cases, corrigenda were issued in the Kerala Circle, including the corrigendum dated 13.10.2003, removing the restriction under FR- 35, and their pay was actually fixed under FR-22 before the Recruitment Rules, 2005, came into force. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while deciding Medini C., specifically took note of these administrative actions and held that the removal of the FR-35 restriction, coupled with the other circumstances, indicated that their promotions had, in substance, been regularised. No corresponding evidence has been produced in respect of Smt. Prathibha R. Desai or the other applicants before us. The distinction between the two sets of cases is, therefore, not merely one of the dates of officiating promotion. It concerns the existence or absence of subsequent administrative action recognising the officiating employees as provisionally promoted and removing the restriction on their pay under FR-35.

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The applicants have not established that any such action was taken in their favour. We may also examine the case of Applicant No.2, Smt. K. Jayalakshmi, as reflected in Annexure-A8(B). She joined as Junior Hindi Translator on 26.09.1995 and was granted an ad-hoc promotion on 29.12.1998 as AD (OL) on an officiating basis. In her representation, she asserts that her salary was fixed under FR-22 with effect from 29.09.2000 and relies upon this circumstance to contend that the Recruitment Rules, 2002, ought to have been applied in her case. The assertion, however, does not appear to be consistent with the five-year requirement referred to in Annexure-A6, particularly when her officiating promotion commenced only in 1998. More importantly, no documentary evidence has been produced to establish that the restriction under FR-35 was actually waived in her case or that her pay was fixed under FR-22 in consequence of such waiver. The respondents have disputed these assertions. In the absence of any contemporaneous pay-fixation order, corrigendum or other supporting document, we cannot accept the applicants’ claim merely on the basis of their representations. More so when the Applicant number 2 having so different set of information, and despite that agreed to club her case with that of the Applicant number one creating confusion. The applicants were required to establish that the benefit contemplated under the 2002 Rules and the relevant administrative

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Mikasha Suneja instructions had actually accrued to them. They have failed to discharge that burden. Accordingly, neither the case of Smt. Prathibha R. Desai nor that of Smt. K. Jayalakshmi establishes any factual parity with the appellants in Medini C. The material placed on record does not establish that any of the applicants had been provisionally promoted or had obtained the benefit of removal of the FR-35 restriction before the Recruitment Rules, 2005, came into force. It is also evident that the applicants approached the respondents for the first time in 2023 or 2024, seeking parity with employees who had obtained relief pursuant to Medini C. No satisfactory explanation has been offered for their failure to challenge the 2005 Rules, the conduct of LICE-2008 or the promotions granted thereunder at the relevant time. The fact that some employees belonging to other Circles were granted relief pursuant to Medini C. does not, by itself, establish that the present applicants are similarly situated. The claim of parity must rest upon comparable service particulars and the existence of the same legal and administrative foundation. The applicants have not established such parity. Their reliance on the All India Combined Seniority List and the benefits granted to certain employees in the Kerala and Madhya Pradesh Circles does not cure this fundamental deficiency.

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We also cannot proceed on the assumption that any benefit extended to an employee junior to the Applicants in another Circle, even if erroneously or inadvertently granted, would confer a corresponding right upon the applicants. There can be no claim to negative equality. In any event, the applicants have failed to establish that the employees who obtained relief pursuant to Medini C. were similarly situated to them in the material respects.

(i) Annexure-A9 is the All India Combined Seniority List dated 05.01.2005. The applicants rely upon this list to contend that their seniority is reflected in an All India list and that they are entitled to parity with employees in the Kerala and Madhya Pradesh Circles who obtained the benefit of the judgment in Medini C. This contention, in our view, is not sufficient to establish their claim. As is evident from Annexure-A4, the powers to make local officiating arrangements were delegated to the Heads of Telecom Circles, and such arrangements were to be made from among eligible Hindi Translators Grade-I, Grade-II and Grade-III, depending upon the prescribed length of service in the respective grades in the Circle/District concerned. Thus, the local officiating arrangements were made by the respective Circle authorities on the basis of the administrative instructions and the eligibility of employees within their respective

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Circles. The existence of an All India Combined Seniority List does not, by itself, establish that the applicants were entitled to the same administrative treatment as employees who had been granted provisional promotions and the benefit of removal of FR-35 restrictions in another Circle. Further, the complete service records and administrative circumstances relating to the employees in the other Circles have not been placed before us. In the absence of such material, no meaningful comparison can be undertaken merely on the basis of relative seniority. As already discussed, the applicants have also failed to establish that their cases are factually comparable to those of the appellants in Medini C. Consequently, Annexure-A9 does not advance their claim for parity. Seniority, by itself, cannot substitute for the requirement of establishing eligibility and the accrual of a right under the applicable Recruitment Rules.

(j) Annexure-A10 relates to the action taken by BSNL in compliance with the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Medini C., dated 21.09.2021. By the order dated 08.07.2024, certain employees were granted promotion with effect from 01.07.2005. The said order is an implementation measure flowing from the judgment in Medini C. However, as already discussed, the applicants have not established that their service particulars and the administrative

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action taken in their cases are comparable to those of the appellants in that judgment. The mere fact that certain employees in other Circles were granted promotion pursuant to the said judgment does not automatically entitle the present applicants to the same benefit. Annexure-A10, therefore, does not substantiate their claim.

(k) Annexure-A11 is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Medini C. and others vs. BSNL, dated 21.09.2021. A careful reading of the judgment reveals the specific factual circumstances which persuaded the Hon’ble Supreme Court to distinguish the cases before it from those governed by Mishri Lal. In the case of the appellants in Medini C., corrigenda had been issued in respect of their officiating promotions. The corrigendum dated 01.10.2003 revised the eligibility conditions, while another corrigendum dated 13.10.2003 removed the restriction on pay under FR-35. Their pay was thereafter fixed under FR-22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court specifically noticed these circumstances and observed as follows: “24. Consequently, a corrigendum was issued on by the respondent(s) removing the clause “restriction of pay under FR-35” as given in the memos of local officiating promotion when the appellants in the first appeal viz., Medini C., B. Geetha Devi and Sobhana Kumari were promoted to the post of Assistant Director (OL) on ad hoc basis with effect from the dates notified against each of them as per the revised eligibility conditions given in the Recruitment Rules.

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In respect of the following persons including appellant Mridula C, the eligible dates for removal of restriction under FR-35 were as under :

Sr. No. Name of Officiating AD (OL) S/Sri/Smt. Eligible date for removal of restriction under FR-35

1. Jobi Joseph 30.12.2002

2. Prasanna Kumari Amma 04.01.2003

3. Mridula C 30.12.2002

4. Sreekumar 30.12.2002

26. A specific reference was made to the revised eligibility conditions of the 2002 Rules while issuing the aforesaid corrigendum. Another corrigendum was issued on 13.10.2003 in respect of Smt. Mridula C. Her pay scale was also regularised. The above were issued subsequent to the enforcement of the 2002 Rules. It is observed that when the restriction of officiating pay under FR-35 was removed, it would indicate that the respondent in substance regularised the promotions of the appellants herein, by issuance of the Corrigendum(s) referred to above as till then they were receiving pay on officiating basis. Further the removal of such restriction under FR-35 has the effect of recognising the appointment in substantive officiating capacity subject to fulfilment of eligibility conditions as prescribed in the relevant recruitment Rules and carrying on higher duties and responsibilities. For immediate reference FR-35 is extracted as under:

“FR-35. The Central Government may fix the pay of an officiating Government servant at an amount less than that admissible under these rules”.

The effect of removal of the restriction of officiating pay under FR-35 implied that there was regular cadre promotion made as the employees became due for promotion and fell within the zone of consideration and fulfilled all qualifications prescribed for promotion.”

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The aforesaid observations demonstrate that the relief in Medini C. was founded upon specific administrative actions taken in respect of the appellants therein. The Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the removal of the FR-35 restriction, the corrigenda issued with reference to the 2002 Rules and the consequent fixation of pay under FR-22 had the effect of recognising their promotions in substance. It was on this factual foundation that the Hon’ble Supreme Court distinguished the case from Mishri Lal, where the employees had continued only on local officiating arrangements under the administrative instructions. We do not find any corresponding material in the present case. No corrigendum removing the FR-35 restriction, no order of provisional promotion, no relevant DPC proceedings and no contemporaneous pay- fixation order under FR-22 have been produced in respect of the applicants. The applicants have, therefore, failed to establish the very circumstances which formed the basis of the relief granted in Medini C. The distinction is fundamental. In Medini C., the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the appellants had been provisionally promoted and that the subsequent administrative actions had effectively recognised their promotions under the 2002 Rules. The present applicants, on the other hand, have established only that they were working under local

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Mikasha Suneja officiating arrangements. They have not established any subsequent administrative action converting those arrangements into provisional or regular promotions. In our considered view, the case of the applicants does not fall within the factual and legal principle recognised in Medini C. and is instead governed by the principle laid down in Mishri Lal.

(l) Annexure-RJ1 - The applicants have also relied upon Annexure- RJ1, bearing Memo No. Staff 03/37/23/VII/103 dated 10.12.2009. This document relates to promotions granted after the applicants qualified in the LICE test. However, no material has been produced to establish that the applicants protested against the conduct of the examination or challenged the applicability of the Recruitment Rules, 2005, at the relevant time. On the contrary, they participated in the examination, qualified and accepted the promotions granted to them. The document, therefore, does not support their present contention that they were entitled to regular promotion under the superseded Recruitment Rules, 2002.

(m) Annexure-RJ2 - The applicants have further relied upon Annexure-RJ2, bearing No. 250-22/2024-Estt.III dated 25.05.2017, relating to Stenographers, contending that the circumstances are analogous.

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However, the relevant service particulars, recruitment conditions and administrative circumstances relating to those employees have not been placed before us. In the absence of such material, it is not possible to ascertain the nature of the alleged analogy or to hold that the said document supports the applicants’ claim. We, therefore, find that Annexure-RJ2 does not advance their case.

16. The respondents have also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in The Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Another vs. G.N. Mani Ravinder and others, Civil Appeal Nos. 12966-12967/2026, dated 17.09.2026, reported in 2026 INSC 1007. In that judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the earlier decisions in Mishri Lal and Medini C. and explained the factual distinction between the two. The relevant observations are reproduced below: “8. Indisputably, as has been noted by the learned Single Judge of the High Court that all the writ petitioners were officiating against the post of Assistant Director (Official Language) or ‘Rajbhasha Adhikari’ which fact was also stated in paragraphs 6 and 9 of the counter affidavit filed by the appellants before the writ court. Thus, it is not in dispute that the private respondents-writ petitioners were never promoted either on regular basis or even on ad hoc basis to the post of ‘Rajbhasha Adhikari’. In the above undisputed factual background, we notice the observations made by this Court in Mishri Lal (supra) in paragraph 10 which is reproduced hereunder:

“10. It may be mentioned that the respondents herein were never regularly promoted as Hindi Officer at any

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Mikasha Suneja point of time either under the 1984 Rules or the Recruitment Rules, 2002. They had never been appointed on the basis of the recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee duly approved by the Union Public Service Commission. In fact, they were appointed purely on a local officiating basis under the powers delegated to the heads of telecom circles on the basis of administrative instructions dated 28-4-1994. Thus, they were never regular appointees and hence had no vested rights for promotion to the post of Hindi Officer under the Recruitment Rules of 2002, which, in fact, were never in operation at any point of time. Besides this, when the revised Recruitment Rules, 2005 were formulated, 120 posts were classified as executive, and for the executive cadre posts, the mode of recruitment was changed and it was now to be filled up by a limited internal competitive examination. It cannot now be allowed to be filled up by promotion of persons working on officiating basis. In our opinion there was nothing illegal in this change of police.”

9. In the subsequent decision of this Court in Medini C. (supra), the affected candidates were promoted on officiating or ad hoc basis. In such a situation, this Court had an occasion to consider whether their cases would be governed by the earlier decision of this Court in Mishri Lal (supra) or they are distinguishable. This Court proceeded to observe thus in paragraphs 20, 21, 30 and 32 to 37:

“20. There can be no cavil that these appellants were appointed as Hindi Translators and Telecom Office Assistants. The appellant viz., C. Mridula was promoted to General Central Service Group as Assistant Director (OL) on officiating basis while the appellants viz., Medini C., B. Geetha Devi and Sobhana Kumari were promoted to the post of Assistant Director (OL) on ad hoc basis. This was prior to the enforcement of the 2002 Rules.

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21. On 24.12.2002, the respondent(s) issued a notification stating that the 2002 Rules would supersede all instructions on the subject including the instructions contained in DOT’s Circular No.372-1/94- STG-III dated 28.04.1994 regarding filling up of the posts of Hindi Officers [Assistant Director (OL)] in field units on local officiating basis. That wherever local officiating arrangements/ad hoc promotions were required, they were to be made in accordance with the provisions of the 2002 Rules. Further local officiating arrangements/promotions on ad hoc basis having already been made were not be disturbed until further orders.

30. The High Court vide its judgment dated 04.11.2011 held that in Mishri Lal, this Court had made observations with regard to the implementation of the 2002 Rules vis-a-vis the facts of the said case and the said observations did not apply to the instant cases. The High Court held in favour of the appellants herein by observing that there were 120 vacancies of Assistant Director (OL) when the 2002 Rules were in force and the appointing authority had promoted in terms of the prevailing Rules and the 2005 Rules did not take away the vested right of the appellants herein as the 2005 Rules were prospective in operation. Citing the decision of this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah & Ors. vs. J. Sreenivasa Rao – AIR 1983 SC 852, it was observed that the posts which fell vacant prior to the amended rules would be governed by the old rules and not by the new rules. Consequently, all the original petitions and writ petition filed by the respondents herein were dismissed by the High Court vide judgment dated 04.11.2011.

32. We have in detail narrated the facts and events that have occurred in these cases and also referred to the Rules of 2002 and 2005 and we have succinctly noted the earlier order dated 04.011.2011 passed by the High Court which were in favour of the appellants herein. The reason as to why the earlier order of the High Court was reviewed and recalled by the impugned judgment is

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Mikasha Suneja mainly on the basis of the judgment of this Court in Mishri Lal in respect of which the High Court in the impugned judgment has stated that the 2002 Rules were not given effect to and hence the appellants had no right to be regularised subsequent to their ad hoc promotions.

33. Hence, we shall consider the judgment of this Court in Mishri Lal. In Mishri Lal respondent nos.1 to 9 therein assailed the 2005 Rules by which the writ petitioners were told to appear in the Limited Internal Competitive Examination for promotion to the post of Rajbhasha Adhikari [AD (OL)]. The said Rules were quashed by the Allahabad High Court at the preliminary stage of admission, without service of notice to the respondent BSNL. In paragraphs 9 of Mishri Lal, this Court noted that there were some objections to the Recruitment Rules of 2002 as “allegedly” these rules were never in operation at any point of time. Thereafter, the revised 2005 Rules were formulated and issued on 05.08.2005 whereby 120 posts were classified as executive with the nomenclature of Rajbhasha Adhikari. While the educational qualifications remained the same as before, under the 2005 Rules, the entire cadre had to be filled by a limited internal competitive examination. These Rules had been struck down by the Allahabad High Court.

34. In paragraph 10 of Mishri Lal, it is noted that the respondents therein were never regularly promoted as Hindi Officer at any point of time. They were appointed on the basis of administrative instructions dated 28.04.1994, purely on officiating basis under the powers delegated to the Heads of Telecom Circles. They were never regular appointees and hence no vested rights for promotion to the post of Hindi Officer under the 2002 Rules inhered in them. Further, this Court observed that when the 2005 Rules were formulated 120 posts were classified as executive and the power of recruitment was changed and such posts were to be filled up by internal competitive examination, the said posts could not be

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Mikasha Suneja filled up by promotion by the persons working on officiating basis.

35. Thus, the aforesaid facts in Mishri Lal and on a consideration of the reasoning of the judgment(s) of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, this Court held in favour of the respondents herein by setting aside the judgment of the Allahabad High Court.

36. In our view the judgment in Mishri Lal cannot be applied to the present case as the facts that obtained in the said case are distinct. In Mishri Lal it was noted that the respondents therein were never regularly promoted as Hindi Officers at any point of time either under the 1984 Rules nor under the 2002 Rules subsequently. They were appointed purely on the local officiating basis under the administrative instructions dated 28.4.1994. Therefore, this Court held that the respondents in the said case were never regular appointees and hence had no vested right for promotion to the post of Hindi Officer under the 2002 Rules which were not given effect to vis- a-vis the respondents therein.

37. But in the instant case the facts are totally distinct inasmuch as these appellants were provisionally promoted while in the Telecom Department as Assistant Director (OL) as early as on 15.05.1994 but they were not regularised and hence they approached the Tribunal seeking an order of regularisation. In fact, Rule 10(3) of 2002 Rules categorically stated that as a “one time measure” all the vacancies in the grade of Assistant Director (OL) in the first year of promotional quota or direct vacancies had to be filled by direct quota by following due procedure from amongst the officials who had been officiating as Assistant Director (OL) in the respondent-BSNL subject to their filling the basic qualifications and experience as prescribed. Despite promulgation of the 2002 Rules no order for regularisation of promotion was issued. Hence, the appellants herein approached the High Court for promotion. It is during the said period, the 2005 Rules were issued but by then the appellants herein had

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Mikasha Suneja already enforced their vested rights regarding their regularisation in their respective posts as per the 2002 Rules on the bases of one time measure that was envisaged under the said Rules. The Tribunal therefore granted relief to them and the High Court by order dated 04.11.2011 dismissed the writ petitions filed by the respondent-BSNL was sustained by this Court in the special leave petitions as well as the review petitions filed by the respondent-BSNL.”

“10. The conspicuous discerning factors in Mishri Lal (supra) and Medini C. (supra) are that in Mishri Lal (supra) the writ petitioners were working as ‘Rajbhasha Adhikari’ on officiating basis like in the present case; whereas in the matter of Medini C. (supra), the writ petitioners were provisionally promoted. Thus, the cases of the private respondents-writ petitioners were covered under the judgment rendered by this Court in Mishri Lal (supra) wherein this Court denied the relief to the writ petitioners only on the ground that since they were working on the next higher post only on officiating basis, there is no vested right in them to be considered for promotion under the old Rules. In the subsequent decision in the matter of Medini C. (supra), the writ petitioners were provisionally promoted and, thus, this Court distinguished the earlier decision of this Court in the matter of Mishri Lal (supra).”

The aforesaid judgment is of considerable relevance to the present controversy. It reiterates that the distinction between Mishri Lal and Medini C. rests upon the nature of the promotion and the subsequent administrative action taken in the individual cases. In Mishri Lal, the employees had continued on local officiating arrangements and had not acquired any vested right under the 2002 Rules. In Medini C., the appellants had been provisionally promoted

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Mikasha Suneja and had pursued their claims at the relevant time. Their cases were supported by the administrative actions recognising their promotions and removing the FR-35 pay restrictions. On examining the service particulars and documents of the applicants before us, we find no evidence that they were provisionally promoted in the manner of the appellants in Medini C. Nor is there evidence that their pay restrictions under FR-35 were removed or that their pay was actually fixed under FR-22 pursuant to any such administrative decision. Their case is, therefore, materially closer to that of the employees in Mishri Lal, who were working only under local officiating arrangements. The applicants cannot consequently claim the benefit of the judgment in Medini C.

17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the same judgment in G.N. Mani Ravinder (supra), further considered the question of the applicability of the earlier Recruitment Rules to vacancies arising before their supersession and observed as follows: “11. It is now settled by this Court in the matter of Raj Kumar (supra) while overturning the earlier decision in the matter of Y.V. Rangaiah and Others v. J. Sreenivasa Rao and Others, that:

(i) There is no rule of universal application that vacancies must be necessarily filled on the basis of the law which existed on the date when they arose;

(ii) It is now settled proposition of law that a candidate has a right to be considered in the light of the existing

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rules and that such right occurs on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates under the rules existing at that point in time; and

(iii) The Government is entitled to take a conscious policy decision not to fill up the vacancies arising prior to the amendment of the rules. The employee does not acquire any vested right for being considered for promotion in accordance with the repealed rules in view of the policy decision taken by the Government. There is no obligation for the Government to make appointments as per the old rules in the event of restructuring. The only requirement is that the policy decisions of the Government must be fair and reasonable and must be justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

12. Thus, applying the ratio laid down by this Court in Raj Kumar (supra), the High Court could not have directed consideration of the private respondents-writ petitioners’ case for promotion on the basis of the Rules existing immediately prior to the enactment of the 2005 Rules. Thus, the common impugned judgments passed by the High Court deserve to be set aside and the same are hereby set aside.”

The aforesaid pronouncement further makes it clear that the mere existence of vacancies under an earlier set of Recruitment Rules does not, by itself, confer an indefeasible right to promotion under those Rules. The entitlement has to be examined in the light of the applicable Rules and the facts demonstrating whether any enforceable right had actually accrued before their supersession. In the present case, the applicants have not established that any such right had crystallised in their favour under the Recruitment Rules, 2002. Their local officiating arrangements, without evidence of

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Mikasha Suneja provisional promotion or the requisite administrative action, do not confer a vested right to regular promotion under the superseded Rules. Thus, on both factual and legal grounds, the applicants cannot claim the benefit of Medini C.

18. The respondents have also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench, in OA No. 306/2012, decided on 28.06.2023, in Anwar Azim Khan vs. BSNL. The relevant findings and operative directions are reproduced below: “12. In the instant case, the applicant was never regularly promoted as Assistant Director (OL) at any point of time rather continued purely on the local officiating basis under the administrative instructions. It has categorically been stated by the respondents that the 2002 Rules were never given effect to vis-à-vis the applicant. Regarding his non- promotion as Assistant Director (OL) on regular basis, the applicant has never agitated his grievance before the competent forum since 2002 when the 2002 Rules came into existence. So far as submission made by learned counsel for the applicant regarding implementation of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Medini. C (supra) in respect of persons mentioned at Sr. Nos.1 to 4 (Pawan Kumar Gurudev, Himanshu Bhatt, Prem Narayan Ahirwal, Vidha Bhagat), we find that those persons had already approached the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur by filing Writ Petition No.5971/2008(s) challenging conduct of LDCE, 2008 on account of not indicating the vacancies available for the LDCE candidates, whereas the applicant had chosen not to be part of that Writ Petition. Therefore, issuance of promotion order dated 02.11.2022 in respect of those officials is well justified. The judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the applicant in the case of Medini. C (supra) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case as admittedly the applicant was never regularly

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Mikasha Suneja promoted as Assistant Director (OL) neither under the old rules nor under the 2002 Rules. Regarding the relief sought for in Para 8.(i) of this Original Application, the same has already been granted by the respondents, during the pendency of this O.A, which is evident as per Annexure R-1 dated 14.08.2012.

13. In view of the aforesaid facts and keeping in view proposition of law propounded in Mishri Lal (supra) and Medini. C (supra), we are of the view that the instant Original Application is bereft of merit and liable to be dismissed.

14. Accordingly, this Original Application is dismissed. No order as to costs.”

The reasoning adopted by the Jabalpur Bench is consistent with the distinction recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court between Mishri Lal and Medini C. The relevant considerations are whether the employee had acquired any enforceable right under the 2002 Rules, whether the employee had pursued the claim at the relevant time, and whether the circumstances of the employees who obtained relief pursuant to Medini C. are comparable. In the present case, the applicants have not established provisional promotions or any corresponding administrative action under the 2002 Rules. They also did not challenge the subsequent recruitment process at the relevant time. We find the reasoning in Anwar Azim Khan to be relevant to the controversy before us and see no reason to take a different view.

19. We shall now consider the question of limitation and delay.

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The applicants have filed MA No. 312/2025 seeking condonation of delay. We have examined the application and the explanation furnished therein. We do not find sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay. The respondents have rightly pointed out that the alleged cause of action arose in 2001-2002, when the applicants claim that their rights under the Recruitment Rules, 2002, ought to have been recognised. However, the earliest representation placed on record seeking parity with the appellants in Medini C. is dated 07.03.2023. There is no satisfactory explanation for the prolonged period of inaction between the relevant events and the submission of the representations in 2023- 2024. The applicants have not established that they challenged the supersession of the 2002 Rules, the introduction of the 2005 Rules or the conduct of LICE-2008 at the relevant time. They participated in the examination, accepted the promotions granted to them and allowed the selection process to attain finality. The material on record does not disclose any continuous pursuit of their alleged rights during the intervening period. The principle that similarly situated employees should ordinarily receive similar treatment cannot be applied without regard to the settled exceptions relating to delay, laches and acquiescence. In State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava (2015), the Hon’ble Supreme Court

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Mikasha Suneja recognised that fence-sitters who approach the Court after considerable delay may stand on a different footing from employees who had diligently pursued their remedies at the relevant time. The respondents have also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India & others vs. A. Durairaj, Civil Appeal No. 1783/2005, decided on 01.12.2010, as well as K.C. Kaushik vs. State of Haryana (2024), in support of the proposition that the doctrine of delay and laches and the conduct of fence-sitters may disentitle an employee from claiming the benefit of relief granted to others. We find that the present applicants fall within the category of employees who did not pursue their alleged rights at the appropriate time, accepted the subsequent recruitment process and approached the authorities only after the judgment in Medini C. became available. Their claim for parity cannot be considered independently of this conduct. Accordingly, even on the ground of delay and laches, the applicants have not made out a case warranting interference. The MA seeking condonation of delay is, therefore, liable to be dismissed.

20. On an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances, we find that no vested right under the Recruitment Rules, 2002, has been established in favour of the applicants. They did not pursue their alleged claims at the relevant time, nor did they challenge the Recruitment Rules, 2005, or the selection process conducted thereunder.

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On the contrary, they voluntarily participated in LICE-2008, conducted under the Recruitment Rules, 2005, qualified and accepted promotion with effect from 07.11.2008. The selection process was thereafter completed and attained finality. In the absence of any timely challenge or a legally sustainable basis for reopening the selection, the applicants cannot now seek to unsettle the consequences of a process in which they themselves participated and under which they accepted promotion. Having consciously participated in LICE-2008 and accepted the promotions granted thereunder without protest or reservation, the applicants must be held to have acquiesced in the recruitment process. They cannot, after such an inordinate lapse of time, seek consideration under the superseded Recruitment Rules, 2002, particularly when they have failed to establish that any vested right had crystallised in their favour before those Rules were superseded.

21. The judgment in Mishri Lal (supra) upheld the validity of the Recruitment Rules, 2005, and held that local officiating arrangements do not, by themselves, create vested rights to regular promotion under the earlier Rules. The applicants before us were working in the cadre of Assistant Director (OL) under local officiating arrangements made pursuant to the administrative instructions. They have not established that they were subsequently provisionally promoted or that their officiating

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arrangements were regularised by removal of the FR-35 restriction and fixation of pay under FR-22, as was the case in Medini C. Their cases are, therefore, materially distinguishable from those of the appellants in Medini C. and are governed by the principle laid down in Mishri Lal. The subsequent judgment in G.N. Mani Ravinder (supra) further reinforces this distinction and leaves no basis for extending the relief granted in Medini C. to employees whose cases are founded merely upon local officiating arrangements.

22. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no legal or factual basis to extend the benefit of the judgment in Medini C. to the applicants. Their claim fails on the merits, as they have not established that they acquired a vested right under the Recruitment Rules, 2002, or that their service particulars are comparable to those of the appellants in Medini C. The claim is further defeated by their participation in and acceptance of the selection process under the Recruitment Rules, 2005, and by the unexplained delay in approaching the authorities and this Tribunal. We are, therefore, not persuaded that any case has been made out warranting interference by this Tribunal.

23. To sum up, the central question is whether the applicants, who served as Assistant Director (OL) under local officiating arrangements, can claim parity with the appellants in Medini C. Our examination of the Recruitment Rules, 2002, the contemporaneous

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Mikasha Suneja administrative instructions and the individual service particulars placed on record establishes that the applicants have not proved that they were provisionally promoted, that the restriction under FR-35 was removed in their cases, or that their pay was actually fixed under FR-22 so as to crystallise any right under the 2002 Rules during the relevant period. The special provision under those Rules was a one-time measure confined to the first year of recruitment and did not confer a continuing right to regularisation. The applicants’ cases are consequently governed by the principle in Mishri Lal, not the factual exception recognised in Medini C. Their subsequent participation in and acceptance of LICE- 2008, without protest, and their unexplained delay in asserting the alleged rights further disentitle them to the relief claimed. The claim for parity, therefore, fails both on merits and on limitation.

24. Accordingly, we pass the following order:

ORDER

OA and MA No. 312/2025 for condonation of delay are dismissed. No order as to costs.

Sd/-

Sd/- (DR. SANJIV KUMAR) (JUSTICE S. SUJATHA) MEMBER (A)

MEMBER (J)

/ms/

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