ARVIND KUMAR vs NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY on 5 November 2026

Order

By Hon’ble Mr. Rajnish Kumar Rai, Member (Judicial) The instant M.A. No. 2955 of 2024 has been filed by the applicants seeking condonation of delay in filing the matter bearing Diary No. 3814 of 2024.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the applicants, namely Arvind Kumar, Kaptan Ali and Navin Kumar, have approached this Tribunal by filing the present matter, bearing Diary No. 3814 of 2024, seeking a direction to the respondents to appoint them against the vacant posts of Group-D employees advertised vide Employment Notice No. NER/RRC/D/2/2010 dated 15.12.2010, along with all consequential benefits. The applicants contend that they had successfully qualified the written examination and Physical Efficiency Test conducted by the Railway Recruitment Cell, Gorakhpur, and their names were included in the list of 5612 successful candidates at serial nos. 3638, 1794 and 2723, respectively. Thereafter, they were also called for medical examination and document verification and were declared medically fit, with their documents found correct and genuine. However, out of the total 4726 advertised posts, the respondents appointed only 3592 candidates, leaving 1134 posts vacant. Despite having successfully qualified the selection process, the applicants have not been given appointment against the remaining vacancies. They further state that they submitted a representation dated 21.12.2023 before the Chairman, Railway Recruitment Cell, Gorakhpur, requesting appointment against the remaining vacancies, but no positive response was received from the respondents. The applicants have, therefore, filed M.A. No. 2955 of 2024 seeking condonation of delay in filing the present matter.

3. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the delay in approaching this Tribunal is neither wilful nor deliberate. It was contended that the applicants had repeatedly approached the Chairman, Railway Recruitment Cell, Gorakhpur, seeking appointment against the existing vacancies, but the respondents had given assurances from time to time. Believing such assurances, and also due to their financial and domestic difficulties and lack of knowledge regarding the limitation period for approaching this Tribunal, the applicants could not approach the Tribunal earlier. Learned counsel further submitted that the respondents have not issued the final panel of the aforesaid selection and 1134 posts out of the total 4726 advertised posts are still vacant. Thus, the cause of action is continuous and recurring in nature. It was also submitted that similarly situated candidates of the same selection have been appointed against the existing vacancies, whereas the applicants, despite having successfully qualified the selection process and being declared medically fit, have not been given appointment. Accordingly, learned counsel prayed that the delay in filing the present matter be condoned in the interest of justice, as otherwise the applicants would suffer irreparable loss and injury.

4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the present matter is hopelessly barred by limitation, as the cause of action, if any, arose on 15.12.2010, when the Employment Notice for recruitment to Group-D posts was issued, whereas the applicants have approached this Tribunal after an inordinate delay of more than 14 years. It was contended that under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the prescribed period of limitation for filing an Original Application is one year from the date on which the cause of action arises. However, the applicants have neither explained the extraordinary delay nor furnished any satisfactory reason for not approaching the Tribunal within the prescribed period of limitation. Learned counsel further submitted that mere submission of representations cannot extend the period of limitation or revive a stale claim. The applicants have also failed to explain the delay on a day-to-day basis. Accordingly, it was strongly urged that the application seeking condonation of delay deserves to be rejected and the matter bearing Diary No. 3814 of 2024 is liable to be rejected as time-barred.

5. In the objection filed on behalf of the respondents, it has been specifically stated that the applicants themselves have admitted that the recruitment notification was issued on 15.12.2010 and that they have approached this Tribunal after more than 14 years without explaining the inordinate delay in filing the present matter. It has further been stated that the applicants have not disclosed any sufficient or cogent reason for the delay either in the present matter or in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay. The respondents have relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surjeet Singh Sahni Vs. State of U.P. and Others, Special Leave Petition (C) No. 3008 of 2022, decided on 28.02.2022, wherein it has been observed that mere representations do not extend the period of limitation and that a litigant approaching the Court after an inordinate delay must furnish a satisfactory explanation. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, regarding the principles governing delay and laches. The respondents have also referred to the order dated 09.02.2024 passed by this Tribunal in M.A. No. 1623 of 2021 in Diary No. 330/1144 of 2021, wherein the application seeking condonation of delay was rejected and the Original Application was consequently dismissed as time- barred. On these grounds, the respondents have prayed for rejection of the application for condonation of delay and dismissal of the present matter as barred by limitation.

6. In the rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the applicants, it has been reiterated that the applicants have already explained the reasons for the delay in approaching this Tribunal and that the delay was neither wilful nor deliberate. It was contended that the recruitment process initiated vide Employment Notice dated 15.12.2010 has not yet been brought to its logical conclusion, as the respondents have neither issued the final panel nor filled the remaining 1134 vacancies, against which 886 selected candidates are still awaiting appointment. It was further contended that the cause of action is continuous in nature on account of the respondents' failure to finalise the recruitment process and that the applicants cannot be deprived of their claim merely on technical grounds of limitation. Reliance was also placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tej Prakash Pathak & Ors. Vs. Rajasthan High Court & Ors., decided on 07.11.2024. Accordingly, learned counsel reiterated that sufficient grounds have been disclosed for condonation of delay and prayed that the delay be condoned in the interest of justice.

7. Learned counsel for the applicants, in the written submissions dated 08.10.2026, reiterated that the recruitment process initiated vide Employment Notice dated 15.12.2010 has not yet been brought to its logical conclusion, as the respondents have neither issued the final or replacement panel nor filled the remaining 1134 vacancies, against which 886 selected candidates, including the applicants, are still awaiting appointment. It was submitted that the respondents had kept the recruitment process pending despite repeated representations and information obtained under the RTI Act, and that the cause of action is continuous and recurring in nature. Learned counsel further placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tej Prakash Pathak & Ors. Vs. Rajasthan High

Court & Ors., as well as the decisions in Ram Singh & 10 Others Vs. Union of India & Others (O.A. No. 215 of 2019), Baiju Kumar Vs. Union of India & Others (O.A. No. 927 of 2019), and the judgments of the Hon’ble High Courts of Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh in support of the contention that the recruitment process should be brought to its logical conclusion and the claims of the applicants should be considered against the existing vacancies. It was, therefore, prayed that the delay in filing the Original Application be condoned in the interest of justice.

8. We have considered the rival submissions advanced by Mr. Satish Dwivedi, learned counsel for the applicants, and Mr. Anil Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents, and have carefully perused the pleadings, documents and written submissions available on record.

9. The short question which arises for our consideration is whether the applicants have made out sufficient grounds for condonation of the inordinate delay of more than 14 years in approaching this Tribunal in respect of the recruitment initiated vide Employment Notice dated 15.12.2010 for Group-D posts. Admittedly, the applicants have approached this Tribunal only in the year 2024. The explanation furnished by the applicants, namely, repeated representations, alleged assurances given by the respondents, financial and domestic difficulties and lack of knowledge regarding the period of limitation, does not constitute a sufficient and satisfactory explanation for such an extraordinary delay. Mere submission of representations cannot extend the statutory period of limitation or revive a stale claim. Further, the plea that the cause of action is continuous and recurring in nature merely because certain vacancies remain

unfilled and the final panel has not been issued, cannot, by itself, justify condonation of such an inordinate delay.

10. The applicants have placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tej Prakash Pathak & Ors. Vs. Rajasthan High Court & Ors., decided on 07.11.2024, as well as certain other decisions in support of their claim that the recruitment process should be brought to its logical conclusion. However, we find that the said judgments, relied upon by the applicants in support of their claim on merits, do not dispense with the requirement of explaining the delay in approaching this Tribunal. The question before us at this stage is not whether the applicants have any enforceable right to appointment against the alleged vacant posts, but whether they have furnished sufficient cause for not approaching this Tribunal within the prescribed period of limitation. The applicants have failed to satisfactorily explain the delay of more than 14 years. The fact that certain vacancies may still be available cannot, by itself, furnish a ground for condoning such an inordinate delay.

11. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons – who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” The aforesaid principles squarely apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The applicants have not brought on record any cogent or convincing material explaining their prolonged inaction for more than 14 years. In our considered opinion, such an inordinate delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of equity or on the plea that certain vacancies are still available.

12. We may also refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Others Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Others, reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained the principles relating to delay, laches, acquiescence and fence- sitters. In paragraph 22.2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.”

The aforesaid judgment reiterates that delay, laches and acquiescence may constitute valid grounds for declining relief to persons who remain inactive and subsequently seek to claim the benefit of a judgment obtained by similarly situated persons who had approached the Court in time. In the present case, the applicants have referred to the appointments allegedly granted to other candidates of the same selection. However, the principle relating to fence-sitters has to be applied in the context of the circumstances contemplated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In any event, the applicants’ claim is required to be examined in the light of the settled principles of delay and laches, and the applicants have failed to furnish a satisfactory explanation for their prolonged inaction of more than 14 years.

13. In view of the foregoing discussion and considering the fact that the applicants have failed to disclose any sufficient cause for the inordinate delay in approaching this Tribunal, we are of the considered view that M.A. No. 2955 of 2024, seeking condonation of delay, is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, M.A. No. 2955 of 2024 stands dismissed. Consequently, the matter bearing Diary No. 3814 of 2024 also stands dismissed as barred by limitation. No order as to costs.

14. All pending Miscellaneous Applications, if any, stand disposed of.

(Manju Pandey)

(Rajnish Kumar Rai) Member (A)

Member (J)

/Shakuntala/