CRL A(MD)/1310/2026 of Muthupandi Vs State Of Tamilnadu Rep By Inspector Of Police, Awps-Thirumangalam on 10 November 2026

JUDGMENT

1. The appeal This criminal appeal challenges the judgment dated 08.10.2026 passed by the Principal Special Court for Trial of POCSO Act Cases, Madurai, in Spl.S.C.No.65 of 2025. By that judgment, the appellant was convicted under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“the POCSO Act”) and sentenced to twenty years of rigorous imprisonment. He was also convicted under Section 10 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (“the PCM Act”).

2. The Case of Prosecution The prosecution alleges that on 10.01.2024 the appellant married a girl aged fourteen years and thereafter had a physical relationship with her. She became pregnant and gave birth to a female child on 08.11.2024. On an intimation received from the Government Hospital, a case in Cr.No.27 of 2024 was registered against the appellant. He was arrested, witnesses were examined, evidence was collected, and a final report was filed. The final report invoked Section 9 of the PCM Act together with Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012.

3. Proceedings before the Special Court

(i) The appellant was released on bail during the investigation. The Special Court took the final report on file and issued summons. After the appellant appeared, copies of the prosecution documents were furnished to him under Section 230 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”), and the case was posted for framing of charges.

(ii) The ‘B Diary’ entry for 18.09.2026 records that the appellant was present and was questioned about the offences and the accusation, and that he admitted the accusation and pleaded guilty. The case was thereafter reserved for judgment and was adjourned from time to time. The judgment was finally pronounced on 08.10.2026. The learned Trial Judge convicted the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and sentenced him to undergo 20 years of Rigorous Imprisonment and pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- with default sentence. The appellant was also found guilty under Section 9 of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, and convicted under Section 10 of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of one year and pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- with default sentence.

4. The appeal: Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence imposed upon him, the appellant herein has preferred this appeal. During the course of hearing of the application seeking suspension of sentence, this Court noticed a fatal error committed by the learned Trial Judge in as much as no charges had been framed and no trial had been conducted. The judgment reflected that the accused had merely been questioned generally with regard to the offence and the accusation against him and that he pleaded guilty. In view of the serious procedural irregularity noticed, the records were immediately called for, along with remarks of the learned Trial Judge. The records were submitted with remarks.

5. Scrutiny of the record

(i) The records of the Special Court, which have been called for and perused, do not bear out the premise on which the conviction rests. The record is internally inconsistent. Although the remarks submitted by the learned Trial Judge suggests that charges were framed on 18.09.2026, the ‘B Diary’ of that date is clear that no formal charges were framed; it says only that the appellant was questioned about the offence and accusation. The recorded plea bears neither the signature of the appellant nor that of the learned Special Judge. The judgment under appeal likewise does not record that any charge was framed, read over or explained to the appellant.

(ii) In her explanation, the learned Special Judge states that the charges were framed, read over and explained. That statement finds no support in the ‘B Diary’, in the plea record or in the judgment. A statement made after the event cannot take the place of the contemporaneous record, because the record of proceedings is the only reliable evidence of what transpired in Court. It is also for this reason that the plea must be recorded in the own words of the accused and authenticated by his signature and that of the Judge, who recorded it.

6. Absence of a valid charge and plea

(i) Framing a charge is the foundation of a criminal trial. The charge must state the offence with which the accused is charged, and it must be read over and explained to him, whereupon he is asked whether he pleads guilty or claims to be tried. These requirements are set out in the BNSS provisions on framing of charge and on conviction upon a plea of guilty (Sections 251 and 252 BNSS, corresponding to Sections 228 and 229 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973). A plea of guilty has legal effect only when it is a plea to a specific charge that the accused has understood. A general admission of an unspecified “accusation” is not such a plea.

(ii) Every accused is entitled to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. That right is meaningful only if the accused knows precisely what he is alleged to have done and under which provision of law. Where the charge is not properly framed, or is not read over and explained, the accused is deprived of that notice, and the resulting plea and conviction cannot be sustained. On this record, no formal charge was framed, and the plea was neither properly recorded nor authenticated. The conviction therefore rests on no valid plea at all.

7. A plea of guilty could not, in any event, support this conviction

(i) Even if charges had been framed under Section 9 of the PCM Act and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and even if the appellant had pleaded guilty to them, the Special Court ought not to have convicted him on that plea. Section 6 of the POCSO Act prescribes a minimum sentence of twenty years’ rigorous imprisonment and a maximum of death. Although a court has a discretion to accept a plea of guilty, it should do so with great caution in cases of this gravity. It must be satisfied that the plea is voluntary, informed and unequivocal. Where the consequences are severe, and the case of the prosecution depends on foundational facts that have not been established, the proper course is to proceed to trial.

(ii) The foundational fact in the present case is the age of the survivor and her evidence regarding sexual intercourse. The offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, can be made out only if the survivor was below eighteen years of age at the relevant time. That fact is itself an essential ingredient of the offence, so an admission of the “accusation” cannot dispense with proof of it, least of all where the admission was neither preceded by a specific charge nor recorded in compliance with law. The prosecution has the duty to prove the age of the survivor by reliable evidence, such as school records, a birth certificate or, where necessary, an ossification test.

(iii) The presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, 2012, arises only after the prosecution has established the foundational facts. In this case, no document was proved and no witness was examined. The Special Court therefore had no material on which to record any finding on age of the survivor. Without a finding that the survivor was below eighteen, the provisions of the POCSO Act could not have been invoked, and the conviction under Section 6 of that Act cannot be sustained.

8. The conviction under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 The conviction under the PCM Act is erroneous for an additional reason. The final report was filed under Section 9 of the PCM Act, which punishes a male adult above eighteen years of age who contracts a child marriage. The Special Court nevertheless convicted the appellant under Section 10, which punishes a person who performs, conducts, directs or abets a child marriage. These are distinct offences with distinct ingredients, and the appellant was never charged under Section 10. He could not be convicted of an offence of which he had no notice and which was not framed against him. The prosecution case, moreover, involved the appellant as the person who married the survivor, not as a person who solemnized the marriage. This reinforces the conclusion that the conviction lacks any proper basis in the charge.

9. Appeal or Revision?

(i) The next question that arises for consideration is whether the present appeal is barred under Section 416 of BNSS, 2023 (Section 375 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973). Admittedly, the case was tried by the Court of Session for an offence under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, which prescribes punishment extending to death.

(ii) A perusal of the records reveals that no formal charge was framed against the accused as mandated under Section 251 of BNSS, 2023 (Section 228(1)(b) Cr.P.C). Consequently, the charge was neither read over nor explained to the accused as contemplated under Section 251(2) of BNSS, 2023 (Section 228(2) Cr.P.C). The records also do not disclose that the accused was properly called upon to plead guilty to the accusation or that his plea was recorded in accordance with Section 252 of BNSS, 2023 (Section 229 Cr.P.C).

(iii) In the absence of a charge framed in accordance with law, there was no legally framed accusation to which the accused could have entered a plea of guilty in the manner contemplated under Section 252 of BNSS, 2023 (Section 229 Cr.P.C) Further, the purported plea does not satisfy the requirements of a voluntary, unequivocal and conscious admission of guilt. Therefore, the mere fact that the trial Court has described the conviction as one based on a plea of guilty would not, by itself, attract the statutory prohibition under Section 416 of BNSS, 2023 (Section 375 Cr.P.C).

(iv) It is pertinent to point out that Section 416 of BNSS, 2023 (Section 375 Cr.P.C) does not impose an absolute prohibition against an appeal in every case where the trial Court records a conviction by referring to a plea of guilty. The statutory restriction operates only when the

conviction is founded upon a legally valid plea of guilty. When the very validity of the alleged plea is in question on account of non- compliance with the mandatory procedure governing a Sessions trial, the accused cannot be deprived of his statutory right of appeal by resorting to the said provision.

(v) In such circumstances, the impugned judgment cannot be treated as a judgment of conviction rendered upon a legally valid plea of guilty so as to attract the bar under Section 416 of BNSS, 2023 (Section 375 Cr.P.C). The appeal is, therefore, maintainable.

10. Conclusion

(a) For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Special Court cannot stand. No valid charge was framed; the plea of the appellant was not properly recorded or authenticated; the age of the survivor, the foundational facts, were never proved; and the appellant was convicted under a provision different from the one under which the final report was laid.

(b) Accordingly,

i. The judgment of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and Section 10 of the PCM Act, 2006, in Spl.S.C.No.65 of 2025 dated 08.10.2026 is set aside. ii. The matter matter is remitted to the Principal Special Court for Trial of POCSO Act Cases, Madurai. The Special Court shall frame appropriate charges, read them over and explain them to the appellant, record his plea in accordance with law, conduct a trial, and dispose of the case on its merits. iii. The appellant, who was earlier released on bail, shall continue on bail and shall co-operate with the Special Court for the speedy disposal of the case. iv. Nothing in this judgment shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the prosecution case or on the guilt or innocence of the appellant. The Special Court shall decide the matter independently, on the evidence adduced before it. v.The criminal appeal is allowed in the above terms. 10-11-2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes/No rgm To

1. Inspector Of Police, Awps-Thirumangalam Police Station Madurai

2. The Additional Public Prosecutor Madurai Bench of Madras High Court Madurai Copy To : Section Officer ( VR Section ) Madurai Bench of Madras High Court

D.LINGESWARAN, J. rgm CRL A(MD) No. 1310 of 2026 10-11-2026