HANUMAN GIRI vs DEPARTMENT OF POSTS on 12 November 2026

O R D E R

The present original application has been filed by the applicants under section 19 of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 seeking following reliefs:- “(i) to issue a suitable order or direction to call for record and set aside the impugned orders Patrank-B2/Ex-gratia/Severance/II-15 Samanaya/2023 Banda dated 23.12.2024, Patrank-B2/Ex-gratia/Severance/II- 43/Samanya/2023 Banda dated 23.12.2024 Patrank-B2/Ex- gratia/Severance/II-36/Samanaya/2023 Banda dated 23.12.2024 and Patrank B-2/Ex-gratia/Severance/11-27 Banda dated 23.12.2024 and Patrank-B2/Ex-gratia/Severance/II-15 Samanaya/2023 Banda dated

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25.02.2025, Patrank-B2/Ex-gratia/Severance/II-43/ Samanya/2023 Banda dated 25.02.2025, Patrank-B2/Ex-Banda gratia/Severance/II- 36/Samanaya/2023 dated B-2/Ex-25.02.2025 and Patrank gratia/Severance/II-27 Banda dated 25.02.2025 only part of recovery (Annexure No. A-1 and A-2).

(ii) to issue a suitable order or direction to refused the recovered amount if any made to the applicants.

(iii) To pass such other and further order as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.

(iv) To award cost of the petition in favour of the applicants”.

2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: The applicants were appointed as Gramin Dak Sevaks (GDS) between 1976 and 1982 and subsequently retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation. Applicant No. 1 was promoted to the post of MTS, while the remaining applicants retired from their respective GDS posts. After retirement, they were paid severance amounts in lieu of pension, as GDS employees are not entitled to regular pension. The applicants have contended that, being retired employees with no regular pensionary income, they are not in a position to bear the financial burden of recovery. They have further stated that the respondents issued recovery orders dated 23.12.2024 and 25.02.2025 without specifying the relevant rules or following the prescribed procedure. According to the applicants, no charge-sheet or disciplinary proceedings were initiated against them before passing the recovery orders. They have submitted that the recovery after retirement is illegal and contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Haryana Vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) reported in (2015) 4 SCC 334, Thomas Daniel Vs. State of Kerala (Civil Appeal No. 7115 of 2010) decided on 2.5.2022 and Jageswar Sahoo and others Vs. The District Judge, Cuttack & others reported in 2025 0 Supreme (SC) 592. Accordingly, they have approached this Tribunal seeking quashing of the recovery order and refund of the amount deducted from their retirement dues.

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3. A counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents, denying the allegations made in the O.A. It has been stated that during an inquiry conducted in Banda Division, it was found that excess severance allowance had been paid to certain Ex-Gramin Dak Sevaks (Ex-GDSs). It was submitted that, as per the Postal Directorate's letter dated 27.06.2018, the admissible rate of severance allowance was Rs. 1,500/- per completed year of service up to 31.12.2015 and Rs.4,000/- per completed year with effect from 01.01.2016, in the case of GDSs who had not opted for the SDBS. In the case of GDSs who had opted for SDBS, the severance allowance up to 31.03.2011 was admissible at the rate of Rs.1,500/- per completed year. The respondents further submitted that, due to an erroneous calculation, excess payment had been made to certain Ex-GDSs, including the applicants, and notices for recovery were accordingly issued to 44 Ex-GDSs vide letter dated 23.12.2024. Respondents have rightly issued the recovery notice, thus, the present original application is liable to be dismissed.

4. A rejoinder affidavit has also been filed by the applicants, in which the facts stated in the Original Application have been reiterated and the contents of the counter affidavit have been denied. Nothing new has been stated in the rejoinder affidavit.

5. I have heard Shri Babu Nandan Singh, learned counsel for the applicants and Shri Vidyapati Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the records.

6. Submission of learned counsel for the applicants is that the applicants were appointed as GDS between 1976 and 1982 and, after rendering long years of service, retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation. It was submitted that the severance amount was paid to them by the Department itself after calculating their qualifying service and determining their entitlement. The applicants had neither furnished any incorrect

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information nor made any misrepresentation or committed any fraud for obtaining the said amount. The alleged excess payment, if any, was made solely due to an error on the part of the departmental authorities. Learned counsel for the applicants further submitted that the impugned recovery notices dated 23.12.2024 and 25.02.2025 were issued after the applicants had already retired from service, without issuing any show-cause notice or affording them an opportunity of hearing and without initiating any disciplinary proceedings against them. It was contended that the respondents could not recover the amount paid to the applicants after their retirement, particularly when the payment was made due to an alleged mistake committed by the Department itself and the applicants were not responsible for the same. It was further argued that the applicants are retired employees and have no regular pensionary benefits, as they were GDS employees. The severance amount was their only financial benefit in lieu of pension after rendering long years of service. Therefore, recovery of such amount would cause serious financial hardship to them. Learned counsel also submitted that the respondents had failed to disclose any specific rule or provision of law authorising recovery of the amount already paid to the applicants. Placing reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rafiq Masih (supra), Thomas Daniel (supra) and Jageswar Sahoo (supra), learned counsel submitted that recovery of excess payment from retired employees, particularly those belonging to Group-C service, is impermissible where the excess payment was not made on account of any fraud or misrepresentation on their part. The applicants cannot be made to suffer for a mistake committed by the departmental authorities themselves, especially after the amount had been paid to them upon their retirement. Thus, applicants prayed that the impugned recovery orders/notices dated 23.12.2024 and 25.02.2025 be quashed and the amount, if already recovered from the applicants,

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be refunded to them. Learned counsel accordingly prayed that the Original Application be allowed with costs.

7. Learned counsel for the respondents opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the applicants and submitted that the judgments relied upon by the applicants are distinguishable on facts and do not impose an absolute bar on recovery of excess payment in every case. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the applicants had wrongly relied upon the office letter dated 25.02.2025, wherein the words 'per month' were inadvertently mentioned in place of 'per year'. The said clerical error was subsequently rectified by a corrigendum dated 05.05.2025, clarifying that severance allowance was admissible on a yearly basis, in accordance with the Directorate's instructions dated 27.06.2018. It was also contended that the applicants had already been informed, vide office letter dated 16.01.2025, about the applicable rates of severance allowance, but this fact had been concealed by them while filing the present Original Application. Accordingly, the respondents submitted that the excess amount paid to the applicants was recoverable and the recovery notices had been issued in accordance with the applicable departmental instructions. The learned counsel, therefore, prayed that the Original Application be dismissed.

8. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for both the parties.

9. The main question which arises for consideration in the present case is whether the respondents are justified in recovering the alleged excess severance amount from the applicants after their retirement, particularly when there is no allegation that the applicants had obtained the said amount by practising fraud or making any misrepresentation.

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10. The facts which are not in dispute are that the applicants were initially appointed as Gramin Dak Sevaks between 1976 and 1982 and, after rendering long years of service, they retired from service. Applicant No. 1 was subsequently promoted to the post of MTS, whereas the remaining applicants retired from their respective GDS posts. It is also not the case of the respondents that the applicants had furnished any incorrect information, committed fraud or made any misrepresentation for obtaining the severance amount paid to them. The respondents themselves have stated that the alleged excess payment occurred due to an erroneous calculation made by the departmental authorities while sanctioning the severance amount.

11. From the stand taken by the respondents in their counter affidavit, it is evident that the dispute relates to the rate at which severance allowance was payable for different periods of engagement. According to the respondents, the admissible rate was Rs.1,500/- per completed year up to 31.12.2015 and Rs.4,000/- per completed year with effect from 01.01.2016 in the case of GDSs who had not opted for SDBS. In the case of GDSs who had opted for SDBS, the severance amount accrued up to 31.03.2011 was payable at the rate of Rs.1,500/- per completed year. The respondents have stated that the departmental authorities erroneously calculated the severance amount at the rate of Rs.4,000/- even for the period prior to 01.01.2016 and, consequently, excess payment was made to the applicants.

12. It is thus clear from the respondents' own case that the alleged excess payment was not made on account of any act or omission on the part of the applicants but was the result of the calculation and sanction made by the departmental authorities themselves.

13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rafiq Masih (supra), has clearly held as under: -

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”It is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship, which would govern employees on the issue of recovery, where payments have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their entitlement. Be that as it may, based on the decisions referred to herein above, we may, as a ready reference, summarise the following few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible in law:

(i) Recovery from employees belonging to Class-III and Class-IV service (or Group ‘C’ and Group ‘D’ service).

(ii) Recovery from retired employees, or employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery.

(iii) Recovery from employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued.

(iv) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post.

(v) In any other case, where the Court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer’s right to recover”.

14. Similarly, in Thomas Daniel (supra) case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- “(9) This Court in a catena of decisions has consistently held that if the excess amount was not paid on account of any misrepresentation or fraud of the employee or if such excess payment was made by the employer by applying a wrong principle for calculating the pay/allowance or on the basis of a particular interpretation of rule/order which is subsequently found to be erroneous, such excess payment of emoluments or allowances are not recoverable. This relief against the recovery is granted not because of any right of the employees but in equity, exercising judicial discretion to provide relief to the employees from the hardship that will be caused if the recovery is ordered. This Court has further held that if in a given case, it is proved that an employee had knowledge that the payment received was in excess of what was due or wrongly paid, or in cases where error is detected or corrected within a short time of wrong payment, the matter being in the realm of judicial discretion, the courts may on the facts and circumstances of any particular case order for recovery of amount paid in excess.

(10) In Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana and Others1 this Court restrained recovery of payment which was given under the upgraded pay scale on account of wrong construction of relevant order by the authority concerned, without any misrepresentation on part of the employees. It was held thus : “5. Admittedly the appellant does not possess the required educational qualifications. Under the circumstances the appellant would not be entitled to the relaxation. The Principal erred in granting him the relaxation. Since the date of relaxation, the appellant had been paid his salary on the revised scale. However, it is not on account of any misrepresentation made by the appellant that the benefit of the higher pay scale

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was given to him but by wrong construction made by the Principal for which the appellant cannot be held to be at fault. Under the circumstances the amount paid till date may not be recovered from the appellant. The principle of equal pay for equal work would not apply to the scales prescribed by the University Grants Commission. The appeal is allowed partly without any order as to costs.”

(11) In Col. B.J. Akkara (Retd.) v. Government of India and Others2 this Court considered an identical question as under: “27. The last question to be considered is whether relief should be granted against the recovery of the excess payments made on account of the wrong interpretation/understanding of the circular dated 76 1999. This Court has consistently granted relief against recovery of excess wrong payment of emoluments/allowances from an employee, if the following conditions are fulfilled:

(a) The excess payment was not made on account of any misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the employee.

(b) Such excess payment was made by the employer by applying a wrong principle for calculating the pay/allowance or on the basis of a particular interpretation of rule/order, which is subsequently found to be erroneous.”

15. Recently Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. M.K. Ravi Varma etc. etc. Vs. National Institute of Technology and Others, Civil Appeal Nos. 8329–8336 of 2016, decided on 23.09.2026 in paragraph 17 to 24 has held as under:- “17. In Jagdev Singh (supra), the coordinate Bench considered paragraph 18 of Rafiq Masih (White Washer) (supra), extracted above, and explained the legal position as follows: “11. The principle enunciated in Proposition (ii) above cannot apply to a situation such as in the present case. In the present case, the officer to whom the payment was made in the first instance was clearly placed on notice that any payment found to have been made in excess would be required to be refunded. The officer furnished an undertaking while opting for the revised pay scale. He is bound by the undertaking.”

18. Respondents, as appellants before the Division Bench of the High Court, had placed Exhibit R2(c) which contained an undertaking given by the appellants conveying their willingness to permit recovery of such amounts in the event that the pay fixation was found to be erroneous. It was, thus, contended that the respondents had merely corrected the mistake in accordance with the entitlement of the appellants under the applicable rules.

19. The contention was accepted by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment. While placing reliance on Chandi Prasad Uniyal (supra), it was held as follows: “32. Apex court was considering a batch of cases relating to recovery and re-fixation of pay of teachers in rectification of

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mistakes occurred while implementing the 5th and 6th pay commission orders. Apex court while upholding the same, held that unjust enrichment cannot be permitted. It is also pertinent to note that petitioners were not required to perform any additional duties on account of the placement as Associate Professors. Admittedly the petitioners have given their undertaking Ext R2(c) expressing their willingness for re- fixation of pay, refund of excess pay etc., as and when any mistake was detected, as in the cases considered by the apex court. The case of the petitioners do not come under that of exceptional categories. However we are of the view that fairness in action required that a notice was issued to them, before effecting re- fixation and recovery as well as de-designation.

33. Now that the reasons for re-fixation are already made known to petitioners and their contentions are already in the pleadings before this court, we do not think that issuance of a notice will serve any purpose, especially when we have found that they were not entitled to any benefits as originally granted. Moreover the petitioners approached this court only in 2012, much after the re fixation of pay and recovery were effected in early 2010. At this stage therefore we are not directing the appellants to undertake the empty formality of issuing notice or opportunity of hearing to petitioners.”

20. It is, therefore, clear that a mistake was committed in extending financial benefits to the appellants; and this was immediately withdrawn upon detection of such mistake. Such recovery of the amounts paid by mistake to the appellants, in view of the undertakings given by them, did not warrant interference by the Single Judge in exercise of writ jurisdiction and the Division Bench appears to be right in its interdiction.

21. Much emphasis has been placed by learned counsel for the appellants on the letter addressed by the Director (T), Government of India, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Department of Higher Education, to the Directors of all the National Institutes of Technology dated … (sic) March, 2013.

22. Sub-paragraph 4 of the last paragraph of such letter reads as follows: “iv) The benefits already given would not be recovered from the academic staff of the Institutes as directed by the Hon’ble Court and also as per NIT Councils decision.” 23. Since the recovery had already been effected from the appellants two years prior to the institution of their writ petition before the writ court, the aforesaid instruction would be of no avail.

24. Insofar as the circumstance of hardship canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants is concerned, we need to observe that no such case had been pleaded in the writ petition. In any event, whether recovery of money would result in hardship has to be determined on the facts of each particular case. After all, we cannot presently conceive of a situation where recovery of money from the recipient would not cause hardship. However, for instance, if it is pleaded and proved to the satisfaction of the writ court that entirety of the excess payment received by the employee has since been spent towards medical treatment and that the employee concerned would face immense hardship in returning such excess payment, or if the same were recovered from him through initiation of appropriate proceedings, in a deserving case the Court would be justified in quashing the notice seeking recovery or refund. This would also be subject to the employee satisfying the Court that the excess payment was not received on account of any misrepresentation or fraud on his part. Since no such case exists here, the contention is rejected” The principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. M.K. Ravi Varma (supra) are also relevant to the facts of the

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present case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the question of hardship arising from recovery has to be examined on the facts and circumstances of each case and that relief against recovery may be granted where the employee establishes that the excess payment was not received on account of any fraud or misrepresentation on his part and that recovery would cause undue hardship.

16. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, it is evident that the applicants had already retired from service when the respondents initiated the recovery proceedings. There is no allegation that they had furnished any incorrect information or committed fraud or misrepresentation for obtaining the severance amount. The alleged excess payment occurred due to an erroneous calculation made by the departmental authorities themselves. Letter on which basis calculation has been made had been issued by the respondents authority themselves. Further, the applicants, being retired GDS employees, do not receive regular pensionary benefits and the severance amount constitutes an important financial benefit received by them after rendering long years of service. Firstly no such documents have been brought on record by the respondents to establish that applicants had furnished an undertaking to refund the excess payment. Therefore, even if any undertaking was obtained from the applicants at the time of settlement of their retiral dues, such undertaking cannot, by itself, justify recovery in the facts of the present case, particularly when the alleged excess payment resulted from the mistake of the Department and there is no material to show that the applicants were responsible for such mistake or had knowingly received the excess amount. Thus, having regard to the principles laid down in Rafiq Masih (supra), Thomas Daniel (supra) and Dr. M.K. Ravi Varma (supra), this Tribunal is of the view that recovery of the alleged excess severance amount from the

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applicants would be harsh and inequitable and cannot be sustained in law.

17. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, the original application is allowed and the impugned recovery orders/notices dated 23.12.2024 and 25.02.2025, to the extent they seek recovery of the alleged excess severance amount from the applicants are hereby quashed. The respondents are directed not to recover any amount from the applicants pursuant to the impugned orders/notices. In case any amount has already been recovered from the applicants, the same shall be refunded to them within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. In case the amount is not refunded within the aforesaid period, the applicants shall be entitled to interest at the applicable GPF rate from the date of expiry of the aforesaid period till actual payment. There shall be no order as to costs. All pending MAs, if any, stand disposed of.

(Justice Om Prakash –VII)

Member (J)

Manish

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