Central Administrative Tribunal

DALCHAND R MEENA vs CENTRAL EXCISE AND CUSTOMS on 2 November 2026

Cites 10, Cited by 0

:1: OA No.120/235/2023

CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

AHMEDABAD BENCH

Original Application No.120/235/2023

Reserved on: 22.09.2026

Order pronounced on: 02.11.2026

CORAM:

Hon’ble Mr. Jayesh V Bhairavia, Member (J)

Hon’ble Mr. Sanjiv Kumar, Member (A)

DALCHAND RAMNARAYAN MEENA

Aged: 54 years (DoB being 12.02.1969)

Son of Late Shri Ramnarayan Meena,

Presently serving as Superintendent of C.E. (Audit), in the Audit Commissionerate, Vadodara & presently residing at No.8/A, Ganga Jamuna Society Subhanpura VADODARA 390 023

… Applicant

(By Advocate Shri M.S. Rao)

V/s.

1.

UNION OF INDIA

(Notice to be served through its Secretary to the GoI, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, North Block, NEW DELHI 110 001).

2.

CENTRAL BOARD OF INDIRECT TAXES & CUSTOMS

[To be represented through its Chairman, CBIC & Customs

North Block, Secretariat Building, NEW DELHI 110 001].

3.

THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL

GST & CENTRAL EXCISE

O/o Pr.CC, CGST & CE

GST Bhawan, Race Course Circle,

VADODARA 390 017

4.

THE COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL G.S.T. & C.E., Audit Commissionerate, (the present DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY)

Second Floor,

New Central Excise Building

Near Aarki Garba Ground

Subhanpura, VADODARA 390 023

P ANUKUMA

:2: OA No.120/235/2023

5.

THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF VIGILANCE

INDIRECT TAXES & CUSTOMS

Ahmedabad Zonal Unit

4th & 5th Floor,

Naranpura Telephone Exchange Building

Mangalmurti Road

Naranpura, AHMEDABAD 380 013

6.

THE COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS, MUNDRA,

(Erstwhile Disciplinary Authority)

No.5-B, Port User Building (PUB)

AP & SEZ, Port Road,

MUNDRA 370 421 Gujarat

7.

SHRI MOHER SINGH JEPH,

Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, (To be served through the Pr.CC, CGST & CE

GST Bhawan, Race Course Circle,

VADODARA 390 017)

… Respondents

(By Advocate Shri H.D. Shukla)

Citations and Judicial Treatment

No citing decisions in the index yet

Cited by

0

Decisions in the index citing it

Cites

10

Decisions referred to

In this index

4

Of the decisions it cites

Overruled / Questioned

0

No negative treatment found

Loading the citing and cited decisions…

ORDER

Per: Hon’ble Shri Jayesh V Bhairavia, Member (J)

1. The applicant is aggrieved by the impugned communications dated 24.03.2022, 12.04.2022, 02.01.2023 and 25.01.2023, whereby the disciplinary authority, instead of concluding the disciplinary proceedings initiated on 01.01.2010 in accordance with the Inquiry Officer’s report holding all the charges as “NOT PROVED”, decided to remit the matter for further inquiry. The applicant contends that he has already been acquitted of the criminal charges by the learned Trial court vide judgment dated 22.02.2017 and that the prolonged pendency of the departmental proceedings for more than 13 years, despite the Tribunal’s order dated 18.09.2020 and the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court dated 24.01.2022, is arbitrary and unjustified. He further alleges that the continued proceedings have caused serious prejudice to his service career by denying him the benefits of MACP and promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner, despite his immediate junior having been promoted. Accordingly, he seeks quashing of the impugned communications and a direction to conclude the disciplinary proceedings by dropping the charges. P ANUKUMA

:3: OA No.120/235/2023

2. By filing the present OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant is seeking the following reliefs:- (A) call upon the official respondents herein to forthwith place before this Hon‟ble Tribunal, in original, all the relevant and material documents, which gave rise to the issuance of the impugned documents at Annexure-A/1 to Annexure-A/4 hereto: (B) upon a close perusal and scrutiny of the aforesaid original documents, this Hon‟ble Tribunal may be graciously pleased to: B-1 quash and aside the, the (i) impugned decision of the applicant‟s disciplinary authority as conveyed in the impugned communication bearing F.No. VIGM/DE/VIG/5-2021- pandvO/OCOMMR-CGST-ADT-VADODARA, dated 24.03.2022 at Annexure-A/1 hereto, (ii) the impugned decision of the applicant‟s disciplinary authority as conveyed by the impugned communication F.No. VIGM/DE/VIG/5-2021- pandvO/OCOMMR-CGST-ADT- VADODARA, dated 12.04.2022 at Annexure-A/2 hereto (iii) the impugned decision of the applicant‟s disciplinary authority as conveyed by the impugned communication F.No.VIGM/DE-VIG/5-2021- pandvO/OCOMMR-CGST-ADT- VADODARA, dated 02.01.2023 at Annexure-A/3 hereto (iv) the impugned decision of the applicant‟s disciplinary authority as conveyed by the impugned communication F.No.VIGM/DE/VIG/5-2021- pandvO/OCOMMR-CGST-ADT- VADODARA, dated 25.01.2023 at Annexure-A/4 hereto, holding and declaring the same to be vitiated in view of the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Prem Nath Bali Vs. Registrar reported in AIR 2016 SC pg.101, referred to hereinabove, the consequent Circular dated 18.01.2016 issued by the CVC, New Delhi, referred to hereinabove, as also the Order dated 29.04.2022 passed by the Jodhpur Bench of this Hon‟ble Tribunal in the case of Dr.Arun Kumar Mishra vs UoI B-2 hold and declare that the Charge Memorandum bearing F.No.II/S(Vig)/21/2009 dated 01.01.2010 at Annexure-A/5 hereto issued by the applicant‟s erstwhile disciplinary authority shall be deemed to have lapsed for the failure of the respondent authorities herein including the applicant‟s current disciplinary authority to complete the disciplinary enquiry and pass final order thereon, even after the expiry of more than 13 years of initiation of the aforesaid Charge Memorandum dated 01.01.2010, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Prem Nath Bali Vs. Registrar reported in AIR 2016 SC pg.101, referred to hereinabove, the consequent Circular dated 18.01.2016 issued by the CVC, New Delhi, referred to hereinabove, as also the P ANUKUMA

:4: OA No.120/235/2023

Order dated 29.04.2022 passed by the Jodhpur Bench of this Hon‟ble Tribunal in the case of Dr.Arun Kumar Mishra vs UoI. B-3 hold and declare that the applicant herein is lawfully entitled to the grant of (i) pay upgradation under the MACP Scheme w.e.f. 23.09.2016 and also (ii) ad hoc / regular promotion to the Group A Gazetted post of Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs with effect from the date his immediate junior viz. the private respondent no.7 herein came to be granted such promotion, together with all consequential benefits flowing therefrom including arrears of salary towards MACP and promotion, with interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of actual payment of such arrears. B-4 issue appropriate directions commanding the respondents No.1, 2, 3 and 4 herein to forthwith grant to the applicant herein (i) pay upgradation under the MACP Scheme w.e.f. 23.09.2016 and also (ii) ad hoc / regular promotion to the Group A Gazetted post of Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs with effect from the date his immediate junior viz. the private respondent no.8 herein came to be granted regular promotion, together with all consequential benefits flowing therefrom including arrears of salary towards MACP and promotion, with interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of actual payment of such arrears. C. Impose such exemplary costs on the official respondents herein as this Hon‟ble Tribunal may deem it fit and proper in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case; D. grant such other & further relief/s as may be deemed fit and appropriate in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case.”

3.

FACTS OF THE CASE

3.1 The applicant, an Indian citizen belonging to the Scheduled Tribe category and hailing from the State of Rajasthan, joined the Central Government service on 06.04.1992 as Inspector of Central Excise and Customs pursuant to his selection by the Staff Selection Commission. He was initially posted at Surat and was subsequently promoted to the post of Superintendent of Customs and Central Excise on 23.09.2002. 3.2 While the applicant was serving as Superintendent of Central Excise and Customs in Range-III, Division-III, Ankleshwar, since 13.06.2006, he was implicated in a CBI case on 15.05.2008 pursuant to a complaint dated 14.05.2008 lodged by Shri Atul C. Patel, Manager of M/s Mitra P ANUKUMA

:5: OA No.120/235/2023

Organics Pvt. Ltd., GIDC, Bharuch. Following his detention by the CBI on 15.05.2008, the applicant was placed under deemed suspension, which was revoked by the competent authority on 10.02.2009. Thereafter, he was transferred and posted as Superintendent of Central Excise and Customs in Surat Commissionerate-I, Surat. 3.3 On 01.01.2010, the Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, Surat-I, initiated major penalty disciplinary proceedings against the applicant by issuing Memorandum No. F.No.II/S(Vig)/21/2009 dated 01.01.2010 (Annexure A/5 refer), alleging demand and acceptance of illegal gratification from the aforesaid complainant. The departmental proceedings were based on the same set of facts, documents and witnesses as those involved in CBI RC No.07(A)/2008/GNR, registered on 15.05.2008, which culminated in CBI Special Case No.13 of 2008 following the filing of the charge-sheet on 27.12.2008. The applicant submitted his written statement of defence denying the charges. However, no substantial progress was made in the departmental inquiry until 12.11.2012, when the Inquiry Officer (IO) and Presenting Officer (PO) were appointed. 3.4 Aggrieved by the continuation of simultaneous departmental and criminal proceedings, the applicant approached this Tribunal by filing OA No.222 of 2013. This Tribunal, vide order dated 05.09.2013, stayed the departmental inquiry initiated on 01.01.2010 for a period of one year or until disposal of the criminal case, whichever was earlier. The respondents challenged the said order before the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat by way of SCA No.18076 of 2013. The said writ petition was dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court vide order/judgment dated 24.12.2013 (Annexure A/6 refer). 3.5 Subsequently, the learned Special Judge (CBI), Court No.9, Mirzapur, Ahmedabad, acquitted the applicant of all the charges in CBI Special Case No.13 of 2008 vide judgment and order dated 22.02.2017 (Annexure A/7 refer). The applicant brought the said judgment to the notice of the IO by placing a copy thereof on record. P ANUKUMA

:6: OA No.120/235/2023

3.6 Upon completion of the departmental inquiry, the IO, Shri Raghuvansh Kumar, submitted his report dated 29.08.2017 (Annexure A/8 refer), holding all the charges against the applicant as “NOT PROVED”. The report was forwarded to the disciplinary authority along with forwarding letter No. RK/IO/DCM/2013/736 dated 28.08.2017, signed by the IO on 29.08.2017 (Annexure A/9 refer). The disciplinary authority furnished a copy of the inquiry report to the applicant vide communication dated 13.09.2017 (Annexure A/10 refer), inviting his representation. Accordingly, the applicant submitted his representation dated 15.09.2017 (Annexure A/11 refer), requesting that the departmental proceedings be dropped. 3.7 Instead of concluding the proceedings on the basis of the inquiry report, the erstwhile disciplinary authority, despite having agreed with the findings of the IO, referred the matter to the Additional Director General of Vigilance, Customs and Central Excise, Ahmedabad Zone, for second-stage advice vide communication dated 20.11.2017 (Annexure A/12 refer). The Additional Director General (Vigilance), vide communication dated 27.02.2018 (Annexure A/13 refer), took the view that the inquiry had not been conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, and returned the case records for necessary action. 3.8 Thereafter, the IO, vide communication dated 14.03.2018 (Annexure A/14 refer), informed the disciplinary authority that he would submit a fresh inquiry report and requested that the complete case file be returned to him. Subsequently, vide clarificatory communication dated 08.05.2018 (Annexure A/15 refer), the IO stated that the inquiry had been conducted in accordance with the applicable procedure. Nevertheless, the IO issued a communication dated 31.01.2019 (Annexure A/16 refer), requiring the applicant to appear for a personal hearing on 15.02.2019, in connection with the proposed further inquiry. 3.9 Challenging the said development and the decision to undertake a fresh/further inquiry, the applicant filed another OA No.54 of 2019 before this Tribunal. Vide notice and interim order dated 14.02.2019 P ANUKUMA

:7: OA No.120/235/2023

(Annexure A/17 refer), this Tribunal directed maintenance of status quo in respect of the departmental inquiry until 28.02.2019, and the interim protection was extended from time to time. During the pendency of the OA, the Directorate General of Vigilance, Ahmedabad Zonal Unit, issued a communication dated 21.06.2019, expressing the view that the affidavit-in-reply filed in the OA would not withstand legal scrutiny and that the disciplinary authority should explore the possibility of filing a fresh affidavit-in-reply. 3.10 This Tribunal, vide its detailed and reasoned final order dated 18.09.2020 (Annexure A/18 refer), quashed and set aside the IO's communication dated 31.01.2019 and directed the disciplinary authority to take an appropriate decision on the applicant's pending representation dated 15.09.2017 expeditiously, and not later than 60 days from receipt of a copy of the said order. Pursuant thereto, the applicant submitted representations dated 02.11.2020 (Annexure A/19 refer) and 08.12.2020 (Annexure A/20 refer), requesting a favourable decision in compliance with the Tribunal's directions. 3.11 Despite the legal opinion dated 02.11.2020 (Annexure A/21 refer) furnished by the learned Central Government Standing Counsel, the office of the erstwhile disciplinary authority referred the matter to the Directorate General of Vigilance, Ahmedabad Zonal Unit, vide communication dated 14.12.2020 (Annexure A/22 refer). The Directorate General of Vigilance, vide communication dated 21.12.2020 (Annexure A/23 refer), advised the disciplinary authority to challenge the Tribunal's order dated 18.09.2020 before the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat. Accordingly, the respondents filed SCA No.6013 of 2021 on 19.03.2021. Meanwhile, the respondents also filed MA No.474 of 2020 in OA No.54 of 2019, seeking extension of time for compliance with the Tribunal's directions. This Tribunal, vide order dated 07.01.2021 (Annexure A/24 refer), allowed the MA and extended the time for compliance by 15 days from that date. 3.12 The Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat dismissed the said SCA No.6013 of 2021 vide final order dated 24.01.2022 (Annexure A/25 refer) and P ANUKUMA

:8: OA No.120/235/2023

directed the competent authority to take an appropriate decision in pursuance of the Tribunal's directions within 60 days from 24.01.2022. 3.13 In purported compliance with the aforesaid judicial directions, the disciplinary authority issued a communication dated 24.03.2022 (impugned order; Annexure A/1 refer), observing that the applicant's acquittal in the criminal case did not ipso facto absolve him of liability in the departmental proceedings. The authority further decided to remit the matter to the IO for further inquiry and submission of a report in accordance with the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The applicant sought copies of the vigilance communications dated 27.02.2018 and 08.02.2021 vide representation dated 28.03.2022 (Annexure A/26 refer), to enable him to make an effective representation. The request was rejected vide communication dated 12.04.2022 (impugned order; Annexure A/2 refer), on the ground that his representation dated 15.09.2017 had already been disposed of on 24.03.2022 and that he was being afforded an opportunity to present his views. 3.14 In response, the applicant submitted a detailed representation dated 12.04.2022 (Annexure A/28 refer), reiterating his request for the relevant vigilance communications. He also submitted a further representation dated 25.04.2022 (Annexure A/29 refer), requesting that the departmental inquiry be dropped. Thereafter, vide reminder representation dated 06.06.2022 (Annexure A/30 refer), the applicant relied upon CBIC Headquarters Order No.29 of 2022 dated 04.05.2022 and Order No.32 of 2022 dated 12.05.2022, seeking similar relief. The disciplinary authority subsequently issued a communication dated 25.11.2022 (Annexure A/31 refer), requiring the applicant to appear for a personal hearing on 07.12.2022. The applicant appeared accordingly, and his statement was recorded (Annexure A/32 refer). He thereafter submitted a written representation dated 15.12.2022 (Annexure A/33 refer), requesting a favourable decision. 3.15 On 02.01.2023, the disciplinary authority issued a communication (impugned order; Annexure A/3 refer) requiring the applicant to produce supporting documents in connection with the general P ANUKUMA

:9: OA No.120/235/2023

examination under Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The applicant submitted his representation dated 12.01.2023 (Annexure A/34 refer), highlighting the prolonged pendency of the disciplinary proceedings despite the IO's report holding all charges as not proved and requesting a final decision on the said report. 3.16 Subsequently, vide communication dated 25.01.2023 (impugned order; Annexure A/4 refer), the disciplinary authority forwarded to the applicant a copy of the vigilance communication dated 28.08.2018 (Annexure A/35 refer) and called upon him to submit his representation for further proceedings. The applicant responded by submitting a detailed representation dated 06.03.2023 (Annexure A/36 refer), requesting that the departmental proceedings be dropped. 3.17 According to the applicant, despite the submission of the aforesaid representation dated 06.03.2023, the departmental proceedings initiated on 01.01.2010 remained pending for more than 13 years. He stated that such prolonged pendency has caused serious prejudice to him, as he has allegedly been denied the benefit of financial upgradation under the Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) Scheme and promotion to the next Group 'A' Gazetted post of Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, despite his immediate junior having been promoted. Aggrieved thereby, the applicant has filed the present OA, being the third round of litigation, challenging the disciplinary authority's communications dated 24.03.2022, 12.04.2022, 02.01.2023 and 25.01.2023, as detailed in Annexures A/1 to A/4, respectively.

4. Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal, the official respondents as well as private respondent no.7 have filed their replies to which the applicant has also filed his rejoinder.

5. CONTENTIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT 5.1 Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the departmental disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant vide charge memorandum dated 01.01.2010 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, have remained pending for more than 13 years, despite the P ANUKUMA

:10: OA No.120/235/2023

Inquiry Officer having submitted his report dated 29.08.2017 holding all the charges against the applicant as “NOT PROVED”. He also contended that such an inordinate and unexplained delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings, particularly when the delay is not attributable to the applicant, is arbitrary, unreasonable and contrary to the settled principles of law. In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prem Nath Bali v. Registrar, High Court of Delhi, reported in AIR 2016 SC 101, and the Central Vigilance Commission's Circular No.02/01/2016 dated 18.01.2016. He further relied upon the order dated 29.04.2022 passed by the Jodhpur Bench of this Tribunal in OA No.290/00193/2021, wherein, according to him, the departmental charge memorandum was quashed on account of the prolonged pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. Thus, he argued that the proceedings in the applicant's case deserve to be treated as having lapsed and to be brought to an end. 5.2 Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant had already been acquitted by the learned Special Judge (CBI), Ahmedabad, vide judgment and order dated 22.02.2017, in respect of the very same incident and allegations forming the basis of the departmental proceedings. According to him, the criminal case and the departmental inquiry were founded upon the same set of facts, documents and witnesses, and the acquittal, read with the Inquiry Officer's findings holding all the charges as not proved, furnished sufficient grounds for dropping the departmental proceedings. In this regard, learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446, contending that continuation of the departmental proceedings in the circumstances of the present case would be unjustified. 5.3 Learned counsel also assailed the impugned communications dated 24.03.2022, 12.04.2022, 02.01.2023 and 25.01.2023, contending that the decisions taken by the erstwhile as well as the present disciplinary authority suffer from arbitrariness, unreasonableness and non- P ANUKUMA

:11: OA No.120/235/2023

application of mind. Learned counsel submitted that the erstwhile disciplinary authority, while furnishing the inquiry report to the applicant, had expressed agreement with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. However, upon seeking second-stage advice from the Directorate General of Vigilance, Ahmedabad Zonal Unit, the authority proceeded to revive the inquiry on the ground that the proceedings had not been conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Learned counsel argued that even the Inquiry Officer, upon reconsideration of the matter, maintained that the inquiry had been conducted in accordance with the applicable rules and procedure. Despite this position, the disciplinary authority decided to remit the matter for further inquiry, acting mechanically upon the vigilance advice instead of independently examining the record and the applicant's representation. 5.4 Learned counsel further contended that the impugned action of the respondents is inconsistent with the final order dated 18.09.2020 passed by this Tribunal in OA No.54 of 2019, whereby the communication dated 31.01.2019 issued by the Inquiry Officer was quashed and the disciplinary authority was directed to take an appropriate decision on the applicant's pending representation dated 15.09.2017 within the prescribed period. Learned counsel also submitted that the respondents challenged the said order before the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in SCA No.6013 of 2021, which was dismissed vide order dated 24.01.2022, with a direction to take an appropriate decision within 60 days. According to learned counsel, the subsequent decision to remit the matter for further inquiry, followed by continued proceedings despite the applicant's repeated representations, defeats the purpose of the judicial directions and reflects a failure to take a fair and independent decision on the merits of the case. 5.5 Learned counsel further submitted that the prolonged pendency of the disciplinary proceedings has caused serious and continuing prejudice to the applicant in his service career. He pointed out that the applicant was denied financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme, due with effect P ANUKUMA

:12: OA No.120/235/2023

from 23.09.2016, on the ground that vigilance clearance had been withheld because of the pending disciplinary proceedings. In support of this contention, learned counsel referred to the communication dated 04.12.2017 (Annexure A/40 refer). He submitted that the applicant was also denied ad hoc promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, despite his immediate junior, Shri Moher Singh Jeph (respondent No.7), belonging to the Scheduled Tribe category, having been granted such promotion under Office Order No.156 of 2020 dated 24.12.2020 (Annexure A/42 refer). Learned counsel referred to the relevant extract of Establishment Order No.275 of 2002 dated 23.09.2002 (Annexure A/41 refer) to establish the applicant's relative seniority and to the respondents' RTI reply dated 26.04.2023 (Annexure A/43 refer), wherein the applicant's promotion case was stated to have been kept in a sealed cover on account of the pending disciplinary proceedings. He argued that the respondents cannot be permitted to keep the proceedings pending indefinitely, thereby depriving the applicant of consequential service benefits and promotional avenues. 5.6 Learned counsel also submitted that the applicant's service record has otherwise been exemplary and that, apart from the charge memorandum dated 01.01.2010, no other disciplinary inquiry is pending against him. He contended that the applicant, who is due to retire on 28.02.2029, continues to suffer adverse service consequences solely because of proceedings that have remained inconclusive for an exceptionally long period, notwithstanding the favourable findings of the Inquiry Officer and his acquittal in the said criminal case. According to learned counsel, the continued pendency of the inquiry has effectively deprived the applicant of a fair opportunity for consideration of his financial upgradation and promotion. 5.7 Lastly, learned counsel for the applicant prayed that the impugned communications dated 24.03.2022, 12.04.2022, 02.01.2023 and 25.01.2023 be quashed and set aside and that the departmental disciplinary proceedings initiated vide charge memorandum dated P ANUKUMA

:13: OA No.120/235/2023

01.01.2010 be brought to an end. He further sought appropriate consequential relief in relation to the applicant's MACP benefit and consideration for promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, in accordance with law.

6. CONTENTIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR OFFICIAL RESPONDENTS 6.1 Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the official respondents by referring to the counter affidavit submitted that the allegations levelled by the applicant are baseless, misconceived and unsustainable in law. At the outset, they have contended that the instant Original Application is premature and barred by limitation. According to learned counsel, the applicant has challenged, inter alia, the communication dated 24.03.2022 issued by the Disciplinary Authority (Annexure R-1 refer) and the subsequent communication dated 12.04.2022 (Annexure R-2 refer), after a lapse of more than one year. They have relied upon Sections 20 and 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, copies whereof have been placed on record as Annexures R-5 and R-6 refer, respectively. By referring to the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, contended that the applicant ought to have exhausted the remedies available under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 before approaching the Tribunal. Their specific submission is that: “The Disciplinary Authority has yet not taken any final decision in this case under the provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Consequently, the applicant has not exhausted all the remedies available to him under the provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and the applicant thereby has not complied with the provisions of Section 20 of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Hence, the application of the applicant is pre-mature, not tenable and liable to be rejected.” 6.2 Learned counsel also contended that the communications dated 24.03.2022 and 12.04.2022 were challenged after a period of approximately fifteen months and, therefore, the Original Application is liable to be rejected under Section 21 of the said Act. 6.3 On the merits, learned counsel submitted that the communication dated 24.03.2022 was issued after considering the applicant’s representation P ANUKUMA

:14: OA No.120/235/2023

dated 15.09.2017, in compliance with the order dated 18.09.2020 passed by the Tribunal in OA No.54/2019 and the judgment dated 24.01.2022 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat in SCA No.6013/2021. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble High Court are reproduced as under:

“the Tribunal has only directed the Disciplinary Authority to take expeditious appropriate decision in respect of the aforementioned representation of the petitioner dated 15.9.2017. It is in this light and to facilitate the process of taking decision by disciplinary authority, impugned communication dated 31.1.2019 has been set aside by the Tribunal. It would be for the disciplinary authority to take appropriate decision in accordance with law as regard the future course of action against the petitioner, in view of what is directed by the Central Administrative Tribunal.” 6.4 The respondents’ counsel maintained that the aforesaid judicial orders required the Disciplinary Authority to take an appropriate decision in accordance with law, but did not direct that the applicant be exonerated or that the departmental proceedings be dropped. He also contended that the decision to remit the matter for further inquiry was taken by the Disciplinary Authority in exercise of its powers under Rule 15(1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. 6.5 The respondents’ learned counsel specifically disputed the applicant’s contention that the Inquiry Officer’s report dated 29.08.2017, which recorded the charges as “NOT PROVED”, together with his acquittal in the criminal case on 22.02.2017, necessarily required the departmental proceedings to be dropped. He submitted that the applicant, through his representation dated 15.09.2017, had sought closure of the departmental proceedings on the basis of the Inquiry Officer’s report and the judgment of the learned Trial court (Annexure R-7 refer). 6.6 According to the respondents’ learned counsel, however, the Inquiry Officer’s report was incomplete and deficient because the inquiry had been concluded by relying upon the judgment of the trial court and other extraneous considerations, rather than by completing the inquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The respondents have raised the following objection to the report: P ANUKUMA

:15: OA No.120/235/2023

“It is noticed that the Inquiry Officer‟s report dated 28.08.2017 is incomplete/deficient in as much as the IO had concluded the inquiry assigned to him by the DA, on the basis of trial court order on extraneous factors. The Inquiry has to be completed by the IO in the manner prescribed under CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and no material from personal knowledge having bearing on the facts of the case or of extraneous nature should be imported to the case.” 6.7 Learned counsel for the respondents maintained that the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer could not, by itself, prevent the Disciplinary Authority from examining whether the inquiry had been conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. In support of the decision to remit the matter for further inquiry, the respondents have relied upon Rule 15(1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 (Annexure R-8 refer). Reliance is also placed upon paragraph 7.26.4 of the Vigilance Manual (Updated 2021), Eighth Edition (Annexure R-9 refer), which provides as under: “A further inquiry may be ordered, when there are grave lacunae or procedural defects vitiating the first inquiry”. 6.8 Reliance is also made upon the instructions issued by the Board (CBEC) vide letter F. No. C-14010/1/2010-Ad.V dated 07.01.2011 (Annexure R-10 refer). The relevant extract of which is reproduced as under: “It is further clarified that after the receipt of the Inquiry Report, the Disciplinary Authority, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 13(1) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, is required to consider the Inquiry Report and satisfy himself that the inquiry has been conducted as per the detailed procedure prescribed under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. If he finds any breach of the prescribed procedure, he is required to remit the case back to the Inquiry Officer for reasons to be recorded in writing for further inquiry and report.” 6.9 The respondents’ counsel has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Madras High Court in R. Balakrishnan v. Food Corporation of India, W.P. No. 20896 of 2003 (Annexure R-11 refer), to support their submission that subsequent proceedings cannot cure an inquiry which was not conducted in accordance with law. 6.10 The respondents’ learned counsel further contended that the acquittal of the applicant by the said learned Trial court does not automatically absolve him of liability in the departmental proceedings, as the two P ANUKUMA

:16: OA No.120/235/2023

proceedings operate in different fields and serve different purposes. In this regard, they have relied upon the Department of Personnel and Training Office Memorandum dated 21.07.2016, issued from F. No. 11012/6/2007-Estt. (A-III) (Annexure R-12 refer). According to the respondents, paragraph 7 of the said Office Memorandum relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., reported in (2005) 7 SCC 764. The relevant para of the same reads as under: “The two proceedings criminal and departmental are entirely different. That they operate in different fields and have different objectives. That acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve the charged officer from the liability under the disciplinary proceedings.”

On this basis, the respondents’ counsel submitted that the Disciplinary Authority was justified in directing further inquiry so that the allegations against the applicant could be examined in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Learned counsel reiterated that the order of acquittal and the report of the Inquiry Officer could not be treated as conclusive grounds for terminating the departmental proceedings without first addressing the alleged procedural deficiencies in the inquiry. 6.11 The respondents’ learned counsel thus submitted that the decision to remit the matter for further inquiry was rightly taken by the disciplinary authority. He submitted that the Inquiry Officer’s report dated 29.08.2017 was forwarded to the applicant on 13.09.2017 and that the then Disciplinary Authority, by letter dated 20.11.2017, sought second- stage advice from the Additional Director General (Vigilance), Zonal Unit, Ahmedabad, under Rule 15(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The respondents’ counsel referred to the communication dated 27.02.2018 issued by the Vigilance Authority, which, according to him, pointed out that the inquiry had not been conducted in the manner prescribed under the applicable rules. The Inquiry Officer’s report dated 29.08.2017 (Annexure R-18 refer). P ANUKUMA

:17: OA No.120/235/2023

6.12 The respondents’ learned counsel also relied upon the letter dated 21.08.2023 issued by the Directorate General of Vigilance, Ahmedabad Zonal Unit (Annexure R-19 refer), to explain the role of the Vigilance Authority relied upon the following clarification: “The DGoV is only an advisory body in such disciplinary proceedings matters and the final decision always rests with the Disciplinary Authority. As per Rule 15 (3) (a) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, where it is necessary to consult the CVC/CVO, the Disciplinary Authority shall seek Second stage Advice before passing the order under Rule 15(5).” 6.13 The respondents’ counsel submitted that the Vigilance Authority did not tender any advice regarding imposition of a penalty or exoneration of the applicant because it considered that the inquiry itself had not been conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. He contended that the Vigilance Authority merely identified the deficiencies for appropriate consideration by the Disciplinary Authority, and the ultimate decision remained within the jurisdiction of the latter. 6.14 With regard to the applicant’s allegation that the Disciplinary Authority acted mechanically and merely followed the advice of the Vigilance Authority, the respondents’ counsel denied the allegation and maintained that the decision was taken after considering the applicable rules, the inquiry record and the judicial directions issued in the earlier proceedings. Reliance is placed upon the orders dated 18.09.2020 passed by the Tribunal and dated 24.01.2022 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat (Annexure R-20 refer). According to the respondents, the Tribunal and the Hon’ble High Court left it to the Disciplinary Authority to determine the appropriate future course of action in accordance with law. Learned counsel thus contended that the decision communicated on 24.03.2022 was a decision on the applicant’s representation dated 15.09.2017 and was not contrary to the directions of either judicial forum. The respondents’ counsel further submitted that the judicial orders did not record any finding exonerating the applicant from the charges or prohibiting the Disciplinary Authority from ordering further inquiry where permissible under Rule 15(1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. P ANUKUMA

:18: OA No.120/235/2023

6.15 The respondents’ learned counsel justified the subsequent communications dated 12.04.2022, 02.01.2023 and 25.01.2023 and contended that the communication dated 12.04.2022 (Annexure R-2 refer), was issued in response to the applicant’s request dated 28.03.2022 for copies of certain vigilance correspondence. He also submitted that the applicant had already been informed of the proposed course of action through the communication dated 24.03.2022 and that the requested correspondence was not considered material to the disposal of his representation. 6.16 As regards the communication dated 02.01.2023 (Annexure R-3 refer), the respondents’ counsel submitted that it was issued to obtain supporting documents, including the daily working sheet or attendance sheet, if any, relating to the general examination of the applicant by the Inquiry Officer under Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Their specific contention is that the communication was intended to verify the relevant facts and did not constitute a final determination of the disciplinary proceedings as is stated in the reply that “No any final order/any final decision in the case has been passed or taken by the DA through this correspondence letter dated 02.01.2023. However, the applicant has challenged it before Tribunal in aforesaid O.A. which is legally not correct and not sustainable in the eyes of law.” 6.17 Similarly, the communication dated 25.01.2023 (Annexure R-4 refer), was issued to provide the applicant with a copy of the CVC correspondence dated 28.08.2018, as referred to in the Tribunal’s order dated 18.09.2020. The respondents have maintained that this communication was issued in the interest of natural justice and to enable the applicant to make his representation. Learned counsel contended that it was not a final order in the disciplinary proceedings and could not independently furnish a ground for interference by the Tribunal. 6.18 The respondents’ counsel further submitted that the representations submitted by the applicant on 12.04.2022, 29.04.2022, 06.06.2022, 15.12.2022, 12.01.2023 and 06.03.2023 were considered and disposed of by the Disciplinary Authority on 01.08.2023 which had been sent by P ANUKUMA

:19: OA No.120/235/2023

email on 04.08.2023 and received physically by the applicant on 07.08.2023 (Annexure R-13 refer). The respondents’ learned counsel relied upon this subsequent disposal to submit that the applicant’s grievance regarding non-consideration of his representations does not survive in the manner alleged by him. 6.19 In response to the applicant’s contention that the departmental proceedings have remained pending for an unreasonable period of more than thirteen years, the respondents’ counsel disputed that the entire delay can be attributed to the department. They have asserted that the applicant frequently remained absent from the scheduled hearings of the inquiry, thereby contributing to the delay. In support of this assertion, they have referred to Daily Order Sheets Nos. 09 dated 27.01.2015, 11 dated 20.08.2015, 13 dated 17.08.2016, 14 dated 16.09.2016, 15 dated 05.10.2016, 16 dated 21.12.2016, 17 dated 11.01.2017 and 18 dated 30.01.2017 (Annexure R-14 refer). 6.20 The respondents’ learned counsel pointed out that, at the instance of the applicant, this Tribunal had stayed the departmental inquiry by order dated 05.09.2013 in OA No. 222/2013 for a period of one year or until disposal of the said criminal case, whichever was earlier (Annexure R- 15 refer). According to the respondents, the inquiry consequently remained stayed during the relevant period and could not proceed in the ordinary course. Further, it is submitted that when the Disciplinary Authority sought to address the deficiencies in the inquiry, the applicant again approached this Tribunal by filing OA No. 54/2019, resulting in further litigation concerning the inquiry proceedings. The respondents have also referred to the present OA No. 235/2023 and the interim order dated 03.08.2023, whereby the respondents were restrained from taking action pursuant to the impugned communication dated 24.03.2022. On this basis, he argued that the delay cannot be attributed exclusively to the department. 6.21 The respondents’ learned counsel also contended that the decisions relied upon by the applicant, including Prem Nath Bali v. Registrar, High Court of Delhi (supra), G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat (supra) and P ANUKUMA

:20: OA No.120/235/2023

the order dated 29.04.2022 passed by the Jodhpur Bench of the Tribunal in OA No. 290/00193/2021, are distinguishable on facts. In support of their submission that a judgment must be understood in the context of its own facts, they have relied upon Ambika Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat, reported in (1987) 1 SCC 213, and Bhavnagar University v. Palittana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd., reported in (2003) 2 SCC 111 (Annexure R-16 refer). 6.22 On the issue of the applicant’s claim for financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme and promotion to the Group-A post of Assistant Commissioner, the respondents’ counsel denied that the applicant was unlawfully deprived of any service benefit. He submitted that the grant of MACP and promotion is governed by the applicable rules, instructions and vigilance-clearance requirements, and that the pendency of disciplinary proceedings is a relevant consideration under the applicable instructions. In this regard, learned counsel relied upon the Office Memorandum dated 02.11.2012 issued by the Department of Personnel and Training, bearing F. No. 22034/4/2012-Estt. (D) (Annexure R-21 refer). He referred to the circumstances in which vigilance clearance may be withheld, namely, where a Government servant is under suspension, where a charge sheet has been issued and disciplinary proceedings are pending, or where prosecution for a criminal charge is pending. 6.23 The learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the Departmental Screening Committee, in its meeting held on 08.06.2023, considered the applicant’s case for MACP benefits and deferred the same because vigilance clearance had not been granted in view of the pending disciplinary proceedings. The relevant Office Memorandum and the material concerning the Screening Committee’s consideration have been referred to (Annexure R-22 refer). Their case is that the applicable MACP instructions do not provide for grant of financial upgradation on an ad hoc basis merely because the claim has been deferred owing to pending disciplinary proceedings. P ANUKUMA

:21: OA No.120/235/2023

6.24 The respondents’ learned counsel has relied upon paragraph 15 of the DoPT Office Memorandum dated 22.10.2019 (Annexure R-23 refer). The relevant extract reads: “If a financial up gradation under the MACPS is deferred and not allowed after 10 years in a level, due to the reason of the employees being unfit or due to departmental proceedinpgs, etc., this would have consequential effect on the subsequent financial up gradation which would also get deferred to the extent of delay in grant of first financial up gradation.”

Learned counsel also relied upon the DoPT Office Memorandum dated 14.09.1992 concerning promotion of Government servants against whom disciplinary proceedings are pending or whose conduct is under investigation (Annexure R-24 refer). According to the learned counsel, the applicant’s claim for promotion had to be examined in accordance with the applicable vigilance and sealed-cover instructions, and the applicant could not claim an automatic right to promotion or MACP while the disciplinary proceedings remained pending. 6.25 The respondents’ learned counsel also referred to the applicant’s representation dated 21.09.2022 seeking consideration for ad hoc promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner under the sealed-cover procedure (Annexure R-25 refer). Further, the Department of Revenue sought the vigilance status and supporting documents from the concerned Audit Commissionerate, which furnished the requisite details by communication dated 13.03.2023 (Annexure R-26 refer). 6.26 The respondents’ learned counsel also relied upon the communication dated 23.05.2023 issued by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI/ACB, Gandhinagar (Annexure R-27 refer). According to the learned counsel, the CBI informed the department that a criminal appeal had been filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat against the applicant’s acquittal in Criminal Appeal No. 263/2018 and that the appeal was pending. The respondents’ counsel, therefore, submitted that the applicant’s service benefits had to be considered in the light of the applicable rules and the vigilance status reflected in the official record. P ANUKUMA

:22: OA No.120/235/2023

6.27 Learned counsel by referring to the para-wise comments furnished by the Vadodara Audit Commissionerate to the Department of Revenue on 15.06.2023 (Annexure R-28 refer), and has maintained that the competent authority must assess each officer’s individual service record, vigilance status and the applicable instructions before deciding a claim for MACP or promotion. They have also relied upon the RTI reply dated 26.04.2023, referred to in the counter-affidavit, which informed the applicant that his promotion case had been kept in a sealed cover because of the pending disciplinary inquiry. 6.28 Lastly, the official respondents’ counsel has maintained that the impugned communications were issued in the course of the departmental proceedings and were intended to ensure that the inquiry was completed in accordance with the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. He denied that the Disciplinary Authority acted arbitrarily, maliciously or without application of mind. According to him, the applicant’s acquittal in the criminal case did not automatically terminate the departmental proceedings; the Inquiry Officer’s report was considered deficient in procedural terms; and the Disciplinary Authority was competent to direct further inquiry in accordance with Rule 15(1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Further, the communications dated 02.01.2023 and 25.01.2023 were procedural communications and did not constitute final orders prejudicially determining the applicant’s guilt. Thus, he prayed that the instant OA be dismissed as premature, barred by limitation and devoid of merit.

7. Respondent no.7 by filing reply submitted that the present OA is explicitly directed against the orders/communications Annexure-A/1 to A/4. Respondent No.7 has no role, execution, or involvement either directly or indirectly in the issuance of the impugned orders or the administrative actions flowing therefrom. Further, a meticulous review of the factual matrix and the grounds for relief formulated by the applicant reveals that no direct or indirect charges, imputations, or allegations have been leveled against Respondent No.7. P ANUKUMA

:23: OA No.120/235/2023

7.1 The applicant has improperly impleaded Respondent No.7 in the array of parties. Because no relief is claimed against Respondent No.7, nor can his presence alter the adjudication of the core dispute, he is neither a necessary nor a proper party, resulting in a clear case of misjoinder. 7.2 The assertions made within Paragraphs 4.01 to 4.24 of the OA do not concern the answering Respondent. Being entirely alien to his service record or official domain, these paragraphs call for no response or rebuttal from Respondent No. 7. Further, Respondent No.7 has no knowledge or awareness of the operational incidents cited in these grounds. Lacking any administrative connection to these occurrences, no comments are offered. The service placements highlighted by the applicant are distinct matters of formal administrative record, verified as follows: o Superintendent Promotion (2002): Respondent No. 7 was promoted to Superintendent and positioned at Serial No. 577 of Establishment Order No. 275 of 2002 dated 23.09.2002 (Annexure-A/41). Concurrently, the Applicant held Serial No. 575, positioned directly above Shri Sitaram Meena at Serial No.

576. o Assistant Commissioner Promotion (2020): Respondent No. 7 was subsequently promoted to Assistant Commissioner via CBIC Office Order No. 156/2020 dated 24.12.2020, positioned at Serial No. 308 (Annexure-A/42 refer, Page 273). o These parallel placements do not establish any conflict of interest or actionable grievance between the Applicant and Respondent No. 7. 7.3 In view of the complete absence of any triable issue or claimed relief against the answering Respondent No.7, he prayed for Order the deletion of the name of Respondent No.7 from the array of parties/private respondents due to misjoinder. P ANUKUMA

:24: OA No.120/235/2023

8. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the applicant by referring to common rejoinder besides reiterating the above submissions submitted that the present OA, being the third round of litigation, is maintainable and that the applicant has been compelled to implead respondent No. 7, his immediate junior, who has been promoted to the post of Assistant Commissioner while the applicant has been denied promotion on account of the pendency of the impugned disciplinary proceedings. Learned counsel contended that the order dated 24.01.2022 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat was in favour of the applicant and that the respondents had failed to appreciate the Tribunal’s earlier findings against conducting a second inquiry. Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant was acquitted by the said learnted Trial Court on 22.02.2017 and that the Inquiry Officer, after considering the relevant material, held all the charges as “NOT PROVED”. Despite the disciplinary authority having initially agreed with the inquiry report, the proceedings were reopened at the instance of the Vigilance authorities, resulting in an unjustified prolongation of the inquiry for more than 13 years. Relying upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in G.M. Tank (supra) and Prem Nath Bali (supra), as well as the judgment in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan (Civil Appeal No. 7935 of 2023 decided on 04.12.2023, learned counsel argued that the respondents could not indefinitely continue the disciplinary proceedings, particularly when the criminal acquittal had not been stayed by the appellate forum. Learned counsel further contended that the respondents’ reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Madras High Court in R. Balakrishnan v. FCI (supra) is misplaced, as the facts of that case were distinguishable. Learned counsel also challenged the denial of relevant vigilance communications, alleging that such denial prevented the applicant from making an effective representation. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that the prolonged pendency of the proceedings had seriously prejudiced the applicant by depriving him of MACP benefits and promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner, despite his immediate junior having been promoted. Accordingly, learned counsel prayed that the OA be P ANUKUMA

:25: OA No.120/235/2023

allowed and the impugned communications be quashed, with consequential reliefs as prayed for.

9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings as well as the judgments on which the learned counsel for the parties placed reliance.

10. It emerges from the records placed before us that the applicant joined the Central Government service on 06.04.1992 as Inspector of Central Excise and Customs and was subsequently promoted to the post of Superintendent on 23.09.2002. While working as Superintendent in Range-III, Division-III, Ankleshwar, he was implicated in a CBI case registered on 15.05.2008 pursuant to a complaint made by Shri Atul C. Patel, Manager of M/s Mitra Organics Pvt. Ltd. The applicant was initially placed under deemed suspension, which was revoked on 10.02.2009. Subsequently, the Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, Surat-I, initiated major penalty disciplinary proceedings against the applicant by issuing charge memorandum dated 01.01.2010 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, alleging demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. The allegations forming the subject matter of the departmental proceedings arose out of the same incident which was also investigated by the CBI in RC No.07(A)/2008/GNR and culminated in CBI Special Case No.13 of 2008. 10.1 During the pendency of the criminal prosecution, the applicant approached this Tribunal by filing OA No.222/2013. This Tribunal, vide order dated 05.09.2013, stayed the departmental proceedings for a period of one year or until disposal of the criminal case, whichever was earlier. The operative portion of the said Order is reproduced as under:- “13. In view of the aforenoted facts and circumstances of the matter, we are of the view that the applicant would stand greatly prejudiced by disclosing his defence in the departmental proceedings before he does so in the criminal trial. We would, therefore, direct that the proceedings in the matter with respect to Charge-sheet dated 01-1-2010 issued against the applicant be stayed for a period of one year or till the disposal of the criminal case, whichever is earlier. It is expected that the parties would take all steps to ensure and cooperate for speed completion of the criminal trial.” P ANUKUMA

:26: OA No.120/235/2023

The challenge made by the respondents to the said order before the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in SCA No.18076/2013 was dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 24.12.2013. The relevant paras of the said Order/Judgment is reproduced as under:- “2. Union of India, Ministry of Finance along with Commissioner of „Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax, Surat is before this Court challenging that order. Learned Advocate for the petitioner rightly invited attention of the Court: to para-10 of the judgment, which reads as under:- “10. It is further observed from the chronology of events brought out in the OA that there has been delay in issuance of the Charge- sheet in the departmental proceedings for more than a year after the filing of criminal case. Secondly that even after the issue of Chargesheet on 01-1-2010 in the disciplinary proceedings, there has been virtually no progress in the departmental inquiry. The period upto 12-11-2012 (i.e. till the appointment of the new PO and

10) has not resulted in any tangible progress in the disciplinary inquiry proceedings, it is only on or after 30-1-2013 when the applicant asked for three months' time that the proceedings can be stated to have actually commenced by way of fixing the preliminary inquiry on 11-3-2013 vide letter dated 22-2-2013. Any delay in the inquiry proceedings till 11-3-2013 cannot therefore be attributed to the applicant. Delay has taken place on the part of the respondents in initiating, expediting and completing the inquiry proceedings for which the applicant cannot be faulted for the same. On the other hand, the criminal trial has already started. According to the pleadings in the OA, which has not been controverted by the respondents, the complainant had been cross-examined on 27-6- 2013 and the next date fixed was 06-7-2013. Further, witnesses were also being examined/cross examined. Three is also no averment made in the reply of the respondents or during arguments that the applicant can be faulted for any delay in the criminal trial. At the same time, it is also noticed that the stage is fast approaching when the applicant in the OA would be required to disclose his defence before the trial Court in the criminal proceedings.”

3. This Court is of the opinion that after having read this para-10, the officers should have restrained themselves from opining that the order is required to be Challenged before this court by way of petition. The Court restrains itself from passing any order against the officer, giving him benefit of doubt that may be on account of his over enthusiasm that he has opined to file petition before this Court.

4. Having perused the judgment and Order passed by the Tribunal, this Court finds that no interference is required at the hands of this Court. In the result, the petition fails and the same is dismissed.”

10.2 The applicant was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charges by the learned Special Judge (CBI), Ahmedabad, vide judgment and order dated 22.02.2017 in CBI Special Case No.13 of 2008. The relevant P ANUKUMA

:27: OA No.120/235/2023

paras of the said judgment of the learned Special Judge (CBI) are reproduced as under:- “2. Brief facts of the prosecution case are that on 14-05-2008, Superintendent, CBI-GANDHINAGAR had received a complaint of corruption from a person named Shri Atul C Patel so he directed to PI Mr. A.Z.Shaikh to go Bharuch along with the team so the contrary it appears that complainant has his own stated that he went to the office of the accused with Rs.20,000/- In response to said accused has not stated that come, on tomorrow with said money. Further, as discussed above, in the absence of accused, complainant and panch no.1 got chance to sit in chamber of the accused, possibility cannot be denied that during said time, tainted money planted in file. Further, when panch witness gone down to give information to CBI team about completion of transaction, at that time, the complainant was alone and as looking to the evidence, accused was also not in his chamber. So, during said time, what has happened may not be within the knowledge of the panbh witness. In these circumstances, and as looking to the Exh.33, it appears that muddamal file of refund of the complainant is recovered from the complainant on 16-5-2008 which is appears rough copy, hence it has not given to the accused. When any application not given to the accused then how he can pass any order and evidence on record shows that to add any new product no permission is required, only intimation is required in the office of Central Excise. And as refund sanctioned by Mr. B.C Patel, Asst. Commissioner, and it has also not duty of the accused and from now where it transpires that accused has tried to delay in making payment of refund. In these circumstances, looking to the entire evidence on record, prosecution, fails to prove demand, recovery and acceptance. Hence, presumptive under Section 20 cannot be drawn. Further, as discussed above, the sanction accorded is mechanical and without application of mine. Hence, prosecution fails to prove all three issues. Hence, issue no.2 and 3 are decided in negative. Hence, following order is passed:-

ORDER

1. The accused person-Mr. Dal Chand Meena, residing at Q.No.20/Type- III, Central Revenue Colony, Central Revenue Colony, Athwalines, Surat, Gujarat is under Section 232 of Cr.P.C. is hereby acquitted from the offences u/s. 7, 3(2) r/w. 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

2. Bail-bond of the accused stands cancelled.

3. The accused is further directed to execute bail bond of Rs.10,000/- „(Rupees Ten Thousand Only) with surety of the like amount in compliance with Sec. 437A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

4. Non-valuable muddamal is ordered to be disposed off (destroyed) on completion of appeal period. P ANUKUMA

:28: OA No.120/235/2023

5. The Currency Notes of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand Only) 40 notes of denomination of Rs.500/- [muddamal article no.7/4] is hereby ordered to deposit in Government after the expiration of the Appeal period.

6. Muddamal Mobile Phone of Nokia Co. is ordered to be handed over to the accused on completion of appeal period.” (emphasis supplied)

Thereafter, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 29.08.2017, holding all the articles of charge levelled against the applicant as "NOT PROVED". The said report was forwarded to the disciplinary authority, and a copy thereof was furnished to the applicant vide communication dated 13.09.2017. The applicant submitted his representation dated 15.09.2017 requesting that the disciplinary proceedings be dropped. 10.3 Instead of passing a final order on the basis of the inquiry report and the applicant's representation, the disciplinary authority sought second-stage vigilance advice from the Additional Director General of Vigilance, Ahmedabad Zone, vide communication dated 20.11.2017. The Vigilance Authority, vide communication dated 27.02.2018, expressed certain reservations regarding the manner in which the inquiry had been conducted and returned the case records for necessary action. Thereafter, certain communications were exchanged between the Inquiry Officer, the disciplinary authority and the Vigilance Authority regarding the procedural aspects of the inquiry. The applicant challenged the proposed further inquiry before this Tribunal by filing OA No.54/2019. This Tribunal, vide its final order dated 18.09.2020, quashed and set aside the communication dated 31.01.2019 issued by the Inquiry Officer and directed the disciplinary authority to take an appropriate decision on the applicant's representation dated 15.09.2017 expeditiously, preferably within 60 days from receipt of a copy of the said order. The relevant extract of the said Order is reproduced as under:- “16. In light of the above, we are of the view that it is not open for the disciplinary authority to take a decision for further inquiry behind the back of applicant that too without deciding his representation dated 15.09.2017 made to the disciplinary authority in response to the inquiry P ANUKUMA

:29: OA No.120/235/2023

report dated 28/29.08.2017. Since the impugned decision was based on the dictates of the CVC, it was incumbent upon the disciplinary authority under the provisions of Sub Rule 3 (b) of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, to supply the copy of said communication of CVC to the applicant delinquent. Failure to adhere to the said provisions, the impugned decision suffers from infirmities and the same is vitiated. The impugned order is also vitiated for the reason of flagrant violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, the impugned decision cannot be allowed to sustain.

17. For the reasons stated above, the Order/decision under challenge i.e. dated 31.1.2019 (Annex.A/2) is quashed and set aside. The disciplinary authority is directed to take appropriate decision on the pending representation dated 15th September, 2017 (Annex.A/1) of the applicant expeditiously, but not later than 60 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

18. The interim order granted by this Tribunal vide order dated 14th February, 2019 is made absolute.

19. The 0.A. is accordingly allowed to the above extent with no order as to costs.” 10.4 The respondents challenged the aforesaid order of this Tribunal before the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in SCA No.6013/2021. The said petition was dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court vide judgment dated 24.01.2022, with a direction to the competent authority to take an appropriate decision in pursuance of the Tribunal's directions within 60 days. The operative paras of the said judgment of the Hon’ble High Court is extracted as under:- “4.1 There is no dispute about the fact that the communication dated 31.1.2019 impugned before the Central Administrative Tribunal is in connection with the same inquiry in which the petitioner was exonerated, as noted above. Be as it may.

5. We do not propose, nor it is needed, to go into the merits of the grievance of the petitioner or about the stand the respondent authorities may be taking in support of their subsequent action, although the petitioner by filing affidavit-in reply to this proceedings sought to rely on the decision of this Court in Union of India Vs. Shri Vasudevan S. Konda being Special Civil Application No.6302 of 2019, decided on 21.1.2021 as well as in A.K.Tripathi Vs. Union of India being Special Civil Application No.7459 of 2005 decided on 20.11.2014 to submit that similar set of facts were dealt with by this Court in those decisions and that the Court ruled against the authorities.

5.1 As stated above, we have not gone into, nor have examined the merits of the case of the petitioner, more particularly, having regard to the kind and nature of the impugned order of the Tribunal.

P ANUKUMA

:30: OA No.120/235/2023

6. By impugned order, the Tribunal has only directed the Disciplinary Authority to take expeditious appropriate decision in respect of the aforementioned representation of the petitioner dated 15.9.2017. It is in this light and to facilitate the process of taking decision, by disciplinary authority, impugned communication dated 31.1.2019 has been set aside by the Tribunal, It would be for the disciplinary authority to take appropriate decision in accordance with law as regard the future course of action against the petitioner, in view of what is directed by the Central Administrative Tribunal.

7. We do not see any good reason to interject with the impugned order. Accordingly, the present Special Civil Application is summarily dismissed.

At this stage, learned advocate for the petitioner fairly requested that time granted by the Tribunal to decide the representation was Sixty days, which i is over; therefore such time may be extended. The request being reasonable, appropriate decision pursuant to the direction of the Tribunal shall be taken by the authority concerned within sixty days to be reckoned from today.”

10.5 Pursuant thereto, the disciplinary authority issued the impugned communication dated 24.03.2022, deciding to remit the matter to the Inquiry Officer for further inquiry and submission of a report in accordance with the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The applicant's subsequent request for copies of certain vigilance communications was rejected vide communication dated 12.04.2022. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority issued further communications dated 02.01.2023 and 25.01.2023, requiring the applicant to furnish documents and submit his representation in connection with the proposed further inquiry. 10.6 It is also not in dispute that the applicant submitted several representations against the continuation of the disciplinary proceedings. The respondents have stated that these representations were considered and disposed of by the disciplinary authority vide communication dated 01.08.2023, which was communicated to the applicant through email dated 04.08.2023 and physically received by him on 07.08.2023. 10.7 It is further evident from the pleadings that the applicant's case for financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme and promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner was not considered in the ordinary course on account of the pending disciplinary proceedings. His case for promotion was reportedly kept in a sealed cover, whereas his immediate P ANUKUMA

:31: OA No.120/235/2023

junior, respondent No.7, was granted promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner vide Office Order No.156/2020 dated 24.12.2020. 10.8 The applicant has, therefore, approached this Tribunal for the third time, principally challenging the decision of the disciplinary authority to remit the matter for further inquiry, notwithstanding the favourable findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, the acquittal in the said criminal case and the considerable period which has elapsed since the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings.

11. Having regard to the pleadings, rival submissions and the material available on record, the following issues arise for our adjudication:

(i) Whether the present OA is maintainable, or is liable to be rejected as premature and barred by limitation under Sections 20 and 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985?

(ii) Whether the disciplinary authority was justified in remitting the matter to the Inquiry Officer for further inquiry under Rule 15(1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, notwithstanding the inquiry report dated 29.08.2017 holding all the charges as "NOT PROVED"?

(iii) Whether the acquittal of the applicant by the learned Special Judge (CBI) vide judgment dated 22.02.2017, coupled with the favourable findings of the Inquiry Officer and the prolonged pendency of the departmental proceedings, warrants termination of the disciplinary proceedings?

(iv) Whether the impugned communications dated 24.03.2022, 12.04.2022, 02.01.2023 and 25.01.2023 suffer from arbitrariness, procedural irregularity or non-application of mind?

(v) Whether the applicant is entitled to consequential consideration for financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme and promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner, particularly when his immediate junior has already been promoted?

12. So far as issue (i) as noted in para 11 above is concerned, the official respondents have raised preliminary objections that the instant OA is P ANUKUMA

:32: OA No.120/235/2023

barred by limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and premature under Section 20 thereof, as no final order imposing a penalty has been passed by the Disciplinary Authority. Respondent No. 7 has separately prayed for deletion from the array of parties on the ground of misjoinder. 12.1 The Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 provides that the Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules. However, it is well established in service jurisprudence that Section 20 of the Act ibid is a rule of discretion and prudence rather than an absolute jurisdictional bar. Where an employee challenges the continuation of disciplinary proceedings as being an abuse of process, devoid of jurisdiction, or in clear violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, relegating the employee to an unending departmental labyrinth would render judicial review illusory. 12.2 The impugned communications dated 24.03.2022 and 12.04.2022 do not constitute routine interlocutory notices; they embody a definitive administrative decision remitting the matter for a second/further inquiry, brushing aside earlier judicial directions. The applicant has already undergone two full rounds of litigation before this Tribunal (OA No. 222/2013 and OA No. 54/2019) and before the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat (SCA No. 18076/2013 and SCA No. 6013/2021). Forcing him to face a repetitive inquiry before approaching this forum would amount to endorsing administrative intransigence. The objection under Section 20 is accordingly rejected. 12.3 The respondents also contended that the communication dated 24.03.2022 was challenged after a lapse of more than one year. This argument ignores the continuous chain of administrative actions. Following the order dated 24.03.2022, the applicant submitted successive representations on 28.03.2022, 12.04.2022, 25.04.2022, 06.06.2022, 15.12.2022, and 12.01.2023. The Disciplinary Authority kept the proceedings alive by issuing fresh directives dated 02.01.2023 (seeking examination documents) and 25.01.2023 (supplying vigilance P ANUKUMA

:33: OA No.120/235/2023

correspondence for further proceedings). The applicant faces a continuous civil and financial injury through the non-conclusion of proceedings and withholding of promotions. The cause of action is continuous, and reckoned from the directives issued in January 2023, the instant OA is well within the statutory period under Section 21 of the Act ibid. 12.4 The Respondent No.7 contends that no direct charges or relief are claimed against him. We note that admittedly respondent No. 7 is the immediate junior belonging to the Scheduled Tribe category who was promoted to the post of Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs vide CBIC Office Order No. 156/2020 dated 24.12.2020. Because the applicant seeks parity of promotion and restoration of seniority from the date his immediate junior was promoted, Respondent No. 7 was impleaded as a proper party to ensure that any consequential re-fixation of seniority occurs with notice to affected parties. Since no personal castigation or penal recovery is sought against Respondent No. 7, his presence on record does not prejudice his rights, nor does it vitiate the proceedings for misjoinder.

13. So far as issue nos.(ii) (iii) and (iv) as noted in para 11 above are concerned, these issues are interconnected and, therefore, are being considered together. 13.1 The principal controversy in the present case revolves around the decision of the disciplinary authority to remit the matter for further inquiry despite the Inquiry Officer having submitted his report dated 29.08.2017 holding all the charges against the applicant as "NOT PROVED". 13.2 The applicant's contention is that the disciplinary authority had no justification to reopen the inquiry, particularly when the learned Trial Court had already acquitted him on the same allegations and the Inquiry Officer, after examining the departmental evidence, had returned findings in his favour. It is further argued that the disciplinary authority P ANUKUMA

:34: OA No.120/235/2023

acted mechanically upon the vigilance advice and failed to take an independent decision on the applicant's representation. 13.3 On the other hand, the official respondents have justified the impugned decision by placing reliance upon Rule 15(1) of the Rules of 1965. According to them, the Inquiry Officer's report was incomplete and deficient because the Inquiry Officer had relied upon the judgment of the learned Court and other extraneous considerations rather than independently completing the inquiry in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The respondents have also placed reliance upon paragraph 7.26.4 of the Vigilance Manual and the Board's instructions dated 07.01.2011. 13.4 In order to appreciate the rival submissions, it would be appropriate to first examine the scope and ambit of Rule 15(1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The said provision reads as under: "The disciplinary authority, if it is not itself the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the inquiring authority for further inquiry and report and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 14, as far as may be." 13.5 A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it evident that the disciplinary authority is vested with the power to remit a matter for further inquiry. However, such power is not unbridled or unfettered. The exercise of such power is subject to two important conditions: first, the disciplinary authority must have valid and legally sustainable reasons for directing further inquiry; and secondly, such reasons must be recorded in writing. The provision contemplates further inquiry and not an unrestricted right to discard an inquiry report merely because its findings are not acceptable to the disciplinary authority or the Vigilance Authority. 13.6 The Hon'ble Supreme Court had occasion to examine an analogous provision in the case of K.R. Deb v. Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, reported in (1971) 2 SCC 102. In the said case, the Inquiry Officer had exonerated the delinquent employee. The disciplinary P ANUKUMA

:35: OA No.120/235/2023

authority, being dissatisfied with the findings, directed further inquiry and thereafter proceeded to appoint different Inquiry Officers. The Hon'ble Supreme Court disapproved such a course of action and held that the statutory rules contemplate one inquiry, though further evidence may be recorded where a serious defect has crept into the inquiry or important witnesses were not examined for some valid reason. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are as follows: "It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one inquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence."

The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed: "But there is no provision in rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report of the Inquiring Officer or Officers does not appeal to the Disciplinary Authority." 13.7 The aforesaid judgment clearly establishes that the power to order further inquiry cannot be exercised merely because the disciplinary authority is dissatisfied with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. There must be some identifiable and substantial defect in the inquiry warranting further examination. The object of Rule 15(1) of the Rules of 1965 is to cure a genuine procedural deficiency and not to provide an opportunity to the disciplinary authority to secure a report favourable to the department after the Inquiry Officer has returned findings in favour of the charged employee. 13.8 In the present case, the respondents have relied upon the communication dated 27.02.2018 issued by the Vigilance Authority, wherein certain deficiencies in the inquiry proceedings were pointed out. Their specific contention is that the Inquiry Officer had relied upon the judgment of the criminal court and other extraneous considerations while recording his findings. 13.9 We are conscious of the fact that a departmental inquiry and a criminal trial operate in different fields and are governed by different standards P ANUKUMA

:36: OA No.120/235/2023

of proof. The Inquiry Officer is required to assess the evidence adduced during the departmental inquiry on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. He cannot substitute the findings of the criminal court for his own assessment of the departmental evidence. To this extent, the respondents' submission has legal force. However, the mere fact that the Inquiry Officer referred to the judgment of the criminal court does not, by itself, establish that the entire inquiry was vitiated or that a fresh inquiry was necessarily required. It was incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to identify the precise procedural irregularities, indicate how those irregularities affected the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and record its own independent reasons for directing further inquiry. The disciplinary authority was also required to examine whether the alleged deficiencies could be cured by calling for further evidence or clarification in the existing inquiry, rather than reopening the entire matter. The distinction between further inquiry to cure a genuine defect and a fresh inquiry to obtain a different conclusion is of considerable significance. 13.10 We further find that the Inquiry Officer, vide communication dated 08.05.2018, had specifically maintained that the inquiry was conducted in accordance with the applicable procedure. Thus, there were conflicting views between the Inquiry Officer and the Vigilance Authority. In such circumstances, the disciplinary authority was expected to independently scrutinise the inquiry record and record its satisfaction regarding the necessity of further inquiry. 13.11It is also relevant that the disciplinary authority had furnished the inquiry report to the applicant vide communication dated 13.09.2017 and had invited his representation. The applicant submitted his representation dated 15.09.2017 seeking closure of the proceedings. The applicant has further contended that the erstwhile disciplinary authority had agreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer before referring the matter for vigilance advice. If that position is borne out by the original departmental file, it assumes considerable significance. The disciplinary P ANUKUMA

:37: OA No.120/235/2023

authority could not simply abandon its earlier assessment without recording cogent and independent reasons. 13.12 We also cannot lose sight of the fact that the Vigilance Authority is only an advisory body. Its advice may certainly be considered by the disciplinary authority, but the ultimate statutory responsibility for taking a decision rests with the disciplinary authority itself. The respondents have also acknowledged this position in their reply, particularly by referring to the communication dated 21.08.2023. Thus, while the disciplinary authority was entitled to seek vigilance advice, it could not surrender its independent decision-making authority to the Vigilance Authority. The impugned decision had to reflect the disciplinary authority's own application of mind to the inquiry report, the evidence on record, the applicant's representation and the alleged procedural deficiencies. 13.13 In this context, the fact that the matter was remitted for further inquiry only on 24.03.2022, despite the inquiry report having been submitted on 29.08.2017, is also relevant. The disciplinary authority took almost four and a half years after receipt of the inquiry report to arrive at the decision to remit the matter. Such a course of action, particularly when the proceedings themselves had already remained pending for more than twelve years, required a particularly careful and reasoned justification.

14. We now proceed to examine the effect of the applicant's acquittal in the criminal proceedings. The applicant was acquitted by the learned Special Judge (CBI), Ahmedabad, vide judgment dated 22.02.2017. It is the applicant's specific case that the criminal prosecution and departmental proceedings arose out of the same incident and were founded upon substantially the same allegations, documents and witnesses. The settled legal position is that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically absolve a Government servant from disciplinary liability. The standards of proof in criminal and departmental proceedings are different. However, this general proposition cannot be applied mechanically without examining the nature of the acquittal and the extent of identity between the two proceedings. P ANUKUMA

:38: OA No.120/235/2023

14.1 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446, considered a situation where the departmental proceedings and the criminal prosecution were founded upon identical facts, charges, circumstances and evidence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where the criminal court, after a regular trial, acquitted the employee on merits and the departmental proceedings were based on the same evidence, allowing the adverse departmental findings to stand would be unjust, unfair and oppressive. The relevant principle emerging from the aforesaid judgment is that although departmental and criminal proceedings ordinarily operate in different fields, the distinction cannot be applied as an inflexible rule where the charges and evidence are identical and the criminal court has recorded findings which completely undermine the basis of the departmental action. 14.2 The Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the said principle in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan, Civil Appeal No.7935 of 2023, decided on 04.12.2023, reported as 2023 INSC 1047. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that mere acquittal in a criminal case does not confer an automatic right to reinstatement or other service benefits. However, where the charges in the departmental inquiry and the criminal case are identical or substantially similar and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are the same, the Court may grant relief if continuation of the departmental findings would be unjust, unfair and oppressive. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the said judgment, observed: "However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension."

The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that judicial review may be exercised where the acquittal follows full consideration of the prosecution evidence and allowing the departmental findings to stand would be unjust, unfair and oppressive. 14.3 We find that the principle laid down in G.M. Tank (supra) and Ram Lal (supra) is relevant for examining the applicant's case. However, we would clarify that the applicant's acquittal by itself cannot be treated as P ANUKUMA

:39: OA No.120/235/2023

conclusive proof of his innocence in the departmental proceedings. The criminal appeal stated to have been filed against the acquittal is also a relevant circumstance. Nevertheless, mere pendency of an appeal does not, by itself, efface or suspend the judgment of acquittal unless it is set aside or its operation is otherwise affected by an appropriate judicial order. 14.4 In the present case, there is an additional and important circumstance. The Inquiry Officer, after conducting the departmental inquiry, has independently held all the charges as "NOT PROVED". Therefore, the applicant is not relying solely upon the criminal court's judgment. He is also relying upon the findings recorded by the departmental Inquiry Officer on the basis of the departmental proceedings. 14.5 The official respondents, on the other hand, have not demonstrated before us, with reference to any specific article of charge, that the Inquiry Officer ignored any material departmental evidence or that any particular witness or material document was not examined, resulting in a serious defect which could not be cured otherwise than by further inquiry. A general assertion that the Inquiry Officer relied upon extraneous considerations cannot, without a detailed examination of the inquiry record, furnish an adequate justification for reopening the entire inquiry after such an extraordinary lapse of time.

15. We now turn to the question of delay, which constitutes one of the most significant aspects of the present controversy. The charge memorandum was issued on 01.01.2010. The inquiry report was submitted on 29.08.2017. The applicant's representation against the inquiry report was submitted on 15.09.2017. However, the disciplinary authority took its decision to remit the matter for further inquiry only on 24.03.2022. Even thereafter, the proceedings continued through various communications and representations during 2022 and 2023. Thus, the disciplinary proceedings had remained pending for more than thirteen years by the time the present OA was instituted. Even after submission of the inquiry report holding all the charges as not proved, the P ANUKUMA

:40: OA No.120/235/2023

respondents did not bring the proceedings to a logical conclusion for several years. 15.1 We are conscious of the respondents' submission that the applicant also contributed to the delay by remaining absent from certain scheduled hearings. The respondents have relied upon Daily Order Sheets Nos.09, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18. They have also pointed out that the departmental inquiry remained stayed pursuant to the orders passed by this Tribunal in OA No.222/2013 and OA No.54/2019. 15.2 . It is true that the entire period of delay cannot automatically be attributed to the respondents. The period during which the inquiry remained stayed under judicial orders, as well as any delay specifically attributable to the applicant herein , has to be taken into account. However, the mere fact that the applicant approached the judicial forum to protect his legal rights cannot be treated as misconduct or as a circumstance disentitling him from complaining of unreasonable delay. 15.3 More importantly, the respondents have not satisfactorily explained why the matter remained pending for such a considerable period even after the submission of the inquiry report dated 29.08.2017 and the applicant's representation dated 15.09.2017. The subsequent correspondence between the disciplinary authority and the Vigilance Authority, and the time taken in obtaining advice and considering the matter, were matters within the administrative control of the department. 15.4 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, reported in (1998) 4 SCC 154, laid down the principles governing delay in disciplinary proceedings. The Court held that there is no fixed period of limitation for completing a departmental inquiry and that the question of delay must be considered in the light of the nature of the charges, the complexity of the inquiry, the reasons for delay and the prejudice caused to the employee. The Hon'ble Supreme Court made it clear that where delay is unexplained and causes prejudice to the employee, the disciplinary proceedings may be liable to be quashed. At the same time, the Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned that delay cannot P ANUKUMA

:41: OA No.120/235/2023

be considered in isolation and that the Court must undertake a balancing exercise keeping in view the seriousness of the charge and the overall circumstances of the case. 15.5 The aforesaid principles were reiterated in Prem Nath Bali v. Registrar, High Court of Delhi, reported in (2015) 16 SCC 415. The Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised that departmental proceedings must be concluded within a reasonable period and that employers should make sincere efforts to complete them expeditiously. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that, as far as possible, an inquiry should be concluded within six months and, where unavoidable circumstances exist, within a reasonably extended period not exceeding one year. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed: "Every employer (whether State or private) must make sincere endeavour to conclude the departmental enquiry proceedings once initiated against the delinquent employee within a reasonable time by giving priority to such proceedings and as far as possible it should be concluded within six months as an outer limit. Where it is not possible for the employer to conclude due to certain unavoidable causes arising in the proceedings within the time-frame then efforts should be made to conclude within the reasonably extended period depending upon the cause and the nature of inquiry but not more than a year." 15.6 We are conscious that the aforesaid observations do not prescribe an inflexible statutory limitation period after which every disciplinary proceeding automatically lapses. Nevertheless, they constitute an authoritative judicial pronouncement emphasising the obligation of the employer to complete disciplinary proceedings within a reasonable time. 15.7 In the present case, the delay is not merely a matter of a few additional months beyond the reasonable period contemplated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The proceedings have continued for more than thirteen years. The Inquiry Officer has already completed the inquiry and returned findings in favour of the applicant. The respondents have not established any compelling circumstance warranting the continuation of the proceedings for such an extraordinary period. 15.8 The prejudice caused to the applicant is also not merely speculative. The applicant has specifically pleaded that his case for financial upgradation P ANUKUMA

:42: OA No.120/235/2023

under the MACP Scheme, due with effect from 23.09.2016, was not processed on account of the pending disciplinary proceedings. He has further pointed out that his case for promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner was kept in a sealed cover, whereas his immediate junior, respondent No.7, was promoted to the said post vide Office Order No.156/2020 dated 24.12.2020. 15.9 The applicant has also placed reliance upon the relevant seniority position reflected in Establishment Order No.275 of 2002 dated 23.09.2002 and the RTI reply dated 26.04.2023. The respondents have not disputed that the applicant's promotion case was kept in a sealed cover because of the pending disciplinary proceedings. They have, however, justified such action on the basis of the applicable vigilance and promotion instructions.

16. We find that the continued pendency of the disciplinary proceedings has had a direct and adverse impact upon the applicant's service career. The applicant, who is due to retire on 28.02.2029, has already suffered considerable prejudice on account of the prolonged uncertainty surrounding the disciplinary proceedings. 16.1 We also cannot overlook the fact that the disciplinary authority's decision dated 24.03.2022 was taken after this Tribunal had already directed the authority to decide the applicant's representation expeditiously and the Hon'ble High Court had further granted 60 days for compliance. The purpose of the earlier judicial directions was to ensure that the disciplinary authority took an appropriate and timely decision on the pending representation. Although those orders did not expressly direct the respondents to drop the charges, they certainly did not authorise the respondents to keep the matter pending indefinitely. 16.2 In this context, we are of the considered view that the respondents cannot rely upon the liberty granted by the Tribunal and the Hon'ble High Court to take an appropriate decision in accordance with law as a justification for prolonging the proceedings without a demonstrable and legally sustainable reason. P ANUKUMA

:43: OA No.120/235/2023

16.3 We further find that the impugned communication dated 12.04.2022, rejecting the applicant's request for copies of vigilance correspondence, and the subsequent communication dated 25.01.2023, forwarding certain vigilance material, have to be examined in the context of the applicant's right to make an effective representation. Where the disciplinary authority proposes to rely upon material which has a bearing on its decision to order further inquiry, the employee must be afforded an effective opportunity to examine and respond to such material. Furnishing the relevant vigilance correspondence at a later stage does not, by itself, cure any earlier failure to provide an effective opportunity, though the question of actual prejudice must also be considered. 16.4 We have also considered the respondents' reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Madras High Court in R. Balakrishnan v. Food Corporation of India. The said decision does not dilute the statutory requirement under Rule 15(1) of the Rules of 1965 that reasons for directing further inquiry must be recorded in writing. Nor does it override the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.R. Deb (supra). The disciplinary authority must establish a genuine procedural defect warranting further inquiry and cannot use the provision merely to secure a different conclusion. 16.5 The respondents have further relied upon the subsequent communication dated 01.08.2023, stating that the applicant's various representations were considered and disposed of. We have taken note of this subsequent development. However, disposal of representations does not, by itself, establish that the underlying decision to remit the matter was legally sustainable. The legality of the decision must be tested on the basis of the statutory provision, the reasons recorded by the disciplinary authority and the circumstances prevailing when the decision was taken. 16.6 On an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances, we find that the case does not warrant another opportunity to the department to continue the inquiry merely on the basis of a general allegation of P ANUKUMA

:44: OA No.120/235/2023

procedural deficiencies. The departmental proceedings have already continued for an exceptionally long period; the Inquiry Officer has returned findings in favour of the applicant; admittedly, the applicant has been acquitted in the criminal case arising out of the same incident; and the respondents have failed to demonstrate any sufficiently compelling reason to justify further continuation of the proceedings at this belated stage.

17. We accordingly hold that, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, the continued departmental proceedings would be oppressive and contrary to the principles of fairness, reasonableness and expeditious administration of disciplinary justice. The decision to remit the matter for further inquiry, followed by the continued attempt to proceed with the inquiry, cannot be sustained.

18. We may clarify that our conclusion is not founded upon the proposition that every acquittal in a criminal case automatically results in dropping of the corresponding departmental proceedings, nor do we hold that Rule 15(1) of the Rules of 1965 does not empower a disciplinary authority to order further inquiry in an appropriate case. Our conclusion rests upon the cumulative effect of the favourable inquiry report, the criminal court's judgment, the absence of a sufficiently demonstrated justification for reopening the inquiry, the extraordinary delay and the concrete service prejudice suffered by the applicant. Therefore, we answer Issue Nos. (ii), (iii) and (iv) in favour of the applicant.

19. Now coming to issue No.(v) as noted in para 11 above, since in this case we hold that the continuation of the disciplinary proceedings is unsustainable, we now proceed to examine the consequential service benefits claimed by the applicant, i.e., the financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme with effect from 23.09.2016 and ad hoc/regular promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner from the date his immediate junior, respondent No.7, was promoted. 19.1 The official respondents have opposed the claim by relying upon the DoPT Office Memorandum dated 02.11.2012 and the instructions P ANUKUMA

:45: OA No.120/235/2023

governing vigilance clearance and sealed-cover procedure. They have further contended that the Departmental Screening Committee, in its meeting dated 08.06.2023, deferred the applicant's MACP case because of the pending disciplinary proceedings. We are of the view that once the disciplinary proceedings are brought to an end, the applicant's case for MACP and promotion would require fresh consideration without treating the said proceedings as a subsisting impediment. However, it is equally well settled that financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme and regular promotion are governed by distinct statutory rules and executive instructions. The mere fact that a disciplinary proceeding is terminated does not automatically confer an indefeasible right to financial upgradation or promotion from the date claimed by the employee. The applicant must satisfy the applicable eligibility conditions, including the prescribed residency period, benchmark, vigilance requirements and other relevant service conditions. 19.2 Insofar as the applicant's promotion is concerned, the respondents have themselves admitted that his case was kept in a sealed cover on account of the pending disciplinary proceedings. The relevant principles governing sealed-cover procedure, including the law laid down in Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, reported in (1991) 4 SCC 109, would therefore require consideration. 19.3 The respondents shall accordingly open and consider the sealed-cover recommendations, if any, in accordance with the applicable rules and instructions. If the applicant is found fit and otherwise eligible, his claim for promotion shall be considered with reference to the relevant vacancy year and the date on which his immediate junior was promoted, subject to the applicable rules and instructions. 19.4 Similarly, his claim for financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme shall be reconsidered by the competent authority independently, without treating the disciplinary proceedings which are being terminated by this order as a subsisting ground for withholding the benefit. P ANUKUMA

:46: OA No.120/235/2023

20. We make it clear that the question of grant of actual financial benefits, notional promotion, arrears of salary and consequential seniority, if any, shall be decided by the competent authority in accordance with the applicable rules and the applicant's eligibility. We, therefore, answer Issue No. (v) partly in favour of the applicant to the extent that his claims for MACP and promotion deserve fresh consideration without the impediment of the disciplinary proceedings being continued against him.

21. In view of the foregoing discussion and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.R. Deb (supra), State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan (supra), G.M. Tank (supra), Prem Nath Bali (supra) and Ram Lal (supra), we are of the considered view that the present case warrants interference by this Tribunal.

22. Accordingly, the instant OA is partly allowed in the following terms:

(i) The impugned communications dated 24.03.2022, 12.04.2022, 02.01.2023 and 25.01.2023, insofar as they give effect to and facilitate the further inquiry against the applicant, are hereby quashed and set aside;

(ii) The disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant vide charge memorandum dated 01.01.2010 are hereby brought to an end. The respondents shall not proceed further against the applicant on the basis of the said charge memorandum;

(iii) The respondents shall consider the applicant's claim for financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme with effect from 23.09.2016, in accordance with the applicable rules and instructions, without treating the aforesaid disciplinary proceedings as a subsisting impediment;

(iv) The respondents shall open the sealed-cover recommendations in respect of the applicant's promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner and consider his case in accordance with the applicable rules and instructions, keeping in view the promotion P ANUKUMA

:47: OA No.120/235/2023

granted to his immediate junior, respondent No.7, vide Office Order No.156/2020 dated 24.12.2020;

(v) In the event the applicant is found eligible and fit for the aforesaid financial upgradation and/or promotion, the consequential benefits, including notional fixation, arrears of pay and other admissible benefits, shall be determined and released in accordance with the applicable rules; and

(vi) The aforesaid exercises shall be completed by the competent authority through a reasoned and speaking order within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.

23. There shall be no order as to costs.

24. All pending MAs, if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly.

(Sanjiv Kumar)

(Jayesh V. Bhairavia) Member (A)

Member (J) P ANUKUMA

You have used today's free searches. Sign in, for free, to keep searching without a limit.

Compass reads the judgments for you and finds the paragraphs for and against your question. Sign in to use it.

My Vault follows judgments for you and records every later decision that cites them. Sign in to keep one.

Sign in to download the court's PDF. The full text stays free to read here.

Sign in, for free, to download the court copy. Reading the full text here stays open to everyone.

Search and read Indian judgments without limits, save them to My Vault and find the relevant paragraphs with Compass.

Open the sign-in page instead