WPC/63/2023 of SANTULAL SONKAR Vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH on 7 October 2024

2024:CGHC:39737

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

Reserved for Order on : 04.09.2024

Order Passed on : 07/10/2024

WPC No. 63 of 2023

1 - Santulal Sonkar S/o Late Shri Taturam Sonkar Aged About 58 Years R/o Sonkar Plaza, Golbazar, Gandhi, Ward, Mungeli District Mungeli Chhattisgarh.

---- Petitioner

versus

1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Urban Administration And Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh.

2 - Deputy Secretary, Department Of Urban Administration And Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh.

3 - Collector Mungeli District Mungeli Chhattisgarh.

4 - Municipal Council Mungeli Through Chief Municipal Officer, Mungeli District Mungeli Chhattisgarh.

Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu

CAV ORDER

Petitioner by way of this petition has questioned the legality andsustainability of the order dated 30.11.2021, whereby petitioner anelected President of Municipal Council, Mungeli has been removedfrom the post of President under Section 41-A of the ChhattisgarhMunicipalities Act, 1961 (In short ‘the Act, 1961’) and has beenfurther held disqualified to hold such post for the next term.

Learned counsel for petitioner submits that a tender for constructionwork including the construction of drainage in Ward No.-8 wasawarded to private contractor namely M/s. Sofia Construction in theyear 2019. Chief Municipal Officer thereafter presented note-sheetbefore petitioner of which petitioner directed for putting the filebefore him after 100% physical verification. Thereafter, again filewas placed before petitioner by the Chief Municipal Officer andpetitioner was informed that physical verification has been done.Petitioner in good faith signed on the note-sheet on or about19.02.2021. It is further contended that Rule 81 of the C.G.Municipal Accounts Rules, 1971 (In short ‘the Rules, 1971’) putsliability upon the Chief Municipal Officer to verify that work and billsare properly presented and it is personal liability of the ChiefMunicipal Officer to verify the work and bills presented. Due topolitical vendetta, false and fabricated complaint was made againstpetitioner before the Collector that payment of Rs.13,21,818/- hasbeen made to the contractor Sofia Construction without actualconstruction of drainage in Ward No.8. The complaint was directedto be inquired through Sub-Divisional Officer (R). Enquiry whichwas conducted by SDO (R) was in utter haste manner and based

on interim report, show cause notice was issued to other officials ofthe council by the SDO (R). SDO(R) prepared report behind theback of petitioner only on the basis of the reply submitted by one ofthe clerk. It is only after objection made, statement of petitioner wastaken on 03.07.2021, in which, he categorically stated that physicalverification was done by the Chief Municipal Officer as perprescribed procedure. SDO(R) thereafter submitted third report tothe Collector reiterating same facts that payment was made withoutexecution of construction work. He submits that according to theRules, 1971, it is the Chief Municipal Officer, who is personallyliable for verification of work and payments. Respondents issuednotice under Section 41-A of the Act, 1961 to petitioner for hisremoval without complying with the provisions of Section 41-A ofthe Act, 1961. Petitioner replied to the show cause notice issueddefending his action requesting for full fledged fact finding enquiry.Enquiry report of the SDO(R), which was basis for issuing noticeunder Section 41-A of the Act, 1961 was not supplied to petitioneralong with show cause notice. Even after objection being raised bypetitioner in his reply to the show cause notice dated 19.07.2021,the order impugned is passed in violation of the principles of naturaljustice. At the time of issuance of show cause notice, petitioner wasmanaging to protect himself from arrest and awaiting the order inthe application filed for grant of anticipatory bail in M.Cr.C.(A) No.978 of 2021. Due opportunity of hearing was not given to petitionerand was not permitted to defend his case in appropriate manner.On the date of passing of order on 30.11.2021, petitioner was in jail.

It is also contention of learned counsel for petitioner that order ofremoval is issued under signature of Deputy Secretary and hence itcannot be said that the order has been passed by the StateGovernment. In support of his contention, he placed reliance uponthe judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sharda KailashMittal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2010) 2 SCC319, in case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad& Ors, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 407. He also placed relianceupon the decision of this Court in case of Mahesh Agrawal Vs.State of Chhattisgarh in W.P.(C) No.1399 of 2018, decided on12.07.2018.

Learned State counsel opposes the submission of learned counselfor petitioner and would submit that petitioner was an electedPresident of Municipal Council, Mungeli. He has to perform hisduties and function in accordance with law.When a authority isvested with him, the same is to be expected to be performed withdue diligence. He submits that President is the competent authorityto issue payment order authentication certificate of every billswherein amount is over and above Rs.50,000/-. He contended thatamount of Rs.13,21,828/- has been paid without execution of thework. Proceedings of payment also bears signature of petitioner.Payments of bills of more than Rs.50,000/- is to be under signatureof Chief Municipal Officer and President, therefore, petitionercannot run away from his liability and responsibility merely sayingthat he signed note-sheet in good-faith. Submission of learnedcounsel for petitioner that proper opportunity was not afforded to

4.

Arguments

4. defend the case and to make his submission, is contrary to therecord. Petitioner was issued show cause notice clearly mentioningas to why the action be not taken under Section 41-A of the Act,1961 and should not be removed from the post of President as heis ineligible to hold the post of President. Petitioner submitted replyto the show cause notice, also prayed for personal hearing.Petitioner was issued notice to appear in the office for personalhearing, he appeared on the date fixed, made his submission andthereafter order was passed after. There is no violation of principlesof natural justice. He further contended that submission of learnedcounsel for petitioner that order was not passed by the competentauthority, is not correct. Decision taken by the State Governmenthas been communicated to petitioner vide order dated 13.11.2021.Order is issued in the name of Governor. The order is issued underthe Rules of business framed under Article 166 of the Constitutionof India. He submits that when there is compliance of therequirements of Article 166 of the Constitution of India it gaves animmunity to the order to the extent that it cannot be challenged onthe ground that it is not an order made by the Governor. Theimpugned order is passed following due process of law, followingprinciples of natural justice providing full opportunity of hearing,hence, it does not call for any interference.

Learned counsel for respondent No.4 submits that action has beentaken by respondents-State. The impugned order is passed by theState Government, therefore, respondent No.4 is a formal party. Norelief has been sought from respondent No.4.

6. I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused thedocuments placed on record.

So far as the grounds raised by learned counsel for petitioner withrespect to proper opportunity of hearing was not granted isconcerned, after receipt of enquiry report, Collector issued showcause notice to petitioner on 12.07.2021, it was replied bypetitioner. Document also shows that Collector has issued showcause notice to other officials and they also submitted reply. Findingthe reply submitted by petitioner and other officials of municipalcouncil to be contradictory, direction was issued for registering theFIR against erring officers and persons. The State Governmentthereafter issued a show cause notice under Section 41-A of theAct, 1961 on 24.07.2021, which was replied by petitioner on16.08.2021. In reply, petitioner has requested for personal hearingfor which respondent State has issued notice and after last notice,petitioner appeared before the Competent Authority, after hearingpetitioner, impugned order was passed.

Provisions of Section 41-A of the Act, 1961 provides for removal ofPresident or Chairman of a Committee, which reads as under :- “41-A. Removal of President or Chairman of aCommittee -- (1) The State Government may, at any time,remove a President, Vice President or a Chairman of anyCommittee, if his continuance as such is not, in the opinionof the State Government desirable in public interest or inthe interest of the Council or if it is found that he isincapable of performing his duties or is working against theprovisions of the Act or any rules made thereunder [or if it is found that he does not belong to the reserved categoryfor which the seat was reserved.]

(2) The State Government may, while ordering theremoval under subsection (1), also order that suchPresident, Vice President or Chairman of any Committeeshall be disqualified to hold such post for the next term :

Provided that no such order under this Section shallbe passed unless a reasonable opportunity of being heardis given.

Perusal of the aforementioned provisions would show that StateGovernment may, at any time, remove a President, if hiscontinuance as such is not, in the opinion of the State Governmentdesirable in public interest or in the interest of the Council or if it isfound that he is incapable of performing his duties or is workingagainst the provisions of the Act or any rules made thereunder.

In the reply submitted to show cause notice under Section 41-A ofthe Act, 1961, petitioner has pleaded that it is not his role to inspectthe work and according the Rules, 1971, it is the Chief MunicipalOfficer is personally responsible to ensure that authenticationcertificate is completed and there exists enough informationregarding payment and the claimant indeed received the amount.Petitioner has not disputed his signature on the bill approved infactadmitted that he signed and approved the bill for payment. In theproceedings he mentioned that the amount should be paid inaccordance with the rules.

Upon consideration on the entire facts and circumstances of thecase and in particular the show cause notice, reply submitted asalso the order passed it is not in dispute that under Rule 81 of theRules, 1971, the bill is to be first placed before the Accountant whowill verify the mathematical calculations made therein based on thebills prepared, measurement book and other documents and aftersigning the same it will be presented before the Chief MunicipalOfficer for orders. Under the proviso, Chief Municipal Officer hasbeen made the person responsible that all the information areavailable for payment and authentication is completed. Rule 148 ofthe Rules, 1971 provides for contractors bills, the bill is to besubmitted through Chief Municipal Offficer and it is the ChiefMunicipal Officer, who has to pass an order on the bills. If he iscompetent to pass orders otherwise submit the bill with hisrecommendations. It is not the case that petitioner without anyapproval of the Accountant and recommendation of the ChiefMunicipal Officer on the bills has endorsed his signature approvingfor payment. There is no evidence to suggest that the otherofficials, who checked the bills i.e. Accountant or the ChiefMunicipal Officer, submitted information and authenticated forpayment was, due to any force or compulsion put by petitioner.case and in particular the show cause notice, reply submitted asalso the order passed it is not in dispute that under Rule 81 of theRules, 1971, the bill is to be first placed before the Accountant whowill verify the mathematical calculations made therein based on thebills prepared, measurement book and other documents and aftersigning the same it will be presented before the Chief MunicipalOfficer for orders. Under the proviso, Chief Municipal Officer hasbeen made the person responsible that all the information areavailable for payment and authentication is completed. Rule 148 ofthe Rules, 1971 provides for contractors bills, the bill is to besubmitted through Chief Municipal Offficer and it is the ChiefMunicipal Officer, who has to pass an order on the bills. If he iscompetent to pass orders otherwise submit the bill with hisrecommendations. It is not the case that petitioner without anyapproval of the Accountant and recommendation of the ChiefMunicipal Officer on the bills has endorsed his signature approvingfor payment. There is no evidence to suggest that the otherofficials, who checked the bills i.e. Accountant or the ChiefMunicipal Officer, submitted information and authenticated forpayment was, due to any force or compulsion put by petitioner.

Petitioner has signed the bills only when bill has been sent by theconcerned engineer that the work has been done, the accountanthas verified the mathematical calculations based on themeasurement book etc., Chief Municipal Officer after satisfying thatthe bills submitted is authenticated and all the information areconcerned engineer that the work has been done, the accountanthas verified the mathematical calculations based on themeasurement book etc., Chief Municipal Officer after satisfying thatthe bills submitted is authenticated and all the information are

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available for payment has signed the bills and recommended for itspayment and placed before petitioner (President).

In case of Tarlochan Dev Sharma Vs. State of Punjab and Ors.,reported in (2001) 6 SCC 260, the Hon’ble Supreme Court hasobserved in para -7 as under :- “7. In a democracy governed by rule of law, onceelected to an office in a democratic institution, theincumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term forwhich he has been elected unless his election is set asideby a prescribed procedure known to law. That a returnedcandidate must hold and enjoy the office and discharge theduties related therewith during the term specified by therelevant enactment is a valuable statutory right not only ofthe returned candidate but also of the constituency or theelectoral college which he represents. Removal from suchan office is a serious matter. It curtails the statutory term ofthe holder of the office. A stigma is cast on the holder of theoffice in view of certain allegations having been heldproved rendering him unworthy of holding the office whichhe held. Therefore, a case of availability of a groundsquarely falling within Section 22 of the Act must be clearlymade out. A President may be removed from office by theState Government, within the meaning of Section 22, onthe ground of “abuse of his powers” (of President), interalia. This is the phrase with which we are concerned in thepresent case.”

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Tarlochan Dev Sharma (supra) further observed in para-11, which reads as under :- “11. The expression “abuse of powers” in the context andsetting in which it has been used cannot mean use of

14. power which may appear to be simply unreasonable orinappropriate. It implies a wilful abuse or an intentionalwrong. An honest though erroneous exercise of power oran indecision is not an abuse of power. A decision, actionor instruction may be inconvenient or unpalatable to theperson affected but it would not be an abuse of power. Itmust be such an abuse of power which would render aCouncillor unworthy of holding the office of President.Inasmuch as an abuse of power would entail adverse civilconsequences, the expression has to be narrowlyconstrued. Yet again, the expression employed in Section22 is “abuse of his powers or of habitual failure to performhis duties”. The use of plural — powers, and the setting ofthe expression in the framing of Section 22 is not withoutsignificance. It is suggestive of legislative intent. Thephrase “abuse of powers” must take colour from the nextfollowing expression — “or habitual failure to performduties”. A singular or casual aberration or failure in exerciseof power is not enough; a course of conduct or plurality ofaberration or failure in exercise of power and that tooinvolving dishonesty of intention is “abuse of powers” withinthe meaning of Section 22 of the Act. The legislature couldnot have intended the occupant of an elective office,seated by popular verdict, to be shown exit for a singleinnocuous action or error of decision.”

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case Sharda Kailash Mittal (supra)

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case Sharda Kailash Mittal (supra)

has observed that the President under the M.P. Municipalities Act,1961 is a democratically elected officer, and the removal of such anofficer is an extreme step which must be resorted to only in graveand exceptional circumstances. The Hon'ble Supreme Court hasobserved in para 25 and 26, which reads as under :- “25. For taking action under Section 41-A for removal of thePresident, Vice-President or Chairman of any Committee,power is conferred on the State Government with noprovision of any appeal. The action of removal casts aserious stigma on the personal and public life of the office-bearer concerned and may result in his/her disqualificationto hold such office for the next term. The exercise of power,therefore, has serious civil consequences on the status ofan office-bearer.

26. There are no sufficient guidelines in the provisions ofSection 41-A as to the manner in which the power has tobe exercised, except that it requires that reasonableopportunity of hearing has to be afforded to the office-bearer proceeded against. Keeping in view the nature ofthe power and the consequences that flows on its exerciseit has to be held that such power can be invoked by theState Government only for very strong and weighty reason.Such a power is not to be exercised for minor irregularitiesin discharge of duties by the holder of the elected post. Theprovision has to be construed in strict manner because theholder of office occupies it by election and he/she isdeprived of the office by an executive order in which theelectorate has no chance of participation.”

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir(supra) has observed in para 28, 29, 30 thus :

“28. In State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh [(1999) 6 SCC172 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080 : AIR 1999 SC 2378] , thisCourt considered the issue of removal of an elected office-bearer and held that where the statutory provision has veryserious repercussions, it implicitly makes it imperative andobligatory on the part of the authority to have strictadherence to the statutory provisions. All the safeguards and protections provided under the statute have to be keptin mind while exercising such a power. The Courtconsidering its earlier judgments in Mohinder Kumar v.State [(1998) 8 SCC 655 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 79] and AliMustaffa Abdul Rahman Moosa v. State of Kerala [(1994) 6SCC 569 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 32 : AIR 1995 SC 244] held asunder : (Baldev Singh case [(1999) 6 SCC 172 : 1999 SCC(Cri) 1080 : AIR 1999 SC 2378] , SCC p. 199, para 28)

“28. … It must be borne in mind that severer thepunishment, greater has to be the care taken to seethat all the safeguards provided in a statute arescrupulously followed.”

29. The Constitution Bench of this Court in G.Sadanandan v. State of Kerala [AIR 1966 SC 1925 :1966 Cri LJ 1533] held that if all the safeguardsprovided under the statute are not observed, an orderhaving serious consequences is passed without properapplication of mind, having a casual approach to thematter, the same can be characterised as having beenpassed mala fide, and thus, is liable to be quashed.

30. There can also be no quarrel with the settled legalproposition that removal of a duly elected member onthe basis of proved misconduct is a quasi-judicialproceeding in nature. [Vide Indian National Congress (I)v. Institute of Social Welfare [(2002) 5 SCC 685 : AIR2002 SC 2158] .] This view stands further fortified by theConstitution Bench judgments of this Court in BachhitarSingh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 395] and Unionof India v. H.C. Goel [AIR 1964 SC 364] . Therefore, theprinciples of natural justice are required to be given fullplay and strict compliance should be ensured, even inthe absence of any provision providing for the same.

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19. Principles of natural justice require a fair opportunity ofdefence to such an elected office-bearer.”

Conclusion

In case at hand, petitioner has pleaded in the writ petition that copyof enquiry report conducted by the SDO (R) has not been supplied.Perusal of the show cause notice would show that it does notmention that along with show cause notice, enquiry report which isformed the basis for taking action against petitioner was enclosed.

As observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court severer the punishment,greater has to be the care taken to see that all the safeguardsprovided in a statute are scrupulously followed.greater has to be the care taken to see that all the safeguardsprovided in a statute are scrupulously followed.

Provisions under Section 41A of the Act, 1961 provides foropportunity of hearing. Word opportunity of hearing used under thestatute is to be understood with proper and full opportunity todefend the allegation/charges which can be only when the entirematerial on which the action is taken against petitioner is provided. opportunity of hearing. Word opportunity of hearing used under thestatute is to be understood with proper and full opportunity todefend the allegation/charges which can be only when the entirematerial on which the action is taken against petitioner is provided.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir (supra)has further observed in para 33, 34, 35 and 36 which reads asunder :- “33. This Court examined the provisions of the PunjabMunicipal Act, 1911, providing for the procedure of removalof the President of the Municipal Council on similargrounds in Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab[(2001) 6 SCC 260 : AIR 2001 SC 2524] and observed thatremoval of an elected office-bearer is a serious matter. Theelected office-bearer must not be removed unless a clear-cut case is made out, for the reason that holding andenjoying an office, discharging related duties is a valuable statutory right of not only the elected member but also ofhis constituency or electoral college. His removal maycurtail the term of the office-bearer and also cast stigmaupon him. Therefore, the procedure prescribed under astatute for removal must be strictly adhered to and unlessa clear case is made out, there can be no justification forhis removal. While taking the decision, the authority shouldnot be guided by any other extraneous consideration orshould not come under any political pressure.

34. In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent isentitled to hold the office for the term for which he hasbeen elected unless his election is set aside by aprescribed procedure known to law or he is removed bythe procedure established under law. The proceedings forremoval must satisfy the requirement of natural justice andthe decision must show that the authority has applied itsmind to the allegations made and the explanationfurnished by the elected office-bearer sought to beremoved.

35. The elected official is accountable to its electoratebecause he is being elected by a large number of voters.His removal has serious repercussions as he is removedfrom the post and declared disqualified to contest theelections for a further stipulated period, but it also takesaway the right of the people of his constituency to berepresented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold such apost is statutory and no person can claim any absolute orvested right to the post, but he cannot be removed withoutstrictly adhering to the provisions provided by thelegislature for his removal (vide Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal[(1982) 1 SCC 691 : AIR 1982 SC 983] , Mohan LalTripathi v. District Magistrate, Rae Bareily [(1992) 4 SCC80 : AIR 1993 SC 2042] and Ram Beti v. District

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21. Panchayat Raj Adhikari [(1998) 1 SCC 680 : AIR 1998 SC1222] ).

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21. Panchayat Raj Adhikari [(1998) 1 SCC 680 : AIR 1998 SC1222] ).

36. In view of the above, the law on the issue standscrystallised to the effect that an elected member can beremoved in exceptional circumstances giving strictadherence to the statutory provisions and holding theenquiry, meeting the requirement of principles of naturaljustice and giving an incumbent an opportunity to defendhimself, for the reason that removal of an elected personcasts stigma upon him and takes away his valuablestatutory right. Not only the elected office-bearer but hisconstituency/electoral college is also deprived ofrepresentation by the person of their choice.”

In the case at hand based on some compliant, Collector got itenquired from Sub-Divisional Officer (R), Mungeli. After receipt ofreport, show cause notice was issued and reply was sought frompetitioner and others. In reply, petitioner has taken specific plea thataccording to Rule 81 of the Rules, 1971, Chief Municipal Officer isresponsible for complete authentication of the proceedings of thebill for payment. In the reply of the accountant, there is no avermentthat accountant has processed the bills on the directions orpressure of petitioner.

Perusal of show cause notice issued by State Government underSection 41-A of the Act, 1961 it would show that it mentions noticeinviting tender for construction of drain from house of HorilalSharma to stadium through boundary wall of garden of 300 meters.On spot new drain was not found to be constructed and existingdrain was old one. Payment has been made to contractor without

22. construction of drain and thereby has extended benefit to thecontractor of Rs.13,21,818/- for which petitioner is liable. Noticeunder Section 41-A of the Act, 1961 was issued mentioning thatwhy he should not be removed being incapable to hold post ofPresident Municipal Council.

Reply to the show cause notice was submitted pleading therein thatunder Rule 81 of the Rules, 1971, it is the Chief Municipal Officerpersonally responsible to ensure that authentication certificate iscomplete. Under Rule 146 of the Rules, 1971 it is not the role ofPresident to inspect spot but it is for the Municipal Engineer,incharge of the public works establishment to inspect the spot andthe work done, it is not the duty of the President Municipal Councilto verify the work and accounts, apart from other defence taken.

In the order Annexure P-1 it only mentions that once there is asignature of petitioner in the proceedings/note-sheet for payment,he could not escape from his liabilities and once the records havebeen produced and signed he could not deny his responsibility.With respect to the defence of Rule 81 of the Rules, 1971 in theimpugned order it is recorded that the said averment of reply isexamined in records, payment without work by signing petitionerhas also made himself responsible along with Chief MunicipalOfficer. In para-4 of the impugned order, defence taken by petitionerwith respect to Rule 146, 148 and 149 of the Rules, 1971 thatprocedure for payment of bills, formate of preparation of bills andafter process and submission of bills after completion of work by

Sub-Engineer through Chief Municipal Officer and onrecommendation of Chief Municipal Officer payment is to be madeand the role of President is only as joint signatory. The said defencehas been held to be non-acceptable by only mentioning that there isa joint signature. In the order impugned it is not concluded thatproceedings for payment of bills produced before petitioner for hissignature was incomplete, procedure prescribed is not followed,payment has been made without there being any valuation reportfrom concerned engineer, value of work completed without beingauthentication and recommendation of Chief Municipal Officer.There is no finding in the impugned order that petitioner in anymanner abused his power or there is intentional wrong committedby him, there is dishonest on the part of the petitioner in signing thebills produced before him. It is also not a case of respondents-Statethat petitioner is a habitual failure in performing duties.

In absence of the specific finding that petitioner signed thedocuments without there being compliance of any procedure forpayment of bills with ill intention, in the opinion of this Court thereappears no strong and weighty reason for taking action againstpetitioner for removal from post of President Municipal Council.

Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sharda Kailash Mittal (supra)has observed that power and the consequences that flows underSection 41-A of the Act, 1961 has to be held that such power canbe invoked by the State Government only for very strong and Balram

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weighty reason. Such a power is not to be exercised for minorirregularities in discharge of duties by the holder of the elected post.

26. The action of removal casts a serious stigma on the personal andpublic life of the office-bearer concerned and may result in his/herdisqualification to hold such office for the next term. The exercise ofpower, therefore, has serious civil consequences on the status ofan office-bearer.

27. For the forgoing discussions made here-in-above andaforementioned decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, the impugnedorder dated 30.11.2021 (Annexure P-1) passed by the StateGovernment removing petitioner from post of President, MunicipalCouncil, Mungeli under Section 41-A of the Act, 1961 is notsustainable and accordingly it is set-aside.aforementioned decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, the impugnedorder dated 30.11.2021 (Annexure P-1) passed by the StateGovernment removing petitioner from post of President, MunicipalCouncil, Mungeli under Section 41-A of the Act, 1961 is notsustainable and accordingly it is set-aside.

28. Accordingly, this petition is allowed.

Sd/- Sd/-

(Parth Prateem Sahu)Judge