CRA/625/1982 of EK RAMAN Vs AHAMEDABAD MFG. & CALICO PRINTING CO. LTD on 5 December 1995

JUDGEMENT

1. The present revision is one under section 29(2) of the Bombay Rent Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act')

filed by the original defendant-tenant, wherein the respondent is the original plaintiff-landlord.

2. Before examining the contentions raised by the petitioner in the present petition, I must bear in mind the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of HELPER GIRDHARBHAI (AIR 1987 SC 1782). The said decision clearly lays down the proposition that concurrent findings of fact cannot be casually dislodged by this court in a revision under section 29(2) of the said Act, and unless there are strong grounds for doing so, such as a perverse finding or total non-application of mind or a gross misinterpretation of the evidence on record, this court would be required to uphold such findings.

3. On the facts of the case it is found that the landlord had filed a suit under the said act for a decree of eviction against the defendant-tenant on the ground that the defendant was in possession of the premises as a service tenant, inasmuch as the premises were let to him in his capacity as an employee, and that on his leaving service he was found to vacate the same, that he was a tenant in arrears of more than six months on the date of the suit and had failed to pay the same.

4. The defendant-tenant had filed his written statement at Exh.11 and contested the suit on all material grounds. It may be noted here that the defendant had also filed Misc. Application No.2012/75 for determination of standard rent of the premises, under section 11(3) of the said Act. The suit of the landlord and the application of the tenant were consolidated, heard and disposed of by common judgement of the trial court. The trial court framed issues at Exh.30 and on appreciation of the evidence on record, passed a decree in favour of the landlord and against the defendant under section 13(1)(f) of the said Act (i.e. a service tenant is liable to vacate on termination of his employment).

5. The tenant being aggrieved by the decree of eviction passed against him preferred an appeal under section 29(1) of the said Act, which also came to be dismissed. It is under such circumstances that the petitioner-tenant has filed the present revision.

6. As discussed hereinabove, the scope of the present revision is extremely limited, and learned counsel for the petitioner tenant was, therefore,constrained to confine his submissions to the aspect of perversity in the appreciation of evidence on record.

7. After considerable effort on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioner, when it became apparent that such efforts are not likely to succeed, he has confined himself to appealing to the court on compassionate grounds and has submitted that some reasonable time may be given to the petitioner to vacate the premises in question. Accordingly I have considered this request in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case.

8. On the one hand, it may be considered in favour of the tenant that he is a poor person of limited resources, that obtaining fresh premises on rent elsewhere is not an easy task in the city of Ahmedabad, and that either he would be required to pay a substantially higher rent or would be required to pay a premium for the purpose of entering into such other premises as a tenant. On the other hand, it must also be kept in mind that the defendant-tenant ceased to be an employee of the landlord as early as June 1973, and that the suit for eviction was filed in August 1974. The tenant has thus, remained in possession for over 20 years, while paying only Rs.8/- per month.

9. Looking to the totality of the facts and circumstances on record and looking to the submissions made by the respective counsel for the parties, it appears to me to be just and reasonable, and in the interest of justice to grant time to the petitioner-tenant to vacate the premises upto 30th November 1996, subject to the condition that the petitioner files an undertaking in this court on usual terms on or before 26th December 1995.

10. Subject to the aforesaid direction rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Ad interim relief vacated.

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