Gujarat High Court

CIVIL APPEAL 14202 of 2025 on 16 October 2025

Cites 1, Cited by 0

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 14202 of 2025

==========================================================

NIKHIL RAJUBHAI KAHAR THRO KAHAR KRISHNABHAI KANAIYALAL Versus STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.

==========================================================

Appearance:O I PATHAN(7684) for the Applicant(s) No. 1MS MAITHILI MEHTA APP for the Respondents ==========================================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORAandHONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL

Date : 16/10/2025

ORAL ORDER (PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA)

Rule. Learned APP waives service of Rule on behalf ofrespondent State. By consent, Rule is fixed forthwith.

Citations and Judicial Treatment

No citing decisions in the index yet

Cited by

0

Decisions in the index citing it

Cites

1

Decisions referred to

In this index

1

Of the decisions it cites

Overruled / Questioned

0

No negative treatment found

Loading the citing and cited decisions…

1. The petitioner came to be preventively detained videthe detention order dated 10.10.2025 passed by thePolice Commissioner, Vadodara, as a bootlegger asdefined under Section 2(b) of the Gujarat Preventionof Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (herein after referredas ‘the Act of 1985).

2. By way of this petition, the petitioner has challengedthe legality and validity of the aforesaid order.the legality and validity of the aforesaid order.

3. This Court has heard learned counsel Mr. O. I. Pathanand Ms. Maithili Mehta, learned Additional PublicProsecutor for the respective parties. and Ms. Maithili Mehta, learned Additional PublicProsecutor for the respective parties.

4. Learned advocate for the detenue submits that thegrounds of detention has no nexus to the “publicorder”, but is a purely a matter of law and order, asregistration of the offence cannot be said to haveeither affected adversely or likely to affect adverse themaintenance of public order as contemplated underthe explanation sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Actof 1985 and therefore, where the offences alleged tohave been committed by the detunue have no bearingon the question of maintenance of public order and hisactivities could be said to be a prejudicial only to themaintenance of law and order and not prejudicial tothe maintenance of public order.grounds of detention has no nexus to the “publicorder”, but is a purely a matter of law and order, asregistration of the offence cannot be said to haveeither affected adversely or likely to affect adverse themaintenance of public order as contemplated underthe explanation sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Actof 1985 and therefore, where the offences alleged tohave been committed by the detunue have no bearingon the question of maintenance of public order and hisactivities could be said to be a prejudicial only to themaintenance of law and order and not prejudicial tothe maintenance of public order.

5. On the other hand, learned State Counsel opposingthe application contended that, the detenue ishabitual offender and his activities affected at thesociety at large. In such set of circumstances, theDetaining Authority, considering the antecedents andpast activities of the detenue, has passed theimpugned order with a view to preventing him fromacting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenanceof public order in the area of Vadodara.the application contended that, the detenue ishabitual offender and his activities affected at thesociety at large. In such set of circumstances, theDetaining Authority, considering the antecedents andpast activities of the detenue, has passed theimpugned order with a view to preventing him fromacting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenanceof public order in the area of Vadodara.

6. Having considered the facts as well as thesubmissions made by the respective parties, the issuearise as to whether the order of detention passed bythe Detaining Authority in exercise of his powerssubmissions made by the respective parties, the issuearise as to whether the order of detention passed bythe Detaining Authority in exercise of his powers under the provisions of the Act of 1985 is sustainablein law?

7. The order impugned was executed upon the petitionerand presently he is in Jail. In the grounds of detention,a reference of one criminal case for the offence underSections 65(E), 81, 108 dated 09.10.2024 withKarelibaug Police Station, registered against thepetitioner under the Prohibition Law was made andfurther it is alleged that, the activities of the detenueas a “bootlegger” affects adversely or are likely toaffect adversely the maintenance of public order asexplained under Section 3 of the Act of 1985.Admittedly, in said offences, the petitioner wasgranted bail.

8. After careful consideration of the material, we are ofthe considered view that on the basis of oneprohibition case,the authority has wrongly arrived atthe subjective satisfaction that the activities of thedetenue could be termed to be acting in a manner‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’. In ouropinion, the said two offences do not have any bearingon the maintenance of public order. In this connection,we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in thecase of Piyush Kantilal Mehta Vs. Commissionerof Police, Ahmedabad, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 322, wherein, the detention order was made on the basisof the registration of the two prohibition offences. TheApex Court after referring the case of PushkarMukherjee Vs. State of Bengal, 1969 (1) SCC 10,held and observed that mere disturbance of law andorder leading to detention order is thus notnecessarily sufficient for action under preventivedetention Act. Paras-17 & 18 are relevant to refer,which read thus:

“17. In this connection, we may refer to a decision ofthis Court in Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of WestBengal, where the distinction between `law andorder' and `public order' has been clearly laid down.Ramaswami, J. speaking for the Court observed asfollows:this Court in Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of WestBengal, where the distinction between `law andorder' and `public order' has been clearly laid down.Ramaswami, J. speaking for the Court observed asfollows:

10. "Does the expression `public order'take in every kind of infraction of order oronly some categories thereof? It ismanifest that every act of assault orinjury to specific persons does not lead topublic disorder. When two people quarreland fight and assault each other inside ahouse or in a street, it may be said thatthere is disorder but not public disorder.Such cases are dealt with under thepowers vested in the executivetake in every kind of infraction of order oronly some categories thereof? It ismanifest that every act of assault orinjury to specific persons does not lead topublic disorder. When two people quarreland fight and assault each other inside ahouse or in a street, it may be said thatthere is disorder but not public disorder.Such cases are dealt with under thepowers vested in the executive

authorities under the provisions ofordinary criminal law but the culpritscannot be detained on the ground thatthey were disturbing public order. Thecontravention of any law always affectsorder but before it can be said to affectpublic order, it must affect the communityor the public at large. In this connectionwe must draw a line of demarcationbetween serious and aggravated forms ofdisorder which directly affect thecommunity or injure the public interestand the relatively minor breaches ofpeace of a purely local significance whichprimarily injure specific individuals andonly in a secondary sense public interest.A mere disturbance of law and orderleading to disorder is thus not necessarilysufficient for action under the PreventiveDetention Act but a disturbance which willaffect public order comes within thescope of the Act."

18. In the instant case, the detaining authority, inour opinion, has failed to substantiate that thealleged anti- social activities of the petitioneradversely affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. It is true someincidents of beating by the petitioner had takenplace, as alleged by the witnesses. But, suchincidents, in our view, do not have any bearing onthe maintenance of public order. The petitioner maybe punished for the alleged offences committed byhim but, surely, the acts constituting the offencescannot be said to have affected the even tempo ofthe life of the community. It may be that thepetitioner is a bootlegger within the meaning ofsection 2(b) of the Act, but merely because he is abootlegger he cannot be preventively detainedunder the provisions of the Act unless, as laid downin sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act, hisactivities as a bootlegger affect adversely or arelikely to affect adversely the maintenance of publicorder We have carefully considered the offencesalleged against the petitioner in the order ofdetention and also the allegations made by thewitnesses and, in our opinion, these offences or theallegations cannot be said to have created anyfeeling of insecurity or panic or terror among themembers of the public of the area in question givingrise to the question of maintenance of public order.The order of detention cannot, therefore, beupheld.”

9. For the reasons recorded, we are of the consideredopinion that, the material on record are not sufficientfor holding that the alleged activities of the detenuehave either affected adversely or likely to affectadversely the maintenance of public order andtherefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by thedetaining authority cannot be said to be legal, validand in accordance with law.opinion that, the material on record are not sufficientfor holding that the alleged activities of the detenuehave either affected adversely or likely to affectadversely the maintenance of public order andtherefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by thedetaining authority cannot be said to be legal, validand in accordance with law.

10. Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The orderimpugned dated 10.10.2025 passed by therespondent authority is hereby quashed. We direct thedetenue to be set at liberty forthwith, if he is notrequired in any other case. Rule is made absoluteaccordingly. Direct service permitted.impugned dated 10.10.2025 passed by therespondent authority is hereby quashed. We direct thedetenue to be set at liberty forthwith, if he is notrequired in any other case. Rule is made absoluteaccordingly. Direct service permitted.

(ILESH J. VORA,J)

P.S. JOSHI

(P. M. RAVAL, J)

Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges. Digitally signed by: PALLAV SUBHASHCHANDRA JOSHI(HC00177), Principal Pvt. Secretary, at High Court of Gujarat on 16/10/2025 14:24:27

You have used today's free searches. Sign in, for free, to keep searching without a limit.

Compass reads the judgments for you and finds the paragraphs for and against your question. Sign in to use it.

My Vault follows judgments for you and records every later decision that cites them. Sign in to keep one.

Sign in to download the court's PDF. The full text stays free to read here.

Sign in, for free, to download the court copy. Reading the full text here stays open to everyone.

Search and read Indian judgments without limits, save them to My Vault and find the relevant paragraphs with Compass.

Open the sign-in page instead