CIVIL APPEAL 14160 of 2025 on 16 October 2025

ORAL ORDER

(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL)

RULE. Learned APP waives service of notice of rulefor and on behalf of the respondents.

1. The petitioner herein namely Jivan RameshbhaiSirashiya came to be preventively detained vide thedetention order dated 16.10.2025 passed by thePolice Commissioner, Ahmedabad City, as abootlegger as defined under Section 2(b) of theGujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985(herein after referred as ‘the Act of 1985).

2. By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the aforesaid order.

3. This Court has heard learned counsel Mr.R.B.ThakorandMr.L.B.Dabhi, learned Additional Public Prosecutorfor the respective parties. andMr.L.B.Dabhi, learned Additional Public Prosecutorfor the respective parties.

4. Learned advocate for the detenue submits that thegrounds of detention has no nexus to the “publicorder”, but is a purely a matter of law and order, asregistration of the offence cannot be said to haveeither affected adversely or likely to affect adverse themaintenance of public order as contemplated underthe explanation sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Actof 1985 and therefore, where the offences alleged tohave been committed by the detunue have no bearingon the question of maintenance of public order and hisactivities could be said to be a prejudicial only to themaintenance of law and order and not prejudicial tothe maintenance of public order.grounds of detention has no nexus to the “publicorder”, but is a purely a matter of law and order, asregistration of the offence cannot be said to haveeither affected adversely or likely to affect adverse themaintenance of public order as contemplated underthe explanation sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Actof 1985 and therefore, where the offences alleged tohave been committed by the detunue have no bearingon the question of maintenance of public order and hisactivities could be said to be a prejudicial only to themaintenance of law and order and not prejudicial tothe maintenance of public order.

5. On the other hand, learned State Counsel opposingthe application contended that, the detenue ishabitual offender and his activities affected at thesociety at large. In such set of circumstances, theDetaining Authority, considering the antecedents andpast activities of the detenue, has passed theimpugned order with a view to preventing him fromacting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenanceof public order in the area of Ahmedabad.the application contended that, the detenue ishabitual offender and his activities affected at thesociety at large. In such set of circumstances, theDetaining Authority, considering the antecedents andpast activities of the detenue, has passed theimpugned order with a view to preventing him fromacting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenanceof public order in the area of Ahmedabad.

6. Having considered the facts as well as thesubmissions made by the respective parties, the issuearise as to whether the order of detention passed bythe Detaining Authority in exercise of his powersunder the provisions of the Act of 1985 is sustainablein law?submissions made by the respective parties, the issuearise as to whether the order of detention passed bythe Detaining Authority in exercise of his powersunder the provisions of the Act of 1985 is sustainablein law?

7. The order impugned was executed upon the petitionerand presently he is in Jail. In the grounds of detention,a reference of one criminal case i.e. (i) for the offenceunder Sections 65ae, 98(2), 81 of the Prohibition Actand presently he is in Jail. In the grounds of detention,a reference of one criminal case i.e. (i) for the offenceunder Sections 65ae, 98(2), 81 of the Prohibition Act dated 3.10.2025 with Vastrapur Police Stationregistered against the petitioner under the ProhibitionLaw was made and further it is alleged that, theactivities of the detenue as a “bootlegger” affectsadversely or are likely to affect adversely themaintenance of public order as explained underSection 3 of the Act of 1985. Admittedly, in saidoffences, the petitioner was granted bail.

8. After careful consideration of the material, we are ofthe considered view that on the basis of oneprohibition case,the authority has wrongly arrived atthe subjective satisfaction that the activities of thedetenue could be termed to be acting in a manner‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’. In ouropinion, the said offence does not have any bearingon the maintenance of public order. In this connection,we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in thecase of Piyush Kantilal Mehta Vs. Commissionerof Police, Ahmedabad, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 322,wherein, the detention order was made on the basis of the registration of the said prohibition offences. TheApex Court after referring the case of PushkarMukherjee Vs. State of Bengal, 1969 (1) SCC 10,held and observed that mere disturbance of law andorder leading to detention order is thus notnecessarily sufficient for action under preventivedetention Act. Paras-17 & 18 are relevant to refer,which read thus:

“17. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of thisCourt in Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal,where the distinction between `law and order' and`public order' has been clearly laid down. Ramaswami, J.speaking for the Court observed as follows:

10. "Does the expression `public order' take inevery kind of infraction of order or only somecategories thereof? It is manifest that every act ofassault or injury to specific persons does not leadto public disorder. When two people quarrel andfight and assault each other inside a house or in astreet, it may be said that there is disorder but notpublic disorder. Such cases are dealt with underthe powers vested in the executive authoritiesunder the provisions of ordinary criminal law butthe culprits cannot be detained on the ground thatthey were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order butbefore it can be said to affect public order, it mustaffect the community or the public at large. In thisconnection we must draw a line of demarcationbetween serious and aggravated forms of disorderwhich directly affect the community or injure thepublic interest and the relatively minor breachesof peace of a purely local significance whichprimarily injure specific individuals and only in asecondary sense public interest. A meredisturbance of law and order leading to disorder isthus not necessarily sufficient for action under thePreventive Detention Act but a disturbance whichwill affect public order comes within the scope ofthe Act."

18. In the instant case, the detaining authority, in ouropinion, has failed to substantiate that the alleged anti-social activities of the petitioner adversely affect or arelikely to affect adversely the maintenance of publicorder. It is true some incidents of beating by thepetitioner had taken place, as alleged by the witnesses.But, such incidents, in our view, do not have any bearingon the maintenance of public order. The petitioner maybe punished for the alleged offences committed by himbut, surely, the acts constituting the offences cannot besaid to have affected the even tempo of the life of thecommunity. It may be that the petitioner is a bootleggerwithin the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act, but merely because he is a bootlegger he cannot be preventivelydetained under the provisions of the Act unless, as laiddown in sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act, hisactivities as a bootlegger affect adversely or are likely toaffect adversely the maintenance of public order Wehave carefully considered the offences alleged againstthe petitioner in the order of detention and also theallegations made by the witnesses and, in our opinion,these offences or the allegations cannot be said to havecreated any feeling of insecurity or panic or terroramong the members of the public of the area in questiongiving rise to the question of maintenance of publicorder. The order of detention cannot, therefore, beupheld.”

9. For the reasons recorded, we are of the consideredopinion that, the material on record are not sufficientfor holding that the alleged activities of the detenuehave either affected adversely or likely to affectadversely the maintenance of public order andtherefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by thedetaining authority cannot be said to be legal, validand in accordance with law.

10. Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order impugned dated 13.10.2025passed by the respondent authority is hereby quashed. We direct thedetenue to be set at liberty forthwith, if he is notrequired in any other case. Rule is made absoluteaccordingly. Direct service permitted.

(ILESH J. VORA,J)

H.M. PATHAN

(P. M. RAVAL, J)

Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges. Digitally signed by: HABIBULLAKHAN MOHAMMADKHAN PATHAN(HC00167), GOV, at High Court of Gujarat on 16/10/2025 15:30:41