RASHMI CHOPRA versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. on 30 April 2019

[2019] 6 S.C.R. 1132

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2019] 6 S.C.R.

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RASHMI CHOPRA

v.

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.

(Criminal Appeal No.594 of 2019).

April 30, 2019

B[ASHOK BHUSHAN AND K.M. JOSEPH, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

s.482 – Application under – By six appellants-accused –Praying for quashing the complaint and criminal proceedings in acomplaint case u/ss. 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and s.3/4 of DowryCProhibition Act – Application dismissed by High Court – Appeal toSupreme Court – Held: There were two sets of allegations in thecomplaint – One was with regard to offences u/ss. 323, 504 and506 IPC and another for offences u/s. 498A IPC and ss. 3/4 ofDowry Prohibition Act – Complaint u/ss. 323, 504 and 506 wasDmade only against one appellant-accused and two unknown persons– Therefore, other appellants could not have been summoned forthe offences u/ss. 323, 504 and 506 IPC – In the complaint u/s.498A IPC r/w ss. 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act there were commongeneral allegations against every appellant and the complaint showsthat the same was filed with a view to harass the appellants andEhence deserves to be quashed – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 323, 504,506 and 498A – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1984 – ss.3/4.

Penal Code, 1860:

s.498A – Complaint alleging offence u/s. 498A – Locus standiof complainant – Held: There is nothing in s.498A to indicate thatFthe complaint has to be necessarily filed by the woman who wassubjected to cruelty by husband or his relatives.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 While taking cognizance of an offence, aMagistrate is not required to pass a detailed order. However, inGa case when Magistrate issues process against a person, who isnot even charged with the offence for which he is summoned, insuch cases the summoning order can be assailed. [Para 12][1143-A-B]

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Dy. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports v. RoshanlalAgarwal & Ors. (2003) 4 SCC 139 : [2003] 2 SCR621; Nupur Talwar v. Central Bureau of Investigation& Anr. (2012) 11 SCC 465 : [2012] 6 SCR 723 –referred to.

1.2 In the present case, there are two sets of allegations.One set of allegations of offence under Section 498A IPC andSection 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and second set of allegationsare allegations made for offences under Sections 323, 504 and506 of IPC. The allegations under Sections 323, 504 and 506has been made citing the incident dated 08.11.2014.[Paras 13 and 14][1143-C-D]

1.3 The complaint with regard to offences under Sections323, 504 and 506 IPC has been made only against the accused/appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 595 of 2019 and two unknownpersons. Neither in the complaint nor statements made bycomplainant or his witnesses, there is any allegation with regardto above offences against any other appellants. There being noallegations for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 IPC inthe complaint or statement before the Magistrate, there was noquestion of summoning the other appellants for offences underSections 323, 504 and 506 of IPC. When the complaint does notallege any offence against other appellants, the cognizance of thecomplaint cannot be taken against other appellants with regardto offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 IPC.[Para 15][1144-C-D]

1.4 In so far as allegations against the appellant in Crl.Appeal No. 595 of 2019, pertaining to Sections 323, 504 and 506IPC is concerned, there were specific allegations, which werealso supported by the complainant and his two witnesses in theevidence, at this stage, this Court cannot pronounce as to whetherany incident as alleged by the complainant happened on08.11.2014 or alleged as offence by respondent No.2 or offenceas alleged was committed by the appellant or not. Therefore,said complaint shall be proceeded with and the order dated17.01.2017 is upheld to the limited extent i.e., summoning of theappellant in Crl. Appeal No. 595 of 2019 under Sections 323, 504and 506 IPC. [Para 31][1156--F-H; 1157-A]

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A2.1 Criminal prosecution can be allowed to proceed onlywhen a prima facie offence is disclosed. Judicial process is asolemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted intoan instrument of oppression or harassment. If High Court findsthat proceedings deserve to be quashed in parameters as laiddown by this Court in *Bhajan Lal case, High court shall notBhesitate in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. toquash the proceedings. [Para 21][1149-H; 1150-A-B]

Rakhi Mishra v. State of Bihar and Others (2017) 16SCC 772 ; Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta (2015) 3 SCC424 : [2015] 1 SCR 1069 ; K. Subba Rao and Others v.CState of Telangana (2018) 14 SCC 452 ; Vineet Kumarand Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2017)13 SCC 369: [2017] 6 SCR 922; *State of Haryana v.Bhajan Lal (1992) 1 Suppl. SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl.SCR 259 – relied on.D2.2 So far as the allegations made in the complaint underSection 498A IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act areconcerned, the complaint was filed by respondent No.2 on10.05.2015, before which date, the petition for divorce had alreadybeen filed in the Court. It is on the record that at the time ofEfiling of the complaint ‘V’ (wife) was living in Canada whereasappellant in Criminal Appeal No. 599 of 2019 (husband) was livingin U.S.A. Both were separately living. It was pleaded in theapplication for divorce that husband and wife had separated on oraround November, 2013. It is on the record that neither on theday criminal complaint was filed in the Court of C.J.M. ‘V’ (wife)Fwas in India nor was she in India at the time when statementswere recorded in complaint of complainant as well as his twowitnesses. The complaint is not by ‘V’ (wife) but it was filed byher father. In the divorce application filed in the State of Michigan,‘V’ (wife) was represented by her attorney. The divorce wasGgranted with orders relating to alimony, pension benefits andretirement benefits, life insurance, property settlement andprovision in lieu of dower, mutual release of claims and otheraspects on 24.02.2016. [Para 22][1150-B-F]

2.3 There is nothing on the record to indicate that ordersof divorce between the parties was brought into the notice of theMagistrate when he issued process against the appellants. Decreeof divorce shall not wipe out any criminal offence, which has beencommitted within the meaning of I.P.C. or Dowry Prohibition Actand the criminal offence committed in jurisdictional court has tobe examined despite the divorce decree having been granted.[Para 23][1150-F-G]

2.4 A perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegationsagainst the appellants for offence under Section 498A IPC andSection 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act are general and sweeping.No specific incident dates or details of any incident has beenmentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed afterproceeding for divorce was initiated in the State of Michigan,where ‘V’ (wife) participated and divorce was ultimately granted.A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complainthas been filed in the Court of C.J.M. The sequence of the eventsand facts and circumstances of the case leads the Court toconclude that the complaint under Section 498A IPC and Section3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act have been filed as counter blast todivorce petition proceeding in the State of Michigan.[Para 24][1150-H; 1151-AC]

2.5 There being no specific allegation regarding any one ofthe applicants except common general allegation against everyonei.e. “they started harassing the daughter of the applicantdemanding additional dowry of one crore” and the fact that allrelatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother’ssister and husband of mother’s sister have been roped in clearlyindicate that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filedwith a view to harass the applicants. Further, prior to filing of theapplication under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. there was no complaintat any point of time by the girl or her father making allegation ofdemand of any dowry by any one of the applicants. [Para 25][1151-C-E]

2.6 The judgment in divorce proceedings indicates that theparties to the divorce petition had settled all issues between themincluding division of properties at the time when divorce A

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Aproceedings were in progress at Michigan and both the partieswere not in India, the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.had been filed making allegation under Section 498A of IPC andss. 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act only to harass and putpressure on the applicants. [Para 26][1151-B-C]

B2.7 Therefore, insofar as the offence under Section 498AIPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned,present is a case, which is covered by Category 7 as enumeratedby *Bhajan Lal case and the High Court erred in refusing toexercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. [Para 31][1156-E-F]C

3. High Court in its impugned judgment has not referredto allegations made in the complaint except noticing that thesummoning order has been passed and noticing the principles oflaw. The High Court ought to have first set out the brief facts ofthe case with a view to understand the factual matrix and thenDexamined the challenge made to the proceedings in the light ofthe principles of law laid down by this Court with a view to recordthe findings on the grounds urged by the appellants as to whetherany interference therein is called for or not. [Para 27][1154-D;1155-B]

EJagdish Prasad and Others v. State of Uttar Pradeshand Another (2019) 2 SCC 184 – relied on.

4. Section 498A IPC provides for an offence when husbandor the relative of the husband, subject her to cruelty. There isnothing in Section 498A, which may indicate that when a womanFis subjected to cruelty, a complaint has to be filed necessarily bythe women so subjected. A perusal of Section 498A indicatesthat the provision does not contemplate that complaint for offenceunder Section 498A should be filed only by women, who issubjected to cruelty by husband or his relative. Complaint filedGby respondent No.2, the father of the victim/girl cannot be saidto be not maintainable on this ground. [Para 30][1156-C-E]

Case Law Reference

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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal AppealNo.594 of 2019

From the Judgment and Order dated 08.08.2018 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad in case application under Section 482 No.30257of 2017

With

Criminal Appeal Nos.598, 599, 597, 596 and 595 of 2019.

Shikhil Suri, Shiv Kumar Suri, Ms. Shilpa Saini, Ms. VinishmaKaul, Santosh Krishnan, Ms. Deepika Kalia, Sarvesh Singh Baghel, Advs.for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been filedchallenging the judgment of Allahabad High Court dated 08.08.2018 bywhich the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the appellantspraying for quashing the complaint and proceedings in Complaint CaseNo. 4967 of 2015 have been dismissed.

2. All the appeals having been filed against the same judgment,facts of the case are being taken from Criminal Appeal No. 594 of2019 – Rashmi Chopra & Ors. Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh &Anr., in which criminal appeal, reply affidavit and rejoinder affidavithave been filed. The background facts of the case necessary to benoted for deciding these appeals are:-

2.1 Nayan Chopra, son of Rashmi Chopra and Rajesh Chopragot married with Vanshika Bobal, daughter of respondentNo.2, Indrajeet Singh on 15.04.2012. All the appellants arefamily members of Nayan Chopra. Rashmi Chopra is C

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Amother, Rajesh Chopra is father, Amit Chopra is Brotherand Anita Gandhi is Mother’s Sister of Nayan Chopra,whereas Kuldeep Gandhi is husband of Anita Gandhi.Nayan Chopra with his mother, father and brother areresident of 203, Jainti Apartment, Police Station – Begumpet,Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh). Anita Gandhi and KuldeepBGandhi are resident of Greater Kailash – I, New Delhi.

2.2 After the marriage of Nayan Chopra and Vanshika, whichwas performed at Noida, District Gautam Buddha Nagaron 15.04.2012, Vanshika went alongwith her husband atHyderabad, the matrimonial home of Vanshika. OnC28.04.2012, Vanshika and Nayan Chopra left for the U.S.A.On or about November, 2013, Vanshika and Nayan Chopraseparated. On 23.10.2014, an application was filed byNayan Chopra in the Circuit Court for the County ofKalamazoo Family Division, Michigan,USA, seekingDdivorce.

2.3 On 10.11.2014, a complaint was sent by respondent No.2through registered post to the Superintendent of Police,Gautam Buddha Nagar, Noida making allegations againstRajesh Chopra and two other unknown persons. AnEapplication under Section 156(3) was filed by respondentNo.2. The application of the respondent No.2 was sent bythe Magistrate to Mediation Centre running under theDistrict Legal Services Authority for counselling. Afterfailure of counselling and mediation, an application underSection 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed by respondent No.2 datedF10.05.2015 making allegations against all the appellantsunder Section 498A and Sections 3/4 of Dowry ProhibitionAct.

2.4 In the complaint, allegations have been made on the basisof incident dated 08.11.2014 against Rajesh Chopra and hisGassociates. It was alleged that Rajesh Chopra called therespondent No.2 near the Gurudwara at Sector 18, Noidato talk about the problem of Nayan Chopra and Vanshikaand when respondent No.2 went for talks, he met RajeshChopra with two unknown persons. Respondent No.2further alleges that on his request to accept his daughter, H

Rajesh Chopra repeated his demand of one crore rupeesand used filthy words against Vanshika, which was objectedby respondent No.2, on which Rajesh Chopra and hisassociates became annoyed and they abused and beat therespondent No.2 and snatched his gold chain from his neckand Rs.60,000/- from his pocket. The allegations withinthe meaning of Sections 323, 324, 504, 506, 392 of I.P.C.were made on the basis of the aforesaid incident. In theapplication, it was also stated that Nayan Chopra has fileda petition for dissolution of marriage in America.

2.5 On the basis of the application of divorce by Nayan Chopra,the Circuit 9[th] Court for the County of Kalamazoo FamilyDivision, Michigan gave a judgment of divorce on24.02.2016. The order of judgment of divorce was passedafter hearing both Nayan Chopra and Vanshika Bobal, whowere represented through attorneys. The judgment ofdivorce made provisions for alimony, pension benefits andretirement benefits, life insurance, property settlement andprovision in lieu of dower, mutual release of claims and otherprovisions.

2.6 The application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. filed byrespondent No.2 was treated as a complaint and registeredas Complaint No. 4967 of 2015, on which the learned JudicialMagistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar issued a summoning orderon 17.01.2017 summoning the appellants under Sections498A, 323, 504, 506 of I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of DowryProhibition Act.

2.7 The appellants filed an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.in the High Court praying for quashing the complaint andproceedings and order dated 17.01.2017 in Complaint CaseNo. 4967 of 2015. In the application under Section 482Cr.P.C., High Court passed an order referring the matter tomediation centre of Allahabad High Court. The mediationhaving failed between the parties, application under Section482 Cr.P.C. was heard. The prayer of the appellants toquash the complaint and proceedings have been refused.The application was disposed of after directing that theapplicants may surrender in the court below and make an A

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Aapplication for bail within a period of two months. Aggrievedagainst the judgment of the High Court, these appeals havebeen filed.

3. All appeals arise out of the same order passed in their applicationunder Section 482 Cr.P.C.B4. We have heard Shri Shikhil Suri, learned counsel for theappellants and Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned AOR appearing for therespondent No.2. We have also heard learned counsel for the State ofUttar Pradesh.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that High CourtCfailed to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in quashing theentire complaint proceedings, which proceedings are nothing but abuseof the process of the court. It is submitted that Nayan Chopra andVanshika Bobal had already been granted divorce by Family Court ofMichigan, which fact was not brought into notice of the Magistrate byDrespondent No.2 before summoning order was passed. It is submittedthat a reading of the complaint does not prima facie discloses any offenceunder Section 498A and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against theappellants. The appellants, Anita Gandhi and Kuldeep Gandhi separatelyreside and they have never met Vanshika, the girl after marriage. Theallegations in the complaint are vague, sweeping and general. TheEcomplaint is not even filed by Vanshika, the girl nor she got her statementrecorded in support of the complaint.In so far as incident alleged on08.11.2014 at Sector 18, Noidano such incident took place and allegationsare false and concocted to somehow rope in Rajesh Chopra, the fatherof the boy Nayan Chopra. The complaint has not been filed by competentFperson, hence ought not to have been entertained.

6. Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for respondentNo.2 submits that there is no error in summoning of the appellants by theMagistrate by order dated 17.01.2017. It is well settled that Magistrateis not required to record elaborate reasons for summoning of an accused.GThe complaint discloses several allegations pertaining to offence underSection 498A and other offences mentioned therein. Two courts havingtaken one particular view of the matter, this Court may not exercise itsjurisdiction in interfering with the orders. It is further submitted thatSection 498A does not indicate that complaint on behalf of the women H

has to be filed by the women herself. The complaint was fully competentand no error has been committed by Magistrate in taking cognizance ofthe complaint.

7. Learned counsel for the parties have placed reliance on variousjudgments of this Court in support of their submissions, which shall bereferred to while considering the submissions in detail.

8. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel forthe parties and have perused the records.

9. The copy of the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., whichhas been treated asprivate complaint by Magistrate has been brought onthe record as Annexure P-2. The allegations in the complaint are thatmarriage was solemnised on 15.04.2012 in which marriage, gifts of Rs.50lakhs were given to Nayan Chopra and his family members. It is allegedthat after the marriage, all family members were not satisfied by thegifts and they started harassing the daughter of respondent No.2 bydemanding further dowry of one crore rupees. They further pressurisedto solemnise the marriage of Vanshika as per Punjabi rites andceremonies, on which pressure, marriage was solemnised on 06.11.2012in Gurudwara at Sector 37, Noida as per Punjabi rites and ceremonies.Further allegations are that family members of Nayan Chopra kept onthreatening Vanshika to desert her and on 01.12.2013 Nayan Choprathrew Vanshika out of house and since then Vanshika is residing withrespondent No.2. Another set of allegations are with regard to incidentdated 08.11.2014 alleged to have been taken place at 6.00 PM near theGurudwara, Sector-18, Noida. It is alleged that Rajesh Chopra, fatherof Nayan Chopra called the respondent No.2 to talk about their problemon which date Rajesh Chopra again repeated his demand of one crorerupees and used filthy words against Vanshika to which respondent No.2objected, on which Rajesh Chopra and his associates became annoyedand they abused and beat the respondent No.2 and snatched his goldchain from his neck and Rs.60,000/- from his pocket. The above twosets of allegations have given rise to summoning order. The summoningorder passed by the Magistrate on 17.01.2017 is as follows:- “ORDER

The accused persons Nayan Chopra, Rajesh Chopra, RashiChopra, Amit Chopra, Kuldeep Gandhi & Anita Gandhi are A

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1142SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Asummoned for the offence under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 ofIPC and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. The complainant is directed totake steps as per Rules within one week. Case is fixed for08.03.2017 for appearance.

Sd/- illegible17.01.2017

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Civil Judge (Jr. Division)J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar.”

C10. One of the submissions, which has been pressed by learnedcounsel for the respondent No.2 is that Magistrate has to be satisfiedthat there are grounds for proceeding and there is no requirement ofgiving any elaborate reasons for summoning the accused.

11. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance onDDy. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports Vs. Roshanlal Agarwal& Ors., (2003) 4 SCC 139, this Court in paragraph No. 9 of thejudgment laid down following:- “9. In determining the question whether any process is to be issuedor not, what the Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether there isEsufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficientground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate forsupporting the conviction, can be determined only at the trial andnot at the stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing the process tothe accused, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons.This question was considered recently in U.P. Pollution ControlFBoard v. Mohan Meakins Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 745 and afternoticing the law laid down in Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State ofW.B., (20000 1 SCC 722, it was held as follows: (SCC p. 749,para 6)

The legislature has stressed the need to record reasons in certainGsituations such as dismissal of a complaint without issuingprocess. There is no such legal requirement imposed on aMagistrate for passing detailed order while issuing summons.The process issued to accused cannot be quashed merely onthe ground that the Magistrate had not passed aspeaking order.”H

12. Same proposition was reiterated by this Court inNupur TalwarVs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., (2012) 11 SCC 465.There can be no dispute to the above proposition as laid down by thisCourt that while taking cognizance of an offence, a Magistrate is notrequired to pass a detailed order, however, in a case when Magistrateissues process against a person, who is not even charged with the offencefor which he is summoned, whether in such cases also the summoningorder cannot be assailed?

13. In the present case, there are two sets of allegations, whichare contained in the complaint, which has also been repeated in thestatements recorded by respondent No.2 and his two witnesses – PW1– Raj Kumar, brother of respondent No.2 and PW2 – Deepa, wife ofrespondent No.2. One set of allegations of offence under Section 498Aand Section 3/4 of D.P. Act and second set of allegations are allegationsmade for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C.

14. We may first take up the allegations for offences under Sections323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. The allegations under Sections 323, 504 and506 has been made citing the incident dated 08.11.2014. It is useful toextract the entire allegations pertaining to incident dated 08.11.2014 fromthe complaint, which are to the following effect:- “…………………..On 08.11.2014 at about 6 p.m. NayanChopra’s father Rajesh Chopra called the Applicant near theGurudwara at Sector 18, Noida to talk about their problem. Whenthe Applicant reached there for talk then he met there RajeshChopra alongwith two unknown persons. When the Applicantrequested Rajesh Chopra to accept his daughter the Rajesh Chopraagain repeated his demand of one core Rupees and said that if hehas arranged for one crore Rupees then he can send his daughterat their home, otherwise keep Vanshika at his house and RajeshChopra used filthy words against Vanshika, then the Applicantobjected for the same, on which Rajesh Chopra and his associatesbecame annoyed and they abused and beat the Applicant andsnatched his gold chain from his neck and Rs.60,000/- from hispocket. The wife of the Applicant and a number of other peoplegathered at the spot and saved the Applicant from them. Whileleaving these persons threatened the Applicant that after arranging A

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Afor one crore Rupees he can send his daughter at their house,otherwise keep her at his house and if he dare to inform the policethen they will kill the Applicant and his daughter Vanshika…….”

15. In the statement made by the complainant in support of hissubmission, complainant repeated the same allegations regarding incidentBdated 08.11.2014 as made in the complaint, as noted above. PW-2,Deepa, wife of respondent No.2 has also about the incident dated08.11.2014 repeated the allegations as narrated in the complaint. A perusalof the allegations in the complaint makes it clear that the complaint withregard to offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 has been made onlyagainst Rajesh Chopra and two unknown persons. Neither in theCcomplaint nor statements made by complainant or his witnesses, there isany allegation with regard to above offences against any other appellantsbefore us. There being no allegations for offences under Sections 323,504 and 506 in the complaint or statement before the Magistrate, therewas no question of summoning the other appellants for offences underDSections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. When the complaint does not allegeany offence against other appellants, we fail to see that how thecognizance of the complaint can be taken against other appellants withregard to offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506. In above view ofthe matter, the complaint as well as summoning order are liable to bequashed against all the appellants except Rajesh Chopra due to the aboveEreasons in above regard.

16. Now, we come to the allegations in the complaint under Section498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. Learned counsel for the respondentin support of his submission that power of the High Court under Section482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised in exceptional circumstances, has reliedFon judgment of this Court in Rakhi Mishra Vs. State of Bihar andOthers, (2017) 16 SCC 772. This Court in the above case has reliedon an earlier judgment of this Court in Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupta,(2015) 3 SCC 424, in which judgment, in paragraph No.8 followingproposition was laid down, which has been referred to and relied on:-G“8. … At the stage of cognizance and summoning the Magistrateis required to apply his judicial mind only with a view to takecognizance of the offence … to find out whether a prima faciecase has been made out for summoning the accused persons. Atthis stage, the learned Magistrate is not required to consider theHdefence version or materials or arguments nor is he required to evaluate the merits of the materials or evidence of the complainant,because the Magistrate must not undertake the exercise to findout at this stage whether the materials would lead to conviction ornot.”

17. This Court in Rakhi Mishra’s case has also laid down thatHigh Court in exceptional circumstances can exercise power underSection 482 Cr.P.C. when a prima facie case is not made out against theaccused. Paragraph No.5 of the judgment is as follows:- “5. The order passed by the trial court taking cognizance againstR-2 and R-4 to R-9 is in conformity with the law laid down in theabove judgment. It is settled law that the power under Section482 CrPC is exercised by the High Court only in exceptionalcircumstances only when a prima facie case is not made out againstthe accused. The test applied by this Court for interference at theinitial stage of a prosecution is whether the uncontrovertedallegations prima facie establish a case.”

18. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on variousjudgments of this Court in support of his submissions. In K. Subba Raoand Others Vs. State of Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452, this Courtlaid down following in paragraph Nos. 5 and 6:-

“5. A perusal of the charge-sheet and the supplementary charge-sheet discloses the fact that the appellants are not the immediatefamily members of the third respondent/husband. They are thematernal uncles of the third respondent. Except the bald statementthat they supported the third respondent who was harassing thesecond respondent for dowry and that they conspired with thethird respondent for taking away his child to the U.S.A., nothingelse indicating their involvement in the crime was mentioned. Theappellants approached the High Court when the investigation waspending. The charge-sheet and the supplementary charge-sheetwere filed after disposal of the case by the High Court.

6. Criminal proceedings are not normally interdicted by us at theinterlocutory stage unless there is an abuse of the process of acourt. This Court, at the same time, does not hesitate to interfereto secure the ends of justice. See State of Haryana v. BhajanLal, 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335. The courts should be careful inproceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to A

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matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of thehusband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegationsunless specific instances of their involvement in the crime aremade out. See Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207and Kailash Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC551"

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19. This Court in Vineet Kumar and Others Vs. State of UttarPradesh and Another, (2017) 13 SCC 369 had occasion to examinethe parameters of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in respectof quashing of criminal proceeding. One of us (Justice Ashok Bhushan)speaking for the Bench after examining the scope and ambit of SectionC482 Cr.P.C. laid down following in Paragraph Nos. 22 to 25:- “22. Before we enter into the facts of the present case it isnecessary to consider the ambit and scope of jurisdiction underSection 482 CrPC vested in the High Court. Section 482 CrPCsaves the inherent power of the High Court to make such ordersas may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code,or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise tosecure the ends of justice.

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23. This Court time and again has examined the scope ofjurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC and laiddown several principles which govern the exercise of jurisdictionof the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. A three-Judge Benchof this Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2SCC 699, held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceedingif it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continuewould be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends ofjustice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In para 7of the judgment, the following has been stated: (SCC p. 703)

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“7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Courtis entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusionthat allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse ofthe process of the court or that the ends of justice require thatthe proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the HighCourt’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, isdesigned to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that acourt proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a G

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RASHMI CHOPRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, theveiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of thematerial on which the structure of the prosecution rests andthe like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceedingin the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than theends of mere law though justice has got to be administeredaccording to laws made by the legislature. The compellingnecessity for making these observations is that without a properrealisation of the object and purpose of the provision whichseeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to dojustice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossibleto appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.”

24. The judgment of this Court in State of Haryana v. BhajanLal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, has elaborately considered thescope and ambit of Section 482 CrPC. Although in the abovecase this Court was considering the power of the High Court toquash the entire criminal proceeding including the FIR, the casearose out of an FIR registered under Sections 161, 165 IPC andSection 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. This Courtelaborately considered the scope of Section 482 CrPC/Article226 of the Constitution in the context of quashing the proceedingsin criminal investigation. After noticing various earlierpronouncements of this Court, this Court enumerated certaincategories of cases by way of illustration where power underSection 482 CrPC can be exercised to prevent abuse of the processof the Court or secure the ends of justice.

25. Para 102 which enumerates 7 categories of cases where powercan be exercised under Section 482 CrPC is extracted as follows:(Bhajan Lal case, SCC pp. 378-79)

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the variousrelevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of theprinciples of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisionsrelating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code whichwe have extracted and reproduced above, we give thefollowing categories of cases by way of illustration whereinsuch power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of theprocess of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, A

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though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearlydefined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines orrigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds ofcases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information reportor the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value andaccepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute anyoffence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report andother materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclosea cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by policeofficers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under anorder of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) ofthe Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR orcomplaint and the evidence collected in support of the samedo not disclose the commission of any offence and make out acase against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute acognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an orderof a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of theCode.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are soabsurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which noprudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there issufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of theprovisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which acriminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution andcontinuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specificprovision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficaciousredress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended withmala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accusedand with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

20. After referring to several other cases, this Court concludedand made following observations in Paragraph No. 41:- “41. Inherent power given to the High Court under Section 482CrPC is with the purpose and object of advancement of justice.In case solemn process of Court is sought to be abused by aperson with some oblique motive, the Court has to thwart theattempt at the very threshold. The Court cannot permit aprosecution to go on if the case falls in one of the categories asillustratively enumerated by this Court in State of Haryana v.Bhajan Lal. Judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannotbe allowed to be converted into an instrument of operation orharassment. When there are materials to indicate that a criminalproceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and proceedingis maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive, the High Courtwill not hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC to quash the proceeding under Category 7 as enumeratedin State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which is to the followingeffect: (SCC p. 379, para 102)

“102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attendedwith mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciouslyinstituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance onthe accused and with a view to spite him due to private andpersonal grudge.”

Above Category 7 is clearly attracted in the facts of the presentcase. Although, the High Court has noted the judgment of Stateof Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, but did not advert to the relevantfacts of the present case, materials on which final report wassubmitted by the IO. We, thus, are fully satisfied that the presentis a fit case where the High Court ought to have exercised itsjurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and quashed the criminalproceedings.”

21. The criminal prosecution can be allowed to proceed only whena prima facie offence is disclosed. This Court has observed that judicialprocess is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted A

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Ainto an instrument of oppression or harassment. If High Court finds thatproceedings deserve to be quashed in parameters as laid down by thisCourt in State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335,High court shall not hesitate in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings.

B22. Now, we revert back to the allegations made in the complaintunder Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. Few facts have to benoticed before we look into the allegations made in the complaint in theabove regard. The complaint has been filed by the respondent No.2before the C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar on 10.05.2015, before whichdate, the petition for divorce has already been filed by Nayan Chopra onC23.10.2014 before the Circuit Court for the County of Kalamazoo FamilyDivision, Michigan. It is on the record that at the time of filing of thecomplaint Vanishka Bobal was living at Canada whereas Nayan Choprawas living at U.S.A. Both were separately living. It was pleaded in theapplication for divorce that husband and wife had separated on or aroundDNovember, 2013. It is on the record that on the day criminal complaintwas filed on 10.05.2015 in the Court of C.J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar byrespondent No.2, neither Vanishka was in India nor she was in India atthe time when statements were recorded in complaint of complainant aswell as his two witnesses. The complaint is not by Vanishka but it hasbeen filed by father of Vanishka, respondent No.2. In the divorceEapplication filed in the State of Michigan, Vanishka Bobal was representedby her attorney. The divorce was granted with orders relating to alimony,pension benefits and retirement benefits, life insurance, propertysettlement and provision in lieu of dower, mutual release of claims andother aspects on 24.02.2016.

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23. There is nothing on the record to indicate that orders of divorcebetween the parties was brought into the notice of the Magistrate whenhe issued process against the appellants. We, however, are in agreementwith the submission of Shri Santosh Krishan that decree of divorcebetween Nayan Chopra and Vanshika shall not wipe out any criminalGoffence, which has been committed within the meaning of I.P.C. orD.P.Act and the criminal offence committed in jurisdictional court has tobe examined despite the divorce decree having been granted.

24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining toSection 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A perusal of the complaint H

indicates that the allegations against the appellants for offence underSection 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping.No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been mentionedin the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding fordivorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of Michigan, whereVanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted.A few monthsafter filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in theCourt of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticedabove. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of thecase leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A andSection 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce petitionproceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra.

25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one of theapplicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. “theystarted harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additionaldowry of one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely,father, mother, brother, mother’s sister and husband of mother’s sisterhave been roped in clearly indicate that application under Section 156(3)Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the applicants. Further, prior tofiling of the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. there was nocomplaint at any point of time by the girl or her father making allegationof demand of any dowry by any one of the applicants. When both NayanChopra and Vanshika started living separately since November, 2013,had there been any dowry demand or harassment the girl would havegiven complaint to Police or any other authority. Further, in the divorceproceedings at Michigan, U.S.A., parties have agreed for dividing theirproperties including gifts given at marriage but no complaint was madein those proceedings regarding harassment by her husband or his familymembers. The judgment of the divorce contains following clausesregarding “Property Settlement and Provision in Lieu of Dower”:

“PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AND

PROVISION IN LIEU OF DOWER

1. Each party affirms that he or she fully and accuratelydisclosed all the assets owned by him or her in which he or shehas any interest. By affixing their signatures on this Judgment,Plaintiff and Defendant affirm that each has disclosed all assets A

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Aeach owns or has any interest in, whether held by him or herindividually, by both of them jointly or with any other person orentity, or by another person or entity for the benefit of a party.The property division set forth in this Judgment of Divorce isintended to be a distribution and allocation of all the property ofthe parties and also is intended to declare the parties’ propertyBinterests as of entry of this Judgment of Divorce. If either partyhas failed, either intentionally or unintentionally, to disclose any ofhis or her assets, the issue of property division may be reopenedon the motion of either party to determine and resolve thedistribution of any previously undisclosed assets.

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2. It appears to the court that the parties have divided betweenthem to their mutual satisfaction all articles of personal property,household furniture and appliances, cash, savings and checkingaccounts and vehicles except as provided below. The personalproperty as so divided shall be the sole and absolute property ofDthe party in whose possession or under whose control each of thearticles of personal property are now found and each shall defendand hold the other harmless from liability thereon.

a. The parties agree to return all jewelry to the other party thatthey currently have in their possession, which was acquiredEas a result of their marriage. Plaintiff testified that he onlyhad one item of jewelry and provided the only jewelry he hadin his possession to Defendant-a single gold ring. Plaintifftestified she does not have any jewelry in her possession.

b. The parties agree that their respective parents will return toFthe other party’s parents, all jewelry given as gifts to theirparents and are in their parent’s possession, which wasacquired by them as a result of the parties’ marriage. Theparents agree to exchange at a mutually agreed upon locationand at a mutually agreed upon time.

G3. Except as otherwise provided herein, each party shall be liablefor the debts incurred by him or her after separation (11/1/2013)and shall defend and hold the other harmless from all liabilitythereon.

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4. Except as provide herein, each party shall be liable for thedebts in his or her name and for the debts associated with propertyawarded to him/her pursuant to the Judgment of Divorce andshall defend and hold the other harmless from all liability therein.

5. Except as otherwise provided herein, each party shall retain allmonies in their respective names, including but not limited tochecking accounts, savings accounts, certificates of deposit, stocks,bonds, IRAs or 401Ks.

6. There are no joint debts of the parties except as provided herein.

7. Plaintiff, NAYAN CHOPRA, shall receive the 2013 HondaCRV free and clear from any claim of the Defendant, VANSHIKABOBAL, and the Plaintiff assumes and agrees to pay the liabilitythereon and to defend and hold the Defendant harmless thereon.Defendant shall transfer title of such vehicles to the Plaintiff iftransferring is needed.

8. Plaintiff, NAYAN CHOPRA, shall receive the 2005 ToyotaCamry free and clear from any claim of the Defendant,VANSHIKA BOBAL, and the Plaintiff assumes and agrees topay the liability thereon and to defend and hold the Defendantharmless thereon.

9. The provisions for each party herein made for the parties shallbe in lieu of the dower or spousal right in the lands of the otherand each shall hereafter hold their remaining lands free, clear anddischarged from any such dower, spousal right and claim and saidprovision shall be in full satisfaction of all claims either may havein any property which the other owns, or may hereafter own, inwhich either has or may hereafter have an interest.

10. The parties warrant that neither has incurred any debt in theother party’s name, or on which the other party may be liable,which is not expressly disposed of in this Judgment.

11. This Judgment of Divorce shall constitute a termination of allrights of a surviving spouse including, but not limited to, homesteadallowance, election, exempt property, settlement and familyallowance by each party in the property of the other, and a A

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1154SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Atermination of all benefits which would otherwise pass to oneparty from the other by testate and intestate, succession or byvirtue of any provision of any will executed prior to the entry ofthis Judgment of Divorce.”

26. The above judgment in divorce proceedings indicates thatBNayan Chopra and Vanshika have settled all issues between themincluding division of properties at the time when divorce proceedingswere in progress at Michigan and both the parties were not in India, thecomplaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. had been filed making allegationunder Section 498A of IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act only to harassand put pressure on the applicants.C

27. One observation also needs to be made with regard to orderpassed by the High Court. High Court in its impugned judgment has notreferred to allegations made in the complaint except noticing thesummoning order has been passed and noticing the principles of law.This Court had occasion to consider a similar order passed by the HighDCourt rejecting the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in JagdishPrasad and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2019)2 SCC 184. In the said case also under Section 482 Cr.P.C. proceedings,the challenge was made to summoning order as well as entire proceedingsof complaint case where allegations under Sections 498A and 323 IPCEas well as Section 3/4 of D.P. Act were made. In paragraph No.3, thefacts giving rise to filing the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. beforethe High Court has been noted. This Court made following observationsin paragraph Nos.6 to 9:- “6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusalFof the record of the case we are inclined to set aside the impugnedorder and remand the case to the High Court for deciding theappellants’ application, out of which this appeal arises, afresh onmerits in accordance with law.

7. On perusal of the impugned order, we find that the Single JudgeGhas quoted the principles of law laid down by this Court in severaldecisions relating to powers of the High Court on the issue ofinterference in cases filed under Section 482 of the Code frompara 2 to the concluding para but has not referred to the facts ofthe case to appreciate the controversy of the case. We are,therefore, unable to know the factual matrix of the case after H

reading the impugned judgment except the legal principles laiddown by this Court in several decisions.

8. In our view, the Single Judge ought to have first set out thebrief facts of the case with a view to understand the factual matrixand then examined the challenge made to the proceedings in thelight of the principles of law laid down by this Court with a view torecord the findings on the grounds urged by the appellants as towhether any interference therein is called for or not. We find thatthe aforementioned exercise was not done by the High Courtwhile passing the impugned order.

9. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to concur with suchdisposal of the application by the High Court and feel inclined toset aside the impugned order and remand the case to the HighCourt (Single Judge) with a request to decide the application afreshon merits in accordance with law keeping in view theaforementioned observations. Having formed an opinion to remandthe case in the light of our reasoning mentioned above, we do notconsider it proper to go into the merits of the case.”

28. What was said by this Court in paragraph No. 7 and 8 of theabove judgment is squarely applicable in the facts of the present caseand the order of the High Court deserves to be set aside on this groundalone.

29. One of the submissions, which has been made by the learnedcounsel for the appellant also needs to be considered. Learned counselfor the appellant had submitted that complaint has not been filed by acompetent person. It is submitted that complaint is not made by Vanshika,but has been filed only by father of Vanshika, hence it is not maintainable.The above submission has been refuted by Shri Santosh Krishnan. Hesubmits that it is not necessary that a complaint under Section 498Ashould be filed only by the victim of offence. He submits that complaintfiled by father of the victim, respondent No.2 was also fully maintainable.Section 498A provides as follows:- “498A.Husband or relative of husband of a womansubjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or therelative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to crueltyshall be pun-ished with imprisonment for a term which may extendto three years and shall also be liable to fine.

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AExplanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means—(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drivethe woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or dangerto life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman;or B(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with aview to coercing her or any person related to her to meet anyunlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is onaccount of failure by her or any person related to her to meetsuch demand.”

C30. Section 498A provides for an offence when husband or therelative of the husband, subject her to cruelty. There is nothing in Section498A, which may indicate that when a woman is subjected to cruelty, acomplaint has to be filed necessarily by the women so subjected. Aperusal of Section 498A, as extracted above, indicates that the provisionDdoes not contemplate that complaint for offence under Section 498Ashould be filed only by women, who is subjected to cruelty by husbandor his relative. We, thus, are of the view that complaint filed by respondentNo.2, the father of Vanshika cannot be said to be not maintainable onthis ground. We, thus, reject the submission of the counsel for the appellantthat complaint filed by respondent No.2 was not maintainable.

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31. In view of the foregoing discussions, insofar as the offenceunder Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act is concerned, we are ofthe view that present is a case, which is covered by Category 7 asenumerated by State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) and theHigh Court erred in refusing to exercise its Jurisdiction under SectionF482 Cr.P.C. We, however, observe that in so far as allegations againstRajesh Chopra pertaining to Sections 323, 504 and 506 of IPC isconcerned, there were specific allegations, which were also supportedby the complainant and his two witnesses in the evidence,at this stage,this Court cannot pronounce as to whether any incident as alleged byGthe complainant happened on 08.11.2014 or alleged as offence byrespondent No.2 or offence as alleged was committed by Rajesh Chopraor not. We, thus, are of the view that insofar as complaint pertaining tooffence under Sections 323, 504 and 506 I.P.C. against Rajesh Choprais concerned, said complaint shall be proceeded with and the order dated 17.01.2017 is upheld to the above extent only, i.e., summoning of RajeshChopra under Sections 323, 504 and 506.

32. In result,

(i) Criminal Appeal Nos.594, 598, 599, 597 and 596 of 2019 (arisingout of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 8103, 8050, 8052, 8042 and 8041 of 2018) areallowed. The complaint as well as summoning order dated 17.01.2017is set aside insofar as the appellants in the above-mentioned criminalappeals are concerned.

(ii) Criminal Appeal No.595 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8039 of 2018 – Rajesh Chopra Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.)is partly allowed. The complaint as well as summoning order is set asideinsofar as offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act isconcerned, however, complaint shall proceed insofar as offence underSections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. and summoning order to that extentonly is upheld.

Kalpana K. Tripathy

Appeals disposed of.

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