SUKH DUTT RATRA & ANR. versus STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. on 6 April 2022

SUKH DUTT RATRA & ANR.

v.

STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 2773 of 2022)

APRIL 06, 2022

[S. RAVINDRA BHAT ANDPAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950: Art. 300-A – Right againstdepriviation of property – Respondent state utilised subject landand adjoining lands for the construction of road in 1972-73 –Appellants claimed to be owners of subject land – Allegedly noland acquisition proceedings were initiated nor compensation wasgiven to the appellants or the owners of the adjoining lands – Landacquisition proceedings were initiated in respect of neighbouringland owners and award was passed on 04.10.2005 – Appellantsfiled writ petition in 2011 before the High Court seekingcompensation for the subject land or initiation of acquisitionproceedings under the Land Acquisition Act – High Court held thatthe matter involved disputed questions of law and fact fordetermination on the starting point of limitation, which could notbe adjudicated in writ proceedings – In the instant appeals, questionthat arose was can the State, merely on the ground of delay andlaches, evade its legal responsibility towards those from whomprivate property was expropriated – Held: The State cannot shielditself behind the ground of delay and laches – There cannot be a‘limitation’ to doing justice – The State has, in a clandestine andarbitrary manner, actively tried to limit disbursal of compensationas was required by law – This arbitrary action was also violative ofthe appellant’s prevailing Art. 31 right – The State was unable toproduce any evidence indicating that the land of the appellantswas taken over in the manner known to law or have ever paid anycompensation – Appellants too were illegally dispossessed withoutfollowing due process of law – In the absence of written consent tovoluntarily give up their land, the appellants were entitled tocompensation in terms of law – Invoking extraordinary jurisdictionunder Arts.136 and 142 of the Constitution, the State is directed to

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Atreat the subject land as a deemed acquisition and appropriatelydisburse compensation to the appellants in the same terms as theorder of the reference court dated 04.10.2005 – State is also directedto pay legal costs and expenses of Rs. 50,000 to the appellants –Land acquisition – Limitation – Delay and laches.

BAllowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The facts of the present case reveal that the Statehas, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner, actively tried to limitdisbursal of compensation as required by law, only to those forwhich it was specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to allCthose who are entitled. This arbitrary action, which is also violativeof the appellants’ prevailing Article 31 right (at the time of causeof action), undoubtedly warranted consideration, and interventionby the High Court, under its Article 226 jurisdiction. [Para19][1051-C-E]

DState of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126 – referredto.

2. The State has merely averred to the appellants’ allegedverbal consent or the lack of objection, but has not placed anymaterial on record to substantiate this plea. Further, the State wasEunable to produce any evidence indicating that the land of theappellants had been taken over or acquired in the manner knownto law, or that they had ever paid any compensation. This was theState’s position and subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007as well, in the other writ proceedings. [Para 21][1052-F-H]

F3. The State’s contention that since the property is notadjoining to that of the appellants, it disentitles them from claimingbenefit on the ground of parity cannot be accepted. Despite it notbeing adjoining (which is admitted in the rejoinder affidavit filedby the appellants), it is clear that the subject land was acquiredfor the same reason – construction of the Narag Fagla Road, inG1972-73, and much like the claimants before the reference court,these appellants too were illegally dispossessed without followingdue process of law thus resulting in violation of Article 31 andwarranting the High Court’s intervention under Article 226jurisdiction. In the absence of written consent to voluntarily give H

SUKH DUTT RATRA & ANR. v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.

up their land, the appellants were entitled to compensation interms of law. The forcible dispossession of a person of their privateproperty without following due process of law, was violative ofboth their human right, and constitutional right under Article 300-A. [Paras 22 and 25][1052-H; 1053-A-C; 1054-D]

Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 2 SCC569- relied on.

4. In view of this court’s extraordinary jurisdiction underArticle 136 and 142 of the Constitution, the State is herebydirected to treat the subject lands as a deemed acquisition andappropriately disburse compensation to the appellants in the sameterms as the order of the reference court dated 04.10.2005. TheRespondent-State is directed, consequently to ensure that theappropriate Land Acquisition Collector computes thecompensation, and disburses it to the appellants, within fourmonths. The appellants would also be entitled to consequentialbenefits of solatium, and interest on all sums payable under laww.e.f 16.10.2001 (i.e. date of issuance of notification under Section4 of the Act), till the date of the impugned judgment, i.e.12.09.2013. Given the disregard for the appellants’ fundamentalrights which has caused them to approach this court and receiveremedy decades after the act of dispossession, the Respondent-State is directed to pay legal costs and expenses of Rs. 50,000 tothe appellants. [Paras 26 and 27][1054-E-G; 1055-A-B]

Bishandas v. State of Punjab [1962] 2 SCR 69;Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.Balwant Regular Motor Service [1969] 1 SCR 808 –followed.

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius ShapurChenai [2005] Supp (3) SCR 388; N. Padmamma v. S.Ramakrishna Reddy (2008) 15 SCC 517; Delhi AirtechServices Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh &Ors. [2011] 12 SCR 191; Jilubhai Nanbhai Kahchar v.State of Gujarat [1994] Supp 1 SCR 807 – relied on.

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ATukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. Maharashtra IndustrialDevelopment Corporation (MIDC) [2012] 13 SCR; AirIndia Ltd. vs. Vishal Capoor [2005] Supp 3 SCR 670;State of Maharashtra vs. Digambar [1995] Supp 1 SCR492; State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr vs. Bhailal Bhai& Ors. [1964] 6 SCR 261; Brijesh Kumar & Ors. vs.BState of Haryana (2014) 11 SCC 351; Wazir Chand vs.The State of Himachal Pradesh [1955] 1 SCR 408; Stateof Uttar Pradesh and Ors. vs. Dharmander PrasadSingh and Ors. [1989] 1 SCR 176 – referred to.

Entick vs. Carrington [1765] EWHC (KB) 198 –Creferred to.

Case Law Reference

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2773of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.09.2013 of the High Courtof Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in CWP No.7873 of 2011.

Sharan Thakur, Mahesh Thakur, Siddhartha Thakur, Ms. VipashaSingh, Ms. Biswendra Singh, Advs. for the Appellants.

Abhinav Mukerji, Ms. Bihu Sharma, Ms. Pratishtha Vij, AkshayC. Shrivastava, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

1. Delay condoned and leave granted. With consent of counselfor the parties, the appeal was heard finally. The appellants are aggrievedby final judgment[1] of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla,disposing their writ petition, with liberty to institute a civil suit in accordancewith law.

Facts

2. Sukh Dutt Ratra and Bhagat Ram (hereafter ‘appellants’) claimto be owners of land[2] situated at Mauzal Sarol Basach, Tehsil Pachhad,District Sirmaour, Himachal Pradesh (hereafter ‘subject land’). TheRespondent-State utilised the subject land and adjoining lands for theconstruction of the ‘Narag Fagla Road’ in 1972-73, but allegedly no landacquisition proceedings were initiated, nor compensation given to theappellants or owners of the adjoining land.

3. Pursuant to a judgment by the Himachal Pradesh High Court[3](hereafter ‘High Court’) directing the State to initiate land acquisitionproceedings, a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 (hereafter ‘Act’) was issued on 16.10.2001 (published on 30.10.2001)and the award was passed on 20.12.2001 fixing compensation at 30,000per bigha. Proceedings under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement ofcompensation, were initiated by ten neighbouring land owners (Mata 1 Dated 12.09.2013 in CWP No. 7873/2011.

2 Khasra Nos. 141, 232/142, 143, 144, 145, 281/267, 206/147, 158, 268/149, 282/267,and Khasra Nos. 201/138, 242/146, 209/154, 158, 211/163, 16/172, further KhasraNos. 50, 51, 89, 278/92, 280/93, and 205/147, 281/267, 151, 152, 283/153, 285/20.

3 In Devender Singh &Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh CWP No. 816/1992.

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ARam and others), whose lands were similarly utilised for the constructionof the same road and an award[4] dated 04.10.2005 was passed by thereference court in their favour. It was held that the reference petitionerswere entitled to enhanced compensation of 39,000 per bigha; solatiumof 30% per annum on the market value of the land; additionalcompensation at the rate of 12% per annum under Section 23(1-A) ofBthe Act w.e.f. 16.10.2001 (date of issuance of notification under Section4) till the date of making of the award by the Collector, i.e. 20.12.2001;and under Section 28, interest of 9% per annum from 16.10.2001 for aperiod of one year, and thereafter 15% per annum, till date of payment.In 2009, the High Court dismissed[5] the appeal against this order byCthoseclaimants, who were seeking statutory interest from the date oftaking possession (rather than date of initiation of acquisition proceedings).

4. Similarly situated land owners, filed writ proceedings beforethe High Court: a writ petition filed by one Anakh Singh, from the adjoiningvillage was allowed by the High Court[6] with the direction to acquireDlands of the writ petitioners under the Act, with consequential benefits;subsequently other similarly situated owners also received[7] the benefitof these directions.

5. This led the appellants to file a writ petition before the HighCourt in 2011, seeking compensation for the subject land or initiation ofEacquisition proceedings under the Act. Relying on a Full bench decision[8]of the High Court, it was held in the impugned judgment that the matterinvolved disputed questions of law and fact for determination on thestarting point of limitation, which could not be adjudicated in writproceedings. The writ petition was disposed of, with liberty to file a civilsuit in accordance with law. Aggrieved, the appellants have approachedFthis court through these appeals.

Contentions of parties

6. Mr. Mahesh Thakur, learned counsel on behalf of theappellants argued that the State had illegally usurped the appellants’

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4 Award in Land Ref. Petition No. 10-LAC/4 of 2004 and consolidated matters.

5 Dated 25.08.2009 in RFA No. 1-9/2006.

6 Order dated 23.04.2007 in CWP No. 1192/2004.

7 Order dated 20.12.2013 in CWP No. 1356/2010.

8 Shankar Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh CWP No. 1966/2010-C, judgment datedH02.03.2013 (hereafter “Shankar Dass”).

lands, without following due process of law and reliance was placedon this court’s decision in State of U.P. v. Manohar[9]and TukaramKana Joshi & Ors. v. Maharashtra Industrial DevelopmentCorporation (MIDC)[10].

7. It was further submitted that the appellants’ case is on thesame footing as that of adjoining land owners who were grantedcompensation and consequential benefits by land acquisition award dated04.10.2005, and in subsequent writ proceedings. Counsel urged that thestate’s inaction is arbitrary, given that the lands adjoining the subject landwere acquired under directions of the High Court, despite it being usedfor the same purpose.

8. Counsel highlighted that the Respondent-State had not disputedthat the appellants were owners of the subject land, that it had beentaken and used by the State for construction of Narag Fagla Road, andthat no compensation had been paid. So, given that these facts areundisputed, it was urged that the High Court had erred in dismissing thewrit petition, in light of this court’s decision in Air India Ltd. v. VishalCapoor[11].

9. Counsel drew our attention to a judgment of this court in VidyaDevi v. State of Himachal Pradesh[12], which he argued had similarfacts and prevailing circumstances: petitioners’ lands had been taken bythe State at the same time and for the same purpose as that of theappellants, and this court had after condoning delay of 1756 days, allowedthe appeal and directed the State to pay compensation along with allstatutory benefits, including solatium, interest, etc.

10. Mr. Abhinav Mukerji, learned counsel on behalf of the Stateof Himachal Pradesh, urged that the petition was hit by immense delayand latches and liable to be dismissed on this ground alone: appellantshad approached the High Court after an inordinate delay of 38 years in2011, against action taken by the State in 1972-73; and an inordinatedelay of about 6 years in approaching this court after passing of theimpugned judgment in 2013. Reliance was placed on this court’s decisions 9 (2005) 2 SCC 126 (hereafter “Manohar”)

10 2012 (13) SCR29 (hereafter “Tukaram Kana Joshi”)

11 2005 Supp (3) SCR 670.

12 (2020) 2 SCC 569; Civil Appeal Nos. 60-61/2020, judgment dated 08.01.2020(hereafter “Vidya Devi”).

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Ain State of Maharashtra v. Digambar[13], State of Madhya Pradesh &Anr v. Bhailal Bhai & Ors.[14]and Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State ofHaryana[15]. Counsel also submitted that the decision in Tukaram KanaJoshi (supra)which the appellants strongly rely on, is per incuriam inlight of the larger bench decision in Digambar (supra), which was notconsidered in Tukaram Kana Joshi. The Respondent-State opposesBthe application for condonation of delay filed by the appellants on thesame grounds, by way of reply.

11. On facts, counsel on behalf of State submitted that the NaragFagla road was in fact constructed at the request of the appellants, andCother landowners who wanted the benefit of connectivity; counsel claimsthat they volunteered their land for this purpose, and hence, it wasconstructed with their verbal consent. Since 1972-73 when it was built,there was no objection raised or compensation sought by the appellantstill 2011. Further, counsel contended that the lands dealt with in otherwrit proceedings (CWP No. 1192/2004 and 1356/2010) are not adjoiningDto the subject land of the appellants’, as claimed by them. It was submittedthat the appellants’ land falls in Sirmour District while the lands in theother writ proceedings, were acquired for the road between Jalari toSujanpur via Bara-Choru, which is a different road, falling in the Hamirpurdistrict. Therefore, on these facts, the counsel urges that the ground ofEparity is untenable.

12. Lastly, it was argued that in light of the disputed questions offact relating to limitation, construction of the road, and verbal consentfor the same – the appropriate forum would be the civil court, and thusthe impugned order required no intervention.

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Analysis and conclusion

13. While the right to property is no longer a fundamental right[16],it is pertinent to note that at the time of dispossession of the subject land,this right was still included in Part III of the Constitution. The right againstdeprivation of property unless in accordance with procedure establishedGby law, continues to be a constitutional right under Article 300-A.

13 1995 Supp (1) SCR 492 (hereafter “Digambar”)14 1964 (6) SCR 261

15 (2014) 11 SCC 351

H16 Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.

14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that nobody canbe deprived of liberty or property without due process, or authorizationof law. The recognition of this dates back to the 1700s to the decision ofthe King’s Bench in Entick v. Carrington[17] and by this court in WazirChand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh[18]. Further, in severaljudgments, this court has repeatedly held that rather than enjoying awider bandwidth of lenience, the State often has a higher responsibilityin demonstrating that it has acted within the confines of legality, andtherefore, not tarnished the basic principle of the rule of law.

15. When it comes to the subject of private property, this courthas upheld the high threshold of legality that must be met, to dispossessan individual of their property, and even more so when done by theState. In Bishandas v. State of Punjab[19] this court rejected thecontention that the petitioners in the case were trespassers and couldbe removed by an executive order, and instead concluded that theexecutive action taken by the State and its officers, was destructive ofthe basic principle of the rule of law. This court, in another case -State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh andOrs.[20], held:

“A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resumepossession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, evenafter the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeitureor otherwise. The use of the expression ‘re-entry’ in the lease-deed does not authorise extra-judicial methods to resumepossession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even afterthe expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possessionand forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot bedispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In thepresent case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not placeit in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it is underan additional inhibition stemming from the requirement thatall actions of Government and Governmental authoritiesshould have a ‘legal pedigree’”.

17 [1765] EWHC (KB) 198

18 1955 (1) SCR 408

19 1962 (2) SCR 69

20 1989 (1) SCR 176

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A16. Given the important protection extended to an individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied earlier in Article 31, and now as aconstitutional right in Article 300-A), and the high threshold the Statemust meet while acquiring land, the question remains – can the State,merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its legal responsibilitytowards those from whom private property has been expropriated? InBthese facts and circumstances, we find this conclusion to be unacceptable,and warranting intervention on the grounds of equity and fairness.

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17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State’s actions,or lack thereof, have in fact compounded the injustice meted out to theappellants and compelled them to approach this court, albeit belatedly.CThe initiation of acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurredonly at the behest of the High Court. Even after such judicial intervention,the State continued to only extend the benefit of the court’s directions tothose who specifically approached the courts. The State’s lackadaisicalconduct is discernible from this action of initiating acquisition proceedingsDselectively, only in respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who hadapproached the court in earlier proceedings, and not other land owners,pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in CWP No. 1192/2004) and20.12.2013 (in CWP No. 1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, atevery stage, the State sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring landrequired for public use in the manner prescribed by law.E

18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches whichconclude either way – as contended by both sides in the present dispute– however, the specific factual matrix compels this court to weigh infavour of the appellant-land owners. The State cannot shield itself behindthe ground of delay and laches in such a situation; there cannot be aF‘limitation’ to doing justice. This court in a much earlier case -Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant RegularMotor Service[21], held:

“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not anarbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practicallyGunjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by hisconduct, done that which might fairly be regarded asequivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct andneglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet SUKH DUTT RATRA & ANR. v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.

[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

put the other party in a situation in which it would not bereasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to beasserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay aremost material.

But in every case, if an argument against relief, whichotherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, thatdelay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute oflimitations, the validity of that defence must be tried uponprinciples substantially equitable. Two circumstances, alwaysimportant in such cases, are, the length of the delay and thenature of the acts done during the interval, which might affecteither party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in takingthe one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”

19. The facts of the present case reveal that the State has, in aclandestine and arbitrary manner, actively tried to limit disbursal ofcompensation as required by law, only to those for which it wasspecifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all those who are entitled.This arbitrary action, which is also violative of the appellants’ prevailingArticle 31 right (at the time of cause of action), undoubtedly warrantedconsideration, and intervention by the High Court, under its Article 226jurisdiction. This court, in Manohar (supra) - a similar case where thename of the aggrieved had been deleted from revenue records leading tohis dispossession from the land without payment of compensation – held:

“Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants, weare satisfied that the case projected before the court by theappellants is utterly untenable and not worthy of emanatingfrom any State which professes the least regard to being awelfare State. When we pointed out to the learned counselthat, at this stage at least, the State should be gracious enoughto accept its mistake and promptly pay the compensation tothe respondent, the State has taken an intractable attitudeand persisted in opposing what appears to be a just andreasonable claim of the respondent.

Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights availableto the citizens are declared by the Constitution. AlthoughArticle 19(1)(f) was deleted by the Forty-fourth Amendmentto the Constitution, Article 300-A has been placed in theConstitution, which reads as follows:

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“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save byauthority of law.—No person shall be deprived of his propertysave by authority of law.”

This is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority fordeprivation of the respondent’s property by the appellantsBwho are State authorities. In our view, this case was aneminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction of theHigh Court under Article 226 of the Constitution…”

20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi(supra) while dealing with asimilar fact situation, this court held as follows:

C“There are authorities which state that delay and lachesextinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of theseauthorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant ofcompensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recoveryof statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and othercategories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that thereDare a few authorities that lay down that delay and lachesdebar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamentalright has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of theConstitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenarioaltogether. The functionaries of the State took over possessionEof the land belonging to the appellants without any sanctionof law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of thebenefit of compensation. The State must either comply withthe procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, orany other permissible statutory mode.”

F21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this court finds that thecontentions raised by the State, do not inspire confidence and deserve tobe rejected. The State has merely averred to the appellants’ allegedverbal consent or the lack of objection, but has not placed any materialon record to substantiate this plea. Further, the State was unable toproduce any evidence indicating that the land of the appellants had beenGtaken over or acquired in the manner known to law, or that they hadever paid any compensation. It is pertinent to note that this was theState’s position, and subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 aswell, in the other writ proceedings.

22. This court is also not moved by the State’s contention thatHsince the property is not adjoining to that of the appellants, it disentitles [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

them from claiming benefit on the ground of parity. Despite it not beingadjoining (which is admitted in the rejoinder affidavit filed by theappellants), it is clear that the subject land was acquired for the samereason – construction of the Narag Fagla Road, in 1972-73, and muchlike the claimants before the reference court, these appellants too wereillegally dispossessed without following due process of law, thus resultingin violation of Article 31 and warranting the High Court’s interventionunder Article 226 jurisdiction. In the absence of written consent tovoluntarily give up their land, the appellants were entitled to compensationin terms of law. The need for written consent in matters of land acquisitionproceedings, has been noted in fact, by the full court decision of theHigh Court in Shankar Dass (supra) itself, which is relied upon in theimpugned judgment.

23. This court, in Vidya Devi (supra)facing an almost identicalset of facts and circumstances – rejected the contention of ‘oral’ consentto be baseless and outlined the responsibility of the State:

“12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, theState could not have deprived a citizen of their propertywithout the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgmentof this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram KanaJoshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491]wherein it was held that the State must comply with theprocedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissiblestatutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed bythe rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond whatis provided by the Constitution.

12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar [Stateof Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3SCC (Civ) 769] held that the right to property is nowconsidered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right,but also a human right. Human rights have been consideredin the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter,livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gaineda multi-faceted dimension.”

24. And with regards to the contention of delay and laches, thiscourt went on to hold:

“2.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay andlaches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to A

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Abe rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of acontinuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock thejudicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is amatter of judicial discretion, which must be exercisedjudiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances ofa case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights,Band the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose.There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts toexercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantialjustice.

12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling,Ca constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with aview to promote justice, and not defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamyv. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]”

25. Concluding that the forcible dispossession of a person of theirprivate property without following due process of law, was violative[22] ofDboth their human right, and constitutional right under Article 300-A, thiscourt allowed the appeal. We find that the approach taken by this courtin Vidya Devi (supra) is squarely applicable to the nearly identical factsbefore us in the present case.

26. In view of the above discussion, in view of this court’sEextraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 and 142 of the Constitution,the State is hereby directed to treat the subject lands as a deemedacquisition and appropriately disburse compensation to the appellants inthe same terms as the order of the reference court dated 04.10.2005 inLand Ref. Petition No. 10-LAC/4 of 2004 (and consolidated matters).FThe Respondent-State is directed, consequently to ensure that theappropriate Land Acquisition Collector computes the compensation, anddisburses it to the appellants, within four months from today. Theappellants would also be entitled to consequential benefits of solatium,and interest on all sums payable under law w.e.f 16.10.2001 (i.e. date ofissuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act), till the date of theGimpugned judgment, i.e. 12.09.2013.

22 Relying on Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius ShapurChenai 2005Supp (3) SCR 388; N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy (2008) 15 SCC 517; DelhiAirtech Services Pvt. Ltd. &Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh &Ors. 2011 (12) SCR 191;Hand JilubhaiNanbhaiKahchar v. State of Gujarat1994 Supp (1)SCR807.

27. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed and the impugnedorder of the High Court is hereby set aside. Given the disregard for theappellants’ fundamental rights which has caused them to approach thiscourt and receive remedy decades after the act of dispossession, wealso deem it appropriate to direct the Respondent-State to pay legalcosts and expenses of 50,000 to the appellants. Pending applications, ifany, are hereby disposed of.

Devika Gujral

Appeal allowed.

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