A. VENUGOPAL versus TELANGANA HOUSING BOARD & ANR. on 4 April 2022

1056

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 4 S.C.R.

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A. VENUGOPAL

v.

TELANGANA HOUSING BOARD & ANR.

(Civil Appeal No. 2703 of 2022)

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APRIL 4, 2022

[HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]

Telangana Housing Board Act, 1956 – Allotment of House –Rental basis – Discrepancy in Name – Appellant’s grandfather wasCallotted a house by the then Andhra Pradesh Housing Board in1968 on rental basis – After his death, father of appellant gave arepresentation seeking transfer of the allotment in his name – At thetime when the allotment was transferred, a small discrepancyhappened that his father wrote his grandfather’s name – After hisfather’s death, the appellant applied for the transfer of the houseDin his name – It was rejected, on account of the discrepancies in thename of the appellant’s grandfather – Writ petition – The SingleJudge while allowing the writ petition found that after having enteredinto a hire purchase agreement with the appellant’s father way backin October, 1978 and after having received all the instalments dueEfrom him fully, it was not proper on the part of the Housing Boardto take advantage of the illiteracy of the father and grandfather ofthe appellant – The Division Bench reversed the judgment on theground that the discrepancy was sufficient justification for theHousing Board to conclude that a fraud was being played uponthem – On appeal, held: Right from the year 1968, the house was inFthe possession and enjoyment of the appellant’s family – In the year1968, there was a discrepancy regarding the initial in name – Afterhis grandfather’s death in 1969, the Housing Board acceptedappellant’s father as his son and entered into a tenancy agreement– Appellant’s father completed all his obligations under the lease-Gcum-sale agreement and also died in 1992 – No dispute was raisedby the Housing Board for a more than 2 decades – Therefore, totake advantage of the discrepancies with which the Housing Boardand the original allottee and his legal heirs having co-existed for 5decades, is completely unfair – Unfortunately, the Division Benchtreated even a man who was dead 30 years ago as having H

perpetrated fraud, by a skewed logic – The judgment of the DivisionBench is set aside and the judgment of the Single Judge of the HighCourt is restored.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.2703 of2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 07.08.2019 of the High Courtfor State of Telangana in Writ Appeal No.654 of 2019.

G. Sivabalamurugan, Selvaraj Mahendran, P. Shankar, Advs. forthe Appellant.

V. Sridhar Reddy, Abhijit Sengupta, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN

Leave granted.

2. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Division Bench of the HighCourt for the State of Telangana, reversing the judgment of the learnedSingle Judge and thereby rejecting his prayer for the transfer andregistration of a house allotted by the first respondent herein in favour ofhis grandfather, the original writ petitioner has come up with the aboveappeal.

3. The appellant herein filed a writ petition contending inter alia(i) that his grandfather by name A. Venkaiah @ Hanumaiah, S/o Balaiahwas allotted a house by the then Andhra Pradesh Housing Board on17.05.1968, on rental basis; (ii) that his grandfather died on 16.09.1969,leaving behind him surviving, his father A. Shankaraiah; (iii) that hisfather Shankaraiah gave a representation on 16.12.1969 seeking transferof the allotment in his name; (iv) that after demanding certain certificatesfrom his father, the Housing Board transferred the allotment in favour ofhis father by the proceeding dated 14.04.1970; (v) that at the time whenthe allotment was transferred, a small discrepancy happened when hisfather wrote his grandfather’s name; (vi) that in October, 1977 theHousing Board offered the house for outright sale or hire purchase; (vii)that his father opted for hire purchase; (viii) that thereafter his fatherstarted paying the EMI regularly; (ix) that all the instalments payable byhis father, were duly and promptly paid and the entire payment schedulewas completed by March, 1992; (x) that unfortunately his father died on A

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A20.04.1992; (xi) that thereafter the appellant applied for the transfer ofthe house in his name, but a dispute arose between the appellant and hissisters; (xii) that the suit for partition filed by his sisters in O.S. No.4359of 2004 was eventually settled before the Lok Adalat on 25.06.2014;(xiii) that as per the Lok Adalat award, the appellant paid money to hissisters, as the house site was just 120 sq. yards and was incapable ofBbeing divided into six shares; (xiv) that in view of the settlement, hissisters gave ‘No Objection’ for the registration of the house in favour ofthe appellant, on 16.07.2016; (xv) that when the appellant applied alongwith those documents for the transfer of the house in his name, it wasrejected by Order dated 3.12.2014, on account of the discrepancies inCthe name of the appellant’s grandfather; (xvi) that though the appellantsigned an affidavit before the Metropolitan Magistrate on 6.07.2015 andgot it attested, the second respondent again rejected the request of theappellant by subsequent orders dated 18.05.2017 and 31.05.2018; and

(xvii) that, therefore, he was constrained to file the writ petition.

D4. The writ petition was contested by the respondents on the groundinter alia (i) that the name mentioned by the original applicant in theapplication dated 17.05.1968 was M. Venkaiah @ Balaiah; (ii) that inthe rental agreement executed by him, he had written his initial as “A” inone place and as “M” at another place; (iii) that after the demise of theoriginal allottee, a representation dated 16.12.1969 was received fromEA. Shankaraiah, claiming to be the son and only legal heir of the originalallottee; (iv) that, however, the claimant A. Shankaraiah gave his father’sname as A. Yenkaiah; (v) that the death certificate accompanying theapplication was that of A. Venkaiah; (vi) that believing his representationto be true, the Housing Board transferred the tenancy in favour of A.

FShankaraiah by proceedings dated 14.04.1970; (vii) that the tenancywas later converted into hire purchase and a lease-cum-sale agreementwas entered into in October, 1978; (viii) that while entering into therental agreement, A. Shankaraiah gave his father’s name as A. Yenkaiah,but while executing the lease-cum-sale agreement he gave his father’s

name as Venkaiah; (ix) that when the appellant applied as the son of A.GShankaraiah for transfer and registration by letter dated 19.06.2013, theBoard found out the discrepancies; (x) that though the appellant producedthe Lok Adalat award, the respondents found the claim to be untenableand they decided to take action under Sections 52 and 53 of the TelanganaHousing Board Act, 1956 for unauthorized occupation and that, therefore,Hthe writ petition deserved to be dismissed.

5. On the basis of the pleadings on record and also on admittedfacts, the learned Single Judge found that the discrepancy regarding theinitial of the original allottee and the discrepancy regarding the way inwhich the original allottee’s name was written by the appellant’s fatherappeared consistently from the beginning. The learned Judge furtherfound that from the year of allotment namely, 1968, the name of theoriginal allottee was written in English with different spellings and thatafter having entered into a hire purchase agreement with the appellant’sfather way back in October, 1978 and after having received all theinstalments due from him fully and completely, it was not proper on thepart of the Housing Board to take advantage of the illiteracy of thefather and grandfather of the appellant. The learned Judge also foundthat there was no other claimant for the house and that admittedly theappellant had been in occupation of the same for decades. Therefore,the learned Judge allowed the writ petition.

6. But unfortunately the Division Bench reversed the judgment ofthe learned Single Judge on the ground that the discrepancies in themanner in which the name of the original allottee was written wassufficient justification for the Housing Board to conclude that a fraudwas being played upon them. Interestingly, the Division Bench went tothe extent of holding that even the appellant’s father who passed awayin 1992 was guilty of fraud.

7. We do not know how the Division Bench reached the aboveconclusions. Right from the year 1968, the house has been in thepossession and enjoyment of the appellant’s family. Even in the originalapplication made by Venkaiah in the year 1968, there was a discrepancyregarding the initial. After his death in 1969, the Housing Board acceptedA. Shankaraiah as his son and entered into a tenancy agreement on14.04.1970 and a lease-cum-sale agreement on 6.10.1978. Shankaraiahcompleted all his obligations under the lease-cum-sale agreement andalso died in 1992. It is not as though at the time of transferring thetenancy in the year 1970 or at the time of entering into a lease-cum-saleagreement on 6.10.1978 with Shankaraiah, such discrepancies did notexist. No dispute was raised by the Housing Board about the so calledunauthorized occupation of the house by the appellant herein even after1992 for a more than 2 decades. Therefore, to take advantage of thediscrepancies with which the Housing Board and the original allotteeand his legal heirs having co-existed for 5 decades, is completely unfair.

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AUnfortunately, the Division Bench treated even a man who was dead 30years ago and who had entered into two agreements (a tenancyagreement in the first instance and a lease- cum-sale agreement inthe second instance) as having perpetrated fraud, by a skewed logic.Courts cannot be oblivious to the realities of life and we say no more.

B8. In fine, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the DivisionBench is set aside and the judgment of the learned Single Judge isrestored. The Housing Board shall execute a deed of transfer and registerthe same in favour of the appellant within a period of two months fromthe date of receipt of this order, subject to the completion of the necessaryformalities. There will be no order as to costs.

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Ankit Gyan

(Assisted by : Rahul Rathi, LCRA)

Appeal allowed

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