COUNCIL FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION versus SHRI PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE OF ARCHITECTURE & ORS. on 8 November 2019

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2019] 15 S.C.R.

AALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION

v.

SHRI PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA BOARDINGHOUSE’S COLLEGE OF ARCHITECTURE & ORS.

B(Civil Appeal No. 364 of 2005)

NOVEMBER 08, 2019

[RANJAN GOGOI, CJI, DEEPAK GUPTAAND ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]

Education/Educational Institutions – Architectural course –CInstitutions running said course – Norms and standards for – Issueas to the final authority in case of any contradiction in the opinionof Council of Architecture (CoA) [constituted under the 1972 Act]and All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) [constitutedunder the 1987 Act], in the matters of grant of approval toDinstitutions for conducting the said course and monitoring theirworking – Seven matters involving similar controversy – In mainappeal C.A. No.364 of 2005, the dispute pertains to intake capacityof the respondent-institution – CoA on carrying out inspection ofthe institution in 2004 restored the intake capacity of 40 studentsper year which was earlier reduced to 30 – However, the DirectorEof Technical Education fixed the same at 30 students on the basisof norms fixed by AICTE – Challenged – High Court inter aliaupheld the power of CoA as the final authority for fixing the normsand standards of institutions running course on architecture – Onappeal, held: So far as recognition of degrees and diplomas ofarchitecture education is concerned, the 1972 Act shall prevail –FAICTE not entitled to impose any regulatory measure in connectionwith the degrees and diplomas in the subject of architecture –Judgment of the Bombay High Court sustained in the main appeal – In civil appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.5400 of 2011, theprocess of recognition contained in the 1972 Act be implementedGin respect of the subject institution before any further admissiontakes place – But, admissions already undertaken in terms ofinterim orders of Supreme Court, not to be disturbed – It is sodirected, as the High Court itself directed compliance of CoA normsand building requirements set by it was to be effected within oneyear – AICTE not to have any regulatory control over theHconcerned institution so far as architecture education is concerned – Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.8443 of 2011 is dismissed –Further, in the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.20460 of 2011,decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court issuing directionscontained in the judgment under appeal in absence of CoA beingimpleaded is erroneous – However, no independent directionsissued as these appeals were heard together as batch matters andthe grievances of CoA have been addressed in the judgment – CivilAppeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos.17005 and 17006 of 2016 aredisposed of in terms of the decision in the main appeal – In appealarising out of SLP(C)No.28121 of 2018, the decision of the KeralaHigh Court is set aside – Institution involved is entitled to operatewith recognition obtained under the 1972 Act – Interim orderspassed in these appeals, dissolved – Architects Act, 1972 – ss.2(d),3, 14-21, 25, 35, 43-45 – All India Council of Technical EducationAct, 1987 – ss. 2(g), 3, 10, 11, 22, 23, 25– All India Council forTechnical Education (Grant of approval for starting new technicalinstitutions, introduction of courses or programmes and approvalof intake capacity of seats for the courses or programmes)Regulations, 1994 – All India Council for Technical Education(Norms and Guidelines for Fees and guidelines for admission inProfessional Colleges) Regulations, 1994 – Council of ArchitectureRegulations, 1982 – Part VIII- Clauses 29, 30 – MinimumStandards of Architectural Education Regulations 1983 – Clauses5, 8; Appendix B, C – Minimum Standards of ArchitecturalEducation Regulation, 2015 – Constitution of India – Art.77 –Interpretation of Statutes.

Interpretation of Statutes – Former and later Acts – Clashingprovisions – Overlapping provisions in the 1972 Act (under whichthe Council of Architecture (CoA) is constituted) and the 1987 Act(under which the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE)is constituted) on the question of grant of approval and subsequentmonitoring of architectural education – Plea on behalf of AICTEthat the 1987 Act being later statute, covering common field, theprovisions of the 1972 Act, to the extent the same deals witharchitectural education, shall be deemed to have been repealed byimplication – Held: It is not an absolute proposition of law that alater Act would always prevail over the former in the event thereare clashing provisions even if there is no express provision ofrepeal – Architects Act, 1972 – All India Council of TechnicalEducation Act, 1987.

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AInterpretation of Statutes – Special law vis-a-vis general law– Council of Architecture (CoA) constituted under the 1972 Act andthe All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) constitutedunder the 1987 Act – Overlapping powers on the aspect of settingnorms for architectural education and for monitoring theinstitutions engaged in imparting such education – Held: A specialBlaw implies a statute covering a particular subject specifically –Subject of conflict in the present proceedings is architecturaleducation – 1972 Act however does not solely deal witharchitectural education – Further, the 1987 Act has certain featuresof a special law being devoted to setting up, supervision andmonitoring of institutions imparting technical education, but it doesCnot cover technical education imparted by all types of institutions– Having regard to the scheme and provisions of these two statutes,ex-facie it is difficult to label either of them as special law or generallaw – Architects Act, 1972 – All India Council of TechnicalEducation Act, 1987.D

Interpretation of Statutes – Principle of implied repeal –Application of – Overlapping of powers between the Council ofArchitecture (CoA) constituted under the 1972 Act and the All IndiaCouncil for Technical Education (AICTE) constituted under the1987 Act, on the aspect of setting norms for architectural educationand monitoring the institutions engaged in imparting suchEeducation – Dominant purpose of the two legislations – Held:Principle of implied repeal cannot apply so far as the provisionsrelating to architecture education is concerned, on the basis of the1987 Act having become operational – One of the dominantpurposes of the 1972 Act is recognition of qualifications onFarchitecture – Registration of an architect is dependent uponacquisition of such recognised qualification – Said Act cannot beheld to have been repealed by implication for the sole reason ofinclusion of the word “architecture” in the definition of technicaleducation– AICTE failed to discharge onus to establish that theprovisions of the 1972 Act was repealed by implication – ArchitectsGAct, 1972 – All India Council of Technical Education Act, 1987 –s.2(g).

Architects Act, 1972 – s.17 – Non-obstante clause –Implication of – Discussed.

All India Council of Technical Education Act, 1987 – s.2(g)H– Subject of conflict in the instant cases is architectural education

Conclusion

as under the 1972 Act and the 1987 Act there are overlappingareas under which the respective Councils i.e. Council ofArchitecture (CoA) and the All India Council for TechnicalEducation (AICTE) could make Regulations – Plea that the contextof regulating architecture education requires exclusion of theexpression “architecture” from the definition of technical education– Held: So far as these appeals are concerned, to altogetherexclude architecture from the purview of AICTE, that expression,i.e. architecture would have to be dropped from the definition oftechnical education – If the issue is examined in the externalcontext, which in this case would be the provisions of 1972 Act,such a course would be inevitable – A meaning different to whatis ascribed in the definition clause can be given to a word indifferent parts of a statute if the context so demands – Subject-dispute involved in these appeals requires omission of the wordarchitecture from the definition of technical education – Suchcourse is also a permissible tool of construction to prevent absurdor unworkable results flowing from a statute – In respect of theprovisions of s.2 (g), the definition of “technical education” wouldhave to be given such a construction and the word “architecture”should be treated to have been inapplicable in cases where theAICTE imports its regulatory framework for institutions undertakingtechnical education – There would however be no substitutionbecause the context would not demand it – Architects Act, 1972 –Interpretation of Statutes.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Both the regulatory authorities under therespective statutes have power to frame regulations for givingeffect to the provisions of the respective Acts. Both the statuteshave provisions for approval and monitoring of architecturecourses run by institutions. So far as the Architects Act, 1972is concerned, the expression employed is recognition ofqualification and the ultimate authority for granting orwithdrawing recognition to degree or diploma courses inarchitectural education by different academic institutions is theCentral Government. The CoA under the statutory schemehowever has significant role in such decision making process.AICTE has also been empowered under the All India Councilof Technical Education Act, 1987 to lay down standards and AB

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Anorms for courses on architecture along with other subjectscoming within the term “technical education”. Under Section3(3)(b), of the 1972 Act, the CoA is required to have two personsnominated by the AICTE. On the other hand, Section 3 (4) (m)of the 1987 Act stipulates that AICTE is to consist ofrepresentatives of various bodies, including a member to beBappointed by the Central Government to represent the CoA.Section 10(k) of the 1987 Act requires AICTE to grant approvalin consultation with the agencies concerned. [Paras 19, 25] [492- B-E]

1.2 Section 20 of the 1972 Act deals with withdrawal ofCrecognition of an authority listed in the Schedule to the Act.Section 21 of the 1972 Act also empowers the Council toprescribe minimum standards of architectural education requiredfor granting recognized qualifications by colleges or institutionsin India. The power of the CoA to examine infrastructuralDfacilities at the time of considering the application for recognitionor monitoring the quality of an institution recognized by theCouncil stems from Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the 1972 Act.Further, none of the Regulations produced however specify theactual norms but refer to standards and norms to be laid downfor approval of technical institutions, which include institutionsEimparting architectural education. [Paras 27, 32] [493-F-H; 494-A-B; 499-B]

Ajoy Kumar Banerjee and Others v. Union of India andOthers (1984) 3 SCC 127 : [1984] 3 SCR 252 ; Stateof Tamil Nadu and Others v. Adhiyaman EducationalFResearch Institute and Others (1995) 4 SCC 104 :[1995] 2 SCR 1075 ; Orissa Lift IrrigationCorporation Limited v. Rabi Sankar Patro and Others(2018) 1 SCC 468 : [2017] 13 SCR 921 ; ParshvnathCharitable Trust and Others v. All India Council forTechnical Education and Others (2013) 3 SCC 385 :G[2012] 11 SCR 1057 – distinguished.

Varun Saini & Ors. v. Guru Govind Singh IndraprasthaUniversity (2014) 16 SCC 330 – referred to.

2. AICTE has referred to a communication emanating fromHthe Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, bearing No.F.17 11/2003 TS.IV. No case has been madeout that the memorandum to which reference has been made,has been published in the official gazette. This memorandum doesnot meet the requirement of valid exercise of power under theaforesaid two provisions by the Central Government so as tomake it binding. This memorandum, at best, can be treated tobe an advisory of the Ministry not having enforceable effect.Moreover, the aforesaid memorandum has been issued beyondthe timeframe laid down under the provisions of the statutesreproduced in the said two sections of the respective Acts. Thememorandum also cannot be treated to be an executive orderunder Article 77 of the Constitution of India. [Paras 37, 39] [502-B; 503-F-H]

3. As a proposition of law, AICTE’s stand is accepted thatthere need not be complete identity in the subject-matters ofthe two rival statutes being tested in the yardstick of point oftime of their commencement of operation. It is not an absoluteproposition of law that a later Act would always prevail over theformer in the event there are clashing provisions even if thereis no express provision of repeal. Further, a special law impliesa statute covering a particular subject specifically. The subjectof conflict in the present proceedings is architectural education.The 1972 Act however does not solely deal with architecturaleducation. The Act intends to control or regulate the professionof architects. It has two main features, one part dealing withregulating the profession of architect and the other partregulating architectural education. Significant portion of thestatute deals with formation of the CoA but the function of thatbody is essentially to regulate and monitor the other two areasof this statue. The 1987 Act deals with technical education andin particular the methodology for approval technical institutionsand their monitoring. The provisions of 1987 Act have not beenimmunised by a non-obstante clause like the one employed inSection 17 of the 1972 Act. Having regard to the scheme andprovisions of these two statutes, ex-facie it is difficult to labeleither of them as special law or general law. The 1987 Act hascertain features of a special law being devoted to setting up,supervision and monitoring of institutions imparting technicaleducation. But the said statute does not cover technicaleducation imparted by all types of institutions. The exceptions ABC

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Ahave been clearly mentioned in Section 2(h) of the act andexplained in the cases of Bharathidasan University andAssociation of Management of private colleges. So far as the1972 Act is concerned, its application is not confined toarchitecture education alone. This enactment contemplatesestablishing the Council of Architecture, recognizing degreesBand diplomas in architecture and regulating the profession ofarchitects. But there is inter-link between architecture educationand registration of architects. Further, the three regulationsunder the 1987 Act do not directly lay down any specific normor standard which ought to be followed. Such norms appear toChave been set by the AICTE in pursuance of the aforesaidregulations. The two Regulations of 1994 do not lay downspecifically such norms. The 2016 regulations has provision forApproval Process Hand Book which may be published from timeto time laying down the manner in which approval shall be given.[Paras 47-51] [511-E-F; 512-B-D-F; 513-A-C, F-G]

DWhirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998)8 SCC 1 : [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 359 ; K.V. Muthu v.Angamuthu Ammal (1997) 2 SCC 53 [1996] 10 Suppl.SCR 188 ; Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. Asstt. CTO (1994)2 SCC 434 ; [1994] 1 SCR 682 ; Pushpa Devi v.EMilkhi Ram (1990) 2 SCC 134 : [1990] 1 SCR 278 –relied on.

M/s. Mathra Parshad and Sons v. State of Punjab andOthers [1962] Supp 1 SCR 913 ; A.B. Abdulkadir v.State of Kerala.1962 Supp (2) SCR 741 ; Assn. ofFRegistration Plates v. Union of India (2005) 1 SCC 679: [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 496 ; Tika Ramji v. State ofU.P. [1956] 1 SCR 393 ; R.S. Raghunath v. State ofKarnataka (1992) 1 SCC 335 : [1991] 1 Suppl. SCR387 ; U.P. State Electricity Board v. Hari Shankar JainG(1978) 4 SCC 16 : [1979] 2 SCR 355 ; J.K. CottonSpinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P.[1961] 3 SCR 185 ; Association of Management ofPrivate Colleges v. All India Council of TechnicalEducation and Others (2013) 8 SCC 271 : [2013] 6HSCR 1054 – referred to.

4. For the sole reason of there being overlapping subjects,Courts straightaway may not get into an exercise to find out ifone statute intends to eclipse the other. The duty of theregulatory bodies in a situation of this nature would be to comeout with a unified regime, which this Court expected in the caseof Municipal Council, Palia. The two regulatory bodies in thefield of architectural education however have not taken thisapproach and on the other hand have engaged themselves in adispute over turf-control. In such a situation, under normalcircumstances attempt should be made first at reconciliation ofthe competing statutory instruments. If that exercise fails, thenthe aim would be to find out what is the dominant purpose orprincipal subject-matter of a particular statute and then construethe conflicting provisions of the respective Regulations to matchthe dominant statutory purpose. The process of recognition andeffect thereof are more expansive under the 1972 Act. All“authorities” require recognition by the Central Government toconduct any degree or diploma course in architecture educationto qualify for being recognised qualification. The CoA under thesaid Act plays a key role in the process of recognition. There isno exclusion or exemption of any institution from undergoingsuch recognition process except the subsisting ones at the timethe Act became operational. The CoA has also wide monitoringpower under Section 18 and 19 of the Act of every authoritywhich grants recognized qualification under the said Act.Moreover, Section 17 of the said Act is armed with a non-obstante clause. The implication of the said clause in Section 17of the 1972 Act is that to be on the register of architects in India,recognized qualification would be sufficient. There is noprovision under the 1972 Act or in any Rule thereunder whichwould entitle a person trained from an AICTE approved technicalinstitution in architecture to describe himself as an architect orget himself registered as such without recognised qualificationunder the 1972 Act. The scheme of the Act thus demonstratesthat lack of recognized qualification under the 1972 Act wouldin substance disentitle a person from being registered as anarchitect. He would not be able to legally represent himself asan architect in India. This being the statutory mandate, CoA’srole in the process of recognition of qualification of an architect A

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Acannot be said to have been obliterated by the 1987 Act. It is afact that 1987 Act is primarily concerned with setting-up andrunning of a technical institution and not with regulating theprofessions of individuals qualifying from such institutions. Butunder the 1972 Act, conducting a course on architecturaleducation and regulating the profession of architect areBstatutorily interwoven. Recognition of degrees or diplomas inarchitecture cannot be amputated from the said Act and held tohave been replaced by the 1987 Act. That would render the 1972enactment unworkable. The third distinguishing element of the1972 Act is that the CoA is not the ultimate decision-makingCauthority but it is the Central Government in relation to processof recognition of degree or diploma in architectural educationor withdrawal thereof. Such decision is required to be takenafter consultation with the CoA. But since CoA has beenconferred with power to make regulations in relation to, inter-Dalia, recognition norms and monitoring of institutions impartingarchitectural education, CoA’s role in such process is critical.The approval power of AICTE is direct. But in the eventAICTE’s norms come into conflict with that of CoA, any reportor representation the CoA may make to the CentralGovernment would be dependent upon the decision of theECentral Government. The Central Government’s decision, takenunder the provisions of the 1972 Act in such a case wouldobviously prevail, the latter being an authority superior to boththe Councils constituted under the two statutes. [Paras 54, 57-59] [515-F-H; 516-A; 517-B-E-H; 518-A-E]FMunicipal Council Palai v. T.J. Joseph [1964] 2 SCR87 ; LIC v. D.J. Bahadur (1981) 1 SCC 315 : [1981]1 SCR 1083 – relied on.

“Principles of Statutory Interpretation” by Justice G.P.GSingh (14th Edition)– referred to.

5.1 AICTE is exercising its power to regulate institutionsimparting architectural education on the strength of definitionof technical education, which has been defined to meanprogrammes of education, research and training in architecture.HThe duty of the AICTE to regulate “technical education” is derived from the provisions of Section 10 of the 1987 Act. Sofar as these appeals are concerned, to altogether excludearchitecture from the purview of AICTE, that expression, i.e.architecture would have to be dropped from the definition oftechnical education. If the issue is examined in the externalcontext, which in this case would be the provisions of 1972 Act,such a course would be inevitable. In the event AICTE’s standis to be accepted and CoA’s role is eliminated from therecognition process of architectural qualification, then a personhaving a degree or diploma from an AICTE approved institutiononly would in effect not be entitled to enrollment in the registerof architects and would not be able to represent himself as anarchitect. Secondly, in view of the decisions of this Court in thecases of Bharatidasan University and Association of Managementof Private Colleges, there would be two parallel authoritiesregulating architectural education. CoA would regulateuniversities and affiliated colleges imparting such educationwhile AICTE would supervise rest of the institutions. Moreover,the authority of Central Government to recognize qualificationsin architecture education would stand obliterated by a body,AICTE and that too in respect of certain categories of technicalinstitutions only. The subject-dispute involved in these appealsrequires omission of the word architecture from the definitionof technical education. Such a course is also a permissible toolof construction to prevent absurd or unworkable results flowingfrom a statute. [Paras 60-62] [518-F-G; 519-D-H; 520-A]

“Bennion on Statutory Interpretation” by F A RBennion, Fifth Edition published by Lexis Nexis (atpage 972) – referred to.

5.2 In respect of the provisions of Section 2 (g) of the 1987Act, the definition of “technical education” would have to begiven such a construction and the word “architecture” shouldbe treated to have been inapplicable in cases where the AICTEimports its regulatory framework for institutions undertakingtechnical education. There would however be no substitutionbecause the context would not demand it. This construction ofthe definition clause is necessary as the external contextrequires it to prevent an unworkable outcome in implementationof the 1987 Act. The principle of implied repeal cannot apply so AB

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Afar as the provisions relating to architecture education isconcerned, on the basis of the 1987 Act having becomeoperational. One of the dominant purposes of the 1972 Act isrecognition of qualifications on architecture. The registration ofan architect is dependent upon acquisition of such recognisedqualification. The said Act cannot be held to have been repealedBby implication for the sole reason of inclusion of the word“architecture” in the definition of technical education. AICTEhas failed to discharge its onus to establish the said provisionsof the 1972 Act was repealed by implication. [Para 63] [520-C-F]

C6. So far as recognition of degrees and diplomas ofarchitecture education is concerned, the 1972 Act shall prevail.AICTE will not be entitled to impose any regulatory measurein connection with the degrees and diplomas in the subject ofarchitecture. Norms and Regulations set by CoA and otherspecified authorities under the 1972 Act would have to beDfollowed by an institution imparting education for degrees anddiplomas in architecture. Individual appeals – (a) The judgmentof the Bombay High Court forming subject-matter of AppealNo.364 of 2005 is sustained. The appeal of the All India Councilof Technical Education is dismissed. (b) Three appeals aroseEfrom the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,Gwalior Bench delivered on 2[nd] February, 2011 in W.P. No. 315of 2011. Rajeev Gandhi Proudyogiki Vishwavidyalyalay is theappellant in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 5400/2011. The appellant in the second Civil Appeal (arising out ofSLP(C)No.8443/2011) is the institution, Bharatiya Vidya MandirFShiksha Samiti. For the reasons explained earlier in thisjudgment, the appeal of Bharatiya Vidya Mandir Shiksha Samitiis dismissed. The High Court has directed in the judgment underappeal compliance of the conditions communicated by the CoA.The academic session involved is 2010-2011. Supreme Court atGthe notice stage in the university’s appeal [SLP(C)No.5400 of2011] granted interim stay of the order of the High Court.Subsequently, there were admissions from time to time withinterim directions of this Court. This appeal of the Rajeev GandhiProudyogiki Vishwavidyalaya is accordingly disposed of withdirection that the process of recognition contained in the 1972HAct ought to be implemented in respect of the subject institution

before any further admission takes place. But so far asadmissions already undertaken in terms of interim orders of thisCourt, it is directed that such admissions ought not be disturbed.It is directed so, as it is found the High Court itself had directedcompliance of CoA norms in the judgment under appeal andcompliance of building requirements set by CoA was to beeffected within one year. Thus, CoA norms were substantiallydirected to be complied with. It is also made clear that theAICTE would not have any regulatory control over theconcerned institution so far as architecture education isconcerned. In the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.20460 of 2011that CoA ought to have been impleaded as a party respondentin the said writ petition. Decision of the High Court to issue thedirections contained in the judgment under appeal in absenceof CoA being added in the array of respondents was erroneous.But any independent direction is not issued as these appealswere heard together as batch matters and the grievances of theCoA have been addressed to in the judgment. (c) The CivilAppeals arising out of SLP(C) No. 17005 of 2016 andSLP(C)No.17006 of 2016 have been instituted by the AICTEagainst a common judgment of the Karnataka High Court in WritAppeal No.110 of 2013 and Writ Appeal No. 112 of 2013. Theobservation of the Karnataka High Court in a common judgmenthas been that the controversies would be subject to the outcomeof the appeal arising out of the Bench decision of the BombayHigh Court. That is the first appeal we have dealt with in thisjudgment. These two appeals are accordingly disposed of interms of the decision contained in the preceding sub-paragraph(a). AICTE would not have any power to impose its regulatorymeasures on the concerned institution so far as architectureeducation is concerned. (d) The decision of the Kerala HighCourt in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C)No. 28121 of 2018is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The institution involved inthis appeal shall be entitled to operate with recognition obtainedunder the 1972 Act. All interim orders passed in these appealsshall stand dissolved. All connected applications shall standdisposed of. [Paras 64-66] [520-F-H; 521-A-H; 522-A-H; 523-A-B]

Bharathidasan University and Another v. All IndiaCouncil for Technical Education & Others (2001) 8

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 364Gof 2005.

From the Judgment and Order dated 08.09.2004 of the HighCourt of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 5942 of 2004.

WithHCivil Appeal Nos. 8506, 8507, 8511, 8509, 8508, 8510 of 2019.

Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Ajit Kr. Sinha, Sr. Advs., Harish Pandey,Anil Soni, Ms. Siddhi Padia, Naveen R. Nath, Niraj Sharma, AshokMathur, Ms. Charu Mathur, Shibashish Misra, Rajdipa Bheura, Ms.Hansika Sahu, A. Venayagam Balan, Ms. V. S. Lakshmi, Vijay Kumar,Thomas O., Aniruddha P. Mayee, Haris Beeran, Mushtaq Salim, UsmanGhani Khan, Radha Shyam Jena, V. N. Raghupathy, Md. Apzal Ansari,Manendra Pal Gupta, Ms. Binu Tamta, G. S. Makker, Ms. Sushma Suri,Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, Vijay Kumar, Thomas O., Ms. Bharti Tyagi,Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair, Naresh Kumar, Vishwajit Singh, T. C. Sharma,Ms. Neelam Sharma, Rupesh Kumar, Nishant RamakantraoKatneshwarkar, Anoop Kandari, Rahul Jain, Milind Kumar, GautamNarayan, Arunabh Chowdhury, Rahul Pratap, Abhishek Roy, Ms. ShrutiChoudhry, Dechen W. Lachungpa, Arun Srikumar, Ms. Pritha Srikumar,Ms. Mansi Binjrajka, Raghenth Basant, P. V. Dinesh, Sindhu T. P.,Mukund P. Unny, Raghav Mehrotra, G. Prakash, Jishnu M. L., Mrs.Priyanka Prakash, Mrs. Beena Prakash, Manoj Ranjan Sinha,Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.

1. Delay condoned in SLP(C)No.17005 of 2016 andSLP(C)No.17006 of 2016. Leave is granted in all the six petitions forspecial leave to appeal.

2. This set of appeals mainly involves the question as to whetherthe mandate of the Council of Architecture (CoA) or that of the AllIndia Council for Technical Education (AICTE) would prevail on thequestion of granting approval and related matters to an institution forconducting architectural education course, if there is any contradictionin the opinions of these two bodies. Both of them are regulatory bodiesconstituted by Parliamentary legislations having power to approve orrecognize and thereafter monitor working of such an institution.

3. The CoA owes its origin to the provisions of Section 3 of theArchitects Act, 1972 (the 1972 Act). AICTE has also been constitutedunder the provisions of Section 3 of the All India Council of TechnicalEducation Act, 1987 (the 1987 Act). As the preambles of these twostatutes suggest, the former has been enacted to provide for registrationof Architects and for matters connected therewith. The object of thelatter statute is to provide for a Council with a view to proper planning A

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“technical education” means programmes of education, researchand training in engineering technology, architecture, town planning,management, pharmacy and applied arts and crafts and suchother programme or areas as the central government may, inCconsultation with the Council, by notification in the officialGazette, declare;”

4. Though the preamble of the 1972 Act projects the aim of thelegislation to provide for registration of architects, this statute also dealswith educational aspects of a course in architecture. Duties of CoADunder the 1972 Act includes undertaking steps for recognizingqualifications for the purposes of the said Act. Such recognition, as,contemplated by the Act, is at two levels. There is a schedule to theAct which lists diplomas and degrees awarded by named Indian andforeign institutes or bodies. Section 14 of the 1972 Act describes themas authorities. These degrees and diplomas are recognized qualificationsEunder the said statute. There is also provision for amendment of theschedule, so as to incorporate therein architectural qualification grantedby any authority in India. The CoA under the said Act however hasnot been conferred with the power to directly recognise the architecturalqualification. The Central government is the authority to undertake thatFexercise. CoA under the 1972 statute is a consulting body. The effectof recognition by the Central Government is that such recognisedqualification shall be sufficient for enrollment in the register of architectsmaintained under the said Act. After such registration, a person canclaim to be an architect under the law. Section 25 of the 1972 Act prescribes three modes for entry into the register, the main one beingGholding a recognised qualification. Sub-clause (b) of the said provisionpreserves the right of practising architects at the time of initialpreparation of the register. The said sub-clause is not relevant so farthe subject-controversy is involved. Section 25 (c) prescribes as acondition for entering one’s name in the register, possession of suchHother qualifications as may be prescribed by the Rules. But no such Rule providing for any additional qualification has been brought to ournotice by the learned counsel appearing for the parties.

5. On the question of qualification of architects, Section 2 (d) ofthe 1972 Act defines “recognised qualification” to mean any qualificationin architecture for the time being included in the Schedule or notifiedunder Section 15 thereof. The lis in this set of appeals does not relateto the provisions of Section 15 of the 1972 Act, which is in respect ofqualification from a foreign educational body.

6. The expression “approval”, however, is not employed in the1972 Act. This Act deals with recognition of qualification in architecture.Section 14 of the 1972 Act stipulates: - “14. Recognition of qualifications granted by authorities inIndia.— (1) The qualifications included in the Schedule ornotified under Section 15 shall be recognised qualifications forthe purposes of this Act.

(2) Any authority in India which grants an architecturalqualification not included in the Schedule may apply to the CentralGovernment to have such qualification recognised, and the CentralGovernment, after consultation with the Council, may, bynotification in the Official Gazette, amend the Schedule so as toinclude such qualification therein, and any such notification mayalso direct that an entry shall be made in the Schedule againstsuch architectural qualification declaring that it shall be arecognised qualification only when granted after a specified date:

Provided that until the first Council is constituted, the CentralGovernment shall, before issuing any notification as aforesaid,consult an Expert Committee consisting of three members to beappointed by the Central Government by notification in theOfficial Gazette.”

7. The power to amend the schedule is vested with the CentralGovernment under Section 16 of the 1972 Act. This provision reads:- “16. Power of Central Government to amend Schedule.—Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of Section14, the Central Government, after consultation with the Council,may, by notification in the Official Gazette, amend the Scheduleby directing that an entry be made therein in respect of anyarchitectural qualification.”

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A8. So far as the 1987 Act is concerned, Section 10 thereof, inter-alia, specifies: - “POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL

10. It shall be the duty of the Council to take all such steps asit may think fit for ensuring coordinated and integratedBdevelopment of technical education and maintenance of standardsand for the purposes of performing its functions under this Act,the Council may:- C

(i) lay down norms and standards for courses, curricula,physical and instructional facilities, staff pattern, staffqualifications, quality instructions, assessment andexaminations; D

(j) fix norms and guidelines for charging tuition and other fees; (k) grant approval for starting new technical institutions andfor introduction of new courses or programmes inconsultation with the agencies concerned; xxxxxxxxx E

(m) lay down norms for granting autonomy to technicalinstitutions; xxxxxxxxx (o) provide guidelines for admission of students to technicalinstitutions and Universities imparting technical education; F

(p) inspect or cause to inspect any technical institution; (q) withhold or discontinue grants in respect of courses,programmes to such technical institutions which fail toGcomply with the directions given by the Council within thestipulated period of time and take such other steps as maybe necessary for ensuring compliance of the directions ofthe Council;”

9. In this judgment, altogether seven appeals shall be dealt with,Hall of which involve the dispute outlined in the first paragraph. The main

appeal which has been argued before us in detail is Civil Appeal No.364of 2005. The appellant in this proceeding is AICTE and its appeal isagainst the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Courtdelivered on 8th September 2004 in Writ Petition No.5942 of 2004.Dispute in this matter pertains to intake capacity of an institution bythe name of Shri Prince Shivaji Maratha Boarding House’sCollege of Architecture. The CoA, on carrying out inspection of thecollege in the year 2004 chose to restore the intake capacity of 40students per year which was reduced to 30 students for two earlieracademic years, 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. Such reduced intakecapacity was based on a joint inspection undertaken by CoA and AICTEon 25th April 2003. The CoA had decided to restore the intake capacityto 40 students by a communication on 18th May 2004 upon beingsatisfied with a compliance report filed by the institution followed byinspection. For the Academic Year 2004-05 the Director of TechnicalEducation, however, fixed the intake capacity of 30 students in respectof same institution on the basis of norms and standards fixed by theAICTE. Questioning legality of such action, the institution and the trustwhich ran the latter, brought an action under Article 226 of theConstitution of India before the High Court. The Bench of the HighCourt framed the question for adjudication in the following terms:

“3…..whether the All India Council of Technical Education Act,1987 (for short, ‘AICTE Act’ ) overrides the provisions of theArchitects Act, 1972 in the matter of prescribing and regulatingnorms and standards of architectural institutions. In other words,whether the AICTE Act which is a later Act has impliedlyrepealed the provisions of the Architects Act…..”

10. The Bench of the Bombay High Court found, on examinationof the scheme of both the statutes that the 1972 Act was speciallydesigned to deal with the architects and maintenance of the standardsof architectural education and profession with recognized qualifications.The scope of the AICTE Act, in the opinion of the Bench, coveredvarious programmes of education, research and training in wide rangeof subjects including architecture. The Bench held that the 1972 Actwas not impliedly repealed by the 1987 Act and quashed the order ofthe AICTE authorities reducing the intake capacity. Relying, inter alia,on a decision of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in the case ofBharathidasan University and Another vs. All India Council for A

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ATechnical Education & Others,1 the High Court upheld the powerof regulatory body under the 1972 Act as the final authority for thepurpose of fixing the norms and standards of institutions running courseon architecture. In the judgment appealed against, it was observed, afterreferring to different authorities: -

“20…….. It is obvious that the legislature never intended toconfer on the AICTE a super power undermining the status,authority and autonomous functioning of the existing statutorybodies in areas and spheres assigned to them under the respectivelegislations. There is nothing in the AICTE Act to suggest alegislative intention to belittle and destroy the authority orautonomy of Council of Architecture which is having its ownassigned role to perform. The role of the AICTE vis-à-vis theCouncil of Architects is advisory and recommendatory and as aguiding factor and thereby subserving the cause of maintainingappropriate standards and qualitative norms. It is impossible toconceive that the Parliament intended to abrogate the provisionsof the Architects Act embodying a complete code forarchitectural education, including qualifications of the architectsby enacting a general provision like section 10 of the AICTE Act.It is clear that the Parliament did have before it the ArchitectsAct when it passed AICTE Act and Parliament never meant thatthe provisions of the Architects Act stand pro tanto repealed bysection 10 of the AICTE Act. We, therefore, hold that theprovisions of the Architects Act are not impliedly repealed bythe enactment of AICTE Act because in so far as theArchitecture Institutions are concerned, the final authority for thepurposes of fixing the norms and standards would be the Councilof Architecture. Accordingly, we quash and set aside the orderof the Deputy Director reducing the intake capacity of thepetitioner college of architecture from 40 to 30. Rule isaccordingly made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and(b) with no order as to costs.”

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11. SLP(C) No.5400 of 2011 also originates from a similarcontroversy and the appellant in this proceeding is Rajiv GandhiProudyogiki Vishwavidayalaya. This appeal arises out of a judgmentdelivered by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in a H1 (2001) 8 SCC 676

Writ Petition brought by a Society (Bhartiya Vidya Mandir ShikshaSamiti) running a college of Architecture. The said writ petition wasregistered as W.P. No.315 of 2011 and the judgment was delivered on2nd February, 2011. In this case, the institution had been grantedpermission by the AICTE to conduct B. Arch Degree course with intakeof 80 students for the academic sessions 2010-2011 and it was seekingaffiliation from the said University. The Directorate of TechnicalEducation had allotted 16 students to the institute upon conducting onlinecounselling. The CoA, however, had mandated that the said institutionought to have a separate building, independent school or college ofarchitecture and it should have separate infrastructure facilities for theaforesaid purpose. The appellant University (respondent No.2 in theWrit Petition) informed the institution that it could grant affiliation tothem after approval of the programme B. Arch. by the CoA. This wascontained in clause 2 of a communication issued by the University, dated6th September 2010. In course of hearing before the High Court, asrecorded in the judgment under appeal, it was submitted on behalf ofthe institution that it would construct their own building for the purposeof B. Arch. Degree course within a period of one year. The Bench ofMadhya Pradesh High Court directed the appellant University toconsider the matter with regard to grant of temporary affiliation to theinstitution without insisting upon compliance of condition No.2 in theletter dated 6th September 2010. The Bench, however, directedcompliance of aforesaid condition of the CoA within a period of oneyear for conducting the said course and if no such compliance wasmade, and the institution could not get approval from AICTE (respondentNo.3 in that proceeding) within the stipulated period, admission ofstudents for B. Arch. course in future was made impermissible. In thisdecision, co-existence of power of both the regulatory bodies was insubstance accepted. One of the questions on which the University wantsdecision of this Court in this appeal is whether the various regulationsframed in pursuance of the 1972 Act could be overlooked by the Benchof the High Court in issuing such directions.

12. SLP(Civil) No. 8443 of 2011 is an appeal by the institutionconcerned, being Bhartiya Vidya Mandir Shiksha Samiti, assailingthe same judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, delivered inWrit Petition No. 315 of 2011 on 2nd February 2011. In this appeal also,the question of conflict of powers in deciding admission norms betweenCoA and AICTE has been raised. The power of the CoA to direct A

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Aconstruction of a separate building is specifically questioned in thisappeal.

13. The same judgment has also been assailed by the CoA inSLP(Civil) No. 20460 of 2011. One of the grievances of the CoA inthis appeal is that it was not made a party in the Writ Petition in whichBthe High Court had directed granting of temporary affiliation to theinstitution without insisting on approval of Council of Architecture. On18th July 2011, a Bench comprising of two Judges of this Court grantedpermission to CoA to file this SLP. The direction of the High Court inthe judgment under appeal was conditional in that the respondent-institution was required to construct and create separate building andCinfrastructure within a period of one year. That was the specificrequirement of CoA so far as Bhartiya Vidya Mandir Shiksha Samiti isconcerned.

14. SLP(Civil) No.17006 of 2016 has been instituted by AICTEchallenging the legality of a common judgment and order passed by aDDivision Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No.110 of2013 and Writ Appeal No.112 of 2013. The dispute in these two appeals,inter-alia, was over contradictory directives issued by the CoA andAICTE in relation to admission of two students for the academic session2011-2012 beyond the intake capacity by an institution operated by oneEBMS Educational Trust. The intake capacity so far as course ofarchitecture was concerned for the applicable academic session was80 students. The appellate committee of the AICTE had recommendedthat excess admission fee, five times that of total fee collected perstudent, ought to have been levied in each case of admission beyondthe intake capacity. On the other hand, CoA had given its approval forFintake of additional two students during the academic year 2011-2012on condition that the institution would admit two students less than thatof its intake capacity of 80 for the next academic session i.e. 2012-2013. In the writ petition, the learned Single Judge, referring to adecision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Khayti GirishGPurnima Kulkarni Vs. College of Architecture & Ors.[2], had heldthat approval of CoA was sufficient and it was not necessary that thepetitioners (the aforesaid Trust) had to seek approval from the AICTE.In the appeal preferred by the AICTE before an Appellate Bench ofthe same Court, it was held in substance by the Division Bench that H2 2012 (4) AIR BOM R 371

the decision of the learned Single Judge would be ultimately subject tooutcome of the pending appeal before this Court on the same point.That appeal, we are apprised, is the first case in this batch of appeals.In the case of Khayti Girish Purnima Kulkarni(supra), the judgmentof the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shri Prince ShivajiMaratha Boarding House’s Council of Architecture, KolhapurVs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.was referred to and followed.

15. SLP(Civil) No.17005 of 2016 is also against same judgmentby the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court by which two writappeals stood disposed of. AICTE is the appellant in this appeal. Theorigin of this appeal lies in the writ petition instituted by BMS Schoolof Architecture. Legality of a circular issued by the VisvesvarayaUniversity dated 19th September, 2011 mandating all institutions teachingarchitecture to secure approval of the AICTE was questioned in thatwrit petition. Also assailed in the writ petition was an order issued bythe State Government on 21st September, 2011 in substance directingcompliance of the same requirement. The main point involved in thisappeal is if AICTE norms can be made applicable in respect ofarchitecture course or not.

16. SLP(Civil) No.28121 of 2018 (Muslim EducationalAssociation Vs. The University of Calicut & Ors.) arises out of adecision of a Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala. In thisdecision, it has been held that approval of AICTE is necessary forstarting a new college of architecture. The petitioner in that case beforethe High Court was the said Association, which had obtained approvalof the CoA for starting the college. The affiliating university – theUniversity of Calicut had declined approval. One of the reasons forthat was that the Association had not obtained approval from AICTE.The Association approached the High Court invoking its writ jurisdictionquestioning legality of the decision of the university declining itsaffiliation. In the judgment delivered on 29th August 2018 (in W.P.(Civil)No. 25412 of 2018) the High Court primarily addressed the questionas to whether approval of AICTE was necessary in addition to therecognition or approval granted by the CoA. Following an earlier decisionof the same Court in the case of Thejus College of ArchitectureVs. State of Kerala & Ors.in W.P.(C) No.23858 of 2018, decidedon 6th August 2018, the Bench dismissed the Writ Petition, inter-alia,on the reasoning that it did not have approval of the AICTE.

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A17. In some of the cases involved in these proceedings appeal,the CoA has been prescribing certain measures for individual institutionsto undertake to bring them at par with CoA norms. The specificprovision of the 1972 Act or the regulations framed thereunder doesnot specifically provide for prescribing such corrective measures. Suchdirectives, however, in our opinion, are incidental to the regulatoryBpowers conferred upon the CoA.

18. There are specific provisions in the 1972 Act dealing withsetting standards and norms for institutions dealing with the educationof architecture. Some of these provisions have been referred to earlierin this judgment. There are also provisions for monitoring quality ofCeducation being imparted by the respective institutions. The CoA hasalso the power to make representation to the Central government inthe event there are breaches of norms or standards prescribed by theregulations, which may ultimately result in withdrawal of suchrecognition. The decision making hierarchy within the CoA for makingDrepresentations to the Central Government has also been statutorilyprescribed, running up from inspectors to Executive Committee andultimately the Council.

19. Both the regulatory authorities under the respective statuteshave power to frame regulations for giving effect to the provisions ofthe respective Acts. Power to make rules in respect of certain areasEcovered by the statutes have been vested in the Central Governmentboth under the 1972 Act and the 1987 Act. So far as CoA is concerned,their power to make regulations is derived from Section 45 of the 1972Act. The said provision stipulates: - “45. Power of Council to make regulations.F

(1) The Council may, with the approval of the CentralGovernment, [by notification in the Official Gazette] makeregulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act,or the rules made thereunder to carry out the purposesof this Act.

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(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of theforegoing power, such regulations may provide for—

(a) the management of the property of the Council; (b) the powers and duties of the President and the Vice-HPresident of the Council;

(c) the summoning and holding of meetings of the Counciland the Executive Committee or any other committeeconstituted under Section 10, the times and places atwhich such meetings shall be held, the conduct ofbusiness thereat and the number of persons necessaryto constitute a quorum; A

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(d) the functions of the Executive Committee or of anyother committee constituted under Section 10; (e) the courses and periods of study and of practicaltraining, if any, to be undertaken, the subjectsof examinations and standards of proficiencytherein to be obtained in any college orinstitution for grant of recognised qualifications; C

(f) the appointment, powers and duties of inspector; (g) the standards of staff, equipment,accommodation, training and other facilities forarchitectural education; D

(h) the conduct of professional examinations,qualifications of examiners and the conditions ofadmission to such examinations;

(i) the standards of professional conduct and etiquetteand code of ethics to be observed by architects; andE

(j) any other matter which is to be or may be providedby regulations under this Act and in respect of whichno rules have been made.”

(3) Every regulation made under this section shall be laid, as soonas may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament,while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which maybe comprised in one session or in two or more successivesessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediatelyfollowing the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, bothHouses agree in making any modification in the regulation or bothHouses agree that the regulation should not be made, theregulation shall thereafter have effect only in such modified formor be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that anysuch modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to thevalidity of anything previously done under that regulation.”

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(emphasis supplied).

A20. The power to frame regulations by the AICTE originates fromSection 23 of the 1987 Act. This section stipulates:- “23. Power to make regulations.—(1) The Council may, bynotification in the Official Gazette, make regulations notinconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and the rules generallyBto carry out the purposes of this Act.

(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of theforegoing power, such regulations may provide for all or any ofthe following matters, namely:—

(a) regulating the meetings of the Council and the procedureCfor conducting business thereat; (b) the terms and conditions of service of the officers andemployees of the Council;

(c) regulating the meetings of the Executive Committee andDthe procedure for conducting business thereat; (d) the area of concern, the constitution, and powers andfunctions of the Board of Studies; (e) the region for which the Regional Committee be establishedand the constitution and functions of such Committee.”

E21. Under the 1987 Act, the power of Central Government tomake rules is derived from Section 22 of the Act. The said provisionstipulates:- “22. Power to make rules.—

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(1) The Central Government may, by notification in the OfficialGazette, make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act.

(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of theforegoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of thefollowing matters, namely:—G

(a) the procedure to be followed by the members in thedischarge of their functions; (b) the inspection of technical institutions and Universities;

(c) the form and manner in which the budget and reports areHto be prepared by the Council;

(d) the manner in which the accounts of the Council are tobe maintained; and A

(e) any other matter which has to be, or may be, prescribed”

22. Similar power on the Central Government has been conferredunder Section 44 of the 1972 Act, which lays down:- B

“44. Power of Central Government to make rules.-(1) TheCentral Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act.

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of theforegoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of thefollowing matters, namely—

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(a) the manner in which elections under Chapter II shall beconducted, the terms and conditions of service of themembers of the Tribunal appointed under sub-section (2)of Section 5 and the procedure to be followed by theTribunal; D

(b) the procedure to be followed by the expert committeeconstituted under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section14 in the transaction of its business and the powers andduties of the expert committee and the travelling and dailyallowances payable to the members thereof; E

(c) the particulars to be included in the register of architectsunder sub-section (3) of Section 23; (d) the form in which a certificate of registration is to be issuedunder sub-section (7) of Section 24, sub-section (4) ofFSection 26 and Section 33; (e) the fee to be paid under Sections 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32and 33; (f) the conditions on which a name may be restored to theregister under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 27; G

(g) the manner of endorsement under sub-section (3) ofSection 27; (h) the manner in which the Council shall hold an enquiry underSection 30; H

A(i) the fee for supplying printed copies of the register underSection 34; and (j) any other matter which is to be or may be provided byrules under this Act.

B(3) Every rule made under this Section shall be laid, as soon asmay be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, whileit is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may becomprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions,and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following thesession or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agreeCin making any modification to the rule or both Houses agree thatthe rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effectonly in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case maybe; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shallbe without prejudice to the validity of anything previously doneDunder that rule.”

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23. In course of hearing before us, on behalf of AICTE threeRegulations have been brought to our notice by Mr. Pandey, learnedcounsel representing this body. The first one carries the title “All IndiaCouncil for Technical Education (Grant of approval for starting newEtechnical institutions, introduction of courses or programmes andapproval of intake capacity of seats for the courses or programmes)Regulations, 1994.” This Regulation has been framed by the AICTE inexercise of power under Section 23(1) of the 1987 Act and becameeffective on 31st October, 1994. Another Regulation, framed also inFexercise of power under Section 23(1) read with Sections 10 and 11of the 1987 Act of the year 2016 in supersession of earlier regulationshas also been referred to. But so far as the present appeals areconcerned, the respective causes of action predates this regulation of2016 except in the case of the Muslim Educational Association, i.e.S.L.P.(Civil) No.28121 of 2018. The other Regulation is titled “All IndiaGCouncil for Technical Education (Norms and Guidelines for Fees andguidelines for admission in Professional Colleges) Regulations, 1994,framed in exercise of powers conferred under Section 23(1) andSections 10 (j) and (o), 1987 Act. This one is dated 20th May, 1994.No other regulation or rule has been brought to our notice in course ofHhearing on behalf of AICTE.

24. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior counsel representing theCoA has referred to Minimum Standard of Architectural EducationRegulations, 1983, framed by CoA in exercise of powers conferred byclauses (e), (g), (h) and (j) of sub-section (2) of Section 45 read withSection 21 of the 1972 Act. Another document which was producedbefore us by Dr. Dhavan is the annual report of CoA for the year 2017-2018. So far as this document is concerned, its relevance foradjudication of these appeals would be the content recorded underfollowing two sub-heads therein:- “14.0 APPROVAL OF NEW INSTITUTIONS IN THEACADEMIC SESSION 2017-18:- During the year under the report 22 new institutions were grantedapproval to impart Bachelor of Architecture Courses and 6existing institutions were granted approval for imparting PGCourses.

With this, the total number of institutions imparting recognizedcourses in architecture in the year 2017-18 with the approval ofCouncil are 468.

The annual intake of students sanctioned by the Council atUndergraduate level is approximately 24741, Postgraduate levelis 1640.

15.0EXTENSION OF APPROVAL FOR THEACADEMIC SESSION 2017-18 ONWARDS:

The Council granted extension of approval or otherwise for UGand PG Courses for the academic session 2017-18 as under:-

i) Institutions granted extension of approval for B.Arch.Course: 408

ii) Institutions granted extension of approval for M. Arch.Course: 64

iii) Institutions put on ‘No Admission’ : 12

iv) Institution put on ‘withdrawal of approval’ : NIL

The Council also initiated the process of inspection for theacademic session 2018-2019 which were due for inspections.”

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AReporting on these subjects demonstrate CoA’s continuedengagement in the process of recognition of “authorities” grantingarchitectural qualification.

25. We find that both the statutes have provisions for approvaland monitoring of architecture courses run by institutions. So far as theB1972 Act is concerned, the expression employed is recognition ofqualification and the ultimate authority for granting or withdrawingrecognition to degree or diploma courses in architectural education bydifferent academic institutions is the Central Government. The CoAunder the statutory scheme however has significant role in such decisionmaking process. AICTE has also been empowered under the 1987 ActCto lay down standards and norms for courses on architecture along withother subjects coming within the term “technical education”. We haveextracted relevant parts of Section 10 of the 1987 Act earlier in thisjudgment. Both the Councils also appear to have had proceeded withthis understanding. In the decision of the Bombay High Court deliveredDin the case of Shri Prince Shivaji Maratha Boarding House’sCouncil of Architecture,(supra), it is recorded in the judgment underappeal that joint inspection was held in respect of the institution involvedin that proceeding by AICTE and CoA. Moreover, under Section3(3)(b), of the 1972 Act, the CoA is required to have two personsnominated by the AICTE. On the other hand, Section 3 (4) (m) of theE1987 Act stipulates that AICTE is to consist of representatives of variousbodies, including a member to be appointed by the Central Governmentto represent the CoA. Section 10(k) of the 1987 Act requires AICTEto grant approval in consultation with the agencies concerned.

26. Though both the enactments deal with several aspects of theFmain subject matter of the respective legislations, on the aspect ofsetting norms for architectural education and for monitoring theinstitutions engaged in imparting architectural education, there areoverlapping powers of these two Councils. Section 14 of the 1972 Acthas been reproduced earlier in this judgment. On the aspect ofGrecognising any architectural qualification, Sections 18 and 19 thereofstipulate:

“18. Power to require information as to courses of studyand examinations.- Every authority in India which grants arecognised qualification shall furnish such information as theHCouncil may, from time to time, require as to the courses of study and examinations to be undergone in order to obtain suchqualification, as to the ages at which such courses of study andexaminations are required to be undergone and such qualificationis conferred and generally as to the requisites for obtaining suchqualification.

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19. Inspection of examinations.-

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1. The Executive Committee shall, subject to regulations, ifany, made by the Council, appoint such number ofinspectors as it may deem requisite to inspect any collegeor institution where architectural education is given or toattend any examination held by any college or institutionfor the purpose of recommending to the CentralGovernment recognition of architectural qualificationsgranted by that college or institution.

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2. The inspectors shall not interfere with the conduct of anytraining or examination, but shall report to the ExecutiveCommittee on the adequacy of the standards ofarchitectural education including staff, equipment,accommodation, training and such other facilities as maybe prescribed by regulations for giving such education oron the sufficiency of every examination which they attend.

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3. The Executive Committee shall forward a copy of suchreport to the college or institution and shall also forwardcopies with remarks, if any, of the college or institutionthereon, to the Central Government.”

27. Section 20 of the 1972 Act deals with withdrawal ofFrecognition of an authority listed in the Schedule to the Act. The processinvolves a report by the Executive Committee of the CoA. On thebasis of such report, if it appears to the Council that the courses ofstudy and examination held in any college or institution or the staff,equipment, accommodation, training and other facilities for staff andtraining provided in such college or institution do not conform to theGstandards prescribed by the regulations then the CoA is empowered tomake a representation for withdrawal of recognition to the appropriateGovernment. Section 21 of the 1972 Act also empowers the Councilto prescribe minimum standards of architectural education required forgranting recognized qualifications by colleges or institutions in India.

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A28. From the nature of the dispute giving rise to these sevenappeals, it is apparent that the shortcomings pointed out by the tworegulatory bodies relate primarily to infrastructural facilities of therespective institutions. The power of the CoA to examine suchinfrastructural facilities at the time of considering the application forrecognition or monitoring the quality of an institution recognized by theBCouncil stems from Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the 1972 Act.

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29. A Regulation has been framed by the CoA with the approvalof the Central Government titled as the Council of ArchitectureRegulations, 1982. Part VIII of the 1982 Regulations deals withinspection of educational institutions of Architecture. Clauses 29 andC30 thereof stipulate:

“29. Inspection of educational institutions and theirexaminations.- The inspection of architectural institutions andthe attendance at the time of training and examination undersection 19 shall be carried out in accordance with the followingDmanner, namely : -

(1) each institution imparting instruction in architecture shallbe inspected by the inspectors once in five years:

(2) the Registrar shall fix the date of inspection in consultationwith the inspector or inspectors and the institution; E

(3) the Executive Committee shall appoint such number ofinspectors as may be deemed necessary to inspect aninstitution or to attend any examinations and to reportthereon:

Provided that the minimum number of inspectors for suchinspection shall be two.

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(4) (a) every inspector shall receive from the Chairman,Executive Committee, a formal commission in writingunder the seal of the Council; (b) the instructions of the Chairman shall specify theinstitution or institutions, courses of studies andscheme of examination or examinations or trainingprogramme or educational standards including staff,equipments, accommodation, training and otherfacilities which are required to be inspected orattended; G

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(c) the Chairman shall inform the inspector that he is toreport to the Executive Committee who shall submittheir final report with recommendations to the Councilin accordance with these regulations; (d) the Registrar shall provide the inspector with a copyof the documents and of the recommendations of theCouncil in regard to recognition of the qualificationsor educational standards and improvements to bemade thereon and of the resolutions with regard toarchitectural education.”

“30. Powers and duties of Inspectors.-

(1) It shall be the duty of the inspector: - (a) to make himself acquainted with such previous reports,if any, on the institution or institutions which he isappointed to inspect as the Executive Committee maydirect and with the observations of the University orexamining body and the report of the Council thereon; (b) to attend personally institution or examination or trainingwhich he is required to inspect but not to interfere withthe conduct thereof;

(c) to inspect the institution which provides a recognizedcourse of study or has applied for the recognition of itscourse of study and scheme of examination and to seethat the course is in conformity with the regulationsrelating to education and the standards laid down by theCouncil; (d) to report to the Executive Committee his opinion as tothe sufficiency or insufficiency of standards of educationor examination or institution inspected by him; (e) to set forth in his report, in order, all the necessaryparticulars as to the question proposed in the written, oralor practical parts of each examination attended by him,the sessional and class work submitted by the candidatesat the time of practical or viva-voce examination, thearrangements made for invigilation, the method andscales of making, the standard of knowledge shown by A

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the successful candidates and generally all such detailsas may be required for adjudicating on the scope andcharacter of the examination; (f) to set forth in his report necessary particulars in respectof institutions so as to enable the Executive Committeeto assess the existing facilities for teaching as well asthe extent to which the recommendations of the Councilregarding professional education have been given effectto; (g) to compare, on receipt from the Registrar, proof copyof any of his reports, the proof with the original andcorrect, sign and return it to the Registrar forpreservation in the records of the Council as theauthentic copy of such report.

(2) Every report of the inspector or inspectors shall be signedand submitted to the Executive Committee.

(3) The reports of inspectors shall be deemed confidential, unlessin any particular case the Executive Committee otherwisedirects.

(4) Copies of the report by inspectors marked confidential shallbe forwarded to the University or the examining body concernedas well as the institution with a request that the authority shouldfurnish to the Executive Committee within six months from thedate of dispatch, such observations thereon as they may thinknecessary.

(5) A confidential copy of report of an inspector or inspectors,with the observations of the University or the examining bodyor the institution thereon, shall be supplied to each member ofthe Council and shall be considered together with comments ofthe Executive Committee by the Council along with theobservations thereon of the Executive Committee forconsideration by the Council at their next meeting.

(6) A copy of every report by the inspector or inspectors, withthe observations of the University or the examining body and theinstitution concerned and the opinion of the Executive Committeethereon, shall, after approval by the Council, be forwarded to theCentral Government and State Government concerned.”

30. The Minimum Standards of Architectural EducationRegulations 1983 in particular, deals with the academic andinfrastructural features of architecture courses. Clause (5) of the saidRegulations provides:- “5 Intake and Migration:-

(1) The sanctioned intake of candidates at the first year levelshall not exceed a maximum of 40 in a class. If more than 40candidates are admitted, separate classes shall be organized.

(2) The institutions may permit, at their discretion, migration ofstudents from one institution to another subject to the maximumnumber of students not exceeding the permitted maximum intakein a class.”

Clause 8 of the 1983 Regulations further provides:- “8. Standards of staff, equipment, accommodation, trainingand other facilities for technical education

(1) The institutions shall maintain a teacher/student ratio of 1:8.

(2) The institutions shall have a minimum number of 12 facultymembers for a student strength of 100.

(3) The institution with the maximum intake of 40 in a classmay have the faculty pattern as prescribed in Appendix-B.

(4) The institutions shall encourage the faculty members toinvolve in professional practice including research.

(5) The institutions shall provide facilities as indicated inAppendix-C.

(6) The institutions shall encourage exchange of facultymembers for academic programmes.

Notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations, theinstitutions may prescribe minimum standards of Architectural Educationprovided such standards does not, in the opinion of the Council, fall belowthe minimum standards prescribed from time to time by the Council tomeet the requirements of the profession and education thereof.”

31. Appendix B to these Regulations deal with designation, pay-scale and qualification required to be prescribed for faculty positions.

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The Institution of Architecture should be located in a building tohave a floor area of about 15 sq.m.m. per student. The buildingshould include class rooms and at least 5 studios, adequate spacefor faculty members, library, workshop, materials museum,Claboratories, exhibition/conference room, office accommodationand common area for students and staff. The space requirementsper student for architectural education whether in the Institutionor in the Hostel are apt to be more than for most other types ofprofessional courses like engineering and medicine because ofDthe large space required for preparation of drawings. This factorshould be borne in mind in the design of Hostels and Studios.

Facilities may also be provided for extra-curricular activities andsports.

The equipment in the workshop/laboratories has also to beprovided to meet with the special requirement for architecturaleducation. It is desirable to provide locker facilities in the studiosfor students.

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32. So far as the two Regulations of 1994 under the 1987 Actproduced before us on behalf of AICTE, the Regulations dated 20thMay, 1994 contemplates fixing approval norms and intake capacity toprofessional colleges. Clause 2 of this Regulation however exemptsHuniversities, university departments or colleges, government colleges, aided colleges and certain other institutions from its application. Thenext one has been made applicable to all new technical institutionsincluding universities and subsisting technical institutions and lays downa detailed approval process through multi-tier decision making structure.The AICTE appears to have made subsequent Regulations time to timesuperseding the earlier ones in respect of the approval process, butbarring the Regulations made in 2016, no other regulations has beenproduced before us. None of the Regulations produced before ushowever specify the actual norms but refer to standards and norms tobe laid down for approval of technical institutions, which includeinstitutions imparting architectural education.

33. Clause 6 of the 1994 regulations dated 31st October, 1994deals with conditions for grant of approval, which stipulates:

“6. Conditions for grant of approval.- Every application undersub-regulation (1) of regulation 4 shall be considered subject tothe fulfilment of the following conditions, namely:-

(i) The financial position of the applicant shall be sound forinvestment in developed land and in providing relatedinfrastructure and instructional facilities as per the normsand standards laid down by the Council from time to timeand for meeting annual recurring expenditure:

(ii) The courses or programmes shall be conducted as per theassessed technical manpower demands;

(iii) The admissions shall be made according to the regulationsand directions of the Council for such admissions in therespective technical institution or university;

(iv) The tuition and other fees shall be charged with the overallcriteria as may be laid down by the Council;

(v) The staff shall be recruited as per the norms and standardsspecified by the Council from time to time;

(vi) the governing Body in case of private technical institutionsshall be as per the norms as specified by the council;

34. Appearing on behalf of AICTE in Civil Appeal No.364 of2005, the fact that there are overlapping provisions on the question ofgrant of approval and subsequent monitoring of architectural education A

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Aunder both these Acts, has not been seriously disputed by Mr. Pandey.His main submission is that the 1987 Act being a later statute, coveringcommon field, the provisions of the 1972 Act, to the extent the samedeals with architectural education, shall be deemed to have beenrepealed by implication. The judgment of this Court relied upon on thispoint is the case ofAjoy Kumar Banerjee and Others Vs. UnionBof India and Others3 His further submission is that the power ofAICTE under the 1987 Act has already been upheld by this Court inthe case of State of Tamil Nadu and Others Vs. AdhiyamanEducational Research Institute and Others4 On the same point,another judgment of this Court in the case of Orissa Lift IrrigationCCorporation Limited Vs. Rabi Sankar Patro and Others,[5] has alsobeen relied upon by him. The other authority he has cited in support ofhis submission that the Rules and Regulations framed by the AICTEhas the force of law and binding is the case of Parshvnath CharitableTrust and Others Vs. All India Council for Technical Educationand Others6 In the case of Varun Saini & Ors. Vs. Guru GovindDSingh Indraprastha University7 also, the necessity on the part of thetechnical institutions for taking prior approval of AICTE has beenhighlighted.

35. Primacy of AICTE on the question of giving approval to atechnical institution and subsequent monitoring thereof have beenEdiscussed in the cases of Orissa Lift Irrigation CorporationLimited (supra) and Parshvanath Charitable Trust and Others(supra). But in these two cases, the question of inter-se primacybetween the rival regulatory bodies covering the same subject did notarise. In the case of Parshvanath Charitable Trust (supra), the dispute Fwas on the question as to whether shifting of location of college runningcourses on technical education could be effected without obtaining a‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC) from the AICTE. The Handbook ofApproval Process, 2008 provides for obtaining NOCs from the StateGovernment, UT administration and affiliating bodies concerned with the AICTE as per laid down procedure subject to the fulfilment ofGnorms and standards of AICTE. The college concerned had changed 3 (1984) 3 SCC 1274 (1995) 4 SCC 1045 (2018) 1 SCC 4686 (2013) 3 SCC 385H7 (2014) 16 SCC 330

location without adhering to the aforesaid procedure and it was heldby this Court in that decision that withdrawal of approval by the AICTEwas valid, there being no compliance with the legal requirements andbinding conditions of recognition, inter-alia, by the AICTE. The lis inthe case of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited (supra) aroseout of a dispute pertaining to service conditions of engineers includingjunior engineers of the said Corporation. In that case, a diploma holderin electrical engineering had joined the Corporation as junior engineer(electrical) and while in service he acquired B.Tech. (Civil) degree froma deemed university. The said deemed university did not have approvalof the AICTE. That University had started its distance educationprogramme without taking approval from any of the regulatoryauthorities including University Grants Commission (UGC) and AICTE.In this decision also, judgment in the case of Bharathidasan University(supra) was taken note of. It was however held that deemeduniversities, whose courses were subject of dispute in the aforesaidcases were required to abide by the provisions of the AICTERegulations and could not introduce courses leading to award of degreesin engineering without the approval of AICTE.

36. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu and Another Vs.Adhiyaman Educational and Research Institute and Others8, thecontroversy arose out of certain overlapping provisions between the1987 Act and Madras University Act, 1923. The disputes were mainlyon the aspects of prescribing terms and conditions for affiliation ofdifferent institutions including engineering colleges. It was held that inrespect of the subjects specified under Section 10 of the 1987 Act inrespect of institutions imparting technical education, it would not be theUniversity Act but the Central Act and the Council created under itwould have the jurisdiction to that extent. It was held that after cominginto operation of the Central Act, the provisions of the University Actwould be deemed to have become unenforceable. In case of technicalcolleges like engineering colleges, this view was taken by this Court,having regard to the fact that the Central statue had been enacted bythe Parliament under Entry 66 of List I as well as Entry 25 of List III.It was also held in that judgment that the provisions of the UniversityAct regarding affiliation of technical colleges like the engineering collegesand the conditions for grant and continuation of such affiliation by the 8 (1995) 4 SCC 104

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AUniversity was to remain operative but the conditions that are prescribedby the University for grant and continuance of affiliation will have tobe in conformity with the norms and guidelines prescribed by theCouncil in respect of matters entrusted to it under Section 10 of theCentral Act.

B37. Learned counsel representing the AICTE has referred to acommunication emanating from the Ministry of Human ResourceDevelopment, Government of India, bearing No.F.17 11/2003 TS.IV.This communication specifically deals with this conflict and specifies:

“The mandate given to the AICTE is to coordinate theCdevelopment of technical education in the country at all levels.Grants of approval for starting new technical educationalinstitutions and for introduction of new courses or Programmesin consultations with the agencies concerned. Although, theCouncil of Architecture deals with mainly architect professionand the Architect Act may be taken as a Special Act dealingDwith profession of architecture, the overall planning andcoordination of technical education falls within the ambit ofAICTE. For starting new courses, increase in intake, setting upof new technical institutions, the power is vested with AICTEunder Section 10(k) of the AICTE Act. In that process AICTEEhas to inspect institutions, look into their infrastructure, set upnorms and standards as per the power provided in the AICTEAct. The Architect Act does not have any power to set up anyinstitute or grant approval to new courses or increase in intake.For the benefit of the profession, the Architect Act provides theFcouncil the authority to prescribe minimum standards ofarchitectural education for the colleges or institutions in India.Regulations framed under Architect Act, 1972, also provides forinspection of institution once in five year and makerecommendation to the central government. The ministrytherefore feels that there is no overlapping of power betweenGthe two statutory bodies in so far as inspections of institutionsare concerned. The architecture education is to be governedunder AICTE Act and CoA should maintain register forrecognition of architects who have completed full timeProgrammes/courses as approved by the AICTE or qualificationsmentioned in the schedule of CoA Act.

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The matter regarding implementation of various provisions, underthe Architect Act, 1972 and the AICTE Act, 1987 has beenconsidered in the ministry and after careful examination theministry is of the view that all aspect of architectural educationshall be concern of the AICTE and CoA would look into thearchitect profession and ethics for maintaining its professionalismin the field of Architecture.”

38. It is brought to our notice by Mr. Pandey, referring to Section25 of the 1987 Act, that it is the Central Government which is theultimate authority deciding on issues in giving effect to the provisionsof the 1987 Act and hence the aforesaid memorandum ought to be giveneffect to while construing the conflict arising from these two statutes.Section 25 of the 1987 Act stipulates:- “25. Power to remove difficulties.—(1) If anydifficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, theCentral Government may, by order, published in the OfficialGazette, make such provisions not inconsistent with the provisionsof this Act as may appear to be necessary for removing thedifficulty:

Provided that no order shall be made under this section after theexpiry of two years from the commencement of this Act.

(2) Every order made under this section shall be laid, as soon asmay be after it is made, before each House of Parliament.”

39. Similar provision is there under Section 43 of the 1972 Act.But no case has been made out that the memorandum to whichreference has been made, has been published in the official gazette.This memorandum does not meet the requirement of valid exercise ofpower under the aforesaid two provisions by the Central Governmentso as to make it binding. This memorandum, at best, can be treated tobe an advisory of the Ministry not having enforceable effect. Moreover,the aforesaid memorandum has been issued beyond the timeframe laiddown under the provisions of the statutes reproduced in the said twosections of the respective Acts. The memorandum also cannot betreated to be an executive order under Article 77 of the Constitution ofIndia.

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A40. Main submission of Dr. Dhavan has been that since the 1972statute specifically deals with architectural education along with certainother areas pertaining to regulating the profession of architects, theprovisions of the said Act ought to prevail over the provisions of the1987 Act. This statute, according to him is “architect” and “architecturaleducation” specific. On the point of implied repeal, his submission isBthat as a proposition of law, implied repeal of an earlier statute underthe normal circumstances ought not to be presumed merely because asubsequent legislation having common subjects of legislation comes intooperation unless there is express provision to that effect. The decisionsrelied upon in support of this proposition is the case of M/s. MathraCParshad and Sons Vs. State of Punjab and Others9. This judgmentis an authority for the proposition that in absence of express provisionno repeal can be implied unless the two statutes cannot stand together.He also referred to another authority i.e. A.B. Abdulkadir Vs. Stateof Kerala10. Relying on the latter authority, he has argued that in theevent the later Act deals with substantially the same subject as that ofDa former Act, then the principle of repeal could be applied. In the caseA.B. Abdulkadir (supra), however, the subsequent statute, beingFinance Act, a Central legislation had specific provision for repeal ofthe corresponding laws.

41. He has also referred to several authorities to contend thatEthe definition clause has to be construed with caution and a particulardefinition given in such clause may have to be reversed, if the statutorycontext otherwise requires. According to him, the context can beexternal and can relate to another existing legislation. CoA’s case onthis point is that though architecture is included in the definition ofF“technical education” in the 1987 Act, coverage of the said subject interms of the regulatory framework created thereunder cannot beautomatically inferred. The rationale behind this submission of CoA isthat the 1972 Act covers architecture education specifically in all itsaspects. The authorities cited for this proposition are:- GAssn. of Registration Plates v. Union of India11; WhirlpoolCorpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks12; K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu 9 1962 Supp (1) SCR 91310 1962 Supp (2) SCR 74111 (2005) 1 SCC 679H12 (1998) 8 SCC 1

Ammal13;Printers (Mysore) Ltd. V. Asstt. CTO;[14]Pushpa Deviv. Milkhi Ram.15

42. The distinction or difference between Technical institutionsand Technical education as contained in the 1987 statute has been dealtwith by the two Judge Benches of this Court in the cases ofBharathidasan University(supra) and Association of Managementof Private Colleges (supra). On the same point, two other authoritieshave been cited on behalf of CoA dealing with the repugnancy betweena State Act and a Central Act under Article 254 of the Constitution ofIndia. These are Municipal Council Palai Vs. T.J. Joseph16 andTika Ramji Vs. State of U.P.17 He has further argued that underordinary circumstances, special law ought to override the general law.According to him, the 1972 Act is a special law, dealing with, inter alia,recognition of institutions conducting architectural education. The 1987Act, in his submission is a general law dealing with technical educationas a whole. It is his case that technical education may include degreeor diploma in architecture. In these appeals, there is specific legislationdealing with architectural education. In the event there is conflictbetween the norms and standards set under the general law, which,according to him is the 1987 Act and law specifically dealing witharchitectural education being 1972 Act, he has argued that proper coursewould be to proceed on the basis that the intention of the legislaturewas to keep out the provisions relating to standards and norms pertainingto architectural education from the 1987 Act and Regulations framedthereunder and mandate following the norms and standards stipulatedin the 1972 Act and connected Regulations. Other authorities relied onfor this proposition are: R.S. Raghunath Vs. State of Karnataka18;LIC Vs. D.J. Bahadur19 ;U.P. State Electricity Board Vs. HariShankar Jain20; andJ.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co.Ltd. Vs. State of U.P.21 These are all authorities in support of theproposition of law that a general provision should yield to the specialprovision, if two statutes are in direct conflict.

13 (1997) 2 SCC 5314 (1994) 2 SCC 43415 (1990) 2 SCC 13416 (1964) 2 SCR 8717 ((1956) 1 SCR 39318 (1992) 1 SCC 33519 (1981) 1 SCC 31520 (1978) 4 SCC 1621 (1961) 3 SCR 185

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A43. His main reliance is on the case of BharathidasanUniversity(supra), in support of his argument that so far as educationin Architecture is concerned, the 1972 Act ought to survive and noteclipsed by the 1987 legislation. In the case of BharathidasanUniversity, the main point involved was as to whether a university inorder to start a course on technical education was required to obtainBprior approval of the AICTE or not. The University in question in thatcase was constituted under Bharathidasan University Act 1981 withits specified area of operation over three districts in the State of TamilNadu. The university commenced courses in technology related subjectssuch as Information Technology, Management, Bioengineering andCTechnology, Petrochemical Engineering and Technology, PharmaceuticalEngineering and Technology etc. The AICTE had objected to runningof such courses without their prior approval. It filed a writ petition beforethe Madras High Court to prevent the University authorities fromrunning/conducting any course or programme in technical education.The University took a plea that it would not fall within the definition ofDtechnical institution contained in Section 2 (h) of the 1987 Act and thuswas outside the purview of Section 10 (k) thereof. Section 2 (h) of the1987 Act stipulates:-

“(h) “Technical institution” means an institution, not being auniversity which offers courses or programmes of technicalEeducation, and shall include such other institutions as the CentralGovernment may, in consultation with the Council, by notificationin the Official Gazette, declare as technical institutions.”

It was held in this judgment :-F“15. To put it in a nutshell, a reading of Section 10 of the AICTEAct will make it clear that whenever the Act omits to cover a“university”, the same has been specifically provided in theprovisions of the Act. For example, while under clause (k) ofSection 10 only “technical institutions” are referred to, clause (o)of Section 10 provides for the guidelines for admission of studentsGto “technical institutions” and “universities” imparting technicaleducation. If we look at the definition of a “technical institution”under Section 2(h) of the Act, it is clear that a “technicalinstitution” cannot include a “university”. The clear intention ofthe legislature is not that all institutions whether university orHotherwise ought to be treated as “technical institutions” covered by the Act. If that was the intention, there was no difficulty forthe legislature to have merely provided a definition of “technicalinstitution” by not excluding “university” from the definitionthereof and thereby avoided the necessity to use alongside boththe words “technical institutions” and university in severalprovisions in the Act. The definition of “technical institution”excludes from its purview a “university”. When by definition a“university” is excluded from a “technical institution”, to interpretthat such a clause or such an expression wherever the expression“technical institution” occurs will include a “university” will bereading into the Act what is not provided therein. The power togrant approval for starting new technical institutions and forintroduction of new courses or programmes in consultation withthe agencies concerned is covered by Section 10(k) which wouldnot cover a “university” but only a “technical institution”. IfSection 10(k) does not cover a “university” but only a “technicalinstitution”, a regulation cannot be framed in such a manner soas to apply the regulation framed in respect of “technicalinstitution” to apply to universities when the Act maintains acomplete dichotomy between a “university” and a “technicalinstitution”. Thus, we have to focus our attention mainly to theAct in question on the language adopted in that enactment. Inthat view of the matter, it is, therefore, not even necessary toexamine the scope of other enactments or whether the Actprevails over the University Act or effect of competing entriesfalling under Entries 63 to 65 of List I vis-à-vis Entry 25 of ListIII of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.

16. The fact that initially the Syndicate of the appellant Universitypassed a resolution to seek for approval from AICTE and didnot pursue the matter on those lines thereafter or that other similarentities were adopting such a course of obtaining the same andthat the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M. Sambasiva Raocase [(1997) 1 An LT 629 (FB)] had taken a particular view ofthe matter are not reasons which can be countenanced in lawto non-suit the appellant. Nor such reasons could be relevant orjustifying factors to draw any adverse finding against and denyrelief by rejecting the claims of the appellant University. We alsoplace on record the statement of the learned Senior Counsel forthe appellant, which, in our view, even otherwise is the correct AB

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Aposition of law, that the challenge of the appellant with referenceto the Regulation in question and claim of AICTE that theappellant University should seek and obtain prior approval ofAICTE to start a department or commence a new course orprogramme in technical education does not mean that they haveno obligation or duty to conform to the standards and norms laidBdown by AICTE for the purpose of ensuring coordinated andintegrated development of technical education and maintenanceof standards.”

44. In the case of Association of Management of PrivateCollegesVs. All India Council of Technical Education andCOthers22, the dispute was between private colleges, including certaincolleges affiliated to Bharathidasan University on one side and AICTEon the other, broadly on the same question which engaged this Courtin the case of Bhartidasan University. In this decision, referring tocertain portions of the judgment of this Court in the case ofDParshvanath Charitable Trust (supra), it was held:- “52. The italicised portions from the said decision in ParshvanathCharitable Trust case [Parshvanath Charitable Trust v. AllIndia Council for Technical Education, (2013) 3 SCC 385]referred to supra would make it clear that the AICTE Act doesEnot contain any evidence of an intention to belittle and destroythe authority or autonomy of other statutory bodies which theyare assigned to perform. Further, the AICTE Act does not intendto be an authority either superior or to supervise or control theuniversities and thereby superimpose itself upon the saiduniversities merely for the reason that it is laying down certainFteaching standards in technical education or programmesformulated in any of the department or units. It is evident thatwhile enacting the AICTE Act, Parliament was fully alive to theexistence of the provisions of the UGC Act, 1956 particularly,the said provisions extracted above. Therefore, the definition ofG“technical institution” in Section 2(h) of the AICTE Act whichauthorises AICTE to do certain things, special care hasconsciously and deliberately been taken to make specific mentionof university, wherever and whenever AICTE alone wasexpected to interact with a university and its departments as well H22 (2013) 8 SCC 271

as constituent institutions and units. It was held after analysingthe provision of Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the AICTE Act thatthe role of the inspection conferred upon AICTE vis-à-visuniversities is limited to the purpose of ensuring propermaintenance of norms and standards in the technical educationsystem so as to conform to the standards laid down by it withno further or direct control over such universities or scope forany direct action except bringing it to the notice of UGC. In thatbackground, this Court in Bharathidasan Universitycase [Bharathidasan University v. All India Council forTechnical Education, (2001) 8 SCC 676] made it very clear bymaking the observation that it has examined the scope of theenactment as to whether the AICTE Act prevails over the UGCAct or the fact of competent entries fall in List I Entry 66 vis-à-vis List III Entry 25 of Schedule VII of the Constitution.

53. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid paragraphsof Bharathidasan University case [BharathidasanUniversity v. All India Council for Technical Education,(2001) 8 SCC 676] which are extracted above makes it veryclear that this Court has exempted universities, its colleges,constituent institutions and units from seeking prior approvalfrom AICTE. Also, from the reading of paras 19 and 20of Parshvanath Charitable Trust case [ParshvanathCharitable Trust v. All India Council for Technical Education,(2013) 3 SCC 385] it is made clear after careful scanning of theprovisions of the AICTE Act and the University GrantsCommission Act, 1956 that the role of AICTE vis-à-visuniversities is only advisory, recommendatory and one of providingguidance and has no authority empowering it to issue or enforceany sanctions by itself.

54. It is rightly pointed out from the affidavit filed by UGC asdirected by this Court in these cases on the question of affiliatedcolleges to the university, that the affidavit is very mechanicaland it has simply and gratuitously without foundation, added astechnical institutions including affiliated colleges without any legalfoundation. Paras 13, 14, 15 and 19 of the affidavit filed by UGCand the assertion made in Para 23 is without any factualfoundation, which reads as under:

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“That it is further submitted that affiliated colleges are distinctand different than the constituent colleges. Thus, it cannot be saidthat constituent colleges also include affiliated colleges.”

Further, the assertion of UGC as rightly pointed out by DrDhavan in the written submission filed on behalf of the appellantBin CA No. 1145 of 2004 that the claim that UGC does not haveany provision to grant approval of technical institution, is facileas it has already been laid down by this Court that the AICTEnorms can be applied to the affiliated colleges through UGC. Itcan only advise UGC for formulating the standards of educationand other aspects to UGC. In view of the law laid down inCBharathidasan University [Bharathidasan University v. AllIndia Council for Technical Education, (2001) 8 SCC 676]and Parshvanath Charitable Trust [Parshvanath CharitableTrust v. All India Council for Technical Education, (2013) 3SCC 385] cases, the learned Senior Counsel Dr Dhavan hasDrightly submitted for rejection of the affidavit of UGC, which wehave to accept as the same is without any factual foundation andalso contrary to the intent and object of the Act.”

45. Learned counsel appearing for different institutions in this setof appeals have broadly supported the arguments advanced on behalfEof CoA. Learned counsel for the Muslim Educational Association[the appellant in SLP(C) No.28121 of 2018] has assailed the decisionof the Calicut University refusing to give affiliation to the said institution.Reference has been made to regulation 15(3) of the Minimum Standardsof Architectural Education Regulation, 2015, which gives 3 years toprovide the building for different infrastructural facilities for a collegeFcoming within the ambit of the said Act. In fact, it has been argued onbehalf of the said institution that the University could not demand AICTEapproval and within the State of Kerala, there were many institutionsimparting architectural education solely on the basis of recognitiongranted under the 1972 Act.

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46. In the case of Bharathidasan University (supra), this Courtfound that in the 1987 Act, there is a distinction made by the legislaturebetween a technical institution per se and certain other kinds ofinstitutions over which some other kind of monitoring or supervision isthere by properly constituted universities. That would be apparent fromthe definition of technical institution under the 1987 Act. Sections 10H

(k) and (m) of the 1987 Act also specifically deal with technicalinstitution. Thus the 1987 Act recognises the distinguishing feature ofa technical institution not being a university. The Council constitutedunder it has supervisory and monitoring power over technical institutionsnot being a university imparting courses in technical education. This wasone of the main reasoning as to why it was found by this Court in thecase of Bharathidasan University (supra) that the said universitywould remain out of the regulatory ambit of the AICTE. Broadly thesame logic was followed in the other authority, Association ofManagement of Private Colleges (supra). The case of AdhiyamanEducational and Research Institute and Others(supra), wasdistinguished in this decision and the relevant paragraphs in that regardhave been referred to earlier in this judgment. None of the authoritiescited on behalf of the AICTE, however, deals with a situation wherethere is a pre-existing Central legislation dealing with overlapping poweron the same subject coming within the definition of “technicaleducation”.

47. CoA in these appeals wants to establish its pre-dominanceon the ground that the 1972 Act is a special Act and AICTE’s standon the other hand is that the 1987 Act having come to the statue bookon a later date, the provisions thereof ought to prevail when the sameare in conflict with an earlier statute. As a proposition of law, we acceptAICTE’s stand that there need not be complete identity in the subject-matters of the two rival statutes being tested in the yardstick of pointof time of their commencement of operation. Again, as a propositionof law, the principle of law canvassed by the rival bodies are acceptedtools of construction. But they require application having regard to thespecific circumstances of a given case. It is not an absolute propositionof law that a later Act would always prevail over the former in theevent there are clashing provisions even if there is no express provisionof repeal. In the case of Ajoy Kumar Banerjee (supra), it was held,referring to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition:- “39. From the text and the decisions, four tests are deducibleand these are :(i) the Legislature has the undoubted right to altera law already promulgated through subsequent legislation, (ii) Aspecial law may be altered, abrogated or repealed by a latergeneral law by an express provision, (iii) A later general law willoverride a prior special law if the two are so repugnant to each A

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Aother that they cannot co-exist even though no express provisionin that behalf is found in the general law, and (iv) It is only inthe absence of a provision to the contrary and of a clearinconsistency that a special law will remain wholly unaffectedby a later general law.”

B48. We shall examine now as to whether the 1972 Act fits thedescription of a special legislation so as to prevail over a subsequentenactment covering its field or area of operation. A special law impliesa statute covering a particular subject specifically. The subject of conflictin the present proceedings is architectural education. The 1972 ActChowever does not solely deal with architectural education. The Actintends to control or regulate the profession of architects. It has twomain features, one part dealing with regulating the profession of architectand the other part regulating architectural education. Significant portionof the statute deals with formation of the CoA but the function of thatbody is essentially to regulate and monitor the other two areas of thisDstatue. So far as effect of recognition is concerned, Section 17 of the1972 Act stipulates:- “17. Effect of recognition.- Notwithstanding anything containedin any other law, but subject to the provisions of this Act, anyrecognised qualification shall be a sufficient qualification forEenrolment in the register.”

49. The 1987 Act deals with technical education and in particularthe methodology for approval technical institutions and their monitoring.The dispute has arisen in these proceedings as architecture has beenFincluded with other subjects in the definition of “technical education”[Section 2 (g)]. Dr. Dhavan wants us, in effect, to exclude the subjectof architecture from the said definition clause while construing theapplicability of the Regulations for approval of a technical institutionand its subsequent monitoring. He has referred to the opening sentenceof Section 2 of the 1987 Act, which contains the definitions and reads:-G

“In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires..”

Such context, according to him can be external, outside thespecific statute and includes other subsisting legislations. Before we dealwith this submission, we shall refer to certain other key features of theHtwo enactments.

50. The provisions of 1987 Act have not been immunised by anon-obstante clause like the one employed in Section 17 of the 1972Act. Having regard to the scheme and provisions of these two statutes,ex-facie it is difficult to label either of them as special law or generallaw. The 1987 Act has certain features of a special law being devotedto setting up, supervision and monitoring of institutions impartingtechnical education. But the said statute does not cover technicaleducation imparted by all types of institutions. The exceptions have beenclearly mentioned in Section 2(h) of the act and explained in the casesof Bharathidasan University (supra) and Association ofManagement of private colleges (supra). So far as the 1972 Act isconcerned, its application is not confined to architecture education alone.This enactment contemplates establishing the Council of Architecture,recognizing degrees and diplomas in architecture and regulating theprofession of architects. But there is inter-link between architectureeducation and registration of architects, on which aspect we shall dilatelater in this judgment.

51. Under both the statutes there are overlapping areas underwhich the respective Councils could make Regulations. Though theseActs, by themselves, do not come into direct conflict the inconsistencieshave surfaced in implementing the power given to the Councilsconstituted under the respective enactments. AICTE contends that thelater statute ought to prevail and as a corollary the regulations framedunder the later statute should prevail. CoA wants its power to eclipseAICTE’s dominant role as a regulator in relation to architecturaleducation on the strength of the 1972 Act being a special Act. Thethree regulations under the 1987 Act which have been brought to ournotice do not directly lay down any specific norm or standard whichought to be followed. Such norms appear to have been set by theAICTE in pursuance of the aforesaid regulations. The two Regulationsof 1994 do not lay down specifically such norms. The 2016 regulationshas provision for Approval Process Hand Book which may be publishedfrom time to time laying down the manner in which approval shall begiven.

52. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu and Another (supra),conflict was between State Legislations, being Tamil Nadu PrivateColleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 and Madras University Act 1923 andthe provisions of 1987 Act. In this judgment it was, inter-alia, held :- A

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“30. A comparison of the Central Act and the University Actwill show that as far as the institutions imparting technicaleducation are concerned, there is a conflict between andoverlapping of the functions of the Council and the University.Under Section 10 of the Central Act, it is the Council which isentrusted with the power, particularly, to allocate and disbursegrants, to evolve suitable performance appraisal systemsincorporating norms and mechanisms for maintainingaccountability of the technical institutions, laying down norms andstandards for courses, curricula, staff pattern, staff qualifications,assessment and examinations, fixing norms and guidelines forcharging tuition fee and other fees, granting approval for startingnew technical institutions or introducing new courses orprogrammes, to lay down norms or granting autonomy to technicalinstitutions, providing guidelines for admission of students,inspecting or causing to inspect colleges, for withholding ordiscontinuing of grants in respect of courses and programmes,declaring institutions at various levels and types fit to receivegrants, advising the Commission constituted under the Act fordeclaring technical educational institutions as deemed universities,setting up of National Board of Accreditation to periodicallyconduct evaluation on the basis of guidelines and standardsspecified and to make recommendations to it or to the Councilor the Commission or other bodies under the Act regardingrecognition or de-recognition of the institution or the programmeconducted by it. Thus, so far as these matters are concerned, inthe case of the institutes imparting technical education, it is notthe University Act and the University but it is the Central Actand the Council created under it which will have the jurisdiction.To that extent, after the coming into operation of the Central Act,the provisions of the University Act will be deemed to havebecome unenforceable in case of technical colleges like theengineering colleges. As has been pointed out earlier, the CentralAct has been enacted by Parliament under Entry 66 of List I tocoordinate and determine the standards of technical institutionsas well as under Entry 25 of List III. The provisions of theUniversity Act regarding affiliation of technical colleges like theengineering colleges and the conditions for grant and continuationof such affiliation by the University shall, however, remain operative but the conditions that are prescribed by the Universityfor grant and continuance of affiliation will have to be inconformity with the norms and guidelines prescribed by theCouncil in respect of matters entrusted to it under Section 10 ofthe Central Act.”

53. The case of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited(supra) also gives primacy to the AICTE on the question of necessityfor an engineering college to obtain approval from the AICTE. In thiscase, question arose on the point as to whether engineering degreecourses operated by colleges could be conducted by open universitiesthrough distance learning mode in absence of approval by the AICTE.This case and the case of Parshvnath Charitable Trust and Others(supra) have been discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Theseauthorities cited on behalf of the AICTE however do not deal withconflict arising from two Regulations framed under two Central statutes,both conferring regulatory powers over a particular subject in the fieldof technical education on two different statutory bodies. The ratio ofthe decision in the case of Bharathidasan University (supra),expanded by the two Judge Bench judgment in the case of Associationof Management of Private Colleges (supra) have been cited insupport of CoA’s contention that the 1972 Act should be treated as aspecial statute and Regulations framed thereunder should override thoseframed under the 1987 Act.

54. For the sole reason of there being overlapping subjects, Courtsstraightaway may not get into an exercise to find out if one statuteintends to eclipse the other. But in the present set of appeals, intentionof the legislature to override one by the other can be examined byanalyzing the provisions of the two statutes. The duty of the regulatorybodies in a situation of this nature would be to come out with a unifiedregime, which this Court expected in the case of Municipal Council,Palia (supra). The two regulatory bodies in the field of architecturaleducation however have not taken this approach and on the other handhave engaged themselves in a dispute over turf-control. In such asituation, under normal circumstances attempt should be made first atreconciliation of the competing statutory instruments. If that exercisefails, then the aim would be to find out what is the dominant purposeor principal subject-matter of a particular statute and then construe theconflicting provisions of the respective Regulations to match the A

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Adominant statutory purpose. In the case of L.I.C. Vs. D.J. Bahadur(supra), it has been observed by a three Judge Bench of this Court: - “52. In determining whether a statute is a special or a generalone, the focus must be on the principal subject-matter plus theparticular perspective. For certain purposes, an Act may beBgeneral and for certain other purposes it may be special and wecannot blur distinctions when dealing with finer points of law. Inlaw, we have a cosmos of relativity, not absolutes-so too in life.”

55. On the subject of implied repeal, the course to be followedby the Court has been explained in the well-known text “Principles ofCStatutory Interpretation”, by Justice G.P. Singh (14th Edition). We givebelow the following quotation from page 737 of this text:-

“There is a presumption against a repeal by implication; and thereason of this rule is based on the theory that the Legislaturewhile enacting a law has complete knowledge of the existing lawson the same subject-matter, and therefore, when it does notprovide a repealing provision, it gives out an intention not to repealthe existing legislation. When the new Act contains a repealingsection mentioning the Acts which it expressly repeals, thepresumption against implied repeal of other laws is furtherstrengthened on the principle expressio unius est exclusioalterius. Further, the presumption will be comparatively strongin case of virtually contemporaneous Acts. The continuance ofexisting legislation, in the absence of an express provision ofrepeal, being presumed, the burden to show that there has beena repeal by implication lies on the party asserting the same. Thepresumption is, however, rebutted and a repeal is inferred bynecessary implication when the provisions of the later Act areso inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of the earlierAct ‘that the two cannot stand together’. But, if the two maybe read together and some application may be made of thewords in the earlier Act, a repeal will not be inferred.”

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56. Having regard to the disputes involved in each of theseappeals, proper course for us would be to find out the decision of whichof these two regulatory bodies ought to prevail. For this purpose, it isnecessary to ascertain the dominant purpose of the two legislationscovering the field of architectural education. Section 10 of the 1987HAct mandates the AICTE to undertake the duties on the subjects specified therein. But it has already been held by two Benches of thisCourt comprising of two Judges each in the cases of BharathidasanUniversity(supra) and Association of Management of PrivateColleges(supra) that a university or its affiliate colleges could runcourses in technical education without approval of the AICTE.

57. The process of recognition and effect thereof are moreexpansive under the 1972 Act. All “authorities” require recognition bythe Central Government to conduct any degree or diploma course inarchitecture education to qualify for being recognised qualification. TheCoA under the said Act plays a key role in the process of recognition.There is no exclusion or exemption of any institution from undergoingsuch recognition process except the subsisting ones at the time the Actbecame operational. The CoA has also wide monitoring power underSection 18 and 19 of the Act of every authority which grants recognizedqualification under the said Act.

58. Moreover, Section 17 of the said Act is armed with a non-obstante clause. The implication of the said clause in Section 17 of the1972 Act is that to be on the register of architects in India, recognizedqualification would be sufficient. There is no provision under the 1972Act or in any Rule thereunder which would entitle a person trained froman AICTE approved technical institution in architecture to describehimself as an architect or get himself registered as such withoutrecognised qualification under the 1972 Act. This would be apparentfrom the provisions of Section 35 of the Act, which stipulates:- “35. Effect of registration.—(1) Any reference in any law forthe time being in force to an architect shall be deemed to be areference to an architect registered under this Act.

(2) After the expiry of two years from the date appointed undersub-section (2) of Section 24, a person who is registered in theregister shall get preference for appointment as an architect underthe Central or State Government or in any other local body orinstitution which is supported or aided from the public or localfunds or in any recognised by the Central or State Government.”

Sub-section (2) of the said provision is not of much relevancefor adjudication of the subject dispute. The scheme of the Act thusdemonstrates that lack of recognized qualification under the 1972 Actwould in substance disentitle a person from being registered as an A

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Aarchitect. He would not be able to legally represent himself as anarchitect in India. This being the statutory mandate, CoA’s role in theprocess of recognition of qualification of an architect cannot be said tohave been obliterated by the 1987 Act. It is a fact that 1987 Act isprimarily concerned with setting-up and running of a technical institutionand not with regulating the professions of individuals qualifying fromBsuch institutions. But under the 1972 Act, conducting a course onarchitectural education and regulating the profession of architect arestatutorily interwoven. Recognition of degrees or diplomas in architecturecannot be amputated from the said Act and held to have been replacedby the 1987 Act. That would render the 1972 enactment unworkable.

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59. The third distinguishing element of the 1972 Act is that theCoA is not the ultimate decision-making authority but it is the CentralGovernment in relation to process of recognition of degree or diplomain architectural education or withdrawal thereof. Such decision isrequired to be taken after consultation with the CoA. But since CoADhas been conferred with power to make regulations in relation to, inter-alia, recognition norms and monitoring of institutions impartingarchitectural education, CoA’s role in such process is critical. Theapproval power of AICTE is direct. But in the event AICTE’s normscome into conflict with that of CoA, any report or representation theECoA may make to the Central Government would be dependent uponthe decision of the Central Government. The Central Government’sdecision, taken under the provisions of the 1972 Act in such a casewould obviously prevail, the latter being an authority superior to boththe Councils constituted under the two statutes.F60. AICTE is exercising its power to regulate institutions impartingarchitectural education on the strength of definition of technicaleducation, which has been defined to mean programmes of education,research and training in architecture. The duty of the AICTE to regulate“technical education” is derived from the provisions of Section 10 ofthe 1987 Act. It has been contended on behalf of the CoA, referringGto the provisions of Section 2 of the 1987 Act, that the context ofregulating architecture education requires exclusion of the expression“architecture” from the definition of technical education. In the caseof Pushpa Devi and others (supra), it has been held that it ispermissible for the Court to refer to “internal and external context” whileHgiving meaning to a definition contained in the interpretation clause of a statue. In this decision, it was observed that a word exhaustivelyexpressed in the definition can have different meanings in different partsof a statute. Broadly, the same principle of construction has beenadopted in the cases of Printers (Mysore) Ltd. and Another (supra)and Whirlpool Corporation (supra).

In the case of K.V. Muthu (supra), it has been held:- “12. Where the definition or expression, as in the instant case, ispreceded by the words “unless the context otherwise requires,”the said definition set out in the section is to be applied and giveneffect to but this rule, which is the normal rule may be departedfrom if there be something in the context to show that thedefinition could not be applied.”

61. So far as these appeals are concerned, to altogether excludearchitecture from the purview of AICTE, that expression, i.e.architecture would have to be dropped from the definition of technicaleducation. In our opinion, if the issue is examined in the external context,which in this case would be the provisions of 1972 Act, such a coursewould be inevitable. In the event AICTE’s stand is to be accepted andCoA’s role is eliminated from the recognition process of architecturalqualification, then a person having a degree or diploma from an AICTEapproved institution only would in effect not be entitled to enrollmentin the register of architects and would not be able to represent himselfas an architect. Secondly, in view of the decisions of this Court in thecases of Bharatidasan University (supra) and Association ofManagement of Private Colleges (supra), there would be two parallelauthorities regulating architectural education. CoA would regulateuniversities and affiliated colleges imparting such education whileAICTE would supervise rest of the institutions. Moreover, the authorityof Central Government to recognize qualifications in architectureeducation would stand obliterated by a body, AICTE and that too inrespect of certain categories of technical institutions only.

62. The authorities we have referred to are for the propositionthat a meaning different to what is ascribed in the definition clause canbe given to a word in different parts of a statute if the context sodemands. The subject-dispute involved in these appeals requiresomission of the word architecture from the definition of technicaleducation. Such a course, in our opinion, is also a permissible tool ofconstruction to prevent absurd or unworkable results flowing from a A

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Astatute. Here we reproduce the following passage from “Bennion onStatutory Interpretation” by F A R Bennion, Fifth Edition published byLexis Nexis (at page 972).

“ Strained construction We have the authority of Lord Reid forthe statement that, to avoid an unworkable result, a strainedBconstruction may be justified even where the enactment is notgrammatically ambiguous. Lord Reid said that cases where it hasproperly been held that one word can be struck out of a statuteand another substituted include the case where without suchsubstitution the provision would be unworkable.”

C63. We are of the opinion that in respect of the provisions ofSection 2 (g) of the 1987 Act, the definition of “technical education”would have to be given such a construction and the word “architecture”should be treated to have been inapplicable in cases where the AICTEimports its regulatory framework for institutions undertaking technicaleducation. There would however be no substitution because the contextDwould not demand it. This construction of the definition clause isnecessary as the external context requires it to prevent an unworkableoutcome in implementation of the 1987 Act. The principle of impliedrepeal cannot apply so far as the provisions relating to architectureeducation is concerned, on the basis of the 1987 Act having becomeoperational. One of the dominant purposes of the 1972 Act is recognitionEof qualifications on architecture. The registration of an architect isdependent upon acquisition of such recognised qualification. The saidAct cannot be held to have been repealed by implication for the solereason of inclusion of the word “architecture” in the definition oftechnical education. AICTE has failed to discharge its onus to establishFthe said provisions of the 1972 Act was repealed by implication.

64. We accordingly hold that so far as recognition of degreesand diplomas of architecture education is concerned, the 1972 Act shallprevail. AICTE will not be entitled to impose any regulatory measurein connection with the degrees and diplomas in the subject ofarchitecture. Norms and Regulations set by CoA and other specifiedGauthorities under the 1972 Act would have to be followed by aninstitution imparting education for degrees and diplomas in architecture.

65. Now we shall turn to the individual appeals –

(a) We sustain the judgment of the Bombay High CourtHforming subject-matter of Appeal No.364 of 2005. The appeal of the All India Council of Technical Educationis dismissed.

(b) Three appeals arose from the judgment of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench delivered on 2ndFebruary, 2011 in W.P. No. 315 of 2011. These are CivilAppeal No……./2019 (arising out of SLP(C) No.5400/2011), Civil Appeal No……/2019 (arising out of SLP(C)No.8443/2011) and Civil Appeal No……/2019 (arising outof SLP(C) No.20460/2011). Rajeev Gandhi ProudyogikiVishwavidyalyalay is the appellant in the Civil Appealarising out of SLP(C) No. 5400/2011. It wantscompliance of the CoA norms and invalidation of thedirective requiring it to grant temporary affiliation by theHigh Court without CoA’s approval. The appellant in thesecond Civil Appeal (arising out of SLP(C)No.8443/2011)is the institution, Bharatiya Vidya Mandir Shiksha Samiti.It has questioned the necessity of obtaining CoA’sapproval or the requirement of compliance with theconditions set by them. It wants compliance of AICTEnorms to be treated as adequate. For the reasonsexplained earlier in this judgment, we dismiss the appealof Bharatiya Vidya Mandir Shiksha Samiti. The HighCourt has directed in the judgment under appealcompliance of the conditions communicated by the CoA.The academic session involved is 2010-2011. This Courtat the notice stage in the university’s appeal[SLP(C)No.5400 of 2011] granted interim stay of theorder of the High Court. Subsequently, there wereadmissions from time to time with interim directions ofthis Court. We accordingly dispose of this appeal of theRajeev Gandhi Proudyogiki Vishwavidyalaya withdirection that the process of recognition contained in the1972 Act ought to be implemented in respect of thesubject institution before any further admission takesplace. But so far as admissions already undertaken interms of interim orders of this Court, we direct that suchadmissions ought not be disturbed. We direct so, as wefind the High Court itself had directed compliance of CoAnorms in the judgment under appeal and compliance of A

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building requirements set by CoA was to be effectedwithin one year. Thus, in our opinion, CoA norms weresubstantially directed to be complied with. We also makeit clear that the AICTE would not have any regulatorycontrol over the concerned institution so far asarchitecture education is concerned. We are of theopinion that in the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.20460of 2011 that CoA ought to have been impleaded as aparty respondent in the said writ petition. We are alsoof the opinion that decision of the High Court to issuethe directions contained in the judgment under appeal inabsence of CoA being added in the array of respondentswas erroneous. But we do not issue any independentdirection as these appeals were heard together as batchmatters and the grievances of the CoA have beenaddressed to in our judgment. Having held that the 1972Act shall prevail on the question of recognition of degreesand diplomas in architecture education, we dispose of thisappeal of the CoA in the above terms.

(c) The Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) No. 17005 of2016 and SLP(C)No.17006 of 2016 have been institutedby the AICTE against a common judgment of theKarnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No.110 of 2013and Writ Appeal No. 112 of 2013. The dispute in thesematters relate to the question of obtaining mandatoryapproval from the AICTE for running course onarchitecture. The former appeal arose out ofcontradictory directives issued by AICTE and CoA overadmission of two students beyond the intake capacity.

The observation of the Karnataka High Court in acommon judgment has been that the controversies wouldbe subject to the outcome of the appeal arising out ofthe Bench decision of the Bombay High Court. That isthe first appeal we have dealt with in this judgment. Weaccordingly dispose of these two appeals in terms of ourdecision contained in the preceding sub-paragraph (a).AICTE would not have any power to impose itsregulatory measures on the concerned institution so faras architecture education is concerned.

(d) The decision of the Kerala High Court in the Civil Appealarising out of SLP(C)No. 28121 of 2018 is set aside. Theappeal is allowed. The institution involved in this appealshall be entitled to operate with recognition obtained underthe 1972 Act.

66. All interim orders passed in these appeals shall stand dissolved.All connected applications shall stand disposed of. There shall be noorder as to costs.

Divya Pandey

Appeals disposed of.

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